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Abstract 
Drawing on media sociology and cultural studies approaches, this thesis aims to 
conceptualise the production culture of religious television. The study of production 
culture emphasises ‘collective, daily cultural performance involving symbolic codes, [and] 
conventionalized power hierarchies’ within media organisation (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). 
The study of production culture of Islam-based television is important as it stands to aid 
our understanding of how religious television programming – and in particular, Islamic 
television programming – comes to take the form it does. It might also enhance our 
understanding of how and under what conditions television production employees 
produce television programmes. By combining participant observation and interviews 
with textual analysis, this study analyses the complex ways in which television production 
workers adapt to the resource limitations and ideological constraints within the 
production culture of a television channel. It analyses both the production quality of a 
magazine talk show called Living the Life and the quality of working life amongst members 
of its production community. This thesis argues that the diminished quality of working life 
exhibited by television production workers contributes to the poor production quality of a 
magazine talk show. Empirical findings reveal the ways in which the socioreligious and 
political mission of the channel shapes creative decision-making processes during the 
production of Living the Life. By exploiting the religious idea of ‘work as a mission,’ the 
channel motivated its television production employees to work with limited resources 
and, subsequently, to become more vulnerable to self-exploit whilst striving for the 
‘deferred reward’ promised by God in the afterlife. Additionally, ideological constraints 
foster a ‘culture of caution’ amongst workers, which lessens both their creative autonomy 
and emotional well-being. Whilst research into television production offers rich insights 
into the employee’s experience of creative-commercial tensions and emotional work, this 
particular thesis demonstrates how religion shapes the production culture of a religious 
television organisation, thereby affecting the ways in which television production 
employees perceive their positions and manage emotions in their everyday working lives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, satellite broadcasting technologies have allowed some Islam-based 
television channels to operate from various countries. By 2015, approximately fifty Islamic 
television services were in operation, broadcasting from the United Kingdom, Europe, 
North America, Africa and the Middle East.1 The increasing number of Islam-based 
television broadcasts has generated numerous scholarly debates over issues such as 
ownership, control of operations, and the agendas that animate such programming. 
However, few research studies of Islam-based television programming provide 
information about a channel’s production culture. The study of production culture 
emphasises ‘collective, daily cultural performance involving symbolic codes, [and] 
conventionalized power hierarchies’ within media organisation (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). 
The study of production culture of Islam-based television is critical as it stands to enhance 
our understanding of how religious television programming – and in particular, Islamic 
television programming – adopts the form that it does. More generally, such a study could 
develop a better understanding of how and under what conditions television production 
employees produce television programmes.  
Al-Jazeera sets the clearest discernible trend in Islam-based television. This station 
has ‘scooped’ leading global news channels, such as the BBC and CNN, with its coverage 
of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on 
New York and Washington (Kraidy and Khalil, 2009, p. 1). Al-Jazeera became well-
known globally for being the first channel to broadcast videotapes of Osama bin Laden, as 
well as for covering Al-Qaeda extensively (Cherribi, 2012). Despite this popularity, both 
the West and the Muslim world have criticised Al-Jazeera for allowing access to 
                                                   
1 The figure stated is based on my personal observation, as there is no census of the actual figures 
of Islamic television channels. Available from: www.watchislamictv.com; 
www.islambox.com/tv-channel; www.muslimvideo.com/live/ 
2 Mohamed Ali was once a political exile associated with the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, a self-
proclaimed moderate Islamic party. Ennahda Movement had long been banned from the 
political spectrum by former President Ben Ali, most notably in the 1989 elections where 
some of its members had to run independently due to government repression. Mohamed 
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religiopolitical extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda (Cherribi, 2012, p. 472), and for 
being ‘an instrument of propaganda for violent radical groups’ (Kraidy and Khalil, 2009, 
p. 146). Nor is Al-Jazeera, the only communication organisation, facing such criticism, as 
several other Islam-based broadcasters have been accused of mobilising religious 
extremism (Kosnick, 2004; Kraidy and Khalil, 2009; Hroub, 2012). Such critiques, 
however, are not grounded in a subtle understanding of the television stations themselves, 
nor of how power dynamics might shape their production processes. Most studies of 
Islam-based television are focused on the broadcast content produced (Pond, 2006; 
Echchaibi, 2011), the politics of representation (Cottle, 2000; Moll, 2010; Saha, 2012), 
audience reception (Chammah, 2010), the political economy of Arab-Islamic television 
industries (Kraidy and Khalil, 2009), and the ideological influences on religious 
broadcasting in the Middle East (Hroub, 2012). Although these various studies are wide-
ranging, there is still inadequate research into the production of Islam-based television.  
1.1 The Research Project 
To address the gap in research into the production of Islam-based television, this thesis 
seeks to understand what shapes the production of a television programme and under 
what conditions employees in television production make such programmes. To do so, a 
study of an Islam-based organisation and a television programme produced by such an 
organisation is appropriate. The focus of this thesis is a study of the production of a 
particular television programme broadcast on the Islam Channel. 
1.1.1 The Islam Channel as a Research Site 
I have chosen the Islam Channel, an Islam-based television station in central London, as a 
site to conduct this research. Mohamed Ali Harrath, a Tunisian political exile who 
migrated to the UK, founded the Islam Channel in 2004.2 Although the unusual profile of 
                                                   
2 Mohamed Ali was once a political exile associated with the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, a self-
proclaimed moderate Islamic party. Ennahda Movement had long been banned from the 
political spectrum by former President Ben Ali, most notably in the 1989 elections where 
some of its members had to run independently due to government repression. Mohamed 
Ali was one of them. See: Zarnosh, A. 2008. Exclusive Interview with Mohamed Ali. [Online]. 
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its CEO stimulated my interest in conducting this research, there are four other reasons 
for choosing the Islam Channel. 
First, the Islam Channel is the first Islam-based programming to use English as a 
broadcast medium. The use of English language by the channel allows a wider audience to 
access such programming, which might signify the channel’s support of a social cohesion 
agenda. Other Islam-based satellite programmes established in the UK either combine 
Urdu with English (e.g., Noor TV) or use only Urdu (e.g., Peace TV) or Arabic as the 
language of television programming (e.g., Al Hiwar Channel). A UK government census 
reported 59% of Muslims in this country have watched the Islam Channel at some point 
(Ofcom, 2011). Furthermore, although the Islam Channel is based in central London, 
viewers in 136 countries can access its programmes via satellite and the Internet (The 
Dawah Project, 2015). The Ofcom Content Sanctions Committee (Graf et al., 2007, p. 6) 
identifies the Islam Channel as ‘a specialist religious channel that broadcasts on the SKY 
platform (EPG 813) and is directed at a largely Muslim audience both in Britain and 
around the world’. The use of English language in its programmes not only allows access 
to English-speaking Muslims but also complements the channel’s mission to proselytise 
non-Muslim viewers (The Dawah Project, 2015). Because the English language is one of the 
channel’s features that attracts British Muslims and (potentially) a non-Muslim audience 
both locally and abroad, the Islam Channel is a suitable site to study the production of 
religious television.   
Second, the Islam Channel represents ‘everyday television’ for young and 
conservative Muslim audiences in Britain. The programmes produced by the channel 
cover a wide range of genres, from current affairs and political discussion to light-hearted 
lifestyle and nonfictional programmes. According to the Office of National Statistics, 
there were 2.71 million Muslims in the UK in 2011 (British Muslims in Numbers, 2015, 
p.16). Of this 2.71 million, 59% watch the Islam Channel (cited in About Islam Channel, 
2012). Also, other data supporting this report indicate that Muslims under the age of 50 
are more attracted to Muslim media than their elders (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
2012, p. 10). Such reports suggest that the Islam Channel, in particular, is popular among 
young British Muslims. Another report by the Islam Channel stated that 80% of the 
channel’s programming is religious programming (Spreading Islam through the Media, 2013). 
Religious programming includes live phone-in programmes, such as IslamQA, and those 
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that feature religious sermons, such as Hajj and Ramadan programmes, Qur’anic 
recitation, or discussions of traditions regarding the Prophet Muhammad and/or Islamic 
jurisprudence. This indicates that the channel aims to cater to a conservative Muslim 
audience.  
This thesis is neither about audience reception nor about trying to ascertain what 
the Islam Channel’s viewers thinks of its programming. Instead, it examines television 
production. My analysis is based on the concept of ‘production culture’, which I will 
discuss in more detail in Section 1.2 and Chapter 3. 
Third, a study of the Islam Channel will help broaden our understanding of Islam-
based television and its programming. Since the events of 9/11 in the United States of 
America and the 7/7 attack on London, Islamic culture has become politicised. Islamic 
media organisations have been scrutinised both by the media regulator Ofcom and by the 
Islamic institutions that monitor their operation within society. The Islam Channel is one 
such organisation.3 In 2006, for instance, Ofcom investigated the Islam Channel for 
‘failing to treat major matters of political controversy with due impartiality’ (Graf et al., 
2007, p.3). In 2010, the UK-based counter-extremism think-tank, the Quilliam 
Foundation, scrutinised Islam-based television organisations beneath a political lens.4 
According to the Quilliam Foundation report (Rajab, 2010), the Islam Channel is 
‘reprogramming’ young British Muslims. The report accused the Islam Channel of 
disseminating extremist ideology through a ‘live’ phone-in television programme called 
IslamQA. As a result of such grave accusations, the UK media regulator Ofcom threatened 
to annul the Islam Channel’s licence to broadcast. This thesis is about the production 
culture of religious television manifested in everyday production processes and how it 
affects the working lives of employees. It is worth exploring whether Ofcom’s scrutiny 
and the Quilliam accusation have had any impact on the production culture of the Islam 
                                                   
3 This important political controversy is related to the programme entitled Jerusalem: the Promise of 
Heaven, produced by the Islam Channel in 2006. According to Ofcom’s Sanctions 
Committee, the channel failed to ensure that its content was treated with due impartiality. 
Ofcom considered that this failure was an example of an overall pattern of weak 
compliance with Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code at the Islam Channel. 
4 The Quilliam Foundation is a counter-extremism think tank based in London. In 2010, Quilliam 
produced a report entitled Reprogramming British Muslims after conducting content analyses 
of key religious programmes produced by the Islam Channel. Available from: 
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org 
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Channel, as well as considering how production community members respond to such 
scrutiny while attempting to meet the needs of the channel’s young and conservative 
audiences.  
Finally, the socioreligious and political mission of the Islam Channel may shape its 
production culture. For that reason, I chose the channel as a research site. The Islam 
Channel’s mission is to: 1) present a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims, 2) educate 
Muslims, and 3) become the voice of the voiceless for Muslims oppressed locally and 
abroad. These mission goals signify the way in which the Islam Channel has positioned 
itself as a Muslim organisation located in the West. A study of the production culture of 
Islam-based television is particularly relevant when recent global threats of religious 
extremism, such as those proffered by Islamic State (IS), are taken into consideration. 
Without research into Islamic television production culture, little can be known about 
either the creative decision-making of its producers or the working conditions that 
constrain certain editorial decisions. I will discuss the socioreligious and political mission 
of the Islam Channel in Chapter 5 to demonstrate what the management and the 
production community perceive this mission to be and in what ways the mission shapes 
television production.   
The stated reasons relating to the Islam Channel’s accessibility, its characteristics as 
everyday television and its socioreligious and political mission justify my choice of the 
channel as a case study for this research. This study of the production culture and 
institutional context of Islam-based television may contribute to better understanding of 
how religious television programming takes the form that it does, as well as of how and 
under what conditions a television production community produces religious 
programmes. Moreover, this study of the Islam Channel may encourage other media 
production researchers to look into the production culture of other faith-based television 
organisations.  
1.1.2 The Magazine Talk Show  
Aside from analysing a single media organisation, this thesis focuses on a particular genre 
of the television programme: a magazine talk show. A number of studies in the nineties 
and early 2000s have analysed television talk shows (daytime or confessional talk shows) 
regarding sociocultural and political perspectives (e.g.Munson, 1993; Livingstone and 
Lunt, 1994; Shattuc, 1997; Lowney, 1999), the history of television talk shows (Timberg, 
- 6 - 
2002), the production of daytime talk shows (Grindstaff, 2002) and audience reception of 
the talk show genre (Mittell, 2003). With the exception of the Grindstaff study, which 
utilises an ethnographic approach to talk shows in the US, most of these studies are either 
based on textual analyses of talk shows (narrative and historical approaches to a wide-
range of talk shows produced in the UK and the US) or upon interviews with the 
presenters and talk show studio audiences. The production of television talk shows within 
the context of religious television, however, remains under-explored. 
Like Laura Grindstaff (2002), my approach is ethnographic. However, unlike her 
work, which is based on four different ‘pre-recorded’ daytime talk shows, this thesis 
focuses on a single talk show that is produced ‘live’ by the Islam Channel. It analyses the 
production quality of Living the Life, a magazine talk show that is broadcast ‘live’ every 
Monday to Thursday at 7:00 pm on the Islam Channel. Living the Life was first aired in July 
2012, and it aimed to emulate the genre conventions of The One Show, a magazine talk 
show produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The One Show is broadcast 
‘live’ on BBC 1 at 7:00 pm, five days a week. I use genre conventions of The One Show as a 
yardstick when assessing the production quality of Living the Life in Chapter 6. In the 
discussion of ‘production quality’ throughout this thesis, I refer to the discourses 
regarding ‘aesthetics of television talk show’ (Bruun, 2001).  
As a public service broadcasting organisation, the BBC aims ‘to enrich people's lives 
with programmes and services that inform, educate and entertain’. The One Show is a 
television programme that attempts to materialise such an ethos.  Likewise, Living the Life 
is also subject to the Islam Channel’s mission. Whereas the BBC’s public service 
broadcasting remit aims to serve the British public, the socioreligious and political mission 
of the Islam Channel targets global Muslims (the Ummah) and non-Muslims. I will discuss 
the mission of the Islam Channel in more detail in Chapter 5, addressing how it causes 
tensions within the channel and shapes its production culture. 
1.2  Research Questions and Thesis Structure  
This thesis aims to contribute to the emerging field of media production studies. It is 
intended to conceptualise the production culture of religious television through an 
ethnographic study of the Islam Channel. In doing so, this thesis asks two questions: 
1. How does a religious television programme come to take the form it does?  
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2. How and under what conditions do television production employees produce 
a religious television programme? 
The thesis is built on three levels of analysis. The first level examines the set of goals 
that the Islam Channel aims to accomplish through its programming. It discusses this 
mission’s meaning to the management and to the channel’s production community, 
including how they relate their personal values and belief systems to this mission. The 
second level involves an analysis of the outputs of Living the Life as a magazine talk show. 
The aim is to analyse production quality about the channel’s mission and the tensions 
within the channel. This thesis argues that a poor quality of working life contributes to the 
poor production quality of the magazine talk show Living the Life. This argument leads to 
the third level of analysis, which includes examining the quality of the working life of the 
staff involved in the production of Living the Life. 
1.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
This thesis combines different approaches to media production studies. In Chapter 3, I 
review relevant literature that shapes the construction of specific research questions, the 
choice of research design and methods, and the focus of analysis. I seek to conceptualise 
the production culture of religious television. In doing so, I apply the concept of 
‘production culture’, originating from cultural studies of the media industries tradition. 
The concept of production culture is proposed by John T. Caldwell (2006; 2008) for the 
study of television and film production within institutional and industrial contexts. I apply 
the concept of production culture that seeks to examine ‘collective, daily cultural 
performance involving symbolic codes, [and] conventionalized power hierarchies’ within a 
media organisation (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). I apply this concept within this thesis to 
answer the first research question: how does a religious television programme, such as the 
magazine talk show Living the Life, come to take the form it does? The concept of 
production culture also offers insight into the shared cultural norms, values and rituals 
involved in television production. Such cultural aspects of television production help 
answer the second research question, regarding how and under what conditions do 
television employees produce the magazine talk show Living the Life.  
This thesis is built upon a two-part literature review, which forms its conceptual 
framework. The first part provides a context for the study, which I discuss in Chapter 2. It 
focuses on tensions between the West and Muslim culture, as well as on tensions among 
Muslim communities themselves. It emphasises such tensions concerning norms, values 
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and rituals in Muslim cultural production, and the ways in which Islam and Muslims are 
supposed to present/ought to be presented by Muslim creative producers. It addresses 
how such tensions may affect television production at the Islam Channel. 
The second part of the literature review (Chapter 3) combines a broad range of 
literature from the media sociology and cultural studies traditions that explore media 
production and creative labour. It seeks to understand how power dynamics that are 
internal and external to the broadcast organisations shape the programmes produced by 
these organisations. It further engages with research into the production of television talk 
shows (Section 3.1), the production of religious television (Section 3.2) and a sociological 
approach to creative labour (Section 3.3).  
This two-part approach to the literature helped me conceptualise the production 
culture of the Islam Channel. I developed the empirical chapters (5 to 7) based on the 
themes that emerged from the data and was guided by the relevant literature. 
1.2.2 Empirical Study 
In addition to applying the concept of production culture and mapping the relevant 
literature in order to conceptualise the production culture of a religious television station, 
I have conducted an empirical study, which draws upon a social constructivist worldview 
and an ethnographic research design. I discuss the research design and these methods in 
Chapter 4, which I have divided into four sections:  
The first section presents the qualitative research paradigm that is the social 
constructivist worldview. Social constructivism holds assumptions that ‘individuals seek 
understanding of the world in which they live and work’ (Creswell, 2013). As a social 
constructivist researcher, I try to understand how members of the production community 
at the Islam Channel perceived their daily individual and collective television production 
rituals. I also seek to understand how power dynamics within the channel shape television 
production.  
The second section discusses the ethnographic research design and methods. I refer 
to Caldwell’s (2006; 2008) production culture to develop the research design. However, 
unlike Caldwell’s ethnography, which based on an extensive cultural-industrial analysis, I 
developed a small-scale ethnographic research design, based on a four-layer analytical 
framework, including the following layers: sociocultural environment, institutional 
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context, television production community and genre conventions. I use this analytical 
framework for conceptualising the production culture of religious television as well as for 
mapping my ethnographic experiences. 
The third section reflects on my ethnographic experience. I deliberate my 
ethnographic research experience with the specificities of the Islam Channel as a research 
site. I reflect on the possibilities and limitations that the setting presented regarding 
structures, relationships between teams, cultural norms around gender and religion, and 
interactions between the production team and other areas of the Islam Channel’s staff. By 
doing so, I was able to examine the power dynamics within the Islam Channel.  
Aside from being a participant observer and conducting interviews, I also analysed 
the production quality of the magazine talk show Living the Life. I identified how tensions 
within the channel affected the production quality of this talk show, as well as my 
experiences and the experiences of other television staff involved in the Living the Life 
production. I have identified the personal values, assumptions, and biases that attend my 
experience as a gendered individual, a Muslim and an academic with extensive 
professional experience. The discussion includes how I obtained access to the research 
site, my relationships with participants in the field, and ethical considerations. All of these 
things have shaped my interpretation of data gathered from the fieldwork.  
Finally, the fourth section discusses the data analysis procedures and the strategies 
for verifying the data. I ensure the validity of the findings by 1) clarifying my assumptions 
and biases; 2) presenting the power dynamics across the production hierarchy and the 
tensions affected the production quality and the working life; 3) spending a prolonged 
period at the Islam Channel, and finally, 4) by using the peer debriefing to enhance the 
accuracy of accounts and results of the analysis. 
1.2.3 Research Findings  
I analysed the empirical data gathered during my fieldwork at the Islam Channel and 
classified the findings into three parts: the first part includes an analysis of the mission of 
the Islam Channel, which I address in Chapter 5. I focus on three aspects of the mission of 
the Islam Channel: to convey a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims, which describes 
the channel’s socioreligious agenda; to educate Muslims, which describes the channel’s 
sociocultural agenda; and to represent the voiceless and oppressed British Muslims and 
global Muslims (Ummah), which describes the channel’s religiopolitical agenda. I gathered 
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data from my observations and interviews of employees at the managerial and television 
production levels and drew upon it in an effort to understand how the employees 
interpret their professional roles and perceive these goals. Such an analytical approach is 
relevant to the study of the production culture of religious television as it examines how 
the channel’s institutional mission has contributed to tensions and the adoption of a 
‘culture of caution’ within the channel. 
The second part of the analysis is discussed in Chapter 6, which aims to identify the 
production culture and institutional context of the Islam Channel. The chapter begins 
with an overview of television talk show genre conventions and production routines, 
focusing mainly on Laura Grindstaff’s (2002) empirical research regarding the production 
of daytime talk shows and Rebecca Whitefoot’s (2014) personal account as a researcher 
involved with the production of the magazine talk show The One Show (BBC 1, 2006-
present).5 Next, I outline the genre conventions of Living the Life and The One Show, 
indicating the criteria of magazine talk shows exhibited by each programme. I use The One 
Show as an example of a “good” magazine talk show (see Table 6). Not only is The One Show 
possibly the current leading UK example of a magazine talk show, but also it was an 
inspirational goal for both the programming manager and the producer of Living the Life 
when the programme was conceived in 2012 (Interviews, 2013). By ‘production quality’ 
of the magazine talk show, I refer to the ‘aesthetics of [the] television talk show’ (Agger 
and Jensen, 2001; Bruun, 2001). I consider how well the producers have achieved success 
in realising their aesthetic goals and in matching generally accepted professional standards. 
I analyse the production quality of Living the Life by relating it to The One Show, which 
serves as an example of a good magazine talk show. I present the results of this textual 
analysis of Living the Life by connecting these results to three main constraints: 1) lack of 
resources, 2) problems relating to the mission of the Islam Channel, and 3) conflicting 
                                                   
5 Whitefoot, R. 2014. A One Show Researcher's First Recollections. Available from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/2H8sv5WnBdX7TCh3HWcctR9/a-one-
show-researchers-first-recollections. Accessed 8 June 2014. I acknowledge that Whitefoot 
may be biased in her reflection because she works for the BBC. One might argue that 
article is more promotional than academic, aiming to promote the BBC’s standards of 
professionalism and its employees’ experiences. I refer to her article not only due to the 
dearth of academic publications regarding these matters, but also because it is the only 
piece (for now) that tells us about the magazine talk show, its making, its genre 
conventions, and what constitutes the daily responsibilities and routines of a researcher 
involved in the magazine talk show’s production.  
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notions of what constitutes a ‘good’ television programme. Ultimately, these constraints 
shape the production culture of the Islam Channel.    
The third part of the analysis aims to explore the quality of working life amongst the 
production community members at the Islam Channel through a critique of my 
experience as a researcher and the experiences of others involved in the production of 
Living the Life. I present this level of analysis in Chapter 7. The findings are linked to my 
argument that a poor quality of working life contributes to the poor production quality of 
a magazine talk show. The analyses in this chapter indicate that the production culture of 
religious television involves exploitation and self-exploitation, limits creative autonomy 
and bears implications for the emotional well-being of employees in television production.  
Based upon the concept of ‘production culture’ (Caldwell, 2006; 2008), in Chapter 
8 I provide a conclusion that sums up the central findings and applies this conclusion to 
conceptualise the production culture of religious television. The findings affirm the 
concept of production culture, which emphasises ‘collective, daily cultural performance 
involving symbolic codes, [and] conventionalized power hierarchies’ within media 
organisation (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). These findings also affirm my argument regarding 
a link between poor employee quality of working life and poor production quality. This 
thesis concludes that the production culture of religious television is shaped by the power 
dynamics that are internal and external to television organisation.  
Section 8.1 draws broader conclusions about the power dynamics in the production 
culture. The discussion concerning the power dynamics animating the production culture 
of the Islam Channel involves four level of analysis (illustrated by the research design in 
Figure 1), which summarise the findings of this thesis. This four-level analysis includes 1) 
the discourse of “the clash”, 2) the internal conflict, 3) implications for working life, and 
4) implications for the production quality. Further, Section 8.2 elaborates the 
contributions of this thesis to television production studies. And finally, Section 8.3 
discusses the implications of this thesis for future research. While this chapter provides an 
overview of the research project, summarising its rationale, purposes, focus, conceptual 
frameworks, empirical study and findings, the following chapter discusses the context for 
the study of the production culture of religious television.  
 
- 12 - 
Chapter 2 
Context for the Study 
This chapter offers a context for the study of the production culture of religious 
television. It begins with a brief historical background of Islam and Muslims in the United 
Kingdom (Section 2.1) and is followed by a discussion of discourses concerning the clash 
between Western and Muslim culture (Section 2.2), as well as conflicts within Muslim 
communities themselves (Section 2.3). An analysis of tensions that uses this contextual 
framework may support our understanding of the power dynamics within this particular 
production culture, which subsequently may help to conceptualise the production culture 
of religious television in general.    
2.1 Islam and Muslims in the United Kingdom 
Early Muslim settlement in the UK can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when 
the British India Company brought Bengali and Kashmiri sailors into the country 
(Herding, 2013, p. 18). Britain became a home for Yemeni sailors in 1869 and for Indian 
soldiers who fought on behalf of Britain during World War II (McLoughlin and Abbas, 
2010, pp. 545-46). In addition to these events, Muslims emigrated to the UK because of 
its immigration policy. The 1948 British Nationality Act granted British citizenship to any 
person from a Commonwealth country, which encouraged migrants from India and 
Pakistan to settle in the UK. This policy, however, was later amended (between 1964 and 
1971) to restrict the access of these same migrants. In 1981, the original Nationality Act 
was revoked (Herding, 2013, p. 18). After the change in policy, those seeking to emigrate 
had to prove that they had British familial ties before they were allowed to immigrate 
(Haddad, 1999, p. 627). 
According to the 2011 census, Muslims form 4.8% of the total population of 
England and Wales (British Muslims in Numbers, 2015, p. 16).6 The census also indicates 
                                                   
6 The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) has published a report called British Muslims in Numbers: 
a demographic, socioeconomic and health profile of Muslims in Britain by drawing on the 
2011 census. Available from: 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf 
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that there are 2.71 million Muslims in the entire UK, an increase of 75% compared to the 
2001 census. Such a percentage constitutes the largest group among all non-Christian faith 
groups (ibid., p. 22). Of the 2.71 million Muslims, 48% are UK-born, 68% are of Asian 
origin and 32% are non-Asian. The largest percentage (76%) of Muslims reside within the 
areas of Greater London, the West Midlands, the North West, Yorkshire and Humberside 
(ibid., p. 16). Sophie Gilliat-Ray suggests that the increasing number of Muslims in the 
UK is due to a high birth rate, immigration and conversions to Islam (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, 
p. 117).  
In 2011, 33% of the Muslim population was aged 15 years or younger, and only 4% 
was above the age of 65. The median age of British Muslims is 25 years, which is younger 
than that of the general UK population (median age of 40 years) (British Muslims in 
Numbers, 2015, p. 27). Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) argues that this youthful 
population benefits a nation with an increasing number of senior citizens (ibid.). 
Consistent with the increased number of young Muslims, the census also states that the 
percentage of Muslims with no qualifications has fallen from 39% to 26% (ibid.). This 
percentage, however, does not correspond to the academic achievement and overall 
socioeconomic status of the UK Muslim population. A study by Matthew Wilkinson 
(2014) addresses factors contributing to under-achievement in education amongst Muslim 
boys in the UK. As a committee members of the UK’s Curriculum for Cohesion, he 
concludes that ‘overcrowded housing, relative absence of parental English language skill, 
low levels of parental engagement with mainstream schools, low teacher expectations, the 
curricular removal of Islam from the school learning environment, and racism and anti-
Muslim prejudice’ are contributing factors to young Muslim’s under-achievement (ibid., 
p. 399). 
The phenomenon of diminished academic achievement tells us not only about the 
social and educational experience of young Muslims, but also about their socioeconomic 
status and quality of working life as they approach adulthood. Just less than one-half of the 
Muslim population (46%) lives in poverty according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
2010 (British Muslims in Numbers, 2015, p. 46). This figure provokes questions relating to: 
a) Muslim inequality and unemployment in the labour market, and b) socioeconomic 
class. In addition to inequality and unemployment within the UK job market, the 2011 
census shows that only 1 in 5 (19.8%) of the Muslim population has full-time 
employment, compared to more than 1 in 3 of the general population (ibid., p. 58). The 
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rate of unemployment among Muslims is nearly double that of the general population 
(7.2% compared to 4%) (ibid.). In their study of Muslims within the labour market, 
Anthony Heath and Jean Martin (2012) argue that ethnicity and religious affiliation 
contribute to Muslims’ socioeconomic disadvantages. The results demonstrate a steep 
‘Muslim penalty’ on economic activity and employment for women and men from 
different ethnic groups (ibid., p. 1005).  
In regards to socioeconomic class, the 2011 census indicates that Muslims 
represent:  a) 5.5% of the proportion of those in the ‘higher professional occupation 
category’, which is not significantly lower than the overall population (7.6%); and b) a 
significant proportion of ‘small employers and own account group', that is, 9.7% of 
Muslim groups, compared to 9.3% of the overall population (British Muslims in Numbers, 
2015, p. 64). While Muslim representation in the higher socioeconomic category is an 
indicator of improvement in their economic well-being, Muslim participation in small 
businesses and self-employment is an indicator of their entrepreneurial interests. Despite 
concerns of Muslim educational under-attainment and a higher percentage of 
impoverishment in comparison to other faith groups, socioeconomic class indicators 
suggest the importance of the Muslim contribution to the UK economy (ibid., p. 65). 
Beyond issues regarding Muslims’ socioeconomic achievement and class, there is 
also anxiety among Muslims concerning their socioreligious life. Living in a country 
dominated by membership in the Anglican Church of England, Muslims are concerned 
about the status of Islam and the right to continue practising their faith. No constitution 
protects Muslims’ right to practice Islam in the UK, nor dictates the way in which the 
state should treat Islam (McLoughlin and Abbas, 2010, pp. 546-47). The 1976 Race 
Relations Act, which recognised the difference of all ethnic groups and aimed to providing 
them with equal rights, only prohibits indirect discriminatory practices on basis of race, 
not religion (Haddad, 1999, p. 627). In response to such uncertainty regarding the future 
of Islam within the UK, Muslims immigrants began establishing faith-based institutions, 
such as the mosque. Most of these immigrants are Sunni, ‘who believe that there is no 
clergy in Islam; [and] thus, the creation and maintenance of Islamic institutions in the 
West is a new experience for the majority of the Muslim diaspora community’ (ibid., p. 
631). As a result, the mosque is regarded as an institution that ‘glues’ the Muslim 
community together and educates Muslim youth. 
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Based upon experiences with colonialism and neo-colonialism in the countries from 
which they emigrated, early Muslim immigrant communities in the UK bore preconceived 
notions of Western culture. They felt that Islamic teachings should be preserved through 
the establishment of religious institutions (e.g., the mosque), which teach and encourage 
younger generations in their practice and maintenance of Islamic values. Such a view of 
Western culture as a threat to both Islam and to younger Muslim generations continues to 
plague religious elders (Haddad, 1999). Contemporary scholars, such as Tariq Ramadan 
(2004; 2009; 2010), Said Fares Hassan (2013), Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid (2014) 
and others, seek solutions for keeping religious identity intact while integrating within 
western society on behalf of Muslims living in the West. 
While the mosque functions as a Muslim institution that oversees socioreligious 
affairs, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) became the first Muslim umbrella 
organisation in the UK. As such, the MCB, an independent body, is charged with 
promoting consultation with and cooperation amongst Muslims. It also coordinates 
Muslim socioreligious and political affairs in the United Kingdom (About Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB), 2015). Founded in 1997, the MCB comprises 500 local mosques and 
national groups, which hold diverse religious and political views. According to Ehsan 
Masood, ‘the MCB is little different in its structure and operation from any other British 
non-governmental lobby group in that it is critical of many aspects of government policy, 
but is happy to effect change from within the structures of parliamentary 
democracy’(Masood, 2006, p. 21). Sunni organisations such as the Muslim Association of 
Britain (MAB), the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), and the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE), 
dominate the MCB. These organisations stem from an anti-colonial political Islam, which 
originated in the Middle East and South Asia (ibid.). However, the MCB enjoys less 
support from the Shi ͑ah communities and the Sunni Sufi groups, which prefer to support a 
second umbrella Muslim organisation, the British Muslim Forum (BMF). BMF has a 
network of some 300 mosques, interfaith communities and youth groups that commonly 
show less of an interest in Muslim political life within the UK (ibid.). While MCB 
members tend to be actively involved in British politics, the BMF focuses upon the 
socioreligious affairs of British Muslims (ibid.). In 1997, the MCB alliance with the Labour 
government proved beneficial for British Muslims.  In comparison to the BMF, the MCB 
has received the support of the majority of British Muslims since its inception and 
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continues to be a leading Muslim organisation that cares for the socioreligious, economic 
and political life of the UK Muslim population.  
The MCB claims to be an organisation that speaks on behalf of Muslims and 
encourages religiopolitical consciousness and civic engagement amongst British Muslims 
(Masood, 2006; British Muslims in Numbers, 2015). In addition, the Muslim Engagement 
and Development (MEND) helps ‘empower and encourage British Muslims within local 
communities to be more actively involved in British media and politics’ (About Muslim 
Engagement & Development (MEND), 2015). Among MEND's core objectives is working 
with other faith groups ‘to ensure Islamophobia is as socially unacceptable as anti-
Semitism and other forms of racism and xenophobia’ (ibid.). MEND complements the 
efforts of the MCB by organising training for Muslims in order to enhance their 
communication skills so as to respond effectively to derogatory and exciting news stories 
(ibid.). 
In this section, I have briefly outlined the historical, sociocultural, economic, 
religious and political contexts of Muslim life in the UK. Issues related to migration, racial 
and ethnic inequality, socioeconomic class, youth and efforts to preserve Islam and 
Muslim identity, as well as to counter Islamophobia, must be considered a part of 
everyday British Muslim life. This brief background of Islam and Muslims in the United 
Kingdom aims to support our understandings of how and under what conditions television 
production workers at the Islam Channel produce religious programmes.  
2.2 The Clash between the West and the Muslim Cultures.  
Power dynamics are integral to production culture. Therefore, an exploration of the 
various tensions facing Muslims in general, and the production of religious media in 
particular, are appropriate for this thesis. This section focuses on the clash between the 
Western and the Muslim cultures, which informs the kinds of challenges that Muslim 
cultural production faces when making cultural products. Muslim cultural production is 
involved in producing items such as calligraphy, both nasheed (devotional songs) and 
musical performances, television programmes, and films. While making these products, 
Muslim media producers learn about their audience and surrounding societal issues. As 
David Hesmondhalgh argues, ‘during the production of media texts, media producers 
draw upon knowledge, values and beliefs circulating in society’(Hesmondhalgh, 2006, p. 
2). In light of his argument, this section considers the clash between the Western and 
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Muslim cultures, as well as its effects upon Muslim society. Mapping the tensions faced by 
Muslims living in the west from both sociocultural and religious perspectives stands to 
help conceptualise the production culture of religious television. 
The argument describing the friction between the West and Muslim cultures is 
represented by Samuel Huntington’s (1996) thesis The Clash of Civilizations. Culturalists 
upholding Huntington’s argument regard ‘every’ Muslim as a threat to Western 
civilisation and Islamic culture and Shari ͑a (Islamic law) as incompatible with Western 
culture (Kundnani, 2015, p. 65). Consequently, those upholding his argument suggest 
that Muslims should shed their religious identities in order to blend into Western society 
(ibid.). The Huntington thesis/culturalists’ interpretation of this “clash” has resulted in 
two things: first, the negative representation of Islam and Muslims in the media; and 
second, the representation of Muslims as ‘a suspect community’ (ibid.).  
The first effect can be observed in the media representations of the events of 
September 11 and the 7/7 bombing of the London transportation system, after which 
Islam and Muslims received negative publicity in the media. These negative 
representations include the use of terms, such as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or ‘Islamic 
extremism’ (when referring to the religion) and ‘fundamentalist’, ‘radical Muslim’, 
‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ when referring to individuals or groups of Muslims (see Said, 
1997; Poole, 2009; Knott et al., 2013). Over the years, the negative media 
representation of Islam has surged. A study by Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole and Teemu 
Taira revealed that references to Islam in selected British media grew significantly from 66 
(in 1982) to 306 (in 2008), an increase by 400% within a 16-year period (Knott et al., 
2013, p. 80). The same study also reported an increase in references to Islam as 
‘extremism’ (to 41), as well as 141 references to ‘militant action’ in 2009 (ibid., p. 81). 
Likewise, the study indicated a growing number of negative representations of Islam and 
Muslims in the media.  
The second effect of the Huntington thesis concerning the clash regards Muslims 
being cast as ‘a suspect community’. Arun Kundnani argues that the ‘anti-extremism’ 
discourse in the media has specific implications for British Muslims; specifically, they have 
become ‘a suspect community’(2015, p. 63). State policing reflects the anxieties that the 
West bears toward the “other-ed” Muslim communities and contributes to the 
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surrounding suspicions. Using the culturalist interpretation, Kundnani explains how 
Muslims have become ‘a suspect community’ despite their dissociation with extremism: 
Muslim extremists are a threat to Western civilization, and the state can 
legitimately use wide-ranging emergency powers to counter them. But 
other Muslims, who do not adopt a literalist interpretation of Islam 
[fundamentalism], must be regarded with suspicion (Kundnani, 2015, p. 
63). 
Culturalists insist that the only way Muslims can free themselves from suspicion is 
by a ‘rejection of their own Muslim identity’ and such ‘liberation’ for Muslims consists of 
leaving their culture [religion] behind rather than autonomously changing it from within’ 
(ibid., p. 65).  
To counter Huntington’s thesis, Edward Said (2001) coined the term ‘the clash of 
ignorance’ in a Nation magazine article that was published six weeks after the 9/11 attacks 
(cited in Karim and Eid, 2014, p. 214). The term ‘the clash of ignorance’ is used to 
describe the dynamics of power that characterize the West’s relationship with Muslims 
and Islamic culture, particularly during the post-9/11 period (Said, 2001). Karim H. 
Karim and Mahmoud Eid (2014) prefer Edward Said’s term ‘clash of ignorance’ to 
describe this apparent conflict between Muslims and the West. Such a conflict is seen as a 
result of the West’s misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Islamic ideology. Much 
like in the representation of Muslims as ‘a suspect community’, ‘the clash of ignorance’ 
refers to Muslims’ experience of ‘institutionalised ignorance’ – that is, ‘an epistemological 
system, a state and its institutions that intentionally produce misrepresentations of the 
[Muslim] Other in a discourse whose objective is to maintain its citizens’ ignorance about 
the rest of the world’ (Gafaiti, 2008, pp. 103-104, cited in Karim and Eid, 2014, p. 5). 
Reformists like Ramadan (2004; 2009; 2010) and Karim and Eid (2014) believe that ‘the 
clash of ignorance’ can be resolved by Muslim engagement with the Western Other, 
integrating whilst preserving Muslim identity and adhering to Islamic culture and 
practices. It is through learning each other’s culture and acknowledging the differences in 
each religious belief system that much of ignorance can be reduced (if not eliminated).  
Also, in an effort to counter Huntington’s thesis and to overcome a lack of 
understanding of Muslims and Islam amongst Western governments/Other, Mahmoud 
Eid suggests an improvement of policies supporting multiculturalism and 
integration/social cohesion, ones aimed at ‘enhancing engagement of cultural and 
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religious groups through active participation in all social activities and positive beliefs in 
Western values and freedoms’ (Eid, 2014, p. 165). Criticising the current policies 
regarding multiculturalism and integration, Eid argues that multiculturalism, which 
supposedly helps to ‘reduce racism and discrimination and provide a space for celebrating 
differences’, has failed ‘despite forceful measures towards Muslims’ because the state fails 
to understand the Muslim faith and its cultural practices (ibid.). Moreover, social 
cohesion/integration also suffers when critiques of multiculturalism assert it has failed to 
integrate different cultures and religions. Such failure, according to Eid, ‘amplifies clashes 
between Western governments and Muslim immigrants, rather than helping engagement 
and integration’ (ibid.). To eliminate the stereotype of Muslims as ‘a suspect community’, 
there is a need for Eid’s suggested policy, which incorporates an ‘understanding of Islam, 
acknowledging and respecting Muslim differences, eliminating racism and discrimination 
against Muslims, correcting their misrepresentations, addressing their concerns, listening 
to their demands, and protecting their human and communication rights’, (ibid., pp. 165-
166). 
This section has examined how debates on the clash between the West and Muslim 
cultures shape the ways in which Islam and Muslims are represented, interpreted, 
perceived and politicised by the media, by those ignorant of Islamic cultures, and by the 
authorities and those in power. The effects on Islam and Muslims discussed above matter 
to this research project as they may also shape the ways and the conditions under which 
religious television programmes are produced by the Islam Channel.  
2.3 Tensions within Muslim Communities 
The second form of power dynamics central to the production culture of religious 
television concerns the tensions within Muslim communities. While previously I have 
discussed the kind of power that is external to Muslim cultural production organisations, 
this section focuses on the clashes between Muslims themselves. It offers a critical 
approach to examining two areas of tensions in British Muslim communities: ideological 
and intergenerational conflicts. 
Whereas Huntington claims that the ideology of Islam is a threat to western 
civilization and the root of the clash between Muslim cultures and the West, Kundnani 
suggests otherwise. Rather, Kundnani argues ‘it is not a clash of civilizations between the 
West’s modern values and Islam’s fanaticism; the “clash” is instead between a traditional, 
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apolitical Islam that is compatible with Western values, i.e., the [moderate/reformist], 
and a totalitarian appropriation of Islam’s meaning that has transformed it into a violent 
political ideology [extremism]’ (Kundnani, 2015, p. 56). To support this claim, Kundnani 
outlines three reformist views that counter those of the culturalists (e.g., Huntington’s 
clash of civilizations): 
a) [Reformists/Moderate Muslims] rejected the view that Islamic culture was 
inherently oppositional to Western interests. What mattered, they said, was 
not the Islamic culture itself, but the politicization of Islamic culture by an 
extremist minority. 
b) Whereas culturalists saw Islam as having an inherent tendency to generate 
extremism, the reformists argued that extremism was a product not of Islam 
but of its perversion. In this view, what distinguished extremist Muslims from 
moderate Muslims was their misinterpretation of Islam as bearing a political 
message. 
c) Against the culturalists, who argued that Islam is inherently reluctant to 
separate itself from the political sphere, the reformists viewed the majority of 
Muslims as practicing their religion apolitically and in ways presenting no threat 
to the West (ibid., p. 65).  
In support of the reformist/moderate Muslim views above, Kundnani claims that 
‘the ideological clash’ is in fact between the reformist/moderate and extremist Muslims, 
not between Islamic and Western cultures, as claimed by Huntington.  
While Said’s (2001) term ‘the clash of ignorance’ implies a conflict between the 
West and Islam as a religion and culture, the ‘clash of ideology’ amongst British Muslims 
may lead to fragmented views on sociocultural issues. Both types of conflict shape the 
creative processes of Muslim cultural production.  
The second form of tension in British Muslim society is an intergenerational clash, 
which results from the generation gap between elder/traditional Muslims and younger 
Muslims. This intergenerational tension developed as an identity crisis among young 
Muslims concerning the ways in which the traditional beliefs and views of kinds of music 
shape how the young understand Islamic principles. The young Muslim adoption of the 
concept of ‘halal and fun’, encouraged by Muslim artists while adoring hip-hop nasheed, 
collides with the traditional British Muslim view of Western culture (including music) 
(Herding, 2013). Such a view emphasises ‘self-protection, self-preservation, and 
sometimes even self-definition over and against the ‘Western megamachine’, asserting 
‘whatever is Western is anti-Islamic’ or ‘Islam has nothing in common with the West’, 
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(Ramadan, 2004, pp. 4-5).7 As a reformist/moderate scholar, Tariq Ramadan criticises 
such misconceptions of Western culture by conservative, traditional Muslims: 
This bipolar vision is widespread and gives some Muslims a sense of 
power, might and legitimacies on the Otherness. But not only is this 
bipolar and simplistic vision a decoy (and the claims that justify it are 
untruths), but the power it bestows is a pure illusion: in practice, the 
Muslims who maintain this thesis only isolate themselves, marginalise 
themselves, and sometimes, by their excessive emotional, intellectual, 
and social isolation, even strengthen the logic of the dominant system 
whose power, by contrast, lies in and always appearing open, pluralistic, 
and rational. (ibid., p. 5). 
Ramadan’s critique of the older Muslim generation’s perceptions of the West 
highlights the existence of a generational gap in Muslim society in Britain. This gap is 
problematic, as it might lead to an identity crisis amongst young Muslims in the field of 
cultural production, one which subsequently makes sound judgements unlikely whenever 
thinking becomes trapped within the traditional way of evaluating Western culture 
(Ramadan, 2004). Instead, Muslim youth should be encouraged to demonstrate ‘creativity 
and fresh, original cultural expressions’, but ‘within the interpretive freedom allowed by 
scriptural sources’ (Ramadan, 2009, p. 193). This type of clash is also a challenge for 
Muslim cultural production in the extent to which such a conflict constrains creativity.  
In light of these ideological and intergenerational conflicts, the following sections 
discuss the challenges and problems in representation faced by Muslim cultural production 
concerning three conflicting aspects of Muslim life. These are: 1) religious identity, 2) 
music and youth, and 3) gender and female subjects. 
2.3.1 Religious Identity 
Muslim cultural production faces challenges when dealing with the representation of 
Muslim identity by Western Others and by Muslim themselves. Western scholars and the 
media tend to describe Muslims in two ways: either ‘bad’ or ‘good.’ Bad Muslims are 
                                                   
7 Halal means religiously permissible, often used for food, but may also used in reference to 
activities, attitudes and behaviours. Tariq Ramadan suggests halal indicates ‘lawful’ and 
haram ‘unlawful’ when discussing music as ‘ethical art’. In Ramadan’s opinion, ethical art 
reflects an ‘ethical dimension [that] does not lie in being artificial and moralizing, but in 
resisting the pressure of money, of show business, of meaningless tastes that have been pre-
programmed, standardized, reduced to their crudest expression’ Ramadan, T. 2009. 
Radical reform : Islamic ethics and liberation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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fundamentalists, terrorists or extremists, and good Muslims are seen as pious and devoted 
to moral and ethical beliefs grounded in the type of religious teachings that dissociate the 
religion from violent extremism or radicalism (see Abu-Lughod, 2005; Abbas, 2011; 
Kundnani, 2015). Media discourses on Muslim identity and social integration are often 
fuelled by an ‘anti-Muslim political culture’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 126) or the ‘politics of 
anti-extremism’, (Kundnani, 2015, pp. 55-88). Because the media often set their agenda 
around these sociopolitical discourses, a large part of Islamic culture and ‘everyday life’ of 
Muslims remains ‘obscured’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 234).  
While many terms are used to describe Islam and Muslims, the words 
‘fundamentalism/fundamentalist/Salafis’ and ‘extremism/extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ are 
used to discuss the negative representations of Islam and Muslims, as well as to refer to 
their ideological stance toward Western modernisation. The terms ‘moderate Islam’ and 
‘moderate Islamist’ is used when referring to a ‘good’ Muslim, who chooses to integrate. 
Knott, Poole and Taira’s research sees the need for a terminology that defines broader 
spectrums of Muslim religious identity (Knott et al., 2013). Aydin Bayram (2014, p. 11) 
argues that the categorisation of Muslim religious identity actually identifies differing 
degree of the Muslims’ responses to Western modernisation. 
The first category, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, includes ‘the scholars of text’ or the 
so-called Salafis.8 Salafis/fundamentalists tend to believe in the exact nature of the 
Qur’anic text (as God’s word), which allows Muslims to understand and solve problems 
without changing the meanings or understandings of the Qur’an. The danger in a literal 
interpretation of the Qur’anic text is that readers might be too easily influenced by these 
explanations, rejecting any references to the historical, social, political and/or economic 
contexts in which Muslims lived. An example of existing Islamic fundamentalism includes 
                                                   
8 They call themselves Salafis because they follow the Salaf, which is the title given to the 
Companions of the Prophet and the pious Muslims of the first three generations of Islam. 
The Quran and Sunnah are, therefore, interpreted in an immediate way without scholarly 
conclaves. See Ramadan, T. 2004. Western Muslims and the future of Islam. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p. 25. 
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the Wahhabi Movement, which aims to restore Islam to its traditional form according to 
Qur’anic texts without reference to the social contexts in which Muslims lived.9  
The second category, ‘extremism’, is an offshoot of Islamic fundamentalism 
discussed above that holds to a particular understanding of scriptural sources. Extremists 
believe that the establishment of an ‘Islamic State’ based on Shari ͑a (Islamic law) can only 
be achieved through struggle (jihad) against or resistance to unbelievers. Fundamentalist 
groups adopt non-violent approaches to religious practice while applying a strict 
interpretation of the Qur’anic text. Extremists (so-called jihadists), however, involve 
themselves in militant activities and support violent acts, such as suicide bombings, against 
those who do not share their beliefs. Their terrorism threatens the lives of both non-
Muslims and Muslims alike who do not share their ideology. Among well-known 
examples of extremist movements that aim to establish an ‘Islamic State’ are the Al-Qaeda 
network, the Taliban, Jama͑at Islamiya (JI) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
The third category is ‘moderate Islam/Muslim’, also called ‘reformist’ by some 
scholars (e.g., Ramadan, 2009; Kundnani, 2015). The scholars (Ulama) among moderate 
Islamists are known as the ‘scholars of context’. Unlike fundamentalists (the scholars of 
text) and extremists, moderate Islam supporters espouse ideas of ‘reform’ and ‘renewal’ 
of the religion by reading to achieve a fuller understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Its 
texts are then implemented in light of various historical-cultural contexts, and this 
inclination can be seen where individual Muslim communities or societies exist (Ramadan, 
2009, pp. 12-13). The term ‘renewal of religion’ does not require a change in the 
sources, principles or fundamentals of Islam, but only a change in the way the religion is 
‘understood, implemented, and lived in different times or places’ (ibid., p.12). This 
renewal of religion involves the interpretation and understanding of texts in the fields of 
law and jurisprudence (fiqh). The ‘minority fiqh’ (Fiqh al-Aqalliyyaat), a ‘reformed’ area of 
Islamic jurisprudence, is an example of the product of renewal of religion to suit the 
context or reality in which Muslims live (see Hassan, 2013; Qaradawi, 2001). Muslim 
                                                   
9 The Wahhabi Movement was founded by Muhammad ibn  ͑Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787). He 
sought to create a fundamentalist return to Islamic principles. See Turner, B. in The 
Blackwell dictionary of modern social thought. 2 ed. 2013. s.v. p.310. 
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scholars have formulated this minority jurisprudence as a solution to the challenges facing 
Muslims living in a ‘minority situation’ (Ramadan, 2009, p.31).  
These three categories of Islamic identity not only reflect the notion of bad/good 
Muslims framed by the media, but also divide Muslim life into three spheres: religious, 
political, and ordinary/every day. Whereas fundamentalism/ist and extremism/ist 
describe the religiopolitical lives of Muslims, moderate Muslims represent the ‘ordinary’ 
lives of Muslims: a civically engaged community co-existing with the rest of Western 
society. Muslim reformists/moderate Islamists have created such an identity to counter 
the negative media misrepresentations of Islam and Muslims that have evolved since early 
in the war on terror (Kundnani, 2015, p. 56).  
Media portrayals of Muslim identity are reduced to a function of Islam as an 
ideology and culture that teaches violence and extremism. Because media discourses are 
often developed as part of an ‘anti-Muslim political culture’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 126) or 
the ‘politics of anti-extremism’ (Kundnani, 2015, pp. 55-88), other subjects related to 
the ordinary lives of Muslims in Britain ‘become obscured’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 234). As 
Sophie Gilliat-Ray argues, ‘there is a sense in which Muslims have, in some studies and 
reports, been reduced to a function of their religion and other dimensions of identity and 
experience have been ignored’ (ibid.). The discourses of extremism/terrorism or the war 
on terror are not the focus of this thesis. Rather, it is ‘the other dimensions of identity and 
experience’ of everyday Muslims that this thesis seeks to explore: the everyday working 
lives of a religious television production community and how these challenges shape 
Muslim cultural production. 
2.2.2 Music and Youth  
Another challenge faced by Muslim cultural production is in dealing with musical 
performances like nasheed or devotional songs. These forms of entertainment are popular 
and widely perceived to be halal entertainment among youth of second- and third-
generation Muslims in Britain (Gilliat-Ray, 2010; Herding, 2013). Despite the notion of 
‘halal and fun’ (Herding, 2013), these young Muslims suffer from two types of 
dissonance: intergenerational and religious ideological (Gilliat-Ray, 2010). These conflicts 
shape not only their opinions about Islam and music, but also others’ views of how Islam 
treats the subject. As a result of media discourses concerning fundamentalism and 
extremism, Islam is perceived and projected as rigid by those misunderstanding its 
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principles concerning music. As a result of such ignorance, Islam is distorted by the media 
and criticised as ‘a sombre, austere, if not angry faith in which the act of having fun needs 
divine license’ (Masood, 2006, p. 62).  
Because these young Muslims are included amongst the target audience of Muslim 
cultural production industries, it is appropriate to better understand their dilemmas and 
the tensions relating to everyday consumption of popular music. Beyond considering these 
young Muslims as a part of the Islam Channel’s audience, they could also be members of 
the channel’s production community. The following sections map the disparate Muslim 
views of music as seen in both intergenerational tensions and the ideological conflict 
between moderate and fundamentalist Muslims. 
 British Muslim views of music have changed over the years. Sophie Gilliat-Ray 
(2010) outlines these changes in three phases:  
a) The first phase was in the 1960s and 1970s when Muslim migrants brought with 
them a variety of traditional musical and artistic forms, such as Sufi nasheed, a 
devotional religious music unique to South Asia (Baily, 1990, cited in Gilliat-Ray, 
2010, p. 240). The themes of these devotional songs contributed to cultural 
solidarity and provided ‘a source of comfort, a partial antidote to the hostility 
experienced in the new society, reinforcing and responding to feelings of 
nostalgia’ (Baily and Collyer, 2006, p. 171).  
b) The second phase involves changes occurring in the Muslim music genres between 
the 1980s and 1990s. Particularly after the Rushdie affair, British-born Muslim 
artists employed their songs to express anger towards Salman Rushdie’s 
derogatory remarks and their experience of racism in Britain (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, 
p. 240).10 In this phase, the use of music changed from a form of relaxation and 
cultural solidarity (in the context of Sufi nasheed) to a form of activism ‘as a means 
to express political resistance and anti-imperialist sentiment’, (ibid.) Aki Nawaz of 
Bradford, leader of the rappers Fun Da Mental, is an example of a British Muslim 
artist in this genre (ibid.).   
c) The third phase, from the late 1990s to the present, describes the blossoming of 
individual nasheed artists and groups performing devotional songs in the pop, rap 
and hip-hop genre within the music scene. While the 1990s witnessed the 
popularity of activism and songs of anti-imperialist sentiment, the popular genres 
of nasheed have been a focus of British Muslims since 2005. British nasheed artists, 
such as Sami Yusuf, are not only popular due to their pleasant voices and 
devotional lyrics, ‘conveying messages of love, mercy, peace and tolerance’, but 
also because their appearance makes them ‘decidedly good Muslims’ (Gilliat-Ray, 
2010, p. 241). Mecca2Medina (M2M) and Pearl of Islam are two popular rap and 
                                                   
10 Salman Rushdie’s book ‘The Satanic Verses’ angered many British Muslims and led to the 
Bradford Riot in 1989. 
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hip-hop nasheed groups among British Muslims. These types of music are a 
‘synthetic fusion of inherited tradition’, which is used as a form of ‘artistic 
expression to assert and negotiate identities,’ particularly those of second-and 
third-generation British Muslims (ibid.). 
These three phases point to the ways in which music and Islamic culture have fused 
within the everyday lives of many Muslims in Britain. The younger generation widely 
accepts the nasheed blended with hip-hop and pop music genres. The older generation, 
however, views the shift of nasheed/devotional songs from traditional to hip-hop and pop 
music genres as a threat to new Muslim identities, as it involves the imitation of Western 
music culture (Gilliat-Ray, 2010; Herding, 2013). Thus, there exists an intergenerational 
clash within Muslim society in Britain. Such friction has caused tensions between Muslim 
parents and their children. One area of concern is educating youth to distance themselves 
from Western entertainment, perceived as harmful, in order to remain faithful to Islamic 
principles and values that might strengthen their Islamic identities (Lewis, 2002; 2008). In 
their desire to prove themselves ‘true’ Muslims to their elders, some young Muslims 
show signs of ‘cultural schizophrenia’, or even opt for the fundamentalist path (Lewis, 
2008, p. 37). In researching young Muslims in Bradford, Philip Lewis (2008) describes 
this identity crisis as a result of Salafi fundamentalism and the tendency of youth to 
alienate themselves from Western culture and music. Sheikh Hamza Yusuf, a moderate 
scholar, advises Muslim parents to inform their children that they are ‘culturally British’, 
although they are Pakistanis or Punjabis in ethnicity: 
They needed to enable youngsters to ‘take the best and leave the rest’ of 
both cultures. It was important that parents allowed this process of 
discernment to take place, otherwise their children would become 
culturally schizophrenic or locked into an identity crisis (Sheikh Hamza 
Yusuf, cited by Lewis, 2008, p. 37).  
In addition to the intergenerational clash of opinions on music and Western culture, 
viewpoints among fundamentalist and moderate Muslims also differ regarding which 
forms of music and instruments are allowed (Van Nieuwkerk, 2011). In the previous 
section, I addressed the root of misrepresentations of Islam and Muslims articulated by the 
culturalist understanding of ‘the clash of civilizations’ (e.g., Huntington, 1996). Unlike 
Huntington, Arun Kundnani (2015) argues that the ‘clash’ occurs among ideologies within 
Islam itself. Such an internal conflict can be observed in two situations: a) tensions among 
fundamentalists themselves; and b) the disagreements between literalist fundamentalist 
and moderate Islamist views of music.  
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Salafi fundamentalists regard music and hip-hop nasheed as haram (impermissible) 
because they consider such musical performances as un-Islamic innovation (bid ͑ah) and thus 
harmful to the Muslim faith in its potential to affect Muslims’ devotion to God. Some 
fundamentalists regard the human voice accompanied by certain percussive instruments as 
acceptable, while others do not (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 240). While some strands of the 
fundamentalist movement support youth in music and entertainment (Hemmasi, 2011, p. 
85), others condemn musicians associated with genres, such as, heavy metal, as 
‘blasphemous’ (Hecker, 2011, p. 55). Fundamentalist opinions of music vary regarding 
which genres and musical instruments are accepted and which are not. Apparently, there 
is a strand of fundamentalism that does hold similar views to those of moderate Islam, 
especially concerning music. In this thesis, I identify them as ‘moderate fundamentalists,’ 
specifically in my discussion of the differing views of music. This category of 
fundamentalism distinguishes itself from Salafi fundamentalists (who adhere to a literal 
interpretation of the text) by holding moderate views on music. For the Salafis, their 
watertight interpretation and rejection of ‘halal and fun’ is a concept that is echoed among 
moderate Muslims (Herding, 2013) as well as those portraying Islam as ‘sombre’ and 
‘austere’ (Masood, 2006, p. 62).   
The second form of ideological conflict regarding views of music in Islam occurs 
between fundamentalist and moderate Muslims. Moderate Muslims accept music 
provided it is harmless to their faith and relaxing to their mind and body (Ramadan, 
2009). The central issue causing disagreement between moderate Muslims and 
fundamentalists is evident in musical genres, like hip-hop, that fundamentalists argue 
violates Islamic principles. In her Ph.D thesis, Inventing the Muslim Cool: Islamic Youth 
Culture in Western Europe, Maruta Herding claims that ‘Salafis [fundamentalists] do not 
embrace Islamic youth culture, mainly because of their rejection of music related to hip-
hop culture’(Herding, 2013, p. 133). Her research demonstrates that various forms of 
social engagement of Muslim youth, such as ‘youth work, political activism, interfaith 
dialogues, charity, and personal development’, were introduced specifically to counter 
negative perceptions of young Muslims in Britain as anti-integrationist due to 
fundamentalists’ definite opinions of music (ibid., p. 134). In her observation of a Muslim 
youth dialogue on ‘Islam, Hip-Hop and Social Change’, Herding found that participants 
were convinced that Muslim youth’s contribution to rap music ‘also contributed to 
community cohesion and interfaith dialogue by openly addressing topics that Muslims had 
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an urge to discuss, especially after 9/11 and 7/7 and as citizens in the West (ibid.).11 The 
panellists of this dialogue included such hip-hop artists as Mecca2Medina, Lowkey, Poetic 
Pilgrimage and a Cambridge Ph.D ‘Sheikh’ Michael Mumisa and, according to Herding, 
they ‘discussed the permissibility of music’. Using the ‘legitimising voice’ of a moderate 
Muslim scholar like Mumisa to justify the permissibility of music, Herding states:  
No proof has been given of music being forbidden, and the panel agreed 
that if they [rappers/hip-hop artists] kept to certain (self-imposed) rules, 
such as respectful language, rap was just another means of expressing 
one’s faith. They were thus concerned with no less than reinterpreting 
Islam and solving intergenerational and intercultural differences within 
Islam (Herding, 2013, p. 135).  
While hip-hop nasheed artists claimed to have an integration agenda and looked 
forward to bridging the generational and cultural gaps in British Muslim society, there 
were also mixed opinions about deciding the halal limit on music and performance. Some, 
influenced by ‘moderate fundamentalists’, felt that the nasheed artists should perform a 
capella (without backing instruments) because fundamentalism condemns all kinds of 
music. In her research on hip-hop nasheed artists, Herding found that artists among 
moderate Muslims and moderate fundamentalists sought justification for lifting the music 
ban based upon its ‘intentions and rules’. Such a ruling regards music as a tool for 
proselytization that helps spread Islamic values, serves as a platform of sociopolitical 
mobilisation and can be disconnected from any connotations relating to sex, drug abuse, 
crime or violence and other activities attributed to youth cultural music scenes (Herding, 
2013, pp. 94-95). The list of justifications for lifting the music ban proposed by moderate 
young Muslims signifies their support for youth engagement and participation in Western 
popular music genres, such as hip-hop. Rap performance seems to be the favoured 
approach because it contains fewer musical instruments. As outlined by Herding above, 
moderate Muslims assess activities related to music based upon ‘intentions and rules’, that 
are formulated in accordance with interpretations of scriptural sources (Qur’an, Hadith) 
                                                   
11 The ‘Hip-Hop and Social Change’ debate was held at the Drum Arts Centre in Birmingham on 
4th May 2010. Over 250 attended a discussion exploring the relationship between hip-hop 
and social change and how both movements sit within the Islamic tradition.  Available 
from: http://faithandthearts.com/category/multimedia 
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and the rulings of the moderate Ulama or ‘scholars of context’ ( e.g., Qaradawi, 2001; 
Ramadan, 2009; Hassan, 2013).  
Whereas moderate Muslims advocate ‘halal and fun’, the Salafi fundamentalists are 
against such a notion. Their attitudes and opinions are reflected in such examples12 as the 
banning of particular types of musical instruments13 and other forms of entertainment. 
Although there is no explicit verse in the Qur’an mentioning a ban on particular types of 
musical instruments or the performing arts per se, fundamentalists has interpreted a few 
Qur’anic verses to claim such performances (i.e. dancing and singing to the music) are 
haram.14 Moreover, in order to support their opinions on music and the performing arts, 
fundamentalists also seek to interpret the Hadith (the Prophet’s oral tradition) and refer 
to several Ulama interpretations vis-à-vis the Prophet Muhammad’s attitudes toward 
particular types of musical instruments. It is obvious that there are differences of opinion 
concerning music and the performing arts among Salafis themselves, such as when 
different groups hold to various interpretations of the Prophet’s traditions.  
                                                   
12 I acknowledge that Herding (2013) also offers a similar example when arguing hip-hop as a 
contested genre of music and the performing arts (p. 93). However, I elaborate further in 
footnotes by referring to a translated Arabic article entitled Ruling on Music, Singing, and 
Dancing (al-Darb bi al-Nawa li man abaha al-Ma ͑azif li al-Hawa) written by a Salafi 
fundamentalist, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Kibbi. I refer to this article to explain the specific 
area in music and performing arts in which fundamentalism is in disagreement with 
moderate Islam. For details on Sheikh Al-Kibbi and Salafism, see Rabil, R., G. 2014. 
Salafism in Lebanon: from apoliticism to transnational jihadism. United State: Georgetown 
University Press. 
13 Some regard ‘drums and wind’ instruments as haram because they resemble the voice of Satan 
and the hedonistic effects these instruments have on the artists and listeners, such as 
deviation from the remembrance of Allah and timely worship. In a different interpretation, 
duff, a type of drum played by women, is allowed only during celebrations, such as Eid and 
weddings, depending on who is attending such events and only in the presence of women. 
Hanbali Mazhab (a Sunni belonging to the strictest fundamentalist strand) added asides from 
‘drums and wind’ instruments, regarding ‘stringed’ instruments (i.e., guitars) as haram (al-
Mughni, 10/173), cited in Muhammad al-Kibbi, S.S. 2015. Ruling on music, singing, and 
dancing. [Online]. [Accessed 26 May 2015]. Available from: http://islamqa.info/en/5000 
14 A number of the fundamentalist Ulama use the following verses from the Qur’an to assert that 
music and the performing arts (singing and dancing) are haram: the Qur’anic verse 
‘Wasting your (precious) lifetime in pastime and amusement’ (Qur’an, Verse al-Najm 
53:59-61) by which the word ‘amusement’ has been interpreted by Salafi fundamentalists 
as ‘singing’. In another verse: ‘[Allah said to Iblees (the devil):] and befool them gradually 
those whom you can among them with your voice’ (Qur’an, Verse al-Israa’ 17:64). Here, 
‘voice’ is referred to as ‘songs, music, and any other call to disobey Allah. Thus, the 
fundamentalists deem any form of entertainment, including the voice (or ma ͑ãzif) and 
musical instruments, as haram (ibid.) 
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A distorted understanding of Islam’s views on music and the performing arts has 
tarnished the image of Islam as a religion that embraces peace and encourages the 
development of art and culture among its adherents. In the media and scholarly discourses 
on extremism and fundamentalism, Islam has been portrayed as a rigid, ‘sombre’, and 
‘austere’ religion that prohibits its believers from having fun and enjoying any music and 
performance. To identify the roots of such a negative portrayal, I analyse two points of 
view: the intergenerational and the religious ideological.   
First, I refer to an intergenerational disagreement (between the older conservative 
generation and the young) that is mentioned in a brief historical account of the 
development of musical genres amongst Muslims in Britain by Gilliat-Ray (2010). Analysis 
of this tension allows me to better understand the dilemmas attending and the processes of 
identity formation amongst young Muslims in Britain in light of the notions of ‘halal and 
fun’ or ‘Muslim cool’ evinced by their positive attitudes toward social cohesion and 
integration into Western culture. I distinguish them from young fundamentalist Muslims, 
who are regarded as the reason for the negative media portrayal of Islam.  
Next, I analyse the ideological differences regarding music and the performing arts 
amongst fundamentalists themselves and between moderate and fundamentalist Muslims. 
Analyses of intergenerational and ideological conflicts within Muslim communities are 
relevant to this thesis’s focus upon cultural production. When making a cultural/media 
product, Muslim producers need to identify in what ways these intergenerational and 
ideological clashes constrain or facilitate the channel’s mission, as well as the extent to 
which such conflicts affect production quality and the quality of the staff’s working lives.   
2.2.3 Gender and Female Subjects 
In addition to misrepresentations of Islam, Muslim identity and the Islamic view of music, 
a misunderstanding of the notions of hijab, veiling and segregation has challenged Muslim 
cultural production. The media discourses on Islam and Muslims, frequently fuelled by 
state politics of anti-extremism, have served to politicise the practices of hijab veiling and 
segregation amongst Muslim community members (Kundnani, 2015). Such 
representations assume expression of the Muslim identity – through veiling, for instance 
to be signs of extremism and oppression. The western media have misrepresented the 
hijab as an article of clothing, a religious symbol and a sign of oppression. In her journal 
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article Hijab in London, Emma Tarlo (2007) emphasises the sorts of associations that 
stereotyped Western media perceptions of the hijab are built upon: 
A whole other set of associations which tie the hijab to ideas of patriarchy, 
oppression, victimhood, ignorance, tradition, barbarism, foreignness, 
fundamentalism, suspicion and the threat of violence – associations which 
have been greatly inflated by 9/11 and through subsequent events such as 
the London Bombings of July 2005 and the cartoon controversy of 2006. 
[As a result of such stereotype], people who look Muslim are constantly 
having to fend off the association of their dress with terrorism and 
oppression (ibid., p. 144). 
The Arabic word hijab is neither confined in meaning to an article of women’s 
clothing nor gender-specific. Rather, in general the hijab is a notion that refers to the acts 
of separating, segregating, screening and keeping things apart (El Guindi, 1999). 
Moreover, it is incorrectly used by many in the media to describe women’s coverings or 
to symbolise oppression. The phenomenon of veiling, or covering one’s face, is 
misunderstood and regarded as a part of women’s lives. As a result of such 
misunderstanding, critiques tend to frame Muslim women wearing these forms of clothing 
as oppressed and segregated from the rest of western society; some perceive veiling as a 
threat to national security due to the anonymous identity of such women (Tarlo, 2007). 
Because these misconceptions exist within society and are adopted by the Western Other, 
it is important here to explore the cultural, historical and religious roots of the hijab, 
veiling and segregation. Exploration of the concept allows me to examine the notion of 
hijab, the practice of veiling and segregation, from informed historical accounts, rather 
than from its portrayal in and politicisation by the western media. The mapping of 
historical and cultural discourse is relevant to this thesis because in making creative 
decisions media producers draw upon sociocultural elements that exist around them. 
These include the notions of hijab, veiling and segregation, which surface in the everyday 
life of western society. 
In her book Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance, Fadwa El Guindi argues that early 
Arab-Islamic studies of women did not focus upon their clothing, but rather discussed 
women’s everyday lives (El Guindi, 1999, p. 6). El Guindi traced the historical roots of 
veiling to pre-Islamic and post-Islamic Arab societies, focusing on the veiling phenomenon 
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among both women and men (ibid.).15 She argues that veiling is not solely a part of Islamic 
culture because ‘it has become accepted in the scholarly circles that the practice of 
women’s veiling existed in the Mesopotamian/Mediterranean region’. She cites other 
accounts that trace the history of veiling; for instance, the ‘[Prophet] Muhammad did not 
introduce the custom of veiling’, or that ‘seclusion and veiling are phenomena […] 
foreign to the Arabs and unknown at the time of Muhammad’ (ibid). El Guindi argues that 
the veiling practice did not originate in Islamic culture, as it was known during the pre-
Islamic period (ibid.). 
In further support of her claim, El Guindi cites Laila Ahmed’s research (1982) 
project (carried out between 1982-1992) on ancient and modern historical materials. 
Ahmed concluded that Islam did not introduce, but rather institutionalised, veiling: 
‘veiling seems not to have been institutionalised until Islam adopted it’. Because ‘veiling is 
evidently very congenial to Islam’, Ahmed finds that ‘as an institution, it [veiling] is 
Islamic’, but ‘before Islam (in the Mesopotamian/Mediterranean region/non-Arabian), it 
was ‘an occasional custom’ (Ahmed, 1982, p. 523). In her later research, Ahmed 
confirms that the practice of veiling and seclusion were part of Greek and Byzantine 
societies as well (Ahmed, 1992, cited in El Guindi, 1999, p. 6). Based upon these 
historical accounts, Ahmed (1982) and El Guindi (1999) agree that the practice of veiling 
and segregation is not rooted in Islam, but rather had been established since the Christian 
era in such regions as the Balkans and the Mediterranean (El Guindi, 1999, p. 7). 
Challenging the media’s projections of modesty-seclusion-oppression onto veiling, El 
Guindi suggests that the hijab and veiling is a cultural code. As such, the underlying 
concepts of hijab and veiling relate not only to clothing, but also to notions of ‘privacy, 
sanctity, respect and restraint’; it is not a symbol of oppression as portrayed in western 
discourses on Islam and women (ibid., p. 96). Her study mentioned little about the ways 
in which the hijab and veiling have become increasingly common signifiers of the wearer’s 
growing religious commitment over time, demonstrated by ever more concealing 
garments. Her anthropological lens also lacks an engagement with the concept of hijab 
                                                   
15 The English term ‘veil’ is commonly used to refer to Middle Eastern and South Asian women’s 
traditional head, face (eyes, nose or mouth) or body cover. See El Guindi, F. 1999. Veil 
modesty, privacy and resistance. [Online]. Oxford: Berg,. Available from: http://0-
dx.doi.org.wam.leeds.ac.uk/10.2752/9781847888969 
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according to Qur’anic text, as well as with the disagreements amongst Islamic ideologies 
over the concept. 
The increasing visibility of the hijab and veiling in western public life is not only 
misinterpreted in the context of dress, but also it has been criticised as a perceived symbol 
of power for both males and females. El Guindi (1999) incorporates men’s veiling in her 
analyses, suggesting there is some universality of meaning for both sexes. In doing so, she 
claims that veiling was practised by women and men, indicating the equality of both 
genders. Unlike El Guindi’s claim, Andrea Rugh (2002) argues that there are issues of 
power and inequality when considering the different purposes of veiling for men and 
women. When men cover their faces, the aim is to lower their gaze toward women (when 
entering women’s spaces); as for women, Rugh indicates that the purpose of 
covering/veiling is ‘to create their own private spaces’ separate from men (ibid., 2002, p. 
112). Because of these differing purposes of veiling, Rugh criticises El Guindi for ignoring 
power dynamics and inequality in her analysis of the hijab and veiling.  
In agreement with El Guindi who claims that the hijab and veiling symbolise 
‘privacy, sanctity, respect and restraint’ (El Guindi, 1999, p. 96), anthropologist Layla 
Abu-Lughod contributes: the hijab and veiling ‘marked the symbolic separation of men's 
and women's spheres, as part of the general association of women with family and home, 
not with public space where strangers mingled’ (Abu-Lughod, 2000, p. 785). She regards 
‘separation’ as equal to privacy, sanctity and respect for the domestic nature of women. 
Her view is in marked contrast to the popular media’s description of ‘separation’ as a 
form of ‘oppression’ and maltreatment of women, as men control the movements of 
women and restrict their engagement with the public. Although Abu-Lughod and El 
Guindi’s analyses are based upon cultural history, their perceptions of the hijab, veiling 
and segregation are in line with the Qur’anic order that requires women to cover while in 
public:  
Oh Prophet, tell thy wives and daughters and the believing women that they should 
cast their outer garments16 over themselves, that is most convenient, that as this 
                                                   
16 According to the scholarly translation and commentaries of the Qur’an by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 
the Arabic word jilbab (plural jalabib) refers to ‘outer garment(s)’, which indicates a long 
gown covering the whole body or a cloak covering the neck and bosom: Yusuf Ali, A. 
2011. The meaning of the Holy Qur'an. 11 ed. Maryland, USA: Amana Publications. 
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distinguish17 them [from the slaves] so that they should be known and not molested 
and Allah is Oft-Forgiving,18 Most Merciful (Qur'an 33: 57, translated by 
Yusuf Ali, 2011, p. 1077).  
There are clashes between ideologies when interpreting the enforcement of hijab on 
women. The Salafi fundamentalists, for example, state that Islam strongly emphasises the 
concepts of decency and modesty during interactions between members of the opposite 
sex (Al-Rizvi, n.d.), leaving no room for their co-mingling in private or public spaces. 
This ruling is based on two Qur’anic verses dedicated to the behaviour of men and 
women. In the first verse, Allah commands the Prophet Muhammad to inform believing 
men as follows: 
Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard19 their 
modesty; that will make for greater purity for them; and Allah is well acquainted 
with all that they do (Qur'an, 24:30 translated by Yusuf Ali, 2011, p. 873).  
In the following verse, Allah commands the Prophet to inform women that they 
should also cast down their glances and guard their modesty: 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their 
modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what 
(must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms 
and do not display their beauty […] (Qur'an, 24:31, translated by Yusuf Ali, 
2011, p. 873).  
These two verses from the Qur’an are often taken literally by fundamentalists, who 
use these rules when imposing strict dress codes for women. The fundamentalists criticise 
different styles and fashions of the hijab or headscarf from the veiling prescribed in the 
                                                   
17 The Qur’an further states that the covering was not to restrict the liberty of women, but to 
protect them from harm and molestation. Yusuf Ali comments on this verse, referring to 
the covering as meant to protect the sanctity and honour of women: ‘In the East and the 
West a distinctive public dress of some sort or another has always been a badge of honour 
or distinction, both among men and women. This can be traced back to the earliest 
civilisations. Assyrian Law in its palmist day (say, 7th century B.C.) enjoined the veiling of 
married women and forbade the veiling of slaves and women of ill fame’, (see Cambridge 
Ancient History, III, p. 107) (ibid.). 
18 This suggests that if a Muslim woman sincerely tries to observe this rule, but owing to human 
weakness falls short of the ideal, Allah ‘the Most Forgiving and the Most Merciful’ will not 
force such rule onto her (ibid.) 
19 Yusuf Ali refers to the rule of modesty in this verse as ‘guard’. The rule is applied to both men 
and women. He states ‘the brazen stare by a man at a woman (or by man at a man) is a 
breach of refined manners. Modesty is meant to protect those who could not abstain from 
sexual desire and maintain appropriate spirituality’ (ibid.) 
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above verse. Despite such criticism, Muslim women continue to challenge the 
conventional and conservative style of headscarf. In their research on Muslim fashion, 
Annelies Moors and Emma Tarlo demonstrate ‘how the alleged contradiction of Islamic 
sartorial prescriptions and trendiness is challenged by Muslim women worldwide’ (Moors 
and Tarlo, 2007, p. 138). 
The religious constraints concerning the hijab are evident in a study of the 4Shbab 
TV, a Muslim youth music television programme by Maurice Chammah (2010). 
Chammah criticises Ahmed Abu Haiba, the producer of the music television programme, 
for his rigid treatment of female singer appearances on the 4Shbab. He finds, despite the 
more modern and sophisticated approach towards religious musical fusion displayed by 
the television format, the treatment of women and the hijab shapes religious television. 
Chammah comments on gender inequality and the stricter rules imposed on female 
singers or actresses who appear on the 4Shbab TV (for example, they are not allowed to 
sing or perform and must wear a hijab). His study addresses how such fundamentalism 
influences the production routine and the creative decisions that are made at the television 
station. Representational issues, such as the hijab, veiling and segregation, are central to 
production studies of Islam-based television.  
Western media discourses tend to limit the notion of the hijab to the item of 
clothing and fashion popular among Muslim women. Although Muslim women wear 
different sorts of headscarves, veils and garments, they all belong to the ‘suspect 
community’ (Kundnani, 2015). Their ‘invisibility’ (a reference to their fully-covered 
body) has always been tied to religious ideologies, such as fundamentalism and extremism, 
and is a presumed to represent a threat to national security (Tarlo, 2007). Tarlo further 
observes that this ‘invisibility’ of Muslim women increases the ‘visibility’ of Muslims in 
the public sphere, which ironically heightens Islamophobia and suspicion amongst the 
Western Other. Instead of being regarded as a symbol of respect and honour for women, 
the notion of the hijab has been disseminated by the media as a sign of oppression. 
Resulting from such misrepresentations, other aspects of the everyday lives of Muslim 
women remain unexplored.  
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
This thesis aims to conceptualise the production culture of religious television. This 
chapter provides a brief background of Muslims in the United Kingdom and the discourses 
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concerning the tensions that result from clashes between the West and Muslim culture 
and between the different religious ideologies expressed by Muslims (e.g., 
fundamentalism vs. moderate Muslim identities). Knowledge of these pressures may 
contribute to the understanding of how norms, values and rituals in Muslim cultural 
production shape media products, and the ways in which Islam and Muslims are supposed 
to present/ought to be represented by Muslim creative producers. I have addressed issues 
surrounding British Muslims’ religious identity, as well as the problems faced by Muslim 
cultural/media producers that relate to music and youth culture and gender and female 
subjects when making cultural products. The different connotations of the “clash” between 
Islam/Muslims and the Western Other (e.g., Huntington, 1996; Ramadan, 2009; Karim 
and Eid, 2014) and the conflict of ideologies within Islam itself (e.g., Bayram, 2014; 
Kundnani, 2015) are relevant to this thesis. These studies inform the way in which the 
discourses concerning Islam, Muslims and the Western Other shape the worldviews of the 
members of the production community at the Islam Channel and, subsequently, inflect its 
production culture. An understanding of the intergenerational clash is equally important 
to this thesis, for it reflects an everyday reality faced by Muslim youth and thus might help 
media producers manage such a conflict. As the first phase of literature review, this 
chapter provides a context for the study of religious television. As the second part of 
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Chapter 3 
Conceptual Framework  
This chapter focuses on literature that has supported my choice of thesis subjects and 
prompted the research questions. I have divided the chapter into three parts. Section 3.1 
reviews a wide range of literature from the media sociology and cultural studies traditions 
that explore media production and creative labour. Section 3.2 analyses the relevant 
literature concerning production studies of religious television, examining areas such as 
broadcasting and occupational challenges within religious television, and covering both 
Christian and Islamic programming. Section 3.3 discusses sociological approaches to 
creative labour, focusing on four key concepts pertinent to studies of work in the 
television industry: exploitation, self-exploitation, creative autonomy and emotional well-
being. These three sections form the framework for this research project and assist me in 
conceptualising the production culture of religious television. Further reference to 
relevant literature is made during chapters 5 through 7 when addressing themes that 
emerged in the findings of this research. 
3.1 Combining Media Sociology with Cultural Studies Approaches 
to Media Production 
For many years, researchers have explored how occupational and organisational 
conditions in general, and media production processes in particular, have shaped media 
content. James Curran points out that two major traditions focus upon media production 
(Curran, 2000, p. 10). One tradition uses media sociology, which views media primarily 
as organisations, while the other is the cultural studies tradition, which sees media as 
cultural products.  
Media sociology examines the organisational conditions under which workers 
labour, as well as how production processes affect media content. Media sociologists 
‘investigate how regulation, policy, political action, aesthetic ideologies, professional 
codes and histories of class, gender and ethnic relationships can all affect the production 
processes and outcomes within media organisations’ (Group, 2000, p. 21). James Curran 
(2000) further categorises this tradition of viewing media as institutions (media sociology) 
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into six different approaches. The first approach has roots in organisational sociology, 
which emphasises the internal processes within media organisations (e.g., Tunstall, 2001). 
The second approach examines media occupations with an eye toward recruitment, career 
paths, culture and norms of groups of media workers (e.g., Weaver and Wilhoit, 1991). 
The third approach focuses on external influences, such as those of the suppliers of news 
on journalistic work (e.g., Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). The fourth approach is that of 
political economy, which tends to focus on media ownership and control (e.g., Murdock, 
1997). The fifth approach focuses on public policy and the civil administration of the 
media (e.g., Humphreys, 1996). The sixth approach views media performance through 
two separate lenses: one lens reviews the media according to a normative framework 
(e.g., McQuail, 1992); and the other lens, from a historical, political economy 
perspective (e.g., Curran and Seaton, 2010). According to Curran, all of these categories 
are ‘media-centred’ in that they describe how media systems and organisations operate 
within society, but ‘not exclusively as organisations’ (2000, p. 10). I position my research 
within the categories of media sociology that emphasises those influences that are 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ to media organisations in order to conceptualise the production 
culture of the Islam Channel.  
Among the six approaches delineated above by James Curran and the Goldsmiths 
Media Group, the political economy approach is considered a ‘sister-discipline’ to media 
sociology (Goldsmiths Media Group, 2000, p. 21). This approach to media and culture 
concentrates on the production and distribution of the cultural product (Durham and 
Kellner, 2001). Therefore, media sociology and political economy are appropriate 
approaches since both emphasise media production. They may complement each other, 
too, as the former ‘links dynamics of power in the cultural industries with questions of 
meaning – questions of the kinds of texts that are produced by cultural industry 
organisations’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a, p. 50). Despite their interests in media 
production, however, political economists insufficiently offer analyses of production 
processes. Oriented towards macro-analysis of media production, political economists pay 
little attention to the analysis of single media organisations, which my research addresses. 
A wide range of media sociology literature explores media production. However, many of 
these studies are concerned with factors that affect the production of news and journalism, 
organisational constraints (e.g., Tunstall, 1971; Schlesinger, 1990; Schlesinger and 
Tumber, 1994; Turow, 1994) and management of the journalism profession (e.g., Deuze 
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and Fortunati, 2011). These studies may support our understanding of the routines 
involved in the production of a television talk show, as journalistic skills are indeed 
required from its creative staff (e.g., Grindstaff, 2002).  
A combination of media sociology and cultural studies is essential for this thesis. I 
stated earlier that media sociology allows us to study media production within an 
organisational context. Nevertheless, it pays little attention to the media product. By 
contrast, cultural studies is a tradition that pays closer attention to media products, in 
particular questioning facets of ‘representation’ (e.g., Barker, 2012). The cultural studies 
tradition has taken various views of media, as ‘an index of shared values’ used within 
cultural indicators (e.g., Nowak, 1984); as a channel of dominant ideology (e.g., Parenti, 
1993) as an extension of the power structure (e.g., Hallin, 1994); as contested spaces 
reflecting the struggle for ascendency (e.g., Hall, 1982); as ‘cultural fora’ for reproducing 
the collective debates of society (Newcomb and Hirsch, 1984); and so forth (see Curran, 
2000, p. 10). These various aspects of cultural studies may support our understanding of 
the magazine talk show format as a media/cultural product. Even so, despites these 
approaches to media as ‘an index of shared values’ (e.g., Nowak, 1984) or as an extension 
of the power structure (e.g., Hallin, 1994), cultural studies is insufficiently sociological. 
Furthermore, it has usually lacked interest in the experiences of media workers, which 
this thesis concerns. Moreover, cultural studies pays too little attention to television 
production analysis, as most attention surrounds questions of media representation. Since 
both the media sociology and the cultural studies tradition have their shortcomings, a 
combination of sociological and cultural approaches is essential to assessing television 
production in an organisational context. 
Recently, cultural studies scholars (such as Havens et al., 2009) have begun to 
analyse media production through the lens of cultural studies. A group of scholars have 
adopted the cultural studies tradition in their examination of media 
production/industries. Vicki Mayer, Miranda J. Banks and John Thornton Caldwell 
(Mayer et al., 2009) demonstrate the ‘harmonisation’ of the cultural studies and the media 
sociology approaches. Their focus on ‘representation’ (e.g., Hall, 1997) as central to the 
cultural studies tradition, however, can at times ‘marginalise’ their other aim: to provide 
an analyses of ‘lived realities’ within a media organisation (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a, p. 56). 
Thus, a combination of cultural studies with media sociology is appropriate for this thesis, 
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as the former focuses on culture and representation and the latter focuses on media 
organisation. This combined approach supports my analyses of culture and 
representational issues, as well as the working life in religious television production. 
The empirical data gathered by the approach taken by cultural studies scholars to 
media industries include ‘routines and rituals, and also political and economic forces that 
shape roles and technologies, as well as the distribution of resources according to cultural 
and demographic differences’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a, p. 56). The concept of production 
culture emphasises the dynamics of power in television production. According to 
Caldwell, 
Production indeed involves physical and manual work. But production 
also unfolds as a collective, daily, cultural performance involving symbolic 
codes, conventionalized power hierarchies […] (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342).  
John T. Caldwell’s research into the Hollywood film and television industries is an 
example of the cultural studies of media industries approach. Caldwell analysed cultures 
of television and film production using concepts of ‘industrial reflexivity’ and ‘critical 
practice’. Using both terms, he examined ‘the industry’s own self-representation, self-
critique, and self-reflection’ (ibid., p. 5). He adopted Geertz’s (1973) ‘interpretive 
anthropology approach to culture’ that aims to ‘look over the shoulders’ of television 
workers. By looking over the producers’ shoulders, Caldwell aims to interpret their 
practices. This suggests how television employees ‘industrial reflexivity’ locate power 
dynamics within institutional contexts, and subsequently, ‘express an emerging and 
unstable economic and social order in Hollywood’ (ibid.).  
Caldwell was also critical when reflecting on his ethnographic experience as well as 
results of textual analysis of television employees’ industrial reflexivity and 'trade artifacts' 
(e.g., the 'behind-the-scenes' videos). Nevertheless, Caldwell’s purpose of doing textual 
analysis was to explore the development and ‘unstable economic and social order in 
Hollywood’. On the contrary, the purpose of deploying textual analysis in this research 
project is to assess the production quality and aesthetic features of a magazine talk show. 
Caldwell’s ‘microsocial’ approach to studying television production labour is relevant for 
this thesis. Applying the concept of production culture to religious television enables me 
to analyse tensions in the Islam Channel about religious ideology. Media sociology allows 
me to examine the power dynamics within the channel, observing how power is exercised 
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from the top (CEO), at the level of middle management and from within the television 
production community.  
Laura Grindstaff’s (2002) sociological research is particularly useful when analysing 
a television talk show’s production because it was built on ‘interpretive but empirically 
grounded manner, the nature of reality constructed and disseminated by media 
institutions as well as the specific processes by which these constructions take place’ 
(Grindstaff, 2009, p. 72).	  I discuss this in the next section, alongside other studies of talk 
shows – the genre that I worked on in my research. 
3.1.1 Television Talk Show Studies 
Media sociology and cultural studies scholars have examined: (a) the economic aspects of 
talk shows; (b) the broadcast institutions that produce or commission the talk shows; and 
(c) the sociocultural contexts of television talk shows production. Understanding these 
aspects of talk shows allows me to comprehend generic conventions, to analyse the 
production quality of the magazine talk show Living the Life and to identify the tensions and 
constraints experienced by the members of its production community. 
The first area of analysis relating to television talk shows deploys an economic 
perspective. Talk shows are known for being a cheap television genre (Gill, 2007), which 
uses the ‘first-person media’ concept (Dovey, 2000). This suggests that independent 
television producers, struggling to secure a commission from broadcast institutions, often 
choose the talk show format because it is cheaply produced by a small production crew or 
even a single-person’s camera work. Aside from low production costs, Dovey’s research 
findings also imply that talk show production is a strategy employed by broadcasters to 
gain ratings. Dovey’s claim confirms Jane Shattuc’s (1997) argument, which regards the 
talk show as a cheap television genre and implies that the costs of its production are 
reduced by involving an ‘assembly-line system of codified rules of production, specialised 
labour, and aesthetic norms and thereby turn[ing] out one of the least expensive forms of 
television to produce – $25,000 to $50,000 each half hour, a fraction of the cost of a unit 
in a network drama’ (p. 66). Another example indicating that talk shows are a cheap 
television genre is Rita Crisci’s (1997) empirical research into ‘the war’ over ratings 
between Italian private and public broadcasters. She discovered ‘an increasing reliance on 
romance, confession and emotional realism in public as well private networks’(cited in 
Gill, 2007, p. 155). Because of the low production costs involved, talk shows became a 
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preferred television genre in the 1990s for the television producers and broadcasters 
commissioning them.  
In the context of US talk shows, Grindstaff (2002, p. 21) suggests that the 
increasing number of such programmes is an indicator of rating competition amongst 
broadcast television institutions. Sensational or tabloid-style programming, such as 
daytime confessional talk shows, are included amongst the strategies to secure high 
ratings. Grindstaff’s study shows that ‘emotion’ in daytime talk show is treated as a 
commodity that bears commercial imperatives for the network television. Although his 
argument does not specifically concern the production of talk shows, Anamik Saha (2012) 
points to strategies, such as ‘making noise’ or including controversial elements within 
minority television programming, as one way to secure higher ratings. Addressing the 
economic aspects of talk shows that rely upon such strategies can help me to analyse the 
resources available to the Islam Channel, to understand its motivation in choosing the talk 
show genre.   
The second area of helpful analysis is the organisational context of a television talk 
show’s production. Both Paddy Scannell (1991) and Andrew Tolson (1991) are among 
media sociologists who observe the development of ‘broadcast talk’ (in Scannell’s sense) 
and talk or chat shows (according to Tolson) from a historical perspective and focusing on 
the institutional context. Scannell argues that broadcast talk, in the British case, has 
undergone ‘a significant shift in the communicative ethos of broadcasting from an earlier 
authoritarian mode to a more populist and democratic manner and style – a key time for 
this transformation being the late 1950s to the late 1960s’ (ibid., p. 10). Tolson (1991), 
however, criticises Scannell’s argument as ‘too harmonious and unitary to be adequate as 
an account of the public sphere of broadcasting in the post-populist era of the 1980s’ 
(ibid.) Using a case study of The Dame Edna Show, Tolson argues that talk shows as a genre 
have become ‘a lynch-pin of the popular public sphere’ and are centred on the figure of 
the ‘real person’ who ‘speaks from experience’ (p. 198). Scannell and Tolson’s studies are 
relevant to my thesis because they point to how shifts within the ideology of a broadcast 
institution can transform the genre of the talk show. Broadcasters’ ideological shifts have 
altered the role of the talk show. For instance, the talk show has changed from serving as a 
platform for those in authority, such as politicians, elites or celebrities, to speak, to now 
serving as a broadcast talk ‘chat show’, during which interviews are conducted within a 
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casual and relaxed environment. The genre of broadcast talk has also developed into 
‘daytime’ (e.g., Kilroy on BBC1, 1986-2004) talk shows that allow access to ordinary 
people discussing social issues and everyday experience. Talk shows include ‘celebrity chat 
shows’ (e.g., The Graham Norton Show, from 2007 to present) and ‘magazine talk shows’ 
(e.g., The One Show on BBC1, 2006 to present). My research focused on an example of the 
latter. 
On-going debates that regard talk shows as a ‘popular’ television programme/genre 
are central to this thesis because they concern the economic and organisational contexts in 
which the production quality of talk shows is understood. Dovey (2000) offers a set of 
contrasts that help to explain the growing emphasis upon ‘popular’ programming in the 
1990s (illustrated in Table 1) – an issue that remains very relevant in the second decade of 
the twenty-first century. 
Table 1: A pattern that characterises certain important features of the 1990s 
media culture 
 
Source: Dovey, J. 2000. Freakshow : First Person Media and Factual Television. London: Pluto. p. 4 
For Dovey, while ‘the traditional’ is perceived as ‘boring’, ‘authoritative’ and 
‘elitist’ (that is, less entertaining), according to his categorisation, ‘the popular’ offers 
‘good’ audience experiences, related to ‘reflexiv[ity]’, ‘pleasure’ and ‘fun’. Dovey 
disagrees with the interpretation of ‘the popular’ as a ‘good’ television experience, 
primarily because the ‘popular’ television programme often benefits broadcasters rather 
than a society and its citizens. Indeed, popular talk shows attract larger audiences, which 
means higher advertising revenues and, subsequently, higher turnover within the 
broadcast institutions. He compares the ‘confessional talk show’, a form of first-person 
media that discusses topics previously deemed taboo (e.g., divorce, sexual orientation, 
infidelity and abuse) ‘to a ‘freakshow’. These topics are more frequently mentioned on 
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television and have become issues that matter in everyday conversation. Although my 
research is not about confessional talk shows, Dovey’s critique of talk shows as a popular 
genre raises such questions as the following: How might the production quality of the 
magazine talk show Living the Life be assessed? Does the use of a popular genre by the Islam 
Channel entail good television? How might we interpret subjective judgements of 
television quality by television producers?  
Cultural studies scholars have at times addressed the aesthetics of television (Agger 
and Jensen, 2001) including questions of production quality.  According to Gunhild Agger 
and Jens F. Jensen (2001, pp. 11-15), the study of television aesthetics has focused on 
analysis of fictional genres, but aesthetic concepts have been increasingly accepted by 
media researchers to genres as news broadcasts and documentary programmes, for 
example questions concerning the ‘dramaturgy’ of the programmes (ibid., p. 15) or 
‘compositional or stylistic aspects’ of television content and genre (Chandler and Munday, 
2011, p. 8). However, aestheticians such as Agger and Jensen have not discussed 
television production or, a talk show.  
In contrast, Hanne Bruun’s (Bruun, 2001) research offers an approach to studying 
the production quality of a television talk show. She analysed the aesthetics/dramaturgic 
elements of five Danish television talk shows broadcast on public service television: Kanal 
22, Lørdagskanalen, Eleva2ren, Damernes Magasin, and Højlunds Forsamlingshus. Her study 
suggests that ‘uncertainty’ and ‘sociability’ are critical factors that accentuate the viewers’ 
experience and subsequently determine the quality/aesthetics of a television talk show. 
Brunn’s scholarship addresses the tension that exists between factors of uncertainty and 
sociability, as well as how these matters can affect the viewing experience and the 
production quality of television talk show. She argues that this tension exists between the 
tendency towards chaos, danger, unpleasantness, and loss of face found in the uncertainty 
factor, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the tendency towards impeccability, 
politeness, and ‘pleasure of sociability’ (ibid., pp. 245-251).  
Bruun also suggests that the ‘experiential consequences’ of a talk show for viewers 
determine its aesthetics/quality. As a television genre, the talk show requires its producer 
to imagine his/her audience as for which particular group of an audience the programme 
he/she aims to serve. As Bruun argues, ‘what constitutes the experience of uncertainty 
and sociability in actual programmes depends very much on who the viewers are’ (ibid.).  
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By properly managing the factors of uncertainty and sociability on a talk show, the 
producers can maintain the production quality of this show. As Bruun argues ‘the 
estimation of the individual talk show’s degree of success and the experiential 
consequences of the viewers is inseparable from considerations of whom the show is 
directed at’ (p. 251). Bruun’s study is highly relevant because it helps to describe aspects 
of production quality, a term which I will apply throughout this thesis, especially when 
discussing the textual analysis of the magazine talk show Living the Life in Chapter 6.  
Whereas scholars like Dovey (2000) criticise the talk show as cheaply produced and 
a profitable genre for its broadcasters, and Bruun (2001) points to factors that stand to 
better define its quality, other researchers view talk shows more positively. For instance, 
Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt (1994, p. 5) argue in their research that audience 
discussion programmes allow audiences comprised by ordinary people to participate in 
discussions with experts and the elites. In doing so, they suggest that talk shows have 
performed three roles: (a) ‘as spokesmen for the people to both government and experts, 
conveying opinions, experiences, information and criticism “upward” to the elite’; (b) as 
an opportunity for the public to communicate with the elites and politicians and 
encourage them to respond directly to the issues raised; and (c) as ‘a social space’ for the 
public to share its everyday experiences either with the studio audience and with the 
audience at home. Their research, however, does not concern the production aspects of 
talk shows. Rather, they focus on how talk shows become sites where ‘life-world 
processes of opinion formation, group discussion and public debate are potentially 
colonised and undermined by media institutions and by the experts and politicians who 
represent established power’ (ibid., p. 8). Despite lacking emphasis upon production 
processes, their study remains relevant to my research into how the magazine talk show 
Living the Life might offer the kind of ‘public sphere’ that is identified by Livingstone and 
Lunt in the talk shows they examined. 
The third aspect of television talk shows that proves relevant to this thesis results 
from analyses that adopt a sociocultural lens. Analyses of the television talk show genre 
offered by media sociologists and cultural studies scholars who examine sociocultural 
aspects are important because issues related to gender and race, in particular, are central 
to the study of the production culture of religious television. In the mid-1990s, 
confrontational talk shows, such as Ricki Lake, Jenny Jones and Jerry Springer, together 
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comprised one of the most popular American television genres. The insights of a group of 
media sociologists who emphasise the sociocultural aspects of daytime talk shows are 
relevant to this thesis. These scholars and their works include Wayne Munson (1993), 
author of All Talk: the Talkshows in Media Culture; Joshua Gamson (1998), Freaks Talk Back: 
Tabloid Talk Shows and Sexual Nonconformity; Kathleen Lowney (1999), Baring Our Souls: 
Talk Shows and the Religion of Recovery; Laura Grindstaff (2002), The Money Shot: Trash, 
Class, and the Making of TV Talk Shows; and Julie Engel Manga (2003), Talking Trash: the 
Cultural Politics of Daytime Talk Shows. Although these studies analyse talk shows from 
sociocultural perspectives, none focuses upon magazine talk show production. Lowney 
(1999) argues that television talk shows offer a new kind of American civil religion, which 
addresses social problems, social deviances and offers solutions to these problems. These 
studies conduct their analyses from multiple angles, including those of the host, the 
contributors (guests) and audience perspectives. Yet, these studies tell little of what 
happens behind the scenes, before and during the filming of these talk shows.  
Although I acknowledged earlier the importance of understanding shifts in the genre 
of the television talk show as important to understanding how the magazine talk show 
emerged, my analyses in this thesis are not about the history of daytime talk shows. Also, I 
am less interested in why studio or home audiences watch talk shows, as well as less 
interested in how guests (contributors) perceive the genre (e.g., Livingstone and Lunt, 
1994). Rather, like Grindstaff, I am interested in ‘why producers and television 
executives thought that people were watching and how, if at all, this information was 
incorporated into the production process itself’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 41). Grindstaff’s 
study is relevant to this thesis because it addresses the hierarchy of power operating within 
the daytime talk show production and representational issues relating to class, gender and 
race. Her research maps out the everyday lived experience of members of the production 
community involved, as well as how they negotiate tensions and contradictions whilst 
dealing with such issues. In doing so, she examines the work roles of talk show 
hosts/presenters, researchers for daytime talk shows, producers and staff involved in the 
production of daytime talk shows.  
Scholars researching daytime/confrontation talk shows have analysed class, gender 
and race in terms of demographic makeup of talk show studio audiences, as well as the 
experts/contributors and members of their production community. Grindstaff analyses 
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class when arguing that daytime talk shows challenge the hierarchy between ‘high’ and 
‘low’ culture, ‘expert and ordinary knowledge’, relating these hierarchies to social class 
and inequality (ibid., p. 17). The class and cultural hierarchies are manifested in 
characteristics such as ‘sleazy topics’ and ‘trashy talk’ used by other, more ‘respectable’ 
media in order to describe daytime talk shows. 
In her seminal work The Talking Cure: TV Talkshows and Women, Jane Shattuc (1997) 
addresses gender as an important consideration of the representational aspects of talk 
shows. Shattuc regards talk shows as a gendered television genre due to their popularity 
amongst women and their construction of a gendered division of labour. For instance, the 
producers of Sally Jesse Raphael, one of the top four talk shows in the mid-1990s, hired 
women as creative producers (executives, seniors, associates, and line producers). In a 
study of the female talk show audience, Manga (2003) suggests that Jerry Springer was 
enjoyed by a female audience because it exuded ‘emotional and physical excess’ (cited in 
Grindstaff, 2004, p. 326). Manga’s study confirms Grindstaff’s (2002) research, which 
reveals daytime talk shows as sites for emotional displays and dramatic outbursts; these 
two elements are commonly associated with women. Although Manga’s study confirms 
the elements of Shattuc’s (1997) and Grindstaff’s (2002), which imply that daytime talk 
shows are a genre for women, it does not document the female creative workers who 
dominate talk show production. Whereas Shattuc addresses how women tend to dominate 
creative work in daytime talk show production, Manga examines how gender, in 
particular female subjects, are framed and understood in the context of 
audience/spectators of daytime talk shows. Unlike Grindstaff, Shattuc does not analyse 
the everyday experience of the production of daytime talk shows. Such aspects concerning 
women are interesting areas to explore within the context of religious television 
production and the magazine talk show genre because the debates surrounding women, 
i.e., their physical appearance and the ways in which women should or should not behave 
and dress in public, are central to religious discourse, particularly in Islam. I address these 
issues in the research reported in this thesis. 
Race is also vital to studies of television talk shows in the 1990s given a crucial 
disparity: Although the production sites of daytime talk shows were ‘occupied by the 
white, well-educated and middle-class’, the programmes were made for working-class 
people of colour (Gill, 2007, p. 162). Researchers have examined the daytime talk show 
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Ricki Lake, which was hosted by a white presenter who acted African-American by using 
colloquial terms, such as ‘street’ and ‘home girls’, borrowed from the ‘hip-hop lexicon’ 
whilst interacting with the guests and the audience (ibid.). Another indicator that some 
talk shows target black audiences is offered by circumstances surrounding Ricki Lake’s 
executive producer’s aim to present a more confrontational form of talk show. Market 
research had proven the connection between television consumption and race and class, 
wherein ‘people of colour and those with lower incomes tend to watch more hours of 
television, especially more hours of daytime television, than do whites or those with high 
incomes’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 60). The therapy form of talk show, another example of 
the genre, is epitomised by Oprah Winfrey. Questions of race arise in such talk shows and 
not only relate to the empowering of women, but also to the power of blacks in a world 
of television dominated by whites (Gill, 2007, p. 162). These studies addressed how 
sociocultural issues relating to race, class and gender are central to both the talk show 
genre and to the discourses concerning it, which help me to better understand the issues 
surrounding talk shows. They, however, lack the account of lived experiences of 
television workers involved in the talk show production that this thesis provides. 
3.1.2 Conceptualising Religious Ideology in the Study of Cultural 
Production 
The traditions of media sociology and cultural studies leave a large gap in the study of 
religious television. Cultural studies scholarship regards culture as not only ‘the effect of 
human activity’, but also as ‘the constructive activity that makes social reality’. Therefore, 
its inquiries include ‘[human] interactions of everyday life, especially in the form of class, 
race, gender, and sexuality’ (Morgan, 2008b, p. 4). Hence, the cultural studies 
scholarship that approaches media and religion, according to David Morgan, ‘may be 
defined as the humanistic form of study that stresses the constructive role of culture in the 
investigation of religion and media’ (ibid.). Similarly, this thesis aims to examine the 
constructive role of culture in the production of religious television.  
When aiming to conceptualise the production culture of religious television, it is 
important to define the context of religion/religious ideology in this thesis. I refer to 
Clifford Geertz's (1973) definition of ‘religion’, which includes three facets: first, religion 
is ‘a cultural system of symbols that provide its believers with a coherent understanding or 
valuation of life, a meaningful, ordered world which enables interaction and 
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interdependence. Second, religion is a shared, communal, distinct way of meaning 
making, a project of culture rather than society. Third, religion is 'a cultural system of 
symbols that consists of people’s ethos and worldview [described as] the tone, character 
and quality of their life’ (cited in Morgan, 2008b, p. 5).  
In the context of this thesis, the term ‘religious ideology’ is applied to identify the 
dynamics of power that are internal and external to the Islam Channel. Regarding internal 
power, religious ideology can include the ways in which its management interprets 
religious messages and imposes a certain religious ideology on members of its television 
production community, as well as embedding such ideological messages within the 
television programme production. While I don’t intend to criticise any particular religious 
ideology here, I do refer to Islam as an ideology in order to better examine how the 
management and production community members of the Islam Channel interpret 
religious ideology/messages and project them onto the production culture of the channel. 
Regarding the dynamic of power external to the Islam Channel, I frame religious ideology 
as ‘a relay or conduit for sources of power’ that is external to media organisation (Corner, 
2011, p. 14). The Salafi fundamentalist view of Islam is an example of religious ideology 
that has an influence on broadcast organisations (see Kraidy and Khalil, 2009; Kraidy, 
2010; Hroub, 2012). A similar ideology may have acquired a certain degree of influence 
on the production culture of the Islam Channel. I have addressed such ideological clashes 
in Chapter 2, tracing how disparate views within Muslim communities on several issues 
pertaining to Islam and Muslims’ religious identity, music and youth, as well as gender 
and female subjects, contribute to tensions within Muslim cultural production. 
Understanding Islam as a religious ideology and ‘a relay or conduit’ of external power 
(Corner, 2011) is relevant to this thesis because understanding the dynamics of power 
within an institutional context is inherent in the study of any production culture 
(Caldwell, 2008). According to Caldwell, the study of ‘culture as an interpretive system’ 
in television production ‘always be seen as fully embedded in the play of power’ (ibid., p. 
2).   
 I have begun this section by mapping two sets of literature that focus on media 
production: first, I draw research from media sociology that examine power dynamics 
from an organisational context, and second, literature from cultural studies. I have argued 
that political economists of media sociology have paid little attention to a single-media 
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organisation and media products despite their focus on internal and external power 
dynamics in media organisation. I also argued that the cultural studies have emphasised too 
much on representation of media product, insufficiently sociological, and lack of 
production analysis. Next, in Sub-section 3.2.1, I reviewed research that highlight 
economic, organisational and sociocultural aspects of talk show as well as how the 
production quality of talk shows is understood by media organisations. Finally, in Sub-
section 3.2.2, I addressed how the term ‘religious ideology’ is applied to identify the 
dynamics of power that are internal and external to religious television.  
3.2 Production Studies of Religious Television  
The media sociology and cultural studies traditions have paid little attention to production 
studies of religious television. Media sociology and cultural studies scholars have examined 
religion: (1) as a popular form and its reception in everyday life; (2) in terms of power 
relations within the social, historical and political-economic context and their 
maintenance through codes and symbols; (3) through critical and humanistic research 
methods; and (4) as part of a commitment to interdisciplinary inquiry and exploration 
(Clark, 2002, p. 15).  
Cultural studies scholars, in particular, frame the study of religion and media ‘in 
terms that decenter religion and media from traditional, institutionally dominated 
definitions, refocusing on the intersections of institutions, authorities, and production 
with popular practices, circulation, and reception’ (Morgan, 2008a, p. xiii). Under such a 
paradigm, media are seen as ‘instruments for converting ideas or intentions into mass-
produced forms for mass dissemination’ (ibid.) Most scholarly approaches to religion and 
media attempted by the cultural studies tradition have not explicitly discussed the 
production culture of a religious broadcast institution in Britain. Most of these studies are 
within the context of media, religion and culture in the United States. With the exception 
of doctoral theses of Ailsa Hollinshead (2002), on The Production and Reception of Discourses 
Concerning Religion in Fictional Broadcasting, and Caitriona Noonan (2008), on The Production 
of Religious Broadcasting: the Case of the BBC, as well as her research into the occupational 
culture of the BBC’s Department of Religions and Ethics (Noonan, 2011; 2012; 2013), 
there remains a dearth of production studies of religious television that focus upon 
institutional context and the experiences of creative workers.  
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There are a number of research studies into the intersections of Islam and media 
from the viewpoint of media sociology and cultural studies. These studies include areas 
such as: television talk shows and political change in Egypt (Sakr, 2013a); the political 
economy of Arab satellite television (e.g., Sakr, 1997; Kraidy and Khalil, 2009; Sakr, 
2011; 2012; 2013b; 2013c); the ideological influences of Islamic authorities upon 
religious broadcasting in the Middle East (Hroub, 2012); and the political economy of a 
single-broadcast institution such as Al-Jazeera (Cherribi, 2012). These research projects 
emphasise macro-analyses of power relations within the context of the political economy 
of media organisations and Islam in the Middle East. In addition to differences in 
geographical context and the particular foci of these studies (i.e., macro-analyses of the 
political economy of religious broadcasting), such research provides little information 
regarding the production of Islam-based television. There are studies concerning talk 
shows (Sakr, 2013a) and the perspectives of television producers (Sakr, 1998), as well as 
research on single broadcasters, like Al-Jazeera (Cherribi, 2012), which may be relevant 
to this thesis.  However, such research does not provide specific accounts of the lived 
experiences of the staff involved in television production – a central concern of this thesis.  
Research stemming from the cultural studies tradition concerns Islam and popular 
culture, as well as observations of phenomena, such as the religious celebrity, authority 
and Islamic televangelism (Moll, 2010; Echchaibi, 2011). Other studies focus upon policy 
research in the intersections of media, Islam and Muslim identity within the Western 
context (e.g., Ramadan, 2004; 2009; 2010; Karim and Eid, 2014).  There are also studies 
regarding how Muslims living in the West can and ought to integrate with the ‘Western 
Other’, Islamophobia, Extremism and the domestic war on terror (Kundnani, 2015). 
Within the British context, research into such areas includes the representation of Islam 
and Muslims in the British media (e.g., Poole, 2009; Knott et al., 2013). How these 
studies approach religion within sociocultural contexts interests me in particular, as the 
insights resulting support my discussion in Chapter 2 of how religion becomes a source of 
power, which can cause tensions within the Muslim cultural production organisation that 
subsequently shape the quality of the texts produced. Despite the large number of studies 
concerning Islam and the media conducted within the Western and British contexts from 
the viewpoints of media sociology and cultural studies, production studies of 
religious/Islam-based television are still underdeveloped. 
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This thesis aims to conceptualise the production culture of religious television using 
the Islam Channel as a site to conduct empirical research. In doing so, I apply the concept 
of production culture (Caldwell, 2006; 2008), which explores the power dynamics in a 
television station and how they shape the products and lives of television production 
workers. Although academic sources in this research area are limited, my analyses will 
draw upon the cultural studies tradition and sociological approaches to religion and the 
media, interweaving insights drawn from studies of religious television (i.e., Christian 
television) with those studies of Islam-based TV. The following sub-sections discuss four 
indicators of power dynamics in religious television production. These are: 1) advertising 
and ratings; 2) institutional control and mission; and 3) external challenges; and 4) 
sociocultural issues relating to identity, gender, class and race. 
3.2.1 Advertising and Ratings 
This section addresses how advertising and ratings shape television production in general 
and religious television in particular. Studies show that advertising forces and viewer 
ratings often result in media organisations imposing some level of control over media 
production processes, particularly over media products/texts (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 
(2011). Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011) point to the importance of programme genre as 
a way to match audience taste and attract advertisers. According to them, ‘cultural 
industries tend to use genres as a way of attempting to match audiences with texts […] 
genre terms are based on shared understanding among producers and audiences to texts’ 
(ibid., p. 14). Understanding business strategy and audience tastes can attract advertising 
revenues and increase programme ratings (Saha, 2012). Murdock and Golding assert that 
cultural industries in general and media organisations in particular are important sites to 
study because they are ‘the major arena for advertising; the commercial media play a 
pivotal role in matching consumer demands to production’ (Murdock and Golding, 2005, 
p. 60). These are the ways media sociology, as described by political economists, observe 
that advertising forces can shape the processes of media production.  
The cultural studies scholars who consider media industries regard advertising as a 
source of tensions in television production (Caldwell, 2006). Caldwell suggests that 
dealing with advertising clients as ‘rituals’ in television production. Caldwell suggests that 
television production involves ‘maintenance rituals’, during which television production 
executives negotiate with advertising clients and sponsors as part of their business 
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requirements and to secure resources (Caldwell, 2006, pp. 140-41). Such rituals include 
‘monitoring rituals’, which subsequently develop anxiety among the television production 
staff involved. Both maintenance and monitoring rituals signify power hierarchies in 
television production (ibid., p. 141). In light of the production culture concept, this thesis 
examines the extent to which advertising and ratings lead to media organisations imposing 
a certain degree of control over religious television production processes, a degree which 
could subsequently affect the production quality of the produced programmes.  
The same is true of religious television of which producers are governed by 
organisational business strategies to gain ratings and advertising revenues. Ailsa 
Hollinshead’s (2002) doctoral research project notes that commercial forces such as 
advertising and viewing figures are prime motivators for television producers who 
commission fictional religious programmes. Her research shows that producers are under 
pressure to create intriguing storylines that increase ratings for TV episodes are 
convincing to advertisers and, subsequently, sustain the broadcasting of the programmes 
for a longer time. According to Hollinshead, a ‘rating governs everything […] if [a] rating 
starts to fall, a programme is in danger of being cancelled’ (ibid., p. 177). Aside from 
ratings and advertising, television producers also experience resource constraints. In her 
interviews with producers of fictional TV programmes that represent religious elements, 
such as Brookside (Channel 4, 1982 – present), Coronation Street (ITV, 1960-present), 
EastEnders (BBC 1, 1985-present) and Hollyoaks (Channel 4, 1995-present), results suggest 
that television producers experience time, planning and financial constraints concerning 
programme development and production. Her research is a clear example of how 
commercial forces and resource constraints shape the production of fictional religious 
programmes.  
In addressing how producers of religious programming negotiate the pressures of 
advertising and ratings, Catriona Noonan (2011) suggests that producers have ‘rebranded’ 
religious programmes by using the term ‘spiritual programming’. Noonan’s analysis of the 
production of Extreme Pilgrim (BBC2, 2008), a program that depicts the spiritual journey of 
an unconventional Church of England vicar, suggests that the representation of spirituality 
in reality television and a lifestyle format is perceived as a creative and innovative 
approach initiated by the broadcast institution due to its advertising and commercial 
appeal (Noonan, 2011, p. 728). Although television producers have acknowledged the 
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shift in which themes associated with spirituality are increasingly prevalent within factual 
religious programming, Noonan states that the traditional form of religious television 
(e.g., the worship format seen particularly in Christian tradition) ‘still resonates and is 
likely to continue’ (ibid., p. 743). Evidently, advertising and rating figures have driven 
television producers to adopt a strategy that incorporates audience preferences.  
3.2.2 Institutional Mission and Control 
Driven by the institutional mission and desire to regulate media production, owners and 
senior managers of media organisation exercise a certain degree of control over their 
employees. Georgina Born (2004) analyses the threats to BBC production under the 
leadership of John Birt, as compared with the relatively high degree of autonomy allowed 
by Greg Dyke as the director-general of that organisation. Her study shows that the 
change of institutional ethos within a media organisation impacts its overall operations, as 
well as individuals and groups involved in media production. Born’s ethnographic research 
of BBC production may illuminate the ways in which an institutional mission and control 
shape the production culture of a television organisation.  
The management control over production routines signifies the power dynamics 
within media organisations. Murdock states that, in general, owners possess potential 
control over media organisations, as they can ‘regulate the output of the divisions they 
own directly, either intervening in day-to-day operations, or establishing general goals and 
understandings, and appointing managerial and editorial staff to implement them within 
the constraints set by overall allocation of resources’ (Murdock, 1990, p. 7). Murdock 
also argues that there are two types of control that managers and owners can exert: 
‘allocative’ and ‘operational’. Allocative control consists of decisions connected to policy 
formulation, including allocation of resources, appointments to senior managerial 
positions, dictation of editorial lines and product investment, and control over the 
distribution of profits. Meanwhile, operational control involves making use of the 
resources allocated and pursuing policy decisions. Murdock maintains that in most cases 
managerial positions have operational rather than allocative control (cited in Goldsmiths 
Media Group, 2000, p. 33). He suggests that workers in media production still follow the 
institutional mission laid down by the owner notwithstanding such control. His study 
confirms the power hierarchies inherent in the production culture of a media organisation 
(Caldwell, 2006; 2008).  
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Curran compares and contrasts the liberal and radical political economy positions 
towards the issue of ownership control and media production (Curran, 2000, p. 26). 
According to Curran, in their critiques of media production, liberals have expressed 
positions that have ‘overemphasised small gains and ignored great losses of individual 
autonomy’. Meanwhile, according to radical political economy, media industries reinforce 
social power because the wealthy and influential own them. Murdock and Curran have 
both expressed concerns over the tight control by owners exerted upon the activities of 
media producers. The ‘news making’ studies of the 1970s by media sociologists (Molotch 
and Lester, 1974; Tuchman, 1978) for example, reveal how institutional routines 
determine what would be defined as news’ (Peterson and Anand, 2004, p. 312). These 
studies demonstrate how structural hierarchy, particularly owners’ control, may facilitate 
or constrain news/media production processes.  
In contrast, some researchers have discovered that media producers, particularly 
those in the television industry, enjoy a certain amount of freedom. The scholarship of 
media sociology and cultural studies explores issues of organisational control and creative 
autonomy concerning media production (e.g., Tunstall, 1993; Gitlin, 1983; Cottle, 
2000; 2003; Born, 2004; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011). As an example, Tunstall 
argues that British television producers enjoy considerable creative autonomy (1993, p. 
24). As asserted by Tunstall, ‘factual television producers have a substantial level of 
autonomy over the content’. Current affairs producers also have ‘a huge degree of 
creative autonomy over both the choice and treatment of subjects’ (ibid., p.  63).   
Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s research (2011) into creative labour in three media 
industries illuminates our understanding of the conditions of those involved in media 
production. Through a normative framework and a combination of three major paradigms 
(political economy of culture; organisation, business and management studies; and 
cultural studies), their research has generated a large amount of interpreted data 
concerning the experience of media workers and working lives in media production. They 
indicate that different media organisations offer their employees various types of working 
environments and experiences, ‘including how much they respect autonomy and workers’ 
needs to produce a good job’ (ibid., p. 222). They also describe two types of autonomy 
relevant to the study of the production culture of religious television. These are 
‘workplace autonomy’ and ‘creative autonomy’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 40). 
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According to these scholars, ‘workplace autonomy’ is ‘the degree of self-determination 
that individual workers or groups of workers have within a certain work situation’. On 
the other hand, ‘creative autonomy’ is ‘the extent to which art, knowledge and symbol-
making and so on can and/or should operate independently of the influence of other 
determinants’ (ibid.) Their study shows the implications of institutional control for the 
creative autonomy of media production workers. The notion of creative autonomy is 
relevant to this thesis – in particular, during analysis of the quality of working life of 
employees involved in magazine talk show production in Chapter 7. 
In the context of religious television, the ways in which the institutional 
mission/control shape programme production may be observed in both Christian and 
Muslim television contexts. In his research into the BBC’s production of ethnic minority 
programmes, Simon Cottle states the Corporation aims ‘to serve Britain’s ethnic 
minorities, which include the Muslim community through targeted programmes and 
services and fair representation in mainstream radio and television output’ (BBC, People 
and Programme 1995, cited in Cottle, 1998, p. 295). Cottle states that an ‘overwhelming 
ethos of conservatism’ seems to impact the quality of minority television programmes 
(Cottle, 1997, p. 60). Cottle (1998) describes a serious kind of control demonstrated by 
the BBC towards the production of ethnic minority programmes. As a result, executives 
and production professionals expressed feelings of discontent. According to Cottle, ‘the 
essential conservative nature and corporate ethos of the BBC constraining programme 
subject matter and innovation of programme forms; the professional producer’s pursuit of 
mainstream programmes, audiences and professional BBC status, and consequent 
tendency to provide less than committed or challenging ethnic minority programmes […]’ 
(ibid., p. 313). Perhaps in Cottle’s case, the corporation’s treatment of programmes 
might have varied from one genre to another (e.g., minority programmes vs. current 
affairs and factual programmes). Cottle's study is an example of how the mission of the 
broadcast institution shapes the production culture of the minority programme producers. 
Although his research did not explicitly analyse the experiences of Muslim television 
producers with the organisational mission, it demonstrates the challenge faced by the BBC 
television producers in representing ethnic minority issues on-screen and behind-the-
scenes of its programming. 
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While Cottle contextualises his research within the politics of representation inside 
the BBC through the lens of the cultural studies of media industries approach (e.g., 
Havens et al., 2009), Catriona Noonan (2008) uses sociological approaches to analyse 
BBC religious broadcasting. Drawing upon historical analyses and ethnographic data, she 
maps the changes and continuities relating to the treatment of religion in BBC 
programming, as well as the occupational challenges facing its production community. She 
looks at both the radio and television broadcasting of religious topics. In her article 
examining the spiritual discourse in UK religious television, Noonan points to an 
evolution in religious broadcasting evident in in the ways in which television producers 
have adopted a discourse of spirituality and faith in the style and tone of programming. 
While this strategy may have been the Corporation’s response to economic forces, i.e., 
viewing figures, it was also an institutional effort to encourage viewership by a wider 
audience and not only those interested in religion. Hence, such interventions by the 
Corporation have continued to be factors that shape creative decision-making of the BBC 
in-house and independent producers. The Cottle and Noonan study offer insights into the 
extent to which the organisational mission adopted by the Islam Channel can shape the 
production quality of its magazine talk show and the working lives of the members of its 
production community. 
From the perspective of Muslim television, there is still little research into the 
production culture of Islam-based television. Despite this void, there are a few research 
studies that focus on the interplay of power within Islam-based television institutions 
relating to institutional ideology and mission. Studies of Islam-based television 
organisations emphasising their social and religiopolitical ethos and ideological roots help 
to theorise the power relations internal and external to the production of religious 
television. No particular study provides an ethnographic account of the production culture 
and the institutional context of an Islam-based television organisation. Nonetheless, 
literature that focuses on the challenges faced by Muslim cultural production institutions 
helps conceptualise the production culture of the Islam Channel. Examples include Kira 
Kosnick’s (2004) study of the Open Channel in Germany, Marwan Kraidy and Joe Khalil 
(2009) on Arab television industries, Talal Rajab (2010) on the Islam Channel and 
Mohammad Ayish (2012) on religious broadcasting on Middle East mainstream television.  
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3.2.3 External Challenges  
Drawing upon the perspective of BBC religious broadcasting, I discuss how institutional 
control and mission shape media production. This section addresses the external 
challenges that affect religious television institutions and production workers. These 
external challenges include the Church authority and media regulators for Christian 
television (Noonan, 2008), and the religious ideology and media regulators for Muslim 
television (e.g., Kraidy and Khalil, 2009; Ayish, 2012). I discuss each challenge in turn.     
The first external challenge facing a Christian broadcaster is the Church authority, 
on account of the close ideological and historical ties between religion and the public 
service principles upheld by the BBC (Noonan, 2014, p. 65). Religion is perceived to have 
been a ‘distinct style of programming since the 1920s’ (Noonan, 2008, p. 11). As 
compared to radio, television is a more complex medium with which to disseminate 
Christian beliefs. Thus, the Corporation tends to treat televised religious programmes 
with more caution because the religious message intended by the producers also appears in 
various programme formats. As Noonan puts it, ‘religious broadcasting does not have a 
typical mode of delivery straddling fact and fiction, at times using discussion, debate or 
drama as a vehicle for their message’ (ibid., p. 10). The clash between the Church and 
producers at the Corporation was concerned with the programme format. While the 
Church prefers a traditional form of religious broadcasting, such as sermon and talk, 
producers struggle to find a way to serve the public interest through programmes that 
contain not only a religious mission but also other aspects of everyday life involving moral 
and ethical values. This is an example of how external influence can cause tensions in 
religious television production. 
The second external challenge faced by a Christian broadcaster is the media 
regulator. Whereas the Church is concerned by new programming formats that could 
compromise the Christian mission, the media regulator recognises religion as ‘a distinct 
genre that meets the needs of particular minority audiences’, hence, it must be protected 
(Ofcom, 2005). The protection of public interest is paramount to the media regulator. 
The creative producers managed to enhance the production quality of the BBC’s religious-
themed programming. They produced lifestyle and reality television genres, including the 
Extreme Pilgrim (BBC2, 2008), The Monastery (BBC 2, 2005) and The Island Parish (BBC2, 
2007). Despite the producers' success, the BBC Department of Religion and Ethics is still 
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fighting for its autonomy. According to Noonan, ‘In the case of religious broadcasting, its 
political links are clearly visible in the way the regulator intervenes in the supply of 
programmes and the policies that [the BBC] forms to support it’ (Noonan, 2008, p. 10). 
To maintain regulatory compliance, the Corporation seeks to control the producers’ 
creative decisions. As a result, unlike Channel 4, which has adopted a more controversial 
approach to representing religion, the BBC is more reserved; TV producers fear pushing 
the envelope too far. As Noonan asserts, ‘producers increasingly occupied the middle 
ground of production as risk-taking was side-lined for safer mainstream programmes’ 
(ibid., p. 33). Noonan’s research is relevant to my thesis as it points out why and how the 
management exercises caution, as well as the extent to which such caution affects the 
production quality and working life at the Islam Channel. 
Studies of Islam-based television in the Middle East address the influence of 
religious authority or ulama on religious programming or the religious-themed television 
genre. For instance, Kraidy and Khalil (2009) suggest that although controversial 
programming, such as the “hot-button” issues of politics, women and entertainment, do 
attract advertising revenues in the Arab-Islamic television industry, they have resulted in 
criticism from religious authorities in the Middle East (Kraidy and Khalil, 2009, p.  33-
54). In Saudi Arabia, Marwan Kraidy and Joe Khalil note: ‘conservative clerics were 
empowered to shape television policy and content which enabled them to influence the 
growth of the national television sector in the ensuing decade’ (ibid., p. 70-73). Kraidy 
and Khalil’s broad political economy analyses of religious television in the Arab television 
industries show how religious ideology is not separable from the state. The mapping of 
ideological influences upon Arab television channels interests me because it demonstrates 
how power dynamics within Muslim cultural industries, including the tension between the 
fundamentalist and moderate Muslim ideologies (addressed in Chapter 2), can shape 
television production. Table 2 illustrates ideological influences on religious television in 
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Table 2: Ideological Influence of Islam-based Television in the Middle East  
 
 
Source: Kraidy, M. and Khalil, J.F. 2009. Arab television industries. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan on behalf of the British Film Institute. p. 71  
 
Whereas Kraidy and Khalil observe Islam-based television from the political 
economy perspective, Mohammad Ayish (2012) analyses three of the Middle East’s 
mainstream television institutions: Al Jazeera, Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC1) 
and Dubai TV (DTV). Ayish approaches these organisations using quantitative content 
analysis and qualitative textual analysis of three religious talk shows produced by these 
broadcast institutions. These programmes are: Al Sharia Wal Hayat (Shari’a/Islamic 
Jurisprudence and Life), produced by Al Jazeera Arabic; Al Haya Kalima (Life is a Word), 
MBC1; and Al Boyout Al Amena (Safe Homes), by Dubai TV. Ayish indicates that 
quantitative analyses show that all three programmes adopt moderate, centrist and 
accommodating approaches to the promotion of those values. According to Ayish, 
‘something that bodes well for the future contributions of this broadcasting genre to the 
development of Arab societies in the context of globalisation’ (Ayish, 2012, p. 20). With 
regards to the fundamentalist threat, Ayish found that none of these talk shows were 
‘carrying any fundamentalist messages, nor any religious or sectarian hate’ (ibid.). His 
qualitative data analysis describes five major themes as central to these three talk shows: 
knowledge, reason, centrism (moderation), freedom and co-existence. The results not 
only seek to promote views of Islam as ‘a religion that respects tolerance, moderation and 
dignity’, but also reflect the states’ agenda, which portrays them as an advocate of 
moderate views and an opponent of Salafi fundamentalism (ibid., p. 32). Such religious 
branding of moderate vs. fundamentalist is vital in the study of religious television 
production because it signifies the dynamics of power within the institution.   
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As with the context of the Muslim minority in the West, media regulators and 
counter-extremist think tanks are alarmed by the way a television organisation, such as the 
Islam Channel, portrays religious personalities. Upon researching the Islam Channel on 
behalf of the British counter-extremist Quilliam Foundation, Talal Rajab (2010) 
concluded that the channel was a hub of Muslim extremists. He believed that the content 
breached the broadcasting code, drawing attention to ‘potential due impartiality issues’ in 
its reporting of the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts, for example (see Ofcom, 2011 for details,  
pp. 5-25). The results of textual analysis also raised concerns from media regulator 
Ofcom about the threat of extremism through the Islam Channel programming.  
Pressures from counter-extremism organisations and media regulators can shape to 
some extent the creative decision-making of television producers. A similar situation can 
be observed elsewhere:  for example, in a country like Germany, immigrant television 
programming has been a subject of political debate. Kira Kosnick’s (2004) study of 
Muslim migrant producers of the Open Channel TV in Germany looks at the clash 
between Germany’s multicultural media policy (which set the Open Channel as public 
minority access) and Muslim television producers. Her research shows that immigrant 
productions at the Open Channel TV were described as the work of extremists and 
fundamentalists with anti-integrationist aims; she discusses how such claims might foster 
the further isolation of immigrant populations, as well as encourage anti-democratic 
sentiments amongst them (ibid., p. 23). Like the Islam Channel, Open Channel TV was 
also scrutinised by its media regulator, The State Media Council (Landesmedienanstalt) of 
Berlin-Brandenburg. After receiving several complaints from German viewers, the media 
regulator initiated an investigation of Open Channel TV. In the absence of concrete 
evidence that the channel advocates religious extremism, it was still accused of such 
extremism at the parliamentary level. According to Kosnick ‘Islamic programmes are the 
first that parliamentary critics refer to when they claim that the Open Channel project has 
[and] failed to them, the programmes are an indication that the channel is a ‘playground 
for extremists’ rather than an example of lived, practical democracy’ (ibid., p. 28).   
I have discussed in Sub-section 3.2.2 internal challenges, such as the institutional 
mission and control, and in Sub-section 3.2.3 external challenges faced by Christian and 
Islam-based broadcast institutions. These organisations face ideological constraints and 
problems caused by the mission and policy set by religious broadcasters. Analysis of 
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institutional aspects of religious television allows an understanding of the dynamics of 
power that are internal and external to these organisations. These problems bear 
implications for television production staff who have to address them, as we shall discuss 
in chapters 5 through 7.  While subsections 3.2.1 through 3.2.2 have examined challenges 
that are internal and external to religious television organisations, the next sub-section 
discusses issues relating to identity, gender, class and race in the society that shape media 
production.  
3.2.4 Sociocultural Issues  
Research on the intersections of media, religion and occupational culture is often 
emphasised within the scholarship on journalism from different geographical contexts. 
From the perspective of U.S. journalism, for example, this type of research includes a 
comparative study of Catholic and evangelical journalists’ religious convictions, as well as 
a discussion of the tendency of both groups to separate professional issues from those in 
their religious lives (Schmalzbauer, 2002). Religious convictions and rituals are excluded 
from the working lives of these journalists. From the perspective of United Kingdom 
journalism, studies include the representations of Islam and Muslims in the media and 
news reporting (Poole, 2009; Knott et al., 2013). In Chapter 2, I have addressed the 
sociocultural contexts in which Muslim media producers live and work. I have elaborated 
on the clash between the West and Islamic cultures (Section 2.2) and tensions within 
Muslim communities relating to religious identity, music and youth, and gender and 
female subjects (Section 2.3). The review of literature in Chapter 2 shows that the clash 
and tensions may affect Muslim media organisations and producers. Even so, these studies 
do not explicitly examine religious television production. Due to the dearth of scholarly 
publications regarding how sociocultural issues shape religious television production, this 
section reviews literature from media sociology and cultural studies that address problems 
in the society concerning identity, gender, class and race that shape media production.  
 It is essential to understand how sociocultural issues affect the creative autonomy of 
media producers. David Hesmondhalgh argues that ‘during the production of media texts, 
media producers draw upon knowledge, values and beliefs circulating in society’ (2006, 
p. 2). The notion of ‘creative autonomy’ is central to the analysis of challenges for media 
producers. Hesmondhalgh and Baker address the creative autonomy of creative labour and 
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the ways in which struggles over autonomy ‘generate tensions and contradictions20 in 
cultural production’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 81). I will discuss creative 
autonomy further in Section 3.3, where I introduce key concepts in the studies of creative 
labour. The point I am making here is that issues relating to sociocultural issues can shape 
media production in ways that challenge the creative autonomy of media producers. The 
knowledge, values and beliefs circulating in the society from which media producers are 
supposed to draw while making their creative decisions, therefore, must be negotiated.   
Another area worth exploring when thinking about challenges is the identity of 
media producers who work in the cultural production industries. Vicki Mayer, Miranda J. 
Banks and John Thornton Caldwell’s cultural studies approach seeks to analyse the various 
levels of the professional hierarchies present within television and film industries (Mayer 
et al., 2009, p. 2). The results indicate how creative workers ‘shape[s] and refashion[s] 
their identities in the process of making their careers in industries that are undergoing 
political transitions and economic reorganisations’. Within an organisational context, the 
lived experience of media producers and ‘the complexity of routines and rituals, the 
routines of seemingly complex processes, the economic and political forces that shape the 
roles, technologies, and the distribution of resources according to cultural demographic 
differences’ (ibid., p. 4). 
Media sociologists and cultural studies scholars emphasise the power dynamics 
within the cultural industries relating to gender, class and race. A class-gender-race model 
is necessary to understand ‘capital-labour structure’ as well as ‘sex-gender and racialized 
identity relations’ (Toynbee, 2008, p. 271). According to Jason Toynbee, these [class-
gender-race/ethnicity] are 'the big three structures' which have a significant impact on 
media-making’ (ibid.). The ways in which these elements are played out in media 
organisations might affect the creative autonomy of individual media producers. Histories 
of class, gender and ethnic relationships all affect the production processes and outcomes 
within media organisations (Goldsmith Media Group, 2000, p. 21). Cultural studies’ 
                                                   
20 According to Hesmondhalgh and Baker, ‘these tensions and contradictions are categorized in a 
form of ‘contrastive pairing’, e.g., tensions between art and capital (Ryan 1992), art and 
commerce (Banks 2007), culture and commerce (Slater and Tonkiss 2001), creativity and 
commerce (Negus and Pickering 2004), culture and commodity (Frow 1996), and culture 
and economy (Ray and Sayer 2004),’. Hesmondhalgh, D. and Baker, S. 2011. Creative 
labour : media work in three cultural industries. London: Routledge. p.  81. 
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critiques of class, race and gender focus on the media product, particularly upon the 
textual representation of these issues (Kellner, 1995; Durham and Kellner, 2001; Barker, 
2012). However, for Toynbee, sometimes these cultural studies’ approaches ‘failed to 
take account of concrete linkages between mode of production, a sectorial organisation of 
the media and professional code of media makers’ (Toynbee, 2008, p. 272). Nevertheless, 
the cultural studies approach to media texts is relevant to this thesis particularly in its 
analyses of the production quality of the magazine talk show in which questions of identity 
and gender may arise. 
There is a strand of cultural studies involved in examining how ‘prevailing patterns 
of cultural behaviour and power are reflected in the cultural industries’ (Hesmondhalgh, 
2013a, p. 55). While Keith Negus’s (1999, p. 82) study asks questions of ‘how gender, 
sexuality or class create patterns which shape the presentations of the artists’, Jason 
Toynbee’s (2000; 2008) efforts examine class, race and gender within the structural 
context of media and the politics of representation. On the one hand, he examines the 
structure of the media sector through the lens of political economy; and on the other, he 
looks at power relations based upon an ideological critique so as to determine the broader 
ideological landscape, including media representation. Overall, both the Toynbee and 
Negus studies highlight that class, gender and race can shape the processes of media 
production. Their studies contribute to my understanding of the power dynamics 
attending identity, class, gender and race within cultural production, particularly the 
power hierarchy involved in religious television, both at the organisational and television 
production levels.  
Sociological approaches to gender in media production address its influence upon 
production processes. Miranda J. Banks (Banks, 2009, p. 87) addressed questions about 
gender equality (or inequality) in media production. She sought to understand how a 
particular profession might be socially constructed through gender, particularly 
concerning those women who work at the lower end of a professional hierarchy in 
television production. In contrast, Julie D’Acci (1994) focuses on ‘above-the-line’ women 
professionals involved in media production, such as television producers, scriptwriters 
and network executives. In a study of the television network responsible for producing 
the long-running television show Cagney & Lacey (1981-1988), she explored how the 
show offered a ‘battleground for a negotiation’ of the term ‘feminism’ (Banks, 2009). 
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Although I am not going to specifically examine feminism or Western feminist media 
production, the female subject is central to my study of religious television, especially in 
the study of the production culture of Islam-based TV. In particular, the question of 
gender is crucial to my studies insofar as it impacts upon the creative autonomy and the 
physical and emotional well-being of female media producers. 
Feminisation of labour is another dimension of the gendered nature of media 
production (Carter et al., 2015, p. 5). Vicki Mayer (Mayer, 2015) categorises feminised 
work into three categories: First, there is work related to the domestic duties of 
housework and childcare. According to Mayer, ‘Jobs that focus on organisational duties, 
interpersonal and time management skills, and the ability to do multiple tasks at once 
(multi-skilling) tend to be framed as feminised work’ (ibid., p. 52). The second category 
includes jobs that tend to emphasise ‘affective performances associated with serving, 
assisting, or caring for others’ (ibid.). Mayer draws upon Arlie Hochschild’s (1983; 2012) 
concept of ‘emotional labour’ in her conceptualisation of this category, e.g., a job that 
requires ‘female performance’ or ‘deep acting in which people sublimed their emotions to 
make others feel more comfortable and pleased’ (ibid.). A third category involves 
communication and social interactions. Although these are aspects of all work, in the 
context of feminised work they are often ‘framed as gossip, chatting or banter’ (ibid., p. 
53). In this sense, ‘feminised work tends to be devalued and degraded about non-
feminised work’ (Kemp 1994, cited in Mayer 2015, p. 53). These categories of feminised 
work in the media illuminate the ways in which female media workers may be framed 
within the context of labour in religious television production.  
While Mayer argues that feminised work suggests the diminished visibility of female 
media workers and the degradation of women’s work within the media industries, Denise 
D. Bielby (2015) addresses gender inequality in media industries somewhat differently, 
attending to the gender gap in pay and employment, resources, and rewards. She also 
points out that female media workers are often segregated from males because the tasks 
assigned to them are based upon sex. Like Mayer, she argues that employers assign these 
jobs based upon their social beliefs that women should behave modestly and carry out such 
tasks. In contrast, she claims that such feminised jobs are the result of ‘employers’’ 
conscious and unconscious beliefs (i.e., sex stereotypes) about the characteristics that 
various jobs require and about what tasks women and men are capable of doing’ (ibid., 
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Bielby, 2015, p. 137). These approaches to female subjects within media production 
industries allow me to map the work roles of women television workers in religious 
television production and the treatment of the physical appearance of women on and off-
screen. These areas are worth exploring in this thesis because they are central to the study 
of issues relating to Islam and Muslims in general and of Islam-based television in 
particular. 
Previously, in sub-sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.3, I have engaged with research that 
addressed three other indicators of power dynamics in religious television. These include: 
1) advertising and ratings; 2) institutional control and mission; and 3) external challenges. 
Because of the lack of research on how sociocultural issues affect religious television 
production, this sub-section (3.2.4) maps literature from media sociology and cultural 
studies that address issues relating to identity, gender, class and race in media production.  
3.3 A Sociological Approach to Creative Labour: the Quality of 
Working Life 
This section discusses research analysing the quality of working life in the creative 
industries. Such studies are relevant as they stand to support our understanding of how 
and under what conditions television production employees produce programmes. I will 
analyse literature that discusses the everyday working lives of creative workers in general 
and of television production staff in particular. I then discuss four key concepts relevant to 
studies of work in television production: exploitation, self-exploitation, creative 
autonomy and emotional well-being. These four concepts form part of my analysis of the 
staff experiences of the production culture at the Islam Channel (discussed in Chapter 6).  
The critique of work under capitalism has always been a particular interest of 
Marxist scholars. The Marxist critique of capitalist economies, however, does not focus 
on the subjective experiences of workers (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 25). I 
acknowledge Marx’s legacy in the studies of cultural labour and note that, to some extent, 
his critique of exploitation and autonomy is relevant to this thesis. Hesmondhalgh and 
Baker point out, Marx himself was not a sociologist and did not conduct his arguments on 
sociological grounds (ibid.). I intend to review sociological research that concentrates on 
the quality of working life, such as that of Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011), which seeks 
to build on Marxian and other normative insights. Their research seeks to conceptualise 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ work in the creative industries, including television production. In 
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developing such a model of good and bad work, they examine four characteristics of 
alienation that characterise bad work, focusing upon how these characteristics impact the 
quality of working life. The four characteristics include: powerlessness, meaninglessness, 
isolation and self-estrangement. In order to better define good work, they suggest a list of 
terms opposite in meaning to those characteristics of alienation: autonomy, 
meaningfulness, sociality and self-esteem. Using these characteristics, they conceptualise 
bad and good work in creative industries. 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker create a model of good and bad work that allows them to 
explore the quality of working life in three creative industries: magazine publishing, music 
and television. In my research, I will measure the quality of working life by drawing on 
some of the concepts that Hesmondhalgh and Baker use. Similar to the efforts of 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker, this research also aims to explore ‘subjective states and 
people’s reflections about them (and the forces that might shape such experience)’ 
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 31). While their work explores three different sites 
of creative industry, my research focuses on a single television organisation that produces 
programmes for Muslim communities in Britain and abroad. It explores the ways in which 
economic, organisational and sociocultural factors shape the production of the magazine 
talk show Living the Life. In the following section, I discuss four key concepts to the study 
of creative labour. I refer to sociological research projects, such as those of Gillian Ursell 
(2000), when analysing exploitation in television industry. I further refer to Mark Banks’ 
(2007) study to address issues common to creative work, such as self-exploitation.  
Four Key Concepts in Studies of Creative Labour 
This section includes four key concepts that are used to analyse the quality of working life 
in Chapter 6: exploitation, self-exploitation, creative autonomy and emotional well-being. Upon 
examining Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s conceptualisation of good and bad work within the 
creative industries, I acknowledge that there are other concepts that might be applied to 
the study of creative labour. My choice of these concepts, however, is supported by the 
previous research projects that have engaged with them in order to explain the factors that 
shape creative decisions, the dynamics of power in creative/cultural labour, as well as the 
physical and emotional well-being of creative workers (e.g., Ursell, 2000; Grindstaff, 
2002; Banks, 2007; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011).  
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3.3.1 Exploitation  
Exploitation is a term frequently used to describe a situation wherein ‘one group or 
individual is structurally in a position enabling them to take advantage of others’ 
(Himmelweit, 2006). Arguments surrounding the exploitation of labour are central to the 
Marxist tradition with regard to work or paid labour under capitalism. Critics focus on 
situations in which employers/business owners make use of, or ‘steal’ their employees’ 
time, to enhance company profits. Using a Marxist lens, Peter Nolan (1993) describes the 
state in which workers experience exploitation by their employers:  ‘because the working 
day is longer than necessary to produce their wages and the remainder of their day is spent 
producing a surplus profit for their capitalist employer’ (pp. 716-717). Such Marxist 
definitions of exploitation are relevant to this thesis, but they are not used to address 
issues concerning minimum wage, long working hours or the size of profit gained by the 
Islam Channel. Instead, in this thesis the term ‘exploitation’ refers to the ways in which 
the Islam Channel deploys the idea of a religious mission in order to encourage hard work 
amongst television production staff. The adoption of the exploitation here differs from the 
Marxist concept which focuses upon the exercise of power by an employer/organisation 
over their employees in order to secure economic and material gain. The concept of 
exploitation can also refer to an ideological power structure, explaining how the channel 
exploits a social, religiopolitical mission in order to motivate their television production 
employees to work hard and to tolerate low salaries.    
Studies show that television production is often seen as a site rife with labour 
exploitation. Gillian Ursell describes exploitation in the working life of television 
workers:  
The willingness of individuals to work in television production is partly to 
be explained by the tantalizing possibilities thereby for securing social 
recognition and acclaim, that is, self-affirmation and public esteem, and 
partly by the possibilities for self-actualization and creativity (be it 
aesthetic or commercially entrepreneurial). For the workers, television 
production is simultaneously a source of potential rewards, both material 
and existential, and a source of definite exploitation […] (Ursell, 2000, p. 
819). 
While Marxist critics focus upon the exploitation of labour under capitalist 
employers, Ursell’s research describes an employee’s motivation to work in television 
production, as well as how both reward and exploitation are involved in the job. By using 
monetary or material rewards and social recognition, for example, employers urge staff to 
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work harder and endure longer hours. Exploitation in Ursell’s sense demonstrates the 
exercise of power by those at the top of the organisational hierarchy, i.e., the manager or 
the CEO.  
In addition to luring workers with material rewards and social recognition, 
television organisations also use strategic management techniques to make a position in 
television production more appealing to potential employees and new entrants to the 
field. Ursell describes the way in which television management exploits ‘flexibility 
employment techniques’ to secure greater flexibility from workers in television 
production. Studies show that such flexibility techniques may lead to exploitation, a 
common experience of workers in television industries (see Tunstall, 1993; Banks, 2007). 
My study not only addresses concerns similar to these, but also aims to explore the ways 
in which the Islam Channel’s mission is strategically used by its management to motivate 
employees to work harder. This conception of exploitation is useful to assess the quality of 
working life of the production community at the Islam Channel in Chapter 7.  
3.3.2 Self-exploitation 
While exploitation involves the exercise of power by those at the top over employees at 
the bottom of the organisational hierarchy, ‘self-exploitation’ is a situation in which 
employees push themselves very hard whilst doing their jobs. Hesmondhalgh and Baker 
define ‘self-exploitation’ as a situation where ‘workers become so enamoured of their jobs 
that they push themselves to the limits of their physical and emotional 
endurance,’(Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 20). They categorise self-exploitation as 
an aspect of ‘bad work’ in television production. Like Hesmondhalgh and Baker, Mark 
Banks (2007) addresses the issue of self-exploitation amongst cultural workers without 
regard to particular industries. Rather, Banks views self-exploitation as prevalent within 
creative industries, where ‘self-employed fashion designers, web designers, television 
workers, artists and so on [involved in] working long hours, often through the night or 
over weekends, taking no holidays, drawing a minimal (if any) salary, skipping meals and 
rest, forever pushing themselves to the limit in order to not only satisfy their own passion 
for creative self-realisation, but also (and perhaps more often) to meet deadlines and 
contractual obligations imposed by others’ (Banks, 2007, p. 58). Angela McRobbie 
(1998), Rosalind Gill (2002), and Gillian Ursell (2006) that self-exploitation is pervasive 
amongst creative workers.  
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The concept of self-exploitation is worth exploring within the context of religious 
television production because such programming is ‘a different sort of genre’ and the 
resulting media products ‘cannot be considered neutral entities’ (Noonan, 2008, p. 10). 
Given such a distinct characteristic of religious television, workers in religious television 
production require a special approach to study their experience and challenges. Television 
employees who work for religious television might self-exploit for different reasons. For 
instance, workers may be driven by religious concepts, such as perceiving ‘work as a 
mission’ or as religious vocation. In Christianity, the notion of good work originated with 
Lutherans and Calvinists and set ‘a cultural norm that doing a ‘good job’ for its own sake 
has a positive moral value as a service to God,’ (Schaltegger and Torgler, 2010, p.99). 
Max Weber (2001), in his Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism, argued that the Calvinist 
doctrine of predestination acknowledges that people need to seek ‘evidence’ to prove that 
they are among the ‘elect’ (God’s chosen).21 Similar notions can be explored to describe 
the Muslim motivation for self-exploitation, as this motivation might also be based upon 
scriptural sources that address the promise of such deferred reward for doing good work 
in this world: 
Whoever does righteousness man or woman, and has faith, verily, to him. We will 
give a new life, a life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their 
reward according to the best of their actions (Qur’an 16:97 translated by Yusuf 
Ali, p. 663). 
These examples demonstrate how a religious calling and the promise of ‘deferred 
reward’ in the afterlife might encourage workers to self-exploit. Because of the distinct 
experiences that a religious television organisation may offer its employees, I will explore 
what motivates television production staff at the Islam Channel to self-exploit and the 
extent to which power dynamics within the channel encourage self-exploitation.   
3.3.3 Creative Autonomy 
Creative autonomy is another important aspect in the study of creative labour. Derived 
from ‘Kantian and utilitarian philosophy’s conceptions of the person, and of personal 
morality’, the term ‘autonomy’ is widely used in multidisciplinary studies and cannot be 
detached from its philosophical roots (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 40). In their 
                                                   
21 The idea is that God chooses the saved and the damned in advance. Cited in Davidson, J.C. and 
Caddell, D.P. 1994. Religion and the Meaning of Work. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion. 33(2), pp.135-147. 
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research, Hesmondhalgh and Baker use ‘autonomy’ to describe the self-determination’ of 
creative workers and emphasise two types: ‘workplace autonomy’ and ‘creative 
autonomy’. Hesmondhalgh and Baker address the creative autonomy of creative labour 
and the ways in which struggles over autonomy ‘generate tensions and contradictions in 
cultural production (ibid., p. 81).   
The notion of the ‘creative autonomy’ of media producers is central to the analysis 
of sociocultural factors. Hesmondhalgh (2006, p. 2) argues that ‘during the production of 
media texts, media producers draw upon knowledge, values and beliefs circulating in 
society’. But the creative autonomy of media producers may be limited. Hesmondhalgh 
and Baker (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 81) address the creative autonomy of 
creative labour and the ways in which struggles over autonomy ‘generate tensions and 
contradictions in cultural production’.22 The point I am making here is that sociocultural 
factors can shape media production in ways that challenge the creative autonomy of media 
producers. The circulating knowledge, values and beliefs in the society from which media 
producers draw whilst making creative decisions, therefore, must be negotiated. In 
agreement with them, I recognise that creative autonomy is limited. Drawing on the idea 
of ‘limited’ creative autonomy, I aim to explore the extent to which creative decision-
making is enabled or constrained by forces that are internal and external to the Islam 
Channel.  
Studies show that possessing autonomy within creative work can be both good and 
bad for workers. While Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011) regard autonomy as 
characterising good work, Banks (2007, p. 61) argues that ‘the seduction of autonomy’ is 
strong enough for workers ‘to deny the hardships of individualised work and to eclipse the 
feelings of exhaustion and despair’. Here, creative autonomy can function as a double-
edged sword for creative labour. For example, having a certain degree of creative 
autonomy increases worker satisfaction, as they operate free from influence whilst making 
creative decisions. However, having a certain degree of creative autonomy can also lead to 
                                                   
22 According to Hesmondhalgh and Baker, these tensions and contradictions are categorized in a 
form of ‘contrastive pairing’, e.g., tensions between art and capital (Ryan 1992), art and 
commerce (Banks 2007), culture and commerce (Slater and Tonkiss 2001), creativity and 
commerce (Negus and Pickering 2004), culture and commodity (Frow 1996), and culture 
and economy (Ray and Sayer 2004). Cited in Hesmondhalgh, D. and Baker, S. 2011. 
Creative labour : media work in three cultural industries. London: Routledge. p. 81 
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over-work/self-exploitation, which affects their work-life balance. Workers tend to self-
exploit to maintain the freedom (creative autonomy) that they struggle for (ibid.).  
This thesis will explore the creative autonomy of the producer and researchers at 
the Islam Channel. I aim to discover the extent to which the creative autonomy of the 
producer is challenged by representational issues relating to Islam and Muslims that are 
circulated by western media.  
3.3.4 Emotional Well-being 
Emotion is an important aspect of creative labour. I intend to explore it as a subject that 
shapes the quality of working life. Some Marxist writers (e.g., Michael Hardt, Antonio 
Negri, and Maurizio Lazzarato) have conceptualised ‘immaterial labour’ and/or ‘affective 
labour’, as ‘labour that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product 
knowledge, or communication’, and ‘human communication and interaction as well as 
gendered caring and health work’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 159). In line with 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s critique of these concepts, I maintain that they pay insufficient 
attention to questions of emotional well-being and are not explored sociologically.  
Since early 2000, media sociologists have included emotion in their analyses of 
creative labour (see Grindstaff, 2002; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2008; Hesmondhalgh 
and Baker, 2011). In their study of the production staff of a British television talent show, 
David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker (2011) examined the emotional well-being of the 
staff. They prefer the concept ‘emotional labour’ to immaterial and/or affective labour. 
‘Emotional labour’ was conceptualised by Arlie Hochschild in her ground-breaking 
research of the commercialisation of human feeling within service industries (see 
Hochschild, 1983; 2012). Hochschild (2012) concluded that ‘emotional labour requires 
one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that 
produces the proper state of mind in others’, (p. 7). Using Hochschild’s conceptualisation 
of emotional labour in order to analyse the staff involved in a talent show production, 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker suggest that these staff members perform emotional labour, 
which involves ‘the suppression of anger and frustration in the name of good working 
relations’, while handling the emotions of contributors and their families (Hesmondhalgh 
and Baker, 2011, p. 177). Like Hesmondhalgh and Baker, I also aim to explore the 
emotional well-being of the television production staff at the Islam Channel. Confronting 
representational issues and ideological constraints also impacts the emotional well-being of 
- 73 - 
members of the production community at the Islam Channel. The concept of emotional 
well-being is useful to analyse the ways in which the television production staff respond to 
constraints and manage their emotions whilst producing the magazine talk show. 
Because talk shows constitute a distinct television genre, the ways in which the 
production staff deal with their own emotions and those of others might differ from 
workers involved with documentaries, news or drama productions. Grindstaff’s work, in 
particular, is useful to my analysis of emotional well-being. Her study of confessional 
daytime talk shows addresses the ‘emotional work’ that production staff are required to 
perform. Like Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011), Grindstaff also applies Hochschild’s 
concept of emotional labour within her observations of production staff who must manage 
programme contributors and their own emotions at the same time. Such a distinct 
experience of making a television talk show, according to Laura Grindstaff, involves 
‘managing one’s own feelings’ by ‘pretending to care about guests or not to care too 
much’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 132). Critiques of different kinds of talk shows also suggest 
that they also have different production rituals, though the experiences of staff may differ 
from one work role to another (i.e., an assistant producer or researcher as well as paid 
and unpaid staff). For example, BBC1 researcher Rebecca Whitefoot notes her experience 
in the production of the magazine talk show The One Show. She points out the difference 
between her previous experience as a broadcast journalist and her current position as a 
researcher of The One Show. Whitefoot describes her feelings upon learning that she had 
received an assignment requiring her to conduct interviews with famous celebrity guests:  
I really love this part of the job. I’m testing the ground ahead of the show, 
discovering which questions will prompt a sit-up-and-listen response from 
the guests and which questions will trigger tumbleweed […] (Whitefoot, 
2014).  
Her excitement tells us of her emotional state upon experiencing routines that 
differ from those of her previous job as a broadcast journalist. Despite the similarities 
between a talk show routine and a newsroom routine, the pressures that talk show 
production present to the producers and staff are different from those of journalists 
(Grindstaff, 2002, p. 82). As Grindstaff argues,  
Prior media experience does not necessarily prepare one for working on a 
talk show, where the normal pressures of television production are 
complicated by the genre’s focus on ordinary people and more important, 
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by the ways in which ordinariness gets constructed in this context (ibid., 
p. 70). 
Both the Whitefoot and Grindstaff studies provide accounts of the implications of 
talk show production for emotion. Their studies have also inspired me to explore the 
emotional implications of producing the magazine talk show Living the Life at the Islam 
Channel.  
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In order to conceptualise the production culture of religious television, I have combined 
the media sociology and cultural studies traditions (Section 3.1). I have explored research 
into television talk show production, which is the main focus of this thesis. The mapping 
of the literature on media production studies offers a broader view of how these factors 
shape production culture across media organisations, media products and television 
genres. Further, a review of the literature regarding talk show production allows me to 
understand how these factors have shaped particular forms of talk show.  
In Section 3.2, concerning production studies of religious television, I examined the 
limited research available on religious television production. With the exception of the 
studies by Ailsa Hollinshead (2002) and Caitriona Noonan (e.g., 2008; 2011; 2013), 
research into religion, media and culture often focuses upon representational issues, 
aiming to separate the analyses of religion and media from traditional, institutionally 
dominated definitions whilst refocusing on ‘the intersections of institutions, authorities 
and production with popular practices, circulation, and reception’ (Morgan, 2008a, p. 
xiii). Although these studies examine media as ‘instruments for converting ideas or 
intentions into mass-produced forms for mass dissemination’ (ibid.), research into the 
production culture of religious television has received little attention.  
I seek to conceptualise the production culture of religious television by engaging 
with Caldwell’s concept of a production culture, which examines the power dynamics 
within institutional context and how values, norms and rituals shape television 
production. This concept assists me in answering questions such as how a religious 
television programme comes to take the form it does, and how and under what conditions 
television production employees produce a religious television programme.  
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In Section 3.2, I have discussed studies that show that advertising pressure affects 
creative decision-making in religious programming. Producers tend to create 
programmes, which not only embody the religious mission, but also include moral and 
ethical values (Noonan, 2008). In my analysis of the organisational factors shaping 
religious television production, I have looked at both Christian and Islam-based television 
perspectives in order to identify issues surrounding these organisations. Studies show that 
both Christian and Islamic broadcast organisations face pressures from within and outside 
their organisations. Both face criticism from religious authorities and media regulators.  
Given the limited research into Muslim cultural production, I use research 
stemming from the traditions of media sociology and cultural studies to analyse 
sociocultural factors shaping religious television. My aim is to identify how sociocultural 
issues affect Islam-based television. I argue that sociocultural factors can shape media 
production in ways that challenge the creative autonomy of media producers. I locate 
literature that focuses upon sociocultural aspects, such as gender, race and class, and 
examine how these aspects shape workers’ creative autonomy and professional identity, as 
well as media production processes. Exploring these sociocultural aspects helps to 
conceptualise the production culture of religious television programming, like that of the 
Islam Channel.  
Finally, in Section 3.3, I have discussed four key concepts relating to the studies of 
creative labour: exploitation, self-exploitation, creative autonomy and emotional well-
being. These concepts are relevant to my thesis as they allow me to establish the link 
between poor quality of working life and the poor production quality of television 
programme. I review sociological research that focuses on television production, 
comparing the various concepts sociologists use to theorise the experience of creative 
workers. I adopt some of these concepts, justify why I have chosen them and explain how 
it is that I intend to apply them in this thesis. I will use the concept ‘exploitation’ to 
explore the channel’s strategy of encouraging production staff to work harder in order to 
accomplish daily production tasks, as well as the meaning of strategic motivation to the 
production staff. I will then apply the concept of ‘self-exploitation’ in order to explore the 
quality of working lives of the production staff, discovering their own motives for self-
exploitation and the extent to which advertising forces, internal and external challenges, 
and sociocultural factors result in self-exploitation among these workers. Then, using the 
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concept ‘creative autonomy’, I will examine the extent to which the producers’ and 
researchers’ creative autonomy is affected by the constraints resulting from 
economic/resources and institutional mission/control and sociocultural factors. Finally, 
based upon Grindstaff’s (2002) argument that talk show production is a site of emotional 
displays and involves pressures, I will explore the ‘emotional well-being’ of the television 
production community. These four concepts will form my analysis in Chapter 7 of the 
experiences of the production culture. To conceptualise the production culture of the 
Islam Channel, I need to approach both the magazine talk show and the production 
community. While the review of literature in sections 3.1 and 3.2 helped me to 
conceptualise the production culture and analyse the production quality of the magazine 
talk show Living the Life, Section 3.3 supports my analysis of the experience of television 
production staff involved in Living the Life.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Design and Methods 
The purpose of this thesis is to conceptualise the production culture of religious television. 
In doing so, it asks two questions: 1) How does a religious television programme come to 
take the form it does; and 2) How and under what conditions do television production 
employees produce a religious television programme? To answer these questions and to 
address how I have carried out my analysis, I have structured this chapter into four 
sections. Section 4.1 addresses the social constructivist research paradigm. Section 4.2 
considers my ethnographic research design and methods. Section 4.3 deliberates on my 
ethnographic experiences. And finally, Section 4.4 discusses the procedures used to 
analyse data and the verification of the findings.   
4.1 The Social Constructivist Research Paradigm  
In this research project, I apply social constructivism as a qualitative research paradigm 
and interpretive framework in order to conceptualise the production culture of the Islam 
Channel. As a framework, social constructivism assumes that ‘individuals seek 
understanding of the world in which they live and work’ (Creswell, 2013, p. 24). As a 
social constructivist researcher, I seek to comprehend how members of the Islam 
Channel’s production community understood their daily television production routines. I 
also examine the daily working lives in which their production rituals are embedded and 
the quality of the magazine talk show, Living the Life. Understanding knowledge itself as a 
social construct bears enormous philosophical implications for this type of research 
project. The ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological assumptions 
help to address these consequences. 
Ontologically, I assume that participants experience multiple realities. Therefore, I 
intend to report ‘multiple forms of evidence and themes using the actual words of 
different individuals and presenting [the] different perspectives’ that I encountered during 
the fieldwork (ibid., p. 20). As a research site, the Islam Channel is comprised of various 
individuals who expressed to me their varied personal views and experiences on the 
culture of their everyday working lives.   
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The epistemological assumption was based on the subjective meanings of 
participants’ experiences and upon my interpretations as the researcher. Like Creswell, I 
argue that these subjective meanings are varied, not simply imprinted on the participants, 
but formed on the basis of interactions with others (hence, social construction) and in 
response to historical and cultural norms, values and rituals in an individual’s life (ibid., p. 
25). When approaching the research participants, I examined the historical background, 
religious values and cultural norms of British Muslims. I linked these realities with the 
television staff’s subjective experiences of working at the Islam Channel. I also 
acknowledged the tensions and ideological conflicts within Muslim communities that 
might affect television production.  
Additionally, I reflected upon my own previous experience as an employee at a 
large broadcast organisation. Prior to joining academia in 2009, I was a news 
translator/announcer for the Al-Jazeera Arabic News Unit at Astro All Asia Broadcast 
Network Plc. (Astro) in the year 2000.23 My job included executing voice-overs for the 
Arabic News provided by Al-Jazeera. I was then offered a permanent position as a 
‘presentation editor’ at Astro within an in-house censorship department, the ‘Network 
Presentation Unit’ (NPU) in 2001. My responsibilities were to remove the incoming 
foreign commercials and to replace them with those assigned by local advertisers; filter 
and edit programmes in accordance with the Malaysian Film Censorship Board (LPF);24 
identify that the correct television programmes were received via a MEASAT satellite and 
then ensure the quality of their output before transmitting them (via satellite) to home 
                                                   
23 Astro is a digital Direct-To-Home (DTH) multi-channel commercial TV service based in Kuala 
Lumpur Malaysia. Details on Astro are available from: http://www.astro.com.my 
24 The Film Censorship Board’s (LPF) function is to implement policies for film censorship and 
the censoring of films and media contents across Malaysia. The first Act adopted was the 
Cinematograph Films Act 1952 (Amendment 1966), followed by the Film Censorship Act 




- 79 - 
viewers.25 Working alongside the Astro Regulatory Department, my job also involved 
preparing reports for the banning of television programmes and films that were due for 
broadcast on Astro channels. I was required to liaise with the Malaysian Film Censorship 
Board (LPF) and Malaysia Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) before 
making any suggestions concerning the banning of films or television programmes on 
Astro.26 As a large broadcast company, Astro has several subsidiaries. Towards the end of 
my seven-year tenure within the Network Presentation Department, I accepted a job offer 
as an interactive TV executive from one of Astro’s subsidiaries, the Astro Digital Five.27 
My tasks at Astro Digital Five included the overseeing the tally of votes during the ‘live’ 
broadcast reality talent show Akademi Fantasia Series 6 and completing a weekly analysis of 
audience ratings in light of these votes. As a social constructivist researcher, too, when 
drawing upon epistemological assumptions, I must recognise the participants’ cultural 
norms and values in addition to my professional experiences.   
Axiologically, I acknowledge that this research is ‘value-laden, and biases are 
present’ when interpreting my experience and that of others (Creswell, 2013, p. 20). 
This philosophical assumption underscores how I position myself as a researcher – that is, 
as an ethnographer (ibid.). As a participant observer, former television employee, and a 
gendered intern, who worked alongside members of the production community, I must 
acknowledge similarities and differences between my own religious and cultural values 
and norms and those of the research participants. I also acknowledge how I have addressed 
various ethical issues and maintained a critical distance throughout my everyday 
interactions with the research participants, helping to ensure the validity of the 
ethnographic research conducted (see my discussion on this in Sub-section 4.3.4).  
                                                   
25 The launch of MEASAT-1 and MEASAT-2 led to a rapid increase in Malaysian infrastructure 
development in both the telecommunication and broadcasting industries, including the 
launch of the technologically advanced digital Direct-To-Home (DTH) Multi-Channel TV 
Service, Astro. Details on MEASAT are available from: 
http://www.measat.com/corp_profile_history.html 
26 Details on the Malaysia Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) are available 
from: http://www.skmm.gov.my/About-Us/History.aspx 
27 Available from: http://productlisting.mscmalaysia.my/msc-company/astro-digital-5-sdn-bhd-
formerly-known-digital-five-sdn-bhd-formerly-known-multimedia 
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Methodologically, a social constructivist worldview involves knowledge which is 
‘inductive, emerging and shaped by a researcher’s experience in collecting and analysing 
data’ (ibid., p. 22). I applied the concept of ‘production culture’ to my research design to 
study a religious television production within an organisational context. In addition to the 
concept of production culture, I also adopted ethnographic research methods to gather 
data for this research as well as to identify how such a production culture comes to shape 
the programme that is produced. I have employed three types of strategies pertinent to 
ethnographic research to collect data; these are: a primary method of participant 
observation; a secondary method of semi-structured interview; and a tertiary method of 
textual analysis, in order to assess the production quality of the magazine talk show Living 
the Life. 
4.2 Ethnographic Research Design and Methods 
Ethnography is central to studies of television production. Researchers like John Caldwell 
(2008), Laura Grindstaff (2002) and Georgina Born (2004) in particular, employed an 
ethnographic research design to study television production, but their studies are different 
in geographical, sociocultural, industrial and genre contexts. Caldwell, for example, 
adopted a cultural-industrial approach to study television and film industries in the USA, 
whereas Grindstaff applied a sociocultural-institutional approach to the study US-
American television talk shows production. While Caldwell and Grindstaff combined 
media sociology and cultural studies traditions, Born, on the other hand, used an 
anthropological lens to examine cultures in television production in the UK. Despite such 
distinctions among these studies, they used a similar methodology: an ethnographic 
research design to observe television professionals in their natural setting and engage in 
their production rituals. Among these ethnographic approaches to television production, I 
mainly refer to Caldwell and Grindstaff’s studies in the following, since I have chosen a 
similar theoretical approach as outlined in the previous chapter. Caldwell’s analysis of 
television production workers’ experiences ‘as forms of cultural negotiation and 
expression’ allowed me to examine the dynamics of power at the Islam Channel 
(Caldwell, 2008, p. 2). Grindstaff’s study guided me in examining ‘the norms and 
practices that circumscribe [talk show] production, as well as the ways in which 
[production workers] makes sense of the genre’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 34). In my research, 
ethnography allowed me to observe and participate in a television production in its 
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organisational context, engaging with a particular group of television production workers 
and the genre of religious programming. 
Although I have borrowed Caldwell’s term ‘production culture’, I did not adopt his 
research design. It is because, Caldwell’s ethnographic research design was based upon 
what he defines as ‘critical industrial practices’, a three-part concept which can be 
summarised as follow: 1) ‘the critical’ dimension involved interpretive schemes of 
trade/business methods and conventions, which he deployed within specific institutional 
contexts and relationships; 2) ‘the industrial’ environment as a television and film 
production ecology; 3) labour ‘practice’ that manifest during the technical production 
tasks or professional interactions (ibid., pp. 5-6). I did not adopt Caldwell’s research 
design for three reasons:  
First, it is unsuitable for studying a single media organisation like the Islam Channel 
because it analysed a number of television organisations, which he positioned within a 
large ecology of television and film industries.  
Second, Caldwell applied a political economy approach to his ‘critical dimension’ of 
production workers in television and film industries ecology. In contrast, I applied a 
sociological approach to study television production workers, using four key concepts in 
studies of creative labour (see Section 3.3 of this thesis). 
Third, Caldwell examined economic and technological influences on 
television/film workers’ practices, which are not the focus of this thesis. I sought to 
examine how the sociocultural environment in which the Islam Channel exists and the 
institutional influences shape television production and working life in the channel.   
What I have learnt from Caldwell’s ethnographic research is how he critically 
analysed television production workers using the Geertz’s (1973) sociological lens that 
aims to ‘look over the shoulders’ of television workers. By looking over the shoulders, 
Caldwell aims to examine an ‘interpretive nature’ of television workers practices. This 
suggests how his and television employees ‘industrial reflexivity’ locate the power 
dynamics within various institutional contexts, and subsequently, ‘express an emerging 
and unstable economic and social order in Hollywood’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 5) (I have 
discussed this in Section 3.1).  
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Thus, the ethnographic research design of this thesis can be characterised as a small-
scale cultural-institutional design to examine a microsocial level of religious television, 
which was based upon a four-layer analytical framework. These layers include: 
sociocultural environment, institutional context, television production community and 
genre conventions. Figure 1 illustrates the analytical framework for conceptualising the 
production culture of religious television. Further, I elaborate upon how this particular 




Figure 1: An Analytical Framework for Conceptualising the Production 
Culture 
 
The four-layer analytical framework indicates aspects that I have examined in my 
ethnography and linked them to the empirical chapters 5 through 7.  
The first layer symbolises the sociocultural environment, which I discussed in 
Chapter 2. Unlike Caldwell, whose study covers a large television and film ‘industrial 
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the environment in which British Muslim society, including production community lives 
and work. A sociocultural environment is an external factor that shape religious television 
production. My approach to such external factor is sociological rather than political 
economy like that of Caldwell. The reason for adopting sociological approach because it 
allows me considers the religious ideology as a power that shapes the production culture 
of the Islam Channel.    
The second layer examines power dynamics from an institutional context. The 
power dynamics represent tensions and contradictions within the Islam Channel. Caldwell 
notes that the production culture of the Hollywood television and film industries includes 
‘a collective, daily cultural performance involving symbolic codes, [and] conventionalized 
power hierarchies’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). Much like Caldwell who sees ‘culture as an 
interpretive system’ that ‘always embedded in the play of power and politics’, I examined 
power dynamics within the Islam Channel (ibid., p. 2). Knowledge of production culture 
offers an understanding of the dynamics of power that are both internal and external to a 
religious television organisation. An understanding of the production culture might equip 
broadcast institutions and television producers with better solutions to negotiate those 
constraints relating to the treatment of religious elements within an entertainment genre. 
Thus, to examine the culture of television production present at the Islam Channel, I need 
to examine the power dynamics from an institutional perspective.  
The Islam Channel is a fairly convenient site in which to conduct ethnographic 
research because it offers a small, unified space and a group of participants to observe and 
communicate with on daily basis. A medium-sized organisation, the Islam Channel 
consists of a group of people who make decisions, negotiate, and work creatively on the 
themes, social issues, segments, scripts and overall content of this television programme. 
Unlike many commercial broadcasters, Islam Channel was driven neither by viewers’ 
ratings nor revenue figures. The unique thing about the channel was its business strategies, 
which embedded in its mission: the da’wah/proselytization goal. I will discuss the three 
mission goals of the Islam Channel and reflect on its uniqueness in detail in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis. In Section 4.3, I consider more closely my ethnographic experience, especially 
given the specificities of the Islam Channel as a research site. I reflect upon the possibilities 
and limitations that the setting presented in terms of its structures, the relationships 
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between teams, the cultural norms regarding gender and religion, and the interactions 
between the production team and other areas of the Islam Channel’s staff.  
The third layer involved an analysis of members of production community. Similar 
to Caldwell, I also ‘look over the shoulders’ of members of television production 
community at the Islam Channel. I observed television production workers as ‘cultural 
expressions and entities involving all of the symbolic processes and collective practices 
that other cultures use to: gain and reinforce identity, to forge consensus and order, to 
perpetuate themselves and their interests, and to interpret the media as audience 
members’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 2). By approaching these workers in that way, allowed me 
to comprehend power dynamics that shapes creative decisions in the magazine talk shows 
production. Knowledge of production culture might assist creative producers in managing 
at both the managerial and television production levels those conflicts that potentially arise 
from such constraints. 
Finally, the fourth layer symbolises textual analysis of the magazine talk show genre 
conventions that I have included in my ethnography. My approach to text however, is 
different from Caldwell’s analysis. While Caldwell analysed ‘the trade and worker 
artifacts’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 4), I assessed the genre conventions of the magazine talk 
show Living the Life. Caldwell analysed such artifacts as, studio press kits, making-ofs, 
behind-the-scenes documentaries, DVD bonus tracks, show-biz reports, and cross-media 
film/TV franchises. While Caldwell adopted an ‘integrated cultural-industrial’ method to 
analyse trade and workers’ artifacts, I took a cultural-institutional approach to analyse 
production quality of talk show genre, and subsequently, identify the problems that shape 
its quality. Caldwell analysed pre-recorded reflexive talk (trade artifact) by the producers, 
directors and other members of production community as a cross-checking approach to 
analyse production practices (worker artifact, e.g., interview data). According to 
Caldwell,  
A method of ‘cross-checking’ proves useful when interrogating 
production practices where, for example, the rhetoric of studio press kits 
does not jive with explanations provided by the production crafts-people; 
or when demo tapes used to market equipment conveniently elide or gloss 
labour issues raised through more macroscopic industrial analysis or spin 
[…], (Caldwell, 2008, p. 4). 
The purpose of textual analysis that Caldwell adopted is different from mine 
because he used it to identify the tensions in television industry, ‘the self-representation, 
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self-critique, and self-reflection’ of production community regarding the industrial 
environment (ibid., p. 5). He examined ‘the interpretive nature’ of television workers 
practices, and subsequently, suggest how his ‘industrial reflexivity’ ‘express an emerging 
and unstable economic and social order in Hollywood’ (ibid.). This indicates that 
Caldwell’s analysis did not include the aesthetic of TV text produced by these workers of 
which my research project focuses.  
In contrast, I used textual analysis to assess the production quality/aesthetic of a 
magazine television talk show by using BBC’s The One Show as an exemplar. Like Caldwell, 
the analysis also involved ‘cross-checking’ approach to the assessment results. However, 
unlike his approach which engaged with a large register of ethnographic data (textual, 
observation, interviews, political economy), I mapped the results of textual analysis 
against personal reflexivity about the channel mission (Chapter 5), in relations to their 
understanding of good TV (Chapter 6), and links with and consequences for the working 
life of production community (Chapter 7). Therefore, when I discuss textual analysis as 
ethnographic methods in the following section, I refer to the aesthetic of the television 
talk show as articulated by Hanne Bruun (2001). I consider how well the producers have 
achieved success in realising their aesthetic goals and in matching generally accepted 
professional standards. I will discuss this in detail in Section 4.2.3.  
I have mentioned at the outset that I applied social constructivism as a qualitative 
research paradigm and interpretive framework to conceptualise the production culture of 
the Islam Channel. Using social constructivism, I sought to understand the sociocultural 
environment in which the production community of the Islam Channel live and work 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 24). Ontologically, I managed to report ‘multiple forms of evidence 
and themes using the actual words of different individuals and presenting [the] different 
perspectives’ that I encountered during the fieldwork (ibid., p. 20). Epistemologically, I 
draw the subjective meanings of participants’ experiences and upon my interpretations as 
the researcher. When approaching the research participants, I examined the historical 
background, religious values and cultural norms of British Muslims. I linked these realities 
with the television staff’s subjective experiences of working at the Islam Channel. I also 
acknowledged the tensions and ideological conflicts within Muslim communities that 
might affect television production. I recognised the participants’ cultural norms and values 
in addition to my professional experiences. Axiologically, I acknowledged that this 
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research is ‘value-laden, and biases are present’ when interpreting my experience and that 
of others (Creswell, 2013, p. 20). This philosophical assumption accentuates how I 
position myself as a researcher, a participant observer, a former television employee, and 
a gendered individual, who worked alongside members of the production community. I 
must acknowledge similarities and differences between my own religious and cultural 
values and norms and those of the research participants. I also acknowledge how I have 
addressed various ethical issues and maintained a critical distance throughout my everyday 
interactions with the research participants, helping to ensure the validity of the 
ethnographic research conducted (see Sub-section 4.3.4). Methodologically, a social 
constructivist worldview involves knowledge that is ‘inductive, emerging and shaped by a 
researcher’s experience in collecting and analysing data’ (Creswell, 2013, p. 22). In 
addition to the concept of production culture, I also adopted ethnographic research 
methods to gather data for this research as well as to identify how such a production 
culture comes to shape the programme that is produced.  
Ethnographic research is a common approach in production studies. Scholars like 
John Caldwell (2008), Laura Grindstaff (2002) and Georgina Born (2004) employed an 
ethnographic research design to study television production. They adopted ethnographic 
methods such as participant observation to observe television professionals in their natural 
setting and engage in their production rituals. They used interview to gain insights into 
tensions and conflicts experienced by production workers. They also conducted textual 
analysis of products made by workers in television production to understand how these 
products come to take the form that they do. In my research, ethnography allowed me to 
observe and participate in a television production in its organisational context, engaging 
with a particular group of television production workers and the genre of religious 
programming. In the following sub-sections, I will expand on ethnographic research 
methods that include participant observation, interviews and textual analysis, where I also 
compelled to reflect upon my role as a researcher, an intern and a gendered individual, 
who possesses extensive professional experience within the television industry, as well as 
specific personal norms and values.  
4.2.1 Participant Observation  
Media products, including television programmes, are relatively easy to access for 
research purposes. Media content can be analysed primarily through types of content and 
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discourse analyses. Surveys, document analyses and statistical data, on the other hand, 
provide information about television organisations, including information concerning their 
policies and ownership. These research approaches, however, provide little information 
about the processes and practices involved in making media content.  
Participant observation combines the participation in the lives of the people being 
studied with the maintenance of a professional distance in order to allow for adequate 
observation and recording of data. It is a process of immersion in a culture that afforded 
me the ability to observe television production within its natural setting, recording 
experiences and events as they came to my attention.  
As a participant observer, I spent four months at the Islam Channel, researching for 
Living the Life. I worked closely with key employees at the managerial level (the human 
resource manager, the manager of production and his assistant) and production 
employees, such as the producer, assistant producers and researchers. I also worked with 
technical crew members, including the multi-skilled operators involved in the production 
of the programme. Such contact with the employees allowed me to examine the factors 
that shape production on a day-to-day basis (e.g., interview questions, the choice of story 
items, etc.) and that might reflect changes made at the development and pre-production 
stages.  
When reflecting upon my experience as an intern at the Islam Channel, I refer to 
Grindstaff (2002), for there is little scholarship examining talk show production 
ethnographically (p. 34). Her experience as an intern for a television talk show offers 
insight into its daily production rituals. Participant observation includes collecting ‘the 
inside perspectives of producers and guests, and with an eye open toward understanding 
how the norms and practices of the production process itself shape and inform the talk 
show as text’ (ibid.). Grindstaff asserted that participant observation of a talk show not 
only involves working with producers and other crew members, but also involves 
interacting with the various guests/contributors that appear daily and often without 
television experience. Following in Grindstaff’s footsteps, I assisted the producer ‘turn 
them [an everyday guest] into a hometown celebrity because they have no television 
experience’ (ibid., p. 47). Also, talk shows feature individuals who are willing to step 
forward and relate their woeful life stories on camera’ (ibid., p. 48). Thus, participant 
observation is suitable for gathering data for this research project. 
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Grindstaff’s (2002) ethnographic experience proved particularly useful in her study 
of television talk show production. She argues that ‘at its best, ethnography evokes a 
world that is dense, richly textured and nuanced, one that treats people as participating 
subjects and not just passive objects of research’ (ibid., p. 34). This encouraged me to 
examine the processes of television talk show production using a similar approach, 
focusing the everyday working lives of individual production staff members in their 
natural settings.  
However, participant observation has its shortcomings. It is a time-consuming 
method of qualitative inquiry (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011, p. 15). Also, as Hansen 
points out, it is a ‘reflexive method, open to the contingencies of the field experience and, 
therefore, less than strictly linear in its execution or predictable in its findings’ (1998, p. 
48). Nonetheless, participant observation remains a highly valuable method by providing 
‘evidence for the dynamics as well as embedded nature of cultural production’ (ibid., p. 
46). I found participant observation to be a very useful method for this research as it 
helped me to gather data first-hand when identifying the power dynamics within the 
production of Living the Life. 
4.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
While observation allows me to view and analyse behaviour, interviews afford me the 
opportunity to listen to respondent opinions. Yet, interviews do have disadvantages, as 
people may lie, attempt to please the researcher with his/her answers, or even reply in a 
cautious or secretive manner. To some extent, participant observation can ‘reveal’ certain 
elements or values that participants might try to conceal during interviews. The semi-
structured interview is a supplementary method intended to accompany participant 
observation, as the openness offered by such interviews might allow me to capture the 
unexpected and possibly gather greater depth of information. It may also complement the 
observation with data on how workers themselves perceive their experience to explore 
their motivations, emotions and reflections on their work. 
Similar to conversations and general exchanges, semi-structured interviews can 
generate an avalanche of data (Hansen, 1998, p. 56). A semi-structured intensive 
interview permits ‘a wider range of contexts and situations to be examined than the in-
depth study of a single case’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 16). Interviews give 
researchers ‘the accounts of interviewees about their experiences and products, and the 
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opportunity [to listen] to some of their accounts of what happens to them, and why they 
think that things happen in the way that they do’ (ibid. p. 15). They also offer insights into 
creative autonomy (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011) and the ‘constrained or surprised 
world of television production’ (Cottle, 1997, p. 12). As a valid method to examine or 
analyse the lived experience of media producers, the semi-structured interview has been 
deployed in some media production studies (e.g., Gitlin 1983; Grindstaff 2002), 
including those of religious broadcasting (e.g. Noonan, 2008) and documentary film 
(Zoellner, 2010).  
Before the fieldwork, I designed an interview based upon the research questions: 
[H]ow and under what conditions do television production workers produce religious 
programmes? I adopted a format similar to that used by Maruta Herding (2013, p. 65-67) 
when studying Muslim youth culture. Figure 2 illustrates the format of the semi-
structured interview that I have used to gather data for this thesis. 
 
Figure 2: A Semi-Structured Interview Format 
 
The format includes questions that: 1) cover substantive aspects of participants’ 
lives at the Channel; 2) encourage participants to elaborate upon their answers when 
desired; and 3) follow-up on various answers. Such a format includes questions that move 
from general-to-specific categories (e.g., from their professional roles in and opinions 
Substantive  
•  Questions relating to their professional roles in the Channel  
•  About their understanding of the mission of the Islam Channel 
•  Opinions on personal and organisational culture 
•  Asking opinions about Living the Life as a magazine talk show 
To keep going 
•  Probing their perceptions on the leadership of the producer and the 
management 
•  About the code of conduct set by the Channel 
•  Asking whether Living the Life is an enjoyable television programme  
•  Asking about their tasks and daily production rituals 
•  Asking about their work relationships 
Follow-up 
•  What makes them think Living the Life is worth watching (audience 
perspective) 
•  Their views of the production quality of Living the Life  
•  The way they felt about those production routines, their responsibilities 
•  The way they felt about co-workers 
•  On their career advancement at the channel 
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about the Channel and the programme to their motivations and feelings about production 
rituals and work relationships.) These sorts of questions offered insights into the everyday 
lives of participants, including considerations of their working conditions, the tensions and 
contradictions, and the extent to which their experiences have challenged their creative 
autonomy and emotional well-being. Moreover, their answers also provide the grounds 
for me to assess the production quality of Living the Life, which I have used to respond to 
the question: How does the religious television programme come to take the form it does?   
I conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of fifteen (15) Islam Channel 
staff, of which three are employed at the managerial level: the human resource manager, 
the manager of programming and the assistant manager of programming. Additionally, I 
interviewed twelve other employees from the creative team (9 people) and the technical 
team (3 people). I interviewed each respondent after explaining details about what my 
research consisted of, why their opinions mattered within the scope of my study and how 
I intended to present them within the thesis. Depending on their work roles and 
availability, I spent 15 minutes to an hour with each respondent. I engaged in these 
interviews near the end of my four-month period spent within the field. I did so in order 
to avoid interrupting research participants while they were involved in production 
processes. If I were to have probed them from time to time, they might have been 
suspicious of me and refused to answer my questions. Another reason would be that I have 
built up trust in the period of my participant observation, making them more 
approachable for interviews.  
Nonetheless, I realised that my professional experience helped me to negotiate with 
(a few) participants in convincing them to speak to me, revealing their thoughts and 
feelings about how members of the Channel management treated them and about their 
relationships with the producer and other members of the production crew. In Malaysia, I 
worked for a large company, Astro, which required me to communicate with co-workers 
and clients of multiple races and religions. Seven years’ of this industrial experience has 
made for excellent communication and negotiation skills. For instance, as a presentation 
editor my job regularly required me to convince my superior or the head of regulatory 
that particular TV programmes would be suitable or unsuitable for Malaysian viewers. 
Hence, my professional experiences aided me in collecting data for this research project. 
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Such professional skills helped me both in doing participant observation and in 
interviewing at the Islam Channel. 
4.2.3 Textual Analysis  
I adopted textual analysis in order to supplement the methods of planned participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews. Whereas semi-structured interviews allow 
me to listen and understand participant opinions directly, particularly regarding how they 
feel about and perceive their professional roles, textual analysis gave me an opportunity to 
examine the output of the magazine talk show Living the Life. While becoming a 
participant observer offered me experiences involved with production routines and in 
creative decision-making, textual analysis of the magazine talk show allowed me to 
identify factors that shaped its output by mapping these factors against the data gathered 
during my fieldwork (i.e., a field notes and my interactions and informal conversations 
with other members of the television production community). 
I analysed episodes of Living the Life as a way of evaluating its production quality in 
aesthetic terms. I refer to the aesthetic of the television talk show as articulated by Hanne 
Bruun (2001). I mentioned in Chapter 3 that Bruun found ‘uncertainty’ and ‘sociability’ 
as critical factors capable of accentuating the viewers’ experience, subsequently, 
determining the quality/aesthetics of a television talk show. The tension between the 
uncertainty and the sociability factors can affect the viewing experience and the 
production quality of television talk show. In addition to these two factors, Bruun suggests 
that the ‘experiential consequences’ of a talk show for viewers determine its 
aesthetics/quality. As a television genre, the talk show requires its producer to imagine 
his/her audience, designating the particular group of the audience that the programme 
he/she produces actually aims to serve. As Bruun argues, ‘what constitutes the experience 
of uncertainty and sociability in actual programmes depends very much on who the 
viewers are’ (ibid.). The producers’ proper management of the uncertainty and sociability 
factors on a talk show is necessary in order to maintain the production quality of the talk 
show (p. 251). Bruun’s study is relevant because it helps to describe production quality, a 
term which I will apply throughout this thesis and especially when discussing the results of 
textual analysis of the magazine talk show Living the Life in Chapter 6.  
As this thesis argues that poor quality of working life contributes to poor production 
quality of the magazine talk show Living the Life, a textual analysis of Episode 144 (20th 
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March 2013) helped me to make judgments concerning its quality, particularly with an 
eye toward genre conventions and camera work (see Chapter 6). Textual analysis allows 
me to assess particular video clips extracted from the output of Living the Life, revealing 
the reasoning behind the producer’s creative decisions and the working conditions under 
which he made such decisions.   
When analysing the output of the episodes of Living the Life, I sought to maintain a 
critical distance, ensuring that my evaluation of the production quality was fair and not 
influenced by my own sense of belonging to the production community with whom I 
shared similar religious beliefs. The feeling of solidarity with other Muslims might have 
affected my value judgements and could have resulted in unbalanced criticisms. To avoid 
such bias, I used the BBC magazine talk show The One Show as a yardstick to assess the 
production quality of Living the Life (see Chapter 6 of this thesis). My aim, again, was to 
answer the question of how the religious television programme comes to take the form it 
does.  
Using The One Show as an exemplar, I evaluated the generic conventions of Living the 
Life (see Table 5). Both the programming manager and the producer admitted that The One 
Show was their model, the type of magazine talk show that they hoped to emulate upon 
first deciding to produce Living the Life in 2012. Second, I outlined the genre conventions 
of both magazine talk shows and presented the criteria and generic conventions that 
shaped the production quality of Living the Life. Finally, I analysed other episodes, 
including Episode 136 of Living the Life (6 March 2013). I found that this episode is 
relevant to highlight issues related to the physical appearance of women (see Section 
6.4.3).  
I combined the method of textual analysis with those of interviews and participant 
observation in an effort to study the production culture of the Islam Channel. I refer to 
Caldwell (2008), who cross-checked between textual analysis with interviews in order to 
explore the production culture of television industries (ibid., p. 342). However, unlike 
Caldwell, I have focused upon a single television organisation, not the television 
industries. Nonetheless, his study has guided me in examining the power dynamics of the 
Islam Channel. I referred to Grindstaff, who used participant observation in conjunction 
with interviews of the workers involved in television talk shows, as well as to Whitefoot, 
who provided rich insights into the production of the magazine talk show. Combining 
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these methods of data collection have provided me with a holistic view of the quality of 
production and the working lives of the staff members at the Islam Channel. As such, 
these methods are pertinent to the media ethnography.  
4.3 Ethnographic Experience  
When reflecting on my ethnographic experience, I refer to Laura Grindstaff’s (2002) role 
as a researcher of daytime talk show production within the US and to Rebecca 
Whitefoot’s role (2014) as a researcher on the magazine talk show The One Show at the 
BBC. Like Grindstaff, I am also an academic and a researcher who participated in the 
production routines of a television talk show.  
As I asserted at the outset of this thesis, I refer to the Whitefoot experience because 
it provides an appropriate account for the study of working life in magazine talk show 
production. Although I am not a researcher like Whitefoot who works for an established 
television station such as the BBC, the subjective experiences of a similar work role (e.g., 
the researcher) contained within the account makes it relevant to this thesis. Whitefoot’s 
reflection on her work as a researcher with The One Show, even if a form of publicity 
(because it appears on the BBC Website), provided insights regarding the magazine talk 
show, including its genre conventions and production rituals.  
Prior to being an academic, I was a television employee. I could relate with 
Whitefoot’s anxiety of fulfilling the daily production rituals and thinking about how to 
serve audience. I could empathise regarding her anxiety to finish the job efficiently and to 
create a television programme that both attracts audiences and accomplishes the BBC’s 
mission: to educate, inform and entertain its viewers. Thus, while doing an ethnography 
of the Islam Channel, my own professional experiences within television production have 
helped me to recognize the operation of power dynamics, as well as to empathise with 
other workers confronted with creative and ideological tensions.   
Combining the insights of Whitefoot and Grindstaff, with past insights from my 
own professional experiences, aided my fieldwork at the Islam Channel and was essential 
to my achievement of reflexivity. Entering the field with professional work experiences to 
draw upon was particularly advantageous, especially concerning strategies to: 1) acquire 
access to the Islam Channel; 2) work and interact with the channel’s key television 
production personnel across the production hierarchy; and 3) communicating/negotiating 
- 94 - 
with potential guests/contributors before inviting them onto Living the Life. Having 
extensive professional experience helped me to accomplish these three strategies while 
doing an ethnography. I will discuss these further in a more reflexive fashion in sections 
4.3.1 and 4.3.2, emphasizing that I am a gendered individual with specific personal values, 
who has lived and worked within a culture that maintains different norms than my 
research participants.   
Despite such advantages, there was one disadvantage to my experience within the 
industry:  at the beginning of my research, I was denied access to the channel because the 
management was hesitant to allow a participant observer who still enjoyed a great 
working relationship with her previous employer. In particular, the management of the 
Islam Channel was concerned that I might share their ‘new’ (at the time) programme 
pitch (e.g., magazine talk show Living the Life) with my colleagues in television production 
at Astro. In the end, however, my prior experience in working within a broadcast 
organisation was a definite advantage for it helped me access the research site, 
communicate with talk show guests and negotiate with people from various professional 
backgrounds at the Islam Channel. In the sub-sections that follow, I reflect on three 
aspects of ethnographic experience; these include: 1) gaining access to the research site; 2) 
field relationships; and 3) limitations of and ethical considerations involved in doing media 
ethnography. 
4.3.1 Gaining Access  
One of the first challenges commonly encountered by researchers is gaining access to the 
research site. A number of studies that involved participant observation report 
researchers’ experiences and the importance of securing access to media organisations 
(Grindstaff, 2002). Gaining access to the BBC, for instance, was not an easy task for 
Phillip Schlesinger (1978; 1992) as he has recounted how the BBC initially refused to 
grant him access. Georgina Born (2004) also described her challenge in getting access to 
the BBC, by which the gatekeeper at the Corporation was suspicious of her and disallowed 
her access (cited in Szczepanik and Vonderau 2013, p. 114). Participant observation 
cannot occur when researchers fail to secure access.  
My search for ‘an insider’ or a contact person at the Islam Channel began in February 
2012. I sent an email expressing my intentions to the manager in charge of recruitment 
and internship. There was, however, no written or verbal reply from the manager. 
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Several of my telephone calls went straight to voicemail messaging. Disappointed, I 
devised another plan to gain the necessary access. 
In June 2012, I became one of the volunteers at an event organised by the Islam 
Channel the Da’wah Project at Leyton. Dressing up as the channel’s mascot, a teddy bear, 
was an interesting experience, as I was able to observe the different backgrounds of the 
Islam Channel’s audience. Entirely by chance, I met the assistant manager of 
programming, who reluctantly listened to my research plans. He initially expressed his 
concern that the channel had attracted a great deal of negative attention from various 
parties. The report by the Quilliam Foundation (Rajab, 2010), which accused the channel 
of promoting religious extremism, was one of the reasons for not allowing researchers 
access to the Islam Channel. After a long conversation to explain intentions and the value 
of the research (Hansen, 1998; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), I succeeded in gaining 
his trust. Nevertheless, my accessibility challenges did not end there. The legal officer 
denied my recently granted access the following day during a visit to the Islam Channel’s 
Head Office in London. After re-negotiating with the assistant manager of programming, I 
signed an agreement in August 2012 to become an intern, and I officially joined the 
production community in February 2013. Participant observation took place at the head 
office in London.   
I realised that my previous professional experience aided in surmounting the 
multiple barriers posed by the Channel. For instance, as a presentation editor at the Astro 
All Asia Broadcast Centre, I communicated with personnel within the organisational 
hierarchy, both internal and external to Astro. This responsibility required me to liaise 
with people from the Local Programming, the International Programming, the regulatory 
and the post-production departments. Also, every two or three months, I accompanied 
the internal regulator to meetings with the Film Censorship Board (LPF) and Malaysia 
Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). These experiences helped me to 
negotiate with the management of the Islam Channel. I succeeded in persuading the 
human resource manager, who then convinced the CEO, to grant me access to the 
Channel. He thought that my professional experience would benefit the production 
community and the Channel during an internship.  
Gaining access to the Islam Channel was not an easy experience. I had to persevere 
through various stages before the management granted me access to the channel. Upon 
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reflection, I noticed that other factors obstructed me from securing a position at the 
channel, too. These included the Islam Channel’s anxiety over accepting a female 
researcher, not only from a foreign country but also bent on accomplishing a ‘mission’: to 
conduct ethnographic research at the channel. I had to ‘manage’ the gatekeeper and the 
participants by securing their trust, as ethnography often draws much suspicion from some 
people within the fieldwork site (Szczepanik and Vonderau, 2013, p. 114). Georgina Born 
(2004) reflected upon how BBC staff were suspicious of her and perceived her as someone 
with an agenda, referring to her as ‘the anthropologist woman’ (ibid.). Hence, I 
understand the Islam Channel’s caution and suspicion, as my presence at the site might 
have engendered anxieties. Given the Islam Channel's reputation in the wake of the 
Quilliam accusation regarding the channel serving as hub of extremism, the CEO 
especially could have been worried about my presence.  
In comparison to Caldwell’s (2008) experience, gaining access to the various 
research sites in Hollywood was not as challenging as mine. His role as both an academic 
and television/film practitioner (director and producer) allowed him to conduct 
ethnography at both television and film industries (p. 349). Whereas for Caldwell, having 
a professional experience and good industrial contacts was a value-added, my own 
professional experience, on the opposite, had both an advantage and a disadvantage. The 
channel might see me as both a threat and an accessory to its reputation due to my dual 
role: as a researcher and an academic. An advantage of having me as a researcher is that 
the channel perceived my professional experience to be helpful to the Living the Life 
production crew. A disadvantage is that, in contrast to Caldwell, my academic role 
seemed problematic for the channel. The channel experienced with Talal Rajab (2010), a 
researcher/academic from Quilliam who conducted observation and published a report 
(perceived accusation) on the Islam Channel has affected my position as an academic 
researcher at the channel. Hence, my presence could be a threat to the channel's 
reputation as well as a second pair of hand (as one assistant producer put it) to the 
production community.  
4.3.2 Field Relationships  
My role as a researcher in this project and on the Living the Life production team shaped 
the way in which the production community of the Islam Channel interacted with me. 
Beyond religion and professional role and experience, I positioned myself as a gendered 
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individual. A key to successful ethnographic research is the ‘forming of useful 
relationships’ (Hansen, 1998, p. 53). Self-reflection, personal conduct, familiarisation 
with the research site and interaction with the research participants were important 
considerations for my observations. It was vital to be sensitive to the various cues 
presented by others during their interactions and to adjust and renegotiate relationships as 
occasions demanded (ibid., p. 54). Throughout the fieldwork at the Islam Channel, I 
managed to maintain good relationships and productive rapport with all of the employees, 
regardless of their professional roles. Establishing good relationships with employees and 
members of production community at the Islam Channel opened up a greater opportunity 
to explore the power dynamics inherent to the production culture of religious television.  
On my first day in the field, a young woman wearing a pink hijab approached me at 
the entrance of the Islam Channel’s head office on Bonhill Street in central London. She 
introduced herself as Maryam, the assistant producer, and told me that the producer of 
Living the Life anticipated my arrival. I introduced myself to her as we took the elevator to 
the first floor, where the programming department was located. As the elevator door 
opened, I saw that the seating arrangement of staff was segregated by gender. I saw people 
sitting at their workstations, where some were gazing at their PCs and others were 
engaged in whispered discussions. The whole floor seemed crowded. As we both emerged 
from the elevator, Maryam led me to the female section, which was located on my right. 
Maryam headed to her desk, located opposite to mine. She arranged to brief me later on 
that day regarding my role and responsibilities. I had a quick glance at the opposite side, 
where the male workstations were located. As a gendered individual, I was curious and 
wondered which one of the men was the producer with whom I would work and which 
one was the head of programming, charged with 'monitoring' me. Suddenly, a man 
walked toward me and introduced himself as Aswad, the producer of Living the Life. 
Welcoming me, he asked about my trip to London and the Islam Channel. He stood 
approximately 5 feet and 4 inches, had a fair complexion, and was Pakistani and mid-
twenties. Pointing out two other men sitting at their desks, Aswad told me that their 
names were Amar and Zain, his assistants. Both men simply waved their hands at me from 
their desks. From a distance, I nodded my head at them as a sign of respect. Aswad then 
took me to meet Malik, the human resource manager, followed by Iqbal, the 
programming manager, and Sara, his assistant. After meeting these key personnel, Aswad 
excused himself to make some phone calls. Then, I sat at my desk, eager to write several 
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notes reflecting upon what had happened during my first day in the field (Fieldnotes, 
February 2013).   
I was assigned to work with the team that produces the programme Living the Life. It 
broadcasts live Monday to Thursday from seven to eight o’clock in the evening. The show 
looks into the lives of Muslims to see how Islam has affected them. Aswad, the producer, 
characterised the programme as having a balance of religion, entertainment and lifestyle 
elements. Nevertheless, the most salient consideration for me at the time was how I was 
supposed to work in a gender-segregated workplace. In Malaysia, I had worked in an 
environment mixed in gender, race and religions. In the production department at Astro, 
for instance, women worked directly alongside men. Both genders occupied the 
organisational and production hierarchies equally. Females were employed within 
managerial, executive and below-the-line positions. They earned similar wages and shared 
responsibilities that were comparable to male workers. As I believe in the combined 
efforts of both genders, especially when it comes to creative work, I was unfamiliar with 
working in a gender-segregated environment. The segregation reminded me of Salafi 
fundamentalism or the Wahhabi tradition. The Saudi Wahhabi worldview affirms norms 
and principles that are focussed upon gender segregation and purifying their culture of 
western influences; this is enforced through ritualistic behaviour in prayer, dress, and 
social relations (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Doumato, 1992 in Kraidy, 2009, p. 359). I found the 
practice of gender segregation at the Channel, not only contradictory to the organisational 
culture of my previous employer, Astro, but also to the Malaysian culture into which I 
was born and raised.  
The first few weeks at the Islam Channel involved getting accustomed to the 
channel’s working hours, understanding the rules and regulations, complying with the 
employee dress code, contributing to morning production meetings and getting to know 
the other staff involved in religious programming, current affairs and lifestyle 
programming. There are three sets of professionals involved in the development of 
television production at the Islam Channel. The first group consists of employees at the 
management or executive level, who are involved in decision-making. These employees 
include the human resource manager, the manager of programming and the assistant 
manager of programming. They oversee the hiring, budgeting and promotion of TV 
programmes, as well as the creative decisions. The second group includes the 
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professionals who are involved in the creative side of producing Living the Life. They 
include paid/permanent staff and unpaid/researchers or interns who assist in the 
production. The permanent staff includes those in managerial positions, such as the human 
resource manager, the manager and assistant manager of the programming department, 
producers, assistant producers and technical staff. The unpaid volunteers/interns included 
the researchers. A third group is comprised by technical staff and are expected to perform 
a variety of tasks. The Islam Channel named this group of staff the ‘multi-skilled 
operators’. Multi-skilled operators performed a variety of tasks, including camera 
operation, visual directing and sound engineering during live broadcasting.  
I maintained a good relationship with the manager and the assistant manager of the 
programming department, as they were the personnel who oversaw my performance. I 
felt uneasy about being constantly watched by them, but also I understood their 
watchfulness because they were the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Islam Channel’s CEO. 
Throughout the fieldwork, I observed the rules regarding behaviour and dress code set by 
the channel for its employees. Meanwhile, I established a good relationship with the 
human resource manager, both because of his position at the channel as well as because I 
needed to liaise with him every time I needed petty cash to buy props for a cooking 
demonstration or another performance by the guests of Living the Life. 
The producer and other members of Living the Life production crew perceived me to 
be helpful. One assistant producer expressed that I acted as a second pair of hands for the 
producer, helping to generate fresh ideas and assist the talk show contributors/guests of 
Living the Life (Assistant Producer, June 2013). When a guest cancelled or none was 
available for an episode, the producer would commonly ‘recycle’ contributors and/or 
modify story items. Thus, the producer claimed that having an experienced intern like me 
on his team was a great advantage. He did not have to train me regarding how to 
communicate or negotiate with potential guests, as I was long accustomed to such 
routines.  
Being relatively new to the TV industry compared to myself, the producer and 
other crew members admitted that I served as their mentor and role model. According to 
certain other producers at the Islam Channel, I was seen as an ‘intern from Malaysia’ who 
had managed to feature several new 'interesting' guests, thereby enhancing the 
programme. These guests included a famous Malaysian Chef, Norman Musa, from 
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London; a chef cum author of the cookbook Veggiestan, Sally Butcher, from London; a 
surgeon who had performed an open-heart operation in Gaza, from Liverpool; and a 
traditional martial arts (silat) group from disparate cultural backgrounds. Among the fresh 
story items featured on the show was the founder of Skateistan, a project that aims to 
empower young Afghan girls by teaching them to skateboard. My professional experience 
helped me develop strategies to communicate with potential guests effectively, making 
them more likely to agree to appear on Living the Life.  .   
Despite the fact that the producer noted the above characteristics as assets, he 
nonetheless still monitored me carefully. He appeared controlling when he did not allow 
me to write a script on my own, nor to independently make creative decisions that might 
enhance the programme. I found that a controlling superior/TV producer have affected 
the creative autonomy of a subordinate/researcher like me. As a gendered individual, 
working beneath a male superior, I found such treatment to be patronizing. I wondered 
how Maryam, the assistant producer, felt about being in a position subordinate to such a 
controlling superior.   
I also maintained professional relationships with other staff within the programming 
department, especially the female staff of Lifestyle programming; these staff members 
included Huda and others whom I could not interview. They helped me significantly 
during my time at the channel, which imply some kind of gender solidarity. I considered 
those who were not directly involved in my project to be potential sources of information 
for advice on possible guests to contact and invite onto the show. Among my observations 
as a researcher, I noted that the key to successful fieldwork is to be pleasant and maintain 
professional courtesy with everyone in the field at both the managerial and production 
levels, including the creative and technical staff, because each day in the field offered 
different experiences. Such experiences have shaped my interpretations of the behaviour 
of the people I interacted and worked with outside the organisational setting. 
Other data included in my analysis were the production meetings, which I attended 
along with five other members of the creative staff, and the manager’s briefings, which 
were attended by the entire staff of the programming department. These meetings 
discussed the production routines, the execution of the generic conventions of Living the 
Life, the treatment of story items for both the main segment and the ‘story of the day 
segment’, the guests booked or cancelled by the creative staff, and potential storylines and 
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guests. Details of the issues, proposed story items and guests discussed during the 
production meetings were recorded in my observation notes.  
The execution of Living the Life’s generic conventions was another important part of 
the research process. As a participant observer, I took notes on processes in the 
production routines that involved me and/or other staff. These processes included: 
researching the guests and story items, booking the guests, creating questions that 
presenters could ask the guests during the filming of the show and selecting the VTs for 
each segment. On the ‘show day’ (so termed by Whitefoot, 2014), the guests needed to 
be contacted and their arrivals, confirmed. How certain issues including the last minute 
cancellation of a guest, were handled by the producer, his assistants and the researchers 
was also observed and noted.  
4.3.3 Limits and Ethical Considerations 
Despite its suitability for studying the lived experience of television staff within the natural 
setting of institutional and television production, ethnographic research has limitations 
that apply here. These limitations include: first, its reliance upon information seen 
through my interpretive lens, which could involve biases, shaped by my personal values 
and norms. The danger in doing ethnography is that it can produce or reinforce ‘a 
stereotype of a group, sub-culture, or culture’ (Fetterman, 2010, p. 24). Second, the 
lengthy time commitment required of an ethnography could have been problematic. I 
might have been criticised by ethnographers from such fields as anthropology or sociology 
for spending too short of a period of time with the group studied, affording (at its best) 
only minimal coverage of ‘many aspects’ of life/culture of this group of people. On the 
other hand, a lengthier period of time committed to fieldwork presents the risk of ‘going 
native’ or ‘siding with participants’ (Creswell, 2013, p. 59).  
My response to such limitations of ethnographic research is two-fold: first, I 
acknowledge that ethnographers ‘are not expected to take responsibility for providing a 
full and complete account’ of a group of people under study (Wolcott, 1999, p. 29). 
Following the opinion of Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1967), Harry F. Wolcott suggests that 
ethnographers should study a culture-sharing group and report an analysis ‘in context’ 
because reporting on all aspects of the life of such a group is an ‘unattainable’ goal to 
achieve (ibid.).  
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Second, the length of time that I spent in the field to conduct ethnographic research 
at the Islam Channel was limited to a period of time within the three-year span of my PhD 
programme (four months: February through June, 2013). Limited funding from the 
research sponsor also restricted the amount of time that I could spend at the channel. 
According to David Fetterman (2010, p. 9), ‘In many applied contexts, limited resources 
compel the researcher to apply ethnographic techniques in a contract deadline time frame 
rather than to conduct a full-blown ethnography’. Time and resource constraints aside, I 
believe that the amount of field data gathered is sufficient ‘to describe the culture or 
problem convincingly and to say something significant about it’ (ibid.). During the short 
period of time at the Islam Channel, I managed to identify the values, norms and rituals of 
the production community under scrutiny. There is also an argument of data saturation; 
for example, my findings/observations start repeating itself after a certain period.  
Although we shared similar religious values (as we are all Sunni Muslims), our culture, 
values, norms and rituals in television production differ. As a Muslim from Malaysia, I 
hold a moderate Islamic view. I am a practicing Muslim woman who wears the hijab, loves 
music and entertainment. I believe that Muslims should interact with people outside of 
their culture. Yet, based upon my observation of the segregated-gender workplace, I 
recognized an influence of fundamentalism (see Kraidy and Khalil, 2009). Such a cultural 
difference facilitated my maintenance of a critical distance, from which I could identify 
problems and thus ‘say something significant’ about the working life in television 
production at the Islam Channel (ibid.). 
By doing ethnography, I was obliged to acknowledge and respect the rights, needs 
and values of the participants. As a participant observer, I could have easily invaded their 
personal space, contradicted religious beliefs and practices, or broached sensitive matters 
that they could not or would not disclose. I needed to respect their loyalties toward the 
Islam Channel and their wish that I avoid asking about confidential information, such as 
salaries or Islam Channel funding. Also, I could not question confidential matters 
regarding the company financial resources during the fieldwork.  
To ensure participant confidentiality, I have masked their names by giving them 
pseudonyms. However, their work roles have been maintained for easy identification and 
referencing when I report the findings. Each participant provided me informed consent by 
signing a consent form. I have underlined the two participants who were members of the 
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production community that I observed and with whom I interacted, but who refused to be 
interviewed. Although I did not conduct interviews with ‘Rima’ and ‘Ayden’, I added 
them to the list and gave them pseudonyms because both of them played a role in my 
observational data. In addition to masking participant identities, researchers often mask 
the research site. In my case, I have obtained the written consent of the Islam Channel’s 
CEO, allowing me to use the actual name of the channel throughout this thesis. 
Nevertheless, when publishing an article or a book, for instance, I must remain cautious of 
how I mask and describe the identity of the participants. Since the Islam Channel is 
considered a small institution, I need to make sure that the participants are 
unrecognisable, especially when they [have] revealed to me something sensitive. Sensitive 
issues relating to ideological tensions or a participant’s treatment by the Islam Channel 
might risk participants’ job security if I were to describe or present them in a manner that 
allows for their recognisition. Table 3 illustrates the list of pseudonyms and their work 
roles. 
Table 3: List of Research Participants and their Pseudonyms 
 Work Roles Pseudonyms 
1. Manager, Human Resource Department Malik 
2. Manager, Programming Department Iqbal 
3. Assistant Manager, Programming Sara 
4. Producer, Living the Life Aswad 
5. Assistant Producer 1, Living the Life Maryam 
6. Assistant Producer 2, Living the Life Amar 
7. Assistant Producer 3, Living the Life Zain 
8. Presenter 1, Living the Life Fadhil 
9.  Presenter 2, Living the Life Shadi 
10. Researcher, Living the Life Akram 
11. Junior Multi-skilled Operator 1 Omar 
12. Junior Multi-skilled Operator 2 Salem 
13. Senior Multi-skilled Operator 1 Kamal 
14. Producer, Lifestyle Programming Huda 
- 104 - 
15. Producer, Current Affairs Jahd 
 Participants refused to be interviewed yet played a role in my observational data: 
16. Presenter 3, Living the Life Rima 
17. Senior Multi-Skilled Operator 2 Ayden 
 
4.4 Data Analysis Procedures and Verification 
My research is inductive, in that I used the data gathered from the field and formed 
analytical themes using the concept of production culture, posing generalisations based 
upon my data as well as my past experiences, and relevant scholarship in the field.  
During my fieldwork I compiled field notes that were updated daily and following 
my observation period I transcribed the interviews I carried our verbatim. All this data 
was analysed and categorised in themes using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software. 
The items were coded according to categories, which I drew from the semi-structured 
interview format (Figure 2). I discovered key themes and organised categories based on 
the analytical framework defined at the outset of this chapter (see Figure 1). Given the 
fact that the participant observer is the primary data collection instrument in qualitative 
research (Creswell, 2011), I then attempted to understand and explain these emerging 
themes based on my interpretative framework.   
To ensure the validity of the data analysis, I adopted the following strategies from 
Creswell (2009, p. 192):  
1) I clarified the researcher’s bias when using an ethnographic research design at 
the outset of this chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.3). I reflected on my experience 
in the industry and my limitations as well as personal biases. 
2) I presented negative information that counters the general Muslim perceptions 
of the Islamic television channel. In the context of this thesis, the use of 
religious notions by the Channel, such as ‘work as a mission’, encourages hard 
work amongst workers in the hopes of being rewarded in the afterlife (see 
Section 7.1) 
3) I spent a prolonged period at the Islam Channel.  A four-month span of time in 
the field allowed me to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
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organisation’s production culture and to discover data, such as economic, 
organisational and sociocultural factors, that shaped the production quality of 
Living the Life and the working lives of the staff.  
4) I used peer debriefing to enhance the accuracy of accounts and results of 
analysis. I chose another doctoral candidate, to whom I explained my research 
experiences from time to time, to check the accuracy of my interpretations. In 
fact, my colleague appeared once on Living the Life as a guest who shared her 
passion for underwater photography with the Islam Channel audience 
(Fieldnotes, 1 April 2013). It is relevant to feature my colleague on the show 
because it familiarised her with the research context. This makes the peer 
debriefing more valuable.   
An extended description was used to a) convey the experiences of the television 
production staff and the meanings they attach to their narrative experiences, b) express 
the manager’s opinions and the CEO’s desire to accomplish the mission of the Islam 
Channel and c) illustrate the production quality of Living the Life. The participant voices 
and my observations provide readers with vivid accounts of the challenges encountered, 
the constraints and tensions experienced and the insights drawn from personal, 
institutional and sociocultural contexts. While chapters 5 through 7 of this thesis present 
the findings of this ethnographic research, Chapter 8 concludes it. In Chapter 5, in 
particular, I will discuss in greater details what makes the Islam Channel unique and 
different from many Islam-based television institutions by reflecting on my ethnographic 
experience and data gathered from interviews with television production staff.      
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
Drawing on the social constructivist research paradigm, I employed the ethnography of 
media production research design to conceptualise the production culture of religious 
television. I referred to Grindstaff and Whitefoot when reflecting upon my ethnographic 
experience within an institutional context, television production culture and textual 
quality. I drew upon Grindstaff’s research when discussing talk show production culture. I 
merged Grindstaff, Whitefoot and my professional experiences when reflecting upon 
conventions of the genre. The ethnography of television production is a suitable research 
design for this research project. It allows me to explore various aspects of lives in religious 
television production. Doing ethnography at an institution like the Islam Channel requires 
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passion and patience. As I was trying to gain access, challenges were present at the 
beginning of my journey at the channel. Likewise, the Islam Channel has furnished me 
with fun yet stressful working experiences. Despite the short period of time, these 
experiences told me enough about the structural issues, tensions and dynamic of powers 
in television production. I maintained my critical distance and endeavoured to analyse 
matters based upon my professional experience and my interpretive framework: a 
gendered individual and a Muslim with personal values, norms and culture. All these 
allowed me to conceptualise the production culture of religious television.  
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Chapter 5 
The Mission of the Islam Channel 
This chapter analyses the institutional mission of the Islam Channel. I divide the analysis 
into two sections. The first section elaborates upon the three goals comprising the 
channel’s mission, which include: 1) to convey a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims; 
2) to educate Muslims; and 3) to represent the voiceless and oppressed Muslims. The 
second section discusses reflexivity as it relates to these missionary goals, exploring both 
the possibilities and the limitations that these goals present to management and television 
production staff. This chapter lays the groundwork for an analysis of the ways in which 
this avowed mission shapes the television production rituals and the output of Living the 
Life (in Chapter 6), as well as the characteristics of working life that the employees of the 
station encounter (in Chapter 7).  
5.1 An Overview of the Three Mission Goals 
This section discusses the three missionary goals of the Islam Channel, as indicated by the 
channel’s website, explained by the CEO’s statement of mission, and articulated by 
management staff. This section also leads onto issues of reflexivity concerning the 
channel’s mission, which I discuss in Section 5.2. 
5.1.1 The Goal to Convey a Moderate Form of Islam to Non-Muslims 
The first missionary goal of the Islam Channel is to convey a moderate form of Islam to 
non-Muslims. The channel sees television as an important broadcast medium capable of 
fulfilling such a goal. As a television broadcaster, it assumes that two roles relate to its 
mission: first, it functions as a platform for da’wah (proselytization) of non-Muslim 
communities by conveying moderate Islamic messages through its religious and light-
entertainment programmes. Second, it perceives itself as a platform for dialogue (as one 
of the da’wah principles) via its current affairs programmes. 
As a platform of da’wah, the channel represents itself as an Islam-based television 
station that observes moderate views by balancing religious programming with lighter 
forms of entertainment. In 2013, religious programming included IslamQA, a ‘live’ call-in 
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programme; Journey through the Qur’an, a recorded series; and Journey of Faith, a recorded 
series of lectures. In an effort to balance this religious programming, key lighter forms of 
entertainment offered by the Islam Channel included the following programmes: Living the 
Life, a live evening magazine talk show; Street Challenge, a recorded vox-pop; and Women's 
AM, a live breakfast talk show. By balancing the genres of programming offered, the 
channel attempts to represent itself as adhering to a moderate form of Islam.  
As a platform for encouraging dialogue, the Islam Channel addressed its 
responsibility to invite non-Muslims to engage in dialogue explicitly. Iqbal, the manager of 
programming, emphasised the intention of Mohamed Ali, CEO of the Islam Channel, as 
providing a platform for interreligious dialogue:   
The Islam Channel CEO, Mohammed Ali on one occasion, stated that 
Muslims are always being ‘talked about’ in the media. One of the reasons 
to establish the Islam Channel was to join the conversation. If ‘others’ are 
talking about ‘us’ (Muslims), we could say to them, ‘let us join the 
conversation so we can discuss the topic properly’. Otherwise, their 
discussion will likely be with non-Muslims. So, if they express opinions 
about Islam, better to come and discuss them with us […], (Interview, 20 
June 2013). 
This eagerness of the Islam Channel CEO to foster a dialogue with non-Muslims by 
specifically inviting them to ‘join the conversation’ affirms the third Qur’anic 
Methodology of Da’wah: ‘reason with them in a better way’. Dialogue is one of the three 
methods mentioned in the Qur’an. In the Meaning of the Holy Quran, Abdullah Yusuf Ali 
explicates the verse, emphasising how Muslims should approach non-Muslims:   
• To invite every human being to Islam with wisdom and discretion, meeting people 
on their ground and convincing them with illustrations from their own knowledge 
and experience, this may be very narrow or very broad.  
• To adopt a ‘beautiful way of preaching’. The preaching must not be dogmatic, 
self-regarding or offensive, but gentle, considerate and such as would attract their 
attention.  
• The manner of argument/dialogue should not be acrimonious, but modelled on 
the most courteous and most gracious example […], (Yusuf Ali, 2011, p. 669). 
 
Modelling this practical guidance in the Qur’an, the channel aims to achieve its goal 
of representing a moderate form of Islam through interreligious dialogue. By televising 
dialogue with non-Muslims, the channel appears to be a Muslim institution that remains 
tolerant of and includes the Western Other. Such moderate Muslim characteristics greatly 
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differ from the way in which fundamentalists treat non-Muslims (Ramadan, 2004; 2009). 
This particular missionary goal explains the channel’s aspiration to spread a moderate 
form of Islam to non-Muslims by offering a balance of religious and light-entertainment 
programmes, as well as by encouraging interfaith dialogue.  
5.1.2 The Goal to Educate Muslims 
The second missionary goal of the Islam Channel is to educate Muslim audiences. The 
channel prioritises two main groups amongst the British Muslim audience. These groups 
include the young and women (assistant manager of programming, interview, 18 June 
2013). This particular missionary goal targets findings of the 2011 government census, 
which indicates that 33% of the Muslim population was aged 15 years or younger (British 
Muslims in Numbers, 2015). It also responds to the discovery of rates of lower academic 
achievement amongst British Muslim youth (see Wilkinson, 2014). By assuming the role 
of an educator, the Islam Channel aims to support young Muslim audience members, 
developing their religious identity and encouraging the practice of Islam. Sara, the 
assistant manager of programming, suggests: 
The Islam Channel aims to offer programmes that inspire young Muslims 
to do good deeds. By presenting Islamic principles to them, they might 
find their Muslim identity within the programme. Something that tells 
who they are and encourages them by telling them that their deen 
(religion) is good, something that educates them […], (Interview, 17 June 
2013) 
Feeling an obligation to spread Islamic teachings throughout Muslim communities in 
the UK, the Islam Channel provides content that helps reinforce Muslim religious identity 
through its programming. Many factors result in rates of lower academic achievement 
amongst Muslim youth in Britain. Such factors include English language barriers, their 
parents diminished engagement with mainstream curricula and the removal of Islam from 
the academic learning environment (Wilkinson, 2014, p.399). Having detached their 
education from both national and Islamic curricula, young Muslims are at risk of being 
persuaded by fundamentalists or, even worse, extremists as they search for and develop 
their religious identities. In response to such a risk, the Islam Channel aims to teach young 
Muslims, guiding them through programmes that allow them to have fun whilst 
simultaneously preserving their religious identity (assistant manager of programming, 
interview, 18 June 2013).   
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The Islam Channel also targets a female audience. Muslim women in Britain include 
women of Asian, South Asian, African, South American, European, Mediterranean, 
Arabic and Middle-Eastern Islamic cultures (Mirza, 2012, p. 121). The 2001 census 
indicates that the majority of Muslim women in the UK, based upon their ethnicity, are 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi. Data also shows that Pakistani and Bangladeshi women exhibited 
the lowest rates of economic participation: in fact, only 22% of Bangladeshi women age 
16 years and older and 27% of Pakistani women of a similar age range were economically 
active (Abbas, 2005, p. 29). In 2011, the percentage of Muslim women employed had 
increased to 29%, but this was not a significant increase (British Muslims in Numbers, 
2015). Because Muslim women occupy a marginalised position in Britain, the channel 
considers it their responsibility to educate these women (assistant manager of 
programming, interview, 18 June 2013). In particular, the channel claims it a 
responsibility to help Muslim women feel safe and comfortable when practising their 
religious duties, such as wearing the hijab and other religiously sanctioned clothing, in 
public places. Hence, the Islam Channel claims that its role is to educate Muslims and 
counter the negative representations of Muslim women in the West (as addressed in 
Chapter 2). Condemning the misrepresentation of Muslim women in the West, Iqbal, the 
manager of programming argues that Islam has been protecting women and their rights,   
Some in the viewing public may be puzzled when Western countries 
assert that Islam does not provide women with individual rights. Islam 
gave women some rights 1434 years ago. The first documented business 
woman, Khadijah, the Prophet’s beloved wife, engaged in commerce […] 
In the UK, however, women were given individual rights only in more 
recent times. The West has a long and complicated history, but over the 
past centuries have women’s rights become available to them. Compared 
to Islam, it has been giving women their rights since 1434 years ago. So 
how come the West come and preach to us (Muslims) that their values are 
superior when they just recently talked about giving women equal rights, 
not to beat women, not to put people in slavery, not to treat black people 
or all people with different colours badly? […] (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
Muslim women are often seen in the West as ‘victims’ of Islamic law (shari’a) and 
jurisprudence (fiqh). Western prejudice towards and stereotypes of Islam and Muslims are 
attitudes that victimise Muslim women, Iqbal commented. For instance, a Muslim woman 
is commonly only represented as either a romantic heroine struggling for freedom from 
her cruel father or a victim fighting against her backwards and traditional Eastern culture 
(Puwar, 2003; Ahmed, 2003 in Mirza, 2012, p. 128). On this basis, the Islam Channel 
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takes pride in educating Muslim women in a way that emphasises their rights. Western 
representations of Muslim women as oppressed by Islam encouraged the channel to 
continue educating women, helping them to find their identities and providing them with 
a voice through a variety of programming options.  
The missionary goal ‘to educate Muslims’ indicates that the channel has assumed its 
role as an educator of young and female audience members. The channel specifies that 
these two groups within British Muslim communities are often victims of Islamophobia 
due to their underprivileged positions. While the channel considers Muslim youth to be an 
audience that needs to strengthen its religious convictions, it offers Muslim women the 
type of support that it believes might help them to preserve their identities (e.g., wearing 
the hijab) whilst still socialising with the broader British society.  
5.1.3 The Goal to Represent the Voiceless and Oppressed Muslims  
The third aim of the Islam Channel is to become the ‘voice’ of both local and global 
Muslims (Ummah). Available via satellite and the Internet, the Islam Channel broadcasts to 
over 132 countries, making it one of the most influential Islamic satellite channels in 
Europe and the world. Given such a level of influence, the Islam Channel has 
characterised itself as the televised voice of British Muslims and the Ummah, using the 
banner, ‘Voice for the Voiceless, Voice of the Oppressed’. Figure 3 illustrates the slogan 
montage inserted during the commercial break: 
 
Figure 3: The Islam Channel’s Montage 
The Islam Channel broadcasts the motto ‘Voice for the voiceless, voice of the 
oppressed’ during each commercial break in programming. The ‘voice for the voiceless’ 
signifies that the Islam Channel endeavours to speak on behalf of Muslim communities 
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whose voices are unheard by the government and/or unnoticed by the public. In doing so, 
the channel addresses stories that receive little attention in the mainstream media. For 
example, in May 2013, through its programme Politics and Media, Islam Channel Current 
Affairs produced a five-part discussion entitled Bangladesh in Crisis. The story concerned 
the rioting of anti-government protesters, led by an alliance of the fundamentalist group 
Jama‘at Islami (JI) and the Bangladesh National Party Bangladesh (BNP), which caused 
social, political and economic unrest in the country. While the BBC framed the crisis only 
as a ‘civil war’, the Islam Channel reported on its religious and political aspects, 
addressing issues relating to Islamic laws of blasphemy, as well as comparing the extremist 
perspective of the blasphemy law with the moderate one. While many news programmes 
attended closely to conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, mainstream media had 
marginalised the crisis in Bangladesh despite the fact that thousands of civilians were 
killed. Thus, by using the ‘voice for the voiceless’ slogan, the channel assumed its role as a 
spokesperson for Muslims who live amidst civil war and conflict.     
In addition to covering stories that are marginalised by the mainstream media, the 
Islam Channel claims to be a ‘voice’ for ‘voiceless British Muslims’ who have become 
victims of Islamophobia. In doing so, the Islam Channel attempts to counter negative 
media and British government representations of Islam and Muslims. A growing number 
of negative representations of Islam and Muslims in the media (Knott et al., 2013, p. 80) 
result in Islamophobia, rendering Muslims ‘a suspect community’ (Kundnani, 2015). 
Therefore, to counter these negative representations in the western media, the Islam 
Channel recognizes a need to speak up on behalf of Islam, British Muslims and the entire 
Ummah.  
With the slogan ‘the voice of the oppressed’, the Islam Channel also expresses 
solidarity with the Ummah (the global Muslim communities), acknowledging oppressed 
Muslims under various regimes, such as the Palestinians under the Zionists and the Syrians 
under the Asad administration. A sense of solidarity with the Ummah and responsibility 
towards British Muslims underpin the channel’s claim to be the ‘voice’.  
5.2 Reflexivity about the Mission  
This section reflects on the channel's mission, interrogating the possibilities and limitations 
that it poses to the channel. Examining reflexivity concerning missionary goals is essential 
for this thesis, as it supports our understanding of how and under what conditions 
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television production workers make creative decisions whilst remaining mindful of the 
channel's mission. The following four sections (5.2.1 to 5.2.4) analyse the missionary 
goals. Section 5.2.1 reflects on the goal ‘to convey a moderate form of Islam to non-
Muslims,’ and thus considers how the channel perceives its da’wah (proselytization) 
agenda. Still related to this first missionary goal, Section 5.2.2 addresses the channel’s 
response to external challenges. Section 5.2.3 discusses the second missionary goal, ‘to 
educate Muslims’, which, I argue, is not only limited to youth and female Muslim 
audiences (as mentioned in the prior section), but also includes conservative business 
clients. Finally, Section 5.2.4 criticises the third missionary goal, speaking on behalf of 
Islam, British Muslims and the entire Muslim Ummah. Section 5.2.4 points to the ways in 
which this goal contradicts the first missionary objective: to convey religious moderation 
to the public. Considering reflexivity as it relates to the three missionary goals is essential 
for this thesis, as such an understanding of the channel’s mission supports an analysis of the 
power dynamics shaping the production quality of Living the Life (in Chapter 6) and the 
quality of working life encountered by the station’s employees (in Chapter 7).  
5.2.1 Da’wah Agenda and Business Model  
The first missionary goal, 'to convey a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims', signifies 
the Islam Channel’s da’wah, or agenda for proselytization, as well as its business model. 
This section demonstrates how, through the Da’wah Project, the channel aims to spread a 
moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims whilst generating revenue through its business 
model. The channel seeks to spread a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims by 
balancing the genres of televised programming that it broadcasts and by promoting 
interreligious dialogue. In revealing itself as adhering to a moderate form of Islam, the 
channel hopes to attract non-Muslim audience members, who wish to learn about and 
subsequently convert to Islam. Although it is quite common for religious broadcasting 
organisations to include proselytization within their agendas (Abelman and Hoover, 1990; 
Kraidy and Khalil, 2009; Al-Najjar, 2012; Ayish, 2012; Hroub, 2012), the Islam Channel 
is unique amongst religious broadcast institutions. The channel's da’wah agenda serves not 
only as a strategy for enticing non-Muslims to convert to Islam, but also as a means of 
capital development.  
In order to remain in the industry, the Islam Channel relies on a unique business 
model, which generates four sources of income through the Da’wah Project as well as 
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sales and marketing revenues (human resource manager, interview, 19 June 2013). These 
sources include: 1) fees collected from individual subscriptions to the Da’wah Card; 2) fees 
received from business subscriptions to the Da’wah Card (allowing for three different 
sponsorship options); 3) stall booking fees collected during the annual Global Peace and 
Unity (GPU) event; and 4) the air-time sales and advertising charges received from non-
subscribers to the Da’wah Card. Under the Da’wah Project, the channel then uses these 
resources for television production and missionary initiatives via radio, publication and its 
website. Figure 4 summarises the Islam Channel’s business model, reflecting its da’wah 
agenda, which includes conveying a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims and 
providing support for British Muslim individuals and enterprises: 
 
 
Figure 4: Business Model of the Islam Channel 
 
The Da’wah Project has been in operation since 2007.  In 2013, it officially 
launched an initiative to manage fundraising events and the Da’wah Card. The goals of the 
Da’wah Project include promoting an understanding of Islam, eliminating misconceptions 
and providing everyone with a free Islamic education (The Dawah Project, 2012). In 
2013, for example, the Da’wah Project launched two radio projects in particular African 
countries and Indonesia in an effort to demonstrate continuous support for Islamic 
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Project reflect the channel’s mission, ‘to convey a moderate form of Islam to non-
Muslims’.   
The Da’wah Project contributes to the channel’s revenue through the Da’wah Card 
scheme. Through this project, the Islam Channel not only executes its da’wah agenda, 
spreading Islam through the media and eliminating misconceptions amongst non-Muslims, 
but also contributes to the growth of the British Muslim economy. The channel promotes 
the scheme to Muslims living in Britain as an initiative that encourages consumer support 
for ethical businesses, thereby providing a win-win situation for both consumers (business 
and individual) and the channel (ibid.). By subscribing to the Da’wah Card scheme, the 
companies enjoy a reasonably priced business sponsorship package that allows them to 
advertise their services or products. For individual subscribers, the Da’wah Card offers its 
holder a discount at participating business outlets. Table 4 summarises the benefits that 
the Da’wah Card holds for both individual consumers and companies: 
Table 4: The Da’wah Card Scheme  
 
Type of Membership Benefits to Da’wah Card holders 
Individuals (consumers) The Da’wah Card offers cardholders discounts at 
participating stores (a full list of stores can be found in the 
Da’wah Card Directory). 
Businesses & Sponsors For a small yearly fee, businesses will be promoted through 
one of the Business Sponsorship packages. 
Source: http://www.theDa’wahproject.com/Da’wah-card/about-the-Da’wah-card/ 
 
The management of the Islam Channel claimed that it receives financial support 
primarily through Da’wah Project membership subscriptions, such as the Da’wah Card 
scheme, which offers advertising space on the channel’s website as well as during its on-air 
advertisements (Human resource manager, Interview, 18 June 2013). Table 4 illustrates 
how individuals and business outlets participate in the Islam Channel’s Da’wah Project 
initiatives to spread Islam through broadcast media. It is also a strategy of the Islam 
Channel to gain the financial support necessary to continue producing television 
programmes and missionary initiatives, like those in Africa and Indonesia. While 
individual subscribers can contribute ‘shares’ to these missionary projects, e.g., through 
- 116 - 
charity, businesses can take part in these projects by subscribing to business sponsorship 
packages.  
The sales and marketing department of the Islam Channel offers its clients three 
options in the Da’wah Card Business Sponsorship Package: Gold, Silver and Bronze. 
Customers who subscribe to the Gold Package have their products and/or services 
advertised on-air up to ten times a day for three months; under the banner of the Islam 
Channel’s Da’wah Project website for three months; and on the Da’wah Card online 
directory for one year. Silver Package subscribers have their business logos advertised on-
air for three months and are included in the Da’wah Card online directory for one year. 
Finally, Bronze Package subscribers receive advertising space within the Da’wah Card online 
directory. A subscriber to any package receives advertising space in an e-newsletter that is 
sent out to over 30,000 subscribers, as well as a 10% discounted fee for stall bookings at 
any Da’wah Project event.  
 
Figure 5 : The Da'wah Card Business Sponsorship Packages 
Source: http://www.thedawahproject.com/dawah-card/register-your-bbusiness/ (The Dawah 
Project business flyer, 2013, accessed on 4, September, 2015). 
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Figure 5 illustrates the details of these three sponsorship package options that the 
sales department of the Islam Channel offers, including their subscription costs, the 
duration of on-air advertising and the size of each allotted advertising space. 
The second source of income derives from on-air time and on-line advertising space 
charged to businesses that do not subscribe to the Da’wah Card sponsorship packages 
(described above). The list of clients advertising with the Islam Channel may be found in 
Figure 6:    
 
 
Figure 6: The List of the Islam Channel Advertising Clients 
Source: http://www.thedawahproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/The-Dawah-
Project-Business-Flyer.pdf. (The Dawah Project business flyer, 2013, accessed on 4, September, 
2015). 
 
These business sponsorship packages support the human resource manager’s claim 
that they support the Islam Channel financially with a sustainable income. In addition to 
the Da’wah Card scheme, the Islam Channel receives revenue from other sources, such as 
stall booking fees paid by business outlets during events organised by the Islam Channel, 
like Global Peace and Unity, an annual event which attracts the participation of thousands 
of people around the world.  
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It is worth reflecting on aspects of the socioreligious and socioeconomic (Da’wah 
Project) agendas of the Islam Channel – in particular, its mission to spread Islam to non-
Muslims – as doing so allows us to discern ideological influences that affect the operations 
and resources of the channel. Studies of Middle Eastern broadcasting institutions often 
indicate fundamentalist influences in their ownership (Kraidy and Khalil, 2009) and 
religious television production (Hroub, 2012; Al-Najjar, 2012). In contrast, no evidence 
suggests that the Islam Channel is affiliated economically to a particular religious ideology 
that provides the channel with its financial support. This information offers insight into 
how the channel sustains its business. Because the CEO and manager refused to disclose 
any additional sources of funding for the Islam Channel, little is known regarding the 
amount of income that the channel has received from sources other than the clients listed 
and the respective amounts charged for advertising available upon the channel’s website.  
5.2.2 Response to External Challenges 
Though remaining with the same missionary goal, ‘to convey a moderate form of Islam to 
non-Muslims’, this section highlights the channel’s response to external challenges. It 
discusses how the channel has deployed this missionary goal strategically in order to 
defend its reputation. The CEO of the Islam Channel, Mohamed Ali Harrath, has 
indicated that the channel aims to promote moderate Islamic views to non-Muslim 
viewers (Zarnosh, 2008). Such a claim signifies the CEO’s effort to separate the channel 
from other organisations with reputations for spreading religious extremism, for instance, 
the British-based extremist movement Hizb-ut-Tahrir (http://www.hizb.org.uk/). By 
underlining this moderation on the Islam Channel website, as well as in marketing leaflets 
and exclusive interviews (with Zarnosh, 2008), Mohamed Ali attempts to maintain both 
the reputation of the Islam Channel and his personal reputation, which have been 
discredited by the public regularly. In particular, the media regulator Ofcom is a constant 
source of criticism, and the counter-extremism think tank, the Quilliam Foundation, 
accuses the channel of spreading extremism via its religious programme IslamQA.  For 
these reasons, the channel constantly finds itself on the defense.  
In response to the publication of the Quilliam Report in 2010, the channel 
restricted access to its premises by researchers, as the Islam Channel is anxious that 
research findings might prove harmful to its reputation (see my reflection in Chapter 4). 
Although the CEO did not express this caution directly, I sensed his uneasiness during my 
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observations and personal communications with him and the other employees at the 
channel. The denial of access to the channel in June 2012 and the CEO’s refusal to be 
interviewed reveals that a ‘culture of caution’ is at work within the channel in its response 
to external pressures, such as the Quilliam accusation. When I requested an interview 
with the CEO, his reactions toward me indicated his discomfort. He gave excuses, such as 
‘the information about the channel is available on the Internet’ as well as insisting that I 
could get ‘the same information from my interview with Iqbal, the manager of 
programming, or with Malik, the human resource manager’. The next thing I knew, he 
excused himself, refusing to be interviewed, and told me that he needed to meet with the 
legal officer (Fieldnotes, 20 June 2013).  
Although the CEO chose not to directly respond to such external pressures, (e.g., 
the accusation) Iqbal, the manager of programming, suggests that the channel has 
attempted to reclaim its reputation and separate itself from extremism. He feels that the 
channel should educate the non-Muslim audience about the misrepresentations of Islam 
and Muslims in the media. According to Iqbal,  
I think there is much undue attention on Muslims and Islam. It is about 
educating the public about what Islam stands for and why people do what 
they do. Some people do some silly stuff and the whole of Islam gets 
tainted by their notions […] (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
By ‘silly stuff’, Iqbal refers to terrorist activities. Iqbal condemned extremist 
militant terrorist activities, as these actions tarnish the images of both Islam and Muslims. 
He feels that it is the responsibility of the Islam Channel to counter this sort of tarnishing, 
defending Islam and Muslims by conveying a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims 
through its programming.  
However, the reaction that I received from the CEO and the manager is a common 
response of employees of broadcast institutions. Caldwell once argued, ‘the media 
[television, film] companies are resolutely proprietary in nature; they guard many internal 
processes and on-screen decisions possessively' once their employees enter 'the public 
world' (Caldwell, 2008, p. 14). The media regulators, like Ofcom, Quilliam or myself, 
belong to ‘the public world’. I understood his position at the time of our conversation as 
one that showed he was deeply traumatised by the Quilliam Foundation’s accusations of 
recruitment of young Muslim audiences to extremism. Likewise, I was once an employee 
of a television organisation. My role as presentation editor included ‘guarding’ the 
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reputation of my employer, which meant responding to various media regulators in ways 
that would not place the reputation of the company for which I worked at risk. Thus, I do 
understand why Iqbal responded to me in that fashion because, in my previous job, I 
needed to represent Astro. The job required me to speak positively about Astro, too. For 
instance, I was required to inform clients about the National Censorship Board (LPF)’s 
monitoring of the content broadcast, thereby affirming Astro’s requirement to follow 
certain standards in maintaining the quality of their programme outputs.   
I comprehend the dilemma within the CEO’s situation, which is one, not only of 
political exile but also one responsible for refuting the Quilliam accusation concerning the 
channel’s encouragement of extremism. Arun Kundnani (2015) elaborates upon the 
dilemma faced specifically by leaders of Muslim organisations, like Mohammed Ali, the 
CEO of the Islam Channel. According to Kundnani,      
Because ideologies circulating among Muslim populations have been 
identified as precursors to terrorism, the perception grows that Muslims 
have a special problem with radicalization. In this context, leaders of 
targeted Muslim communities have become intimidated by the general 
mood and aligned themselves with the government, offering themselves as 
allies willing to oppose and expose dissent within the community. 
Everyone who rejects the game of fake patriotism falls under suspicion, as 
opposition to extremism becomes the only legitimate discourse (ibid., 
2015, pp. 13-14). 
To exclude the channel from being considered ‘a suspect community’ (Kundnani, 
2015) – that is, a Muslim community that opposes an agenda of social integration – the 
management tends to declare its goal to convey a moderate form of Islam. Such a 
cautionary response by the CEO towards outsiders (myself included) is understandable. 
Noonan (2008) found that the television staff of the BBC’s Religion and Ethics section also 
practised a certain degree of caution during their creative decision-making. Because 
religion is perceived as requiring a ‘distinct style of programming' (ibid., p. 11), the 
corporation needs to represent it with caution to serve the public interest. Although 
caution is a common concern within the production of television, my concern is not with 
the ‘act of caution' within the Islam Channel. Rather, it is the ‘form of caution' that I 
intend to analyse here, including the extent to which it affects the production quality of 
television programmes. I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6 the degree to which caution 
impacts the production quality of Living the Life.  
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5.2.3 Young, Female and Conservative Audiences 
The second missionary goal of the Islam Channel is to educate Muslims. As mentioned in 
Section 5.1.2, this particular mission is inflected by the channel’s perception of its 
audiences as young and female. This mission goal, however, is challenged by an 
ideological clash within the channel. A conflict between the CEO-inspired moderate Islam 
and the Salafi fundamentalists that dominate the programming department may shape the 
production of light-entertainment programmes, such as Living the Life (Researcher, 
Interview, 13 June 2013). Because the channel aims not only to serve an audience 
comprised of Muslim youth and females but also conservative fundamentalist audiences, 
the producer might face problems when attempting to balance religious and entertainment 
elements on Living the Life. The business clients, e.g., the Da’wah Card subscribers and 
advertising sponsors are among the channel’s conservative fundamentalist audiences. The 
business clients are considered primary to the Islam Channel as they provide it commercial 
revenue. A report by the Islam Channel stating that 80% of the channel’s programming is 
religious programming supports the claim that the channel prioritises its conservative 
audiences (Spreading Islam through the Media, 2013). Religious programming includes live 
phone-in programmes, such as IslamQA, and those that feature religious sermons, such as 
Hajj and Ramadan, Qur’anic recitation, or discussions of traditions regarding the Prophet 
Muhammad and/or Islamic jurisprudence. This report indicates that the channel aims to 
cater to its conservative business clients in addition to its young and female audience 
members.  
In consideration of the young and female constituents of the audience, moderate 
Muslim staff attempt to strike a balance in the treatment of religious and entertainment 
elements, but those who adhere to Salafi fundamentalism tend to be uncomfortable with 
all forms of entertainment. The notion of balance is central to moderate Islamic views. 
Moderate Muslims believe in the need to strike a balance in their lives between practising 
religion and enjoying life. One programme that the channel feels to be striking a balance 
between light-entertainment and religious elements is Living the Life. The channel hopes 
that Living the Life attracts young and female viewers. Like Sara, the assistant manager of 
programming puts it: 
We are living in the society where technology is sophisticated, in which 
TV production is sophisticated. However, there is also a need for light-
heartedness and fun. Having fun in Islam is good. Otherwise, young 
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people cannot relate anymore. So for us, we put Living the Life at the time 
where people come home after a long day at school or college. They do 
not want anything heavy to watch. So, what we have given them is light-
hearted […], (Interview, 17 June 2013).  
The management perceives Living the Life to be a programme that encourages 
audience members to preserve their religious identity whilst having fun. The ideological 
clash within the Islam Channel, though, could hinder the producer in accomplishing the 
channel’s mission to educate young Muslims and to simultaneously assert notions of ‘halal 
and fun’ or ‘cool’ Muslim identity (Herding, 2013) on Living the Life.  
By growing up as a minority in a country like Britain, young, female British Muslims 
are exposed to a Western lifestyle, which (some argue) could place their religious 
identities at risk (Ramadan, 2004, p. 52). The channel finds that it is hard for a person to 
be simultaneously young, female and Muslim whilst maintaining a religious identity 
(producer, personal communication, 1 March 2013). With the emergence of different 
forms of Islam in Britain, such as fundamentalism, moderate Islam and extremism (as 
published in the Western media and circulated within the society), the task to educate 
young Muslims and participate in their identity formation has grown more complex 
(Gilliat-Ray, 2010). The channel perceives Living the Life to be a television programme 
that helps both young Muslims and Muslim women ‘have fun’ whilst maintaining their 
religious identity. In particular, Herding’s (2013) study explains the dilemma faced by 
Muslim youth in the West when their attempts to appear ‘cool’ are challenged by 
conservative fundamentalism. The dilemma involves promoting both a ‘religious identity’ 
and one of a ‘British Muslim’; for being British means acknowledging British cultural 
values, some of which conflict with Muslim religious values. Therefore, it is challenging 
for the Islam Channel to balance religious and British values in its programming. For 
example, Muslim youth especially resist acknowledging themselves as ‘British Muslims’ 
on account of their disagreement with British foreign policy towards various Middle 
Eastern crises and the war in Iraq (Gilliat-Ray, 2010; Kundnani, 2015). Also, such 
frustrations can turn their loyalties toward the Ummah (the global Muslim) and away from 
the UK government and the Western Other. This type of young Muslim attitude has 
become a chief concern to both the British government and the Islam Channel, as Muslim 
youth could become extremists due to their lack of British patriotism and feelings of 
solidarity with the oppressed Ummah.  
- 123 - 
The values of moderate Islam expressed within the Islam Channel include the 
balancing of religious programming with light entertainment in order to support the 
concept of ‘halal and fun’ that so resonates with moderate Muslims (Herding, 2013), as 
well as to show support for an integrationist agenda. In contrast, Salafi fundamentalists set 
themselves against many British, and more broadly, Western values. The Salafi 
fundamentalists reject the notion of ‘halal and fun,’ which results in the portrayal of Islam 
as a ‘sombre’ and ‘austere’ religion (Masood, 2006, p. 62).   
 In the case of the ideological clash experienced within the Islam Channel, I found, 
on the one hand, the moderate values expressed within the statement of mission (‘to 
convey a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims’) to be affirmed by the aspirations of the 
CEO, the producer of Living the Life, and a few of its assistants, including researchers like 
myself. On the other hand, the programming staff, including the programming manager, 
the producers of religious programmes and an assistant producer of Living the Life, 
reflected fundamentalist religious values. Verbal evidence supports my argument 
concerning the existence of Salafi fundamentalism at the Islam Channel. One of the 
researchers of Living the Life, Akram, explained to me the ideological clash inside the 
channel: 
The religious programming is dominated by the Salafi, which is fine as it is 
one path of Islam […] But the point I am making is that there is a lot of 
Islamic items (for Living the Life) in this country which are not Salafi-
inspired, which will do a lot for the channel and Muslims and non-
Muslims in the UK. These items are not being given airtime because the 
department holds a different view. As far as I can tell, the content is being 
filtered. If it does not accord with the Salafi way, it does not get shown 
[…], (Interview, 13 June 2013). 
Salafi fundamentalism, which seems to exert a pronounced influence at the heart of 
the programming department, might hinder the channel’s mission to educate Muslims by 
viewing ‘halal and fun’ as objectionable. This ideological clash is particularly problematic 
for the production of Living the Life, as its generic conventions require the producer to 
include light entertainment and religious elements. The following provides additional 
verbal support of managerial approval of the fundamentalist influence that impacted Living 
the Life. As Iqbal, the programming manager put it:  
We have non-Muslims; we have presented Jewish organisations and 
Christian organisations. You have seen all these on Living the Life, such as 
rabbis and Christian priests. So, we have no issues on that because we 
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believe it is a platform for everyone. However, when it comes to religious 
issues, we have to make sure that it is in line with our set of ideology 
(Interview, 20 June 2013). 
This statement suggests a conflict between the CEO’s desire for moderate Islam and 
the manager’s inclination towards fundamentalism. Because Living the Life is a light-
entertainment programme, presenting a serious discussion regarding religion would be 
complicated and needs to be handled with caution. For that reason, Iqbal, the 
programming manager, suggested that Aswad, the producer, must always consult him to 
make sure that the religious elements presented are ‘in line’ with the ‘department 
ideology’. The reference to ‘our set of ideology’ above can be understood either as the 
programming department’s Salafism or the channel’s moderate Islam, or possibly both. 
However, when compared to Akram’s claim above, ‘our set of ideology’ can be 
understood as favoring the programming department, for according to the organisational 
hierarchy, the producer of Living the Life is under the direct supervision of the manager of 
the programming department.  
The channel’s perception of conservative audiences impacts upon television 
production at the Islam Channel. In order to respond to these particular conservative 
audience members, the management/programming department tended to deploy a 
stringent monitoring procedure, particularly concerning the light entertainment made 
available on Living the Life. In an effort to avoid offending its conservative audience 
members, the channel tends to exercise caution. My greatest concern here is the extent to 
which such control and caution affect the production quality of Living the Life. Because 
elements of control and caution betray power dynamics within the Islam Channel, it is 
essential to examine their roots. While the controlling of a light-entertainment 
programme, such as Living the Life, was meant to ensure its contents would not offend 
conservative audience members, this caution resulted from the production community’s 
responses to the programming department’s control over their creative decisions. Chapter 
6 discusses in detail the implication of this control for the production quality of Living the 
Life.  
5.2.4 Problems with the Solidarity Agenda 
The ‘voice’ that the Islam Channel claims for itself indicates its religiopolitical mission. 
The missionary goal also suggests the channel’s solidarity with the entire Muslim 
community/Ummah, not just British Muslims. This section addresses two possible ways in 
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which this agenda of solidarity might threaten the channel’s reputation. First, if it declares 
its solidarity with the Ummah, then the channel might appear resistant towards the 
government’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the war in Iraq and the crises in the 
Middle East. Second, expressions of solidarity by the channel with particular Muslim 
individuals or groups might draw the attention of media regulators to the channel, e.g., 
‘potential due impartiality issues’ in the reporting of these crises (see Ofcom, 2011 for 
details, pp. 5-25). The channel risks being accused of bias towards those guests and 
contributors who are associated with individuals or groups identified as upholding a 
certain religious ideology, Muslim charitable organisations or politically affiliated Muslim 
organisations featured on Living the Life (see Chapter 6). Thus, the agenda of solidarity 
with oppressed Muslims appears to be the greatest threat to the channel’s reputation, as it 
might attract unnecessary attention by the media regulators.  
It is essential to address the possibilities that such missionary goals might threaten 
the channel's reputation. There is nothing wrong with standing in solidarity with other 
Muslims, especially given that television production workers engage in ‘cultural 
expressions involving all symbolic processes and collective practices that other cultures 
use to gain and reinforce identity’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 2). Thus, the sense of belonging to 
a cultural and/or religious group is strong, but also as television workers, they are bound 
both by the institution that employs them and their religion (Islam), which encourages 
cooperation (e.g., the concept of al-Ta’awun in the Qur’an).28 In this light, the solidarity 
agenda may put the channel at risk, for example it might be accused of being an ally of the 
form of Muslim political organisations unsanctioned by the government.  
The roots of political Islam are varied. The struggles of political Islam are not 
limited to the quest for liberation of the state from the control of the corrupt government 
or a non-Muslim government’s occupation of a Muslim state. The rise of political Islam 
also strives against Western cultural imperialism, which it perceives as an enemy to 
Muslims (Bayram, 2014, p. 11). Islamic political movements struggling against corrupt 
governments and the West include the Al-Ikhwan ul-Muslimin, or Muslim Brotherhood, in 
Egypt (strongly connected to the fundamentalists), as well as Ennahda in Tunisia. 
Examples of political Islam’s struggle for independence include Hamas (a fundamentalist 
                                                   
28 Al-Quran, 5:2. 
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offshoot) and Fatah (a moderate form of Islam) in Palestine, fighting for liberation from 
Israeli occupation. In particular, the Islam Channel shows its support for the ‘freedom 
fighters’ of Hamas. The channel risks damage to its reputation whenever it features any 
group (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas) that the Western media has portrayed as 
politically affiliated and/or violent on Living the Life, even if by doing the channel means to 
demonstrate solidarity. Infact, Ofcom did issue a report impugning the Islam Channel’s 
‘due impartiality’ in its reporting on the Arab-Israeli conflict for its current affairs 
programme (Ofcom, 2011, pp. 5-25). Such reports risk the reputation of the channel.  
The channel’s mission to represent the ‘voiceless and the oppressed’ amongst 
British Muslim communities includes supporting victims of Islamophobia. An example of a 
tragedy that triggered Islamophobia during my fieldwork in 2013 was the Woolwich 
Attack.29  As a Muslim myself, I was terrified to walk on the streets of London following 
the attack. The Woolwich incidence has triggered my fear of Islamophobia. Living in 
student accommodation near the Finsbury Park Underground Station in North London, a 
densely populated Muslim area, came to seem an unwise choice after all. I thought that 
remaining closer to my Muslim community (nearby the Finsbury Park Mosque) would be a 
safer option for a foreign individual, like me. However, my perception was wrong. 
During my fieldwork, Finsbury Park Mosque was a frequent target of authorities like the 
London Metropolitan Police and the UK National Counter Terrorism Security Office 
(NaCTSO); I began to worry about my safety.30 The NaCTSO officers increasingly 
monitored places of worship, such as the mosque, and crowded places, such as the 
underground stations. A few times upon my return from fieldwork, I encountered a 
group of police officers responsible for securing areas, such as the underground station 
and the nearby mosques. The Woolwich incident increased my empathy for British 
Muslims, who I now perceive even more keenly as victims of Islamophobia as well as 
being ‘a suspect community’ (Kundnani, 2015). As a Muslim woman who was born into a 
                                                   
29 British Soldier Lee Rigby was killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebolawe using knife 
and a cleaver to stab and hack him to death on 22 May 2013 near Royal Artillery Barracks 
in Woolwich. 
30 See security measures taken by the NaCTSO with regard to places of worship and crowded 
places: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-protective-
security-advice-for-places-of-worship, 
          https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/crowded-places 
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moderate Sunni family and raised within a country where Muslims constitute the majority 
of the population, it is hard for me to fully understand the fear and the caution that British 
Muslims experience in their everyday lives. I have never personally encountered events 
that trigger Islamophobia in Malaysia. Nevertheless, as a Muslim, I could comprehend the 
sense of belonging and the emphasis upon solidarity that the Islam Channel seeks to spread 
via its programming. The solidarity that the channel aims to promote to its viewers 
includes support for Muslims, who have been under the oppression of political regimes, 
detained under counter-terrorism legislation or have been victimised by Islamophobia.  
As a television genre that allows the producer to feature a variety of issues, Living 
the Life is also a potential platform for expressing solidarity with the voiceless and 
oppressed Muslims. However, such an agenda might constrain the production of Living the 
Life due to the two potential risks highlighted at the outset of this section: the channel risks 
appearing resistant towards government foreign policy, and the solidarity of Muslim 
individuals and groups that might include those with links to violent extremism. Such 
constraints might affect the creative decisions of the producer, thereby resulting in poor 
production quality.  
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter maps the structural challenges that shape the production culture of the Islam 
Channel. Considering reflexively as it pertains to each missionary goal informs us of the 
possibilities and limitations that the mission poses to the channel, as well as to the 
production of Living the Life. Also, such reflexivity helps us to identify how and under 
what conditions television production workers make a television programme. The mission 
serves both as an inspiration to and a challenge for the channel. Moreover, it can serve as 
an excellent motivation to promote interreligious harmony, spread Islam and support the 
channel’s capital development (through the Da’wah Project). Equally, it can cause 
negative consequences for the channel and members of its production community. The 
mission to educate Muslims reflects the channel’s perception of its audience. The Islam 
Channel’s emphases upon educating young and female viewers through a balanced 
treatment of religious and light-entertainment programmes were challenged by the 
motivation to serve the conservative audience. The Salafi fundamentalists that dominate 
the programming department tend also to challenge this particular notion of balance, 
although it is central to the moderate Islamic views reflected in the aspirations of the CEO 
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and the producer. This clash between the moderate and the Salafi fundamentalists, as well 
as the channel’s perception of its audience, also affects the production of Living the Life. 
Furthermore, the mission can also become a potential threat to the channel’s reputation, 
resulting in the exercise of caution by its employees. The channel’s (implicit) goal to serve 
conservative audience members and to express solidarity with the oppressed 
Muslims/Ummah can threaten the channel’s reputation. A better understanding of the 
meanings of the channel’s mission offers ground for this thesis to examine the extent to 
which each goal facilitates or constrains the production rituals (discussed in Chapter 6) and 
the quality of working life of its production community (in Chapter 7).  
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Chapter 6 
The Production Culture and Institutional Context of the 
Islam Channel 
This chapter revolves around the production quality of a magazine talk show, Living the 
Life. By ‘production quality’ of the magazine talk show, I refer to Bruun’s study of 
aesthetic of [the] television talk show, which suggests that ‘uncertainty’ and ‘sociability’ 
are critical factors that accentuate the viewers’ experience, subsequently, determine the 
quality of a television talk shows. To identify the production quality of a magazine talk 
show, I conducted a textual analysis of Living the Life. The purpose of the textual analysis is 
to answer the question of how does a religious television programme comes to take the 
form it does. To respond to such question, I divide this chapter into five parts. Section 6.1 
provides an overview of the genre conventions and production rituals of television talk 
shows. Section 6.2 discusses the results of textual analysis of Living the Life by examining 
its genre conventions and using The One Show as a yardstick to assess its production quality. 
Sections 6.3 through 6.5 discuss three primary constraints connecting to the results of the 
textual analysis. These limitations include 1) lack of resources, 2) problems relating to the 
mission of the Islam Channel, and 3) the conflicting notions of what constitutes a “good” 
television programme. 
6.1 An Overview of Television Talk Shows:  Genre Conventions and 
Production Rituals 
The genre conventions are the primary definer of any forms of television talk show. The 
genre conventions differentiate one type of talk show from the other. The daytime talk 
show, celebrity chat and magazine talk show, for example, all vary with regard to 
narrative and stylistic characteristics. Although there are distinctions between these talk 
shows, they tend to share three essential elements: presenter, guests and audience. This 
section aims to identify the differences and similarities between talk shows regarding 
genre conventions and production rituals to assist the analysis of production quality of the 
magazine talk show, Living the Life, which this thesis concerns. While textual analysis 
allows me to examine the genre conventions and identify how it shape the production 
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quality of the magazine talk show, the analysis of production rituals involves an 
investigation of ‘collective space as social negotiations’ experienced by the production 
community (Caldwell, 2008, p. 71). 
6.1.1 Genre Conventions 
In their study of daytime talk shows in the 1990s, Livingstone and Lunt (1994) point out 
that the genre conventions of a daytime talk show include a presenter and guests 
discussion recorded in front of a studio audience. Their study indicates that daytime talk 
shows allow the voices of ordinary people to enter the public sphere. This form of talk 
show focuses on a single topic of discussion. It deals in opinions about, or reactions to, a 
particular problem concerning the public. One of the shows they analysed was Kilroy (on 
BBC1, 1986-2004), was an example of a daytime talk show in the UK in which a 
presenter moves through a studio audience inviting opinions on various social issues. 
Another form of the talk show is celebrity talk/chat shows of which The Graham Norton 
Show (from 2007 to present) is an example. On this talk show, the invited celebrity guests 
discuss with the presenter a variety of topics related to their latest films, album releases, 
books or recent community projects. This form of talk show concerns ‘conversations 
among entertainment elites about the entertainment industry’ (Shattuc, 1997, p. 11).  
Although daytime and celebrity talk shows are different forms of talk shows, 
created for various purposes and aimed at specific audiences, they adopt similar genre 
conventions that involve the pre-recorded conversation of a presenter talking to guests in 
front of a studio audience. In contrast, the genre conventions of the magazine talk show, 
which involves a conversation between a presenter and guests, includes the following 
elements: a) visual features (VTs), b) forms of viewers participation (i.e., via email and 
Twitter) and c) ‘live’ broadcasting. The primary example of the magazine talk show on 
UK television is The One Show (BBC1, 2006-present) (Chandler and Munday, 2011, p. 
248). To answer my question about how does a religious television programme comes to 
take the form it does, this thesis focuses on the production of a magazine talk show, Living 
the Life through the analyses of genre conventions and production processes to investigate 
and conceptualise the production culture of the Islam Channel.  
A talk show production involves creative decision-making among producers and 
their team members (e.g., assistant producers, researchers and writers). Genre 
conventions guide the producers in making creative decisions and help them to create a 
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television programme for a particular group of audience. Given the various forms of 
television talk shows (i.e., daytime, celebrity and magazine), the genre conventions also 
vary from one talk show to another. Grindstaff (2002) suggests that the genre conventions 
of a daytime talk show often include guests, presenters/host and visual footage related to 
the topic under discussion. These are prerecorded talk shows in front of a studio audience 
who is sometimes invited by the presenter(s) to participate in the discussion between 
presenter and guests. In their research into daytime talk shows in the UK, Livingstone and 
Lunt (1994) also highlight similar talk show genre conventions.  
Similar to Livingstone and Lunt (1994) and Grindstaff (2002), Hanne Bruun (2001) 
also looks into the three core aspects of a talk show (presenter, guests and audience). 
However, Bruun’s approach to the analysis of genre conventions of the talk show is 
different. Unlike Grindstaff, who identifies the presenter, guests and the visual footage 
(VTs), Bruun suggests that the studio, presenter, and the interview are among the 
conventions of such form of talk show. She asserts that TV studio is the space of the 
programme where she observed ‘the genre unity of time and place’ (ibid., p. 244). Bruun 
suggests that the ‘studio’ where a talk show takes place serves two functions: first, to ‘give 
viewers an experience of simultaneity between the time of the programme and its 
transmission’, and second, ‘to create an experience of mergence of space between the 
programme and the viewers’ so that the viewers feel as if they are ‘participants in the 
programme as opposed to spectators (ibid.). Furthermore, Bruun describes the ‘studio 
presenter’ as a ‘central dramaturgic/aesthetic element who functions as an intermediary 
between the programme and the viewers’ (ibid.). Finally, ‘the interview’, which ‘focuses 
on people and conversation between people’ is the most important element in talk show 
because it contributes to a significant portion of the genre conventions. According to 
Bruun, these three genre conventions ‘are vital in deciding how each talk show is 
perceived and experienced’ by the audience (ibid., p. 245). I refer to both Grindstaff and 
Bruun studies as they provide me an overview of the genre conventions of television talk 
show. I refer mainly to Bruun’s analysis of genre conventions and aesthetic of television 
talk shows when analysing the production quality of a magazine talk show, Living the Life.    
As with a magazine talk show like The One Show, Whitefoot (2014) notes that the 
genre conventions include two presenters, guests, three light story items presented in 
pre-recorded visual footage and ‘live’ broadcasting from the studio. I refer to the 
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Whitefoot article, A One Show Researcher's First Recollections because it provides appropriate 
accounts for the genre conventions of a magazine talk show as well as its production 
rituals. I acknowledge that Whitefoot may be biased in her reflection because she works 
for the BBC. One might argue that her article is more promotional than academic, aiming 
to promote the BBC’s standards of professionalism and its employees’ experiences. I refer 
to her article not only due to the dearth of scholarly publications regarding these matters, 
but also because it is the only piece (for now) that tells us about the magazine talk show, 
its genre conventions and what constitutes the daily responsibilities and routines of a 
researcher involved in the magazine talk show’s production.  
I use The One Show as an example of a “good” magazine talk show. Not only is The 
One Show the current best example of a magazine talk show, but it was also an aspirational 
goal for both the programming manager and the producer of Living the Life since its first 
transmission in 2012 (Interviews, 20 June 2013). The manager of programming at the 
Islam Channel perceived The One Show as a good example of a magazine talk show that 
would allow the channel to engage with its viewers on a daily basis while attempting to 
accomplish its religious mission. According to the manager, 
When we saw The One Show, we liked that concept. We were looking at 
how we can engage with our viewers on a daily basis and show what the 
Muslim community have done out there [...] everyone who comes to 
Living the Life has done extraordinary things. So, Living the Life gives us an 
opportunity to show to the Muslim community what people have done 
and how they can become a role model to the entire Muslim community 
[…] (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
The Whitefoot (2014) reflexivity on the genre conventions of The One Show, in 
particular, guides me through the analysis of the production quality of Living the Life. By 
‘production quality’ of the magazine talk show, I refer to the ‘aesthetics of [the] television 
talk show’ (Bruun, 2001). I consider how well the producers have achieved success in 
realising their aesthetic goals and in matching generally accepted professional standards. 
Hanne Bruun points out that viewers' experience determines the quality of television talk 
show. A good television talk show delivers such elements as the ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘sociability' to its audience. Bruun applied these concepts to analyse the aesthetic of 
television talk show. By ‘uncertainty’, Bruun refers to the unpredictability embedded in 
the unscripted conversation between the presenter and the guest that gives viewers an 
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element of surprise. According to Bruun, ‘it is this degree of unpredictability which might 
conceivably be one of the talk show’s strong points in relation  to viewers’ (ibid., p. 248).  
Table 5 summarises five aspects of the genre conventions of a magazine talk show 
that make The One Show a suitable yardstick to assess the production quality of Living the 
Life.  
Table 5: Living the Life and The One Show Genre Conventions 
Living the Life (2012 – present) The One Show (2006 – present) 
 
Two presenters: male and female/two males. 
 
Two or three sets of guests representing two/three 
story items. 
 
Three separate features/VT inserts: 
 
Stories are selected from the Reuters feed 
subscribed by the Islam Channel. 
They act like fillers, inserted in-between the 
presenter-guests conversations. 
 




Broadcast ‘live’ from the studio 
 
No studio audience. Using the segment ‘Story of 
the Day’ to encourage home viewers to participate 
via email and Twitter 
 
Two presenters: male and female 
 
Three sets of guests representing three 
story items 
 
Two/three short features/VT 
 
Pre-recorded feature presented by the 




Often presented in conjunction with the 
highlighted story items. 
 
 
Broadcast ‘live’ from the studio.  
 
Occasionally involved outdoor filming. 
 
The studio audiences sit among the BBC 
staff. This gives home viewers an 
impression of studio audience watching the 
talk show with them.    
 
 
Bruun builds her argument on the notions of sociability in [the] television talk show. 
She uses the term sociability to describe ‘atmosphere of togetherness’ sought by such talk 
on radio and television, ‘ritual activity’ which emphasises ‘human personalities and 
qualities’ (Bruun, 2001, p. 249-50). She considers the presenter-guest dramaturgy in the 
talk show as ‘a ritualised acting out of the hospitality’, which is a significant part of its 
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conversational structure (ibid., p. 250). Bruun suggests that ‘the talk show must act out of 
hospitality as a ritual to relieve or avert the hostility that viewers might have being invaded 
by strangers (e.g., through the presenter-guest conversation) in their private sphere’ 
(ibid., p. 251). While the ‘uncertainty’ factor of the talk show gives audiences the 
element of surprises, the ‘sociability’ effect of talk show offers them such experiences as 
the ‘atmosphere of togetherness’, of being part of ‘ritualised activity’, and the ‘hospitality’ 
in the presenter-guest conversation (ibid.).  
Although the uncertainty and sociability are two essential elements that determine 
the production quality of a talk show, Bruun argues that both can be conflicting against 
each other (ibid.). The tension between the two elements depends on who are the talk 
show viewers (ibid.). Thus, a magazine talk show like Living the Life that targets the 
Muslim youth and women, the inclusion of the two dimensions must be thought out about 
these groups of audience. While the tension between uncertainty and sociability is 
inevitable, in the analysis of production quality of Living the Life, I need to consider the 
way the producer manages these elements during the execution of genre conventions and 
about his perception of the audience. According to Bruun, ‘How this tension is 
administered depends on the actual use of the genre [and] the way in which this tension 
is managed by the individual programme will have experiential consequences for the 
viewers’ (ibid). As with Living the Life production, the poor management of the 
tensions between uncertainty and sociability (as two characteristics of good production 
quality) might affect the execution of the genre conventions, subsequently, impact its 
production quality.   
6.1.2 Production Rituals 
Caldwell perceives ‘rituals’ in television production as ‘a collective space’ where 
‘social negotiations’ amongst television workers take place (Caldwell, 2008, pp. 81-
104). Caldwell asserts that ‘taking this approach means considering how film/TV 
creators function as industrial actors in a larger ensemble of creative workers [who] 
choreographed through tried and tested modes of institutional interaction create film 
and television’(p. 81). Caldwell’s analysis of television production is based upon two 
aspects of rituals: the ‘pitching’ and ‘networking’. These rituals, according to 
Caldwell, ‘serve as mechanisms for personal fulfilment and career advancement of 
which are identifiable as meaningful personal motives’ (p. 104). In contrast, in this 
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thesis, by using the term ‘production rituals’ I refer to the daily routines that 
producers and members of Living the Life apply to execute the genre conventions of 
magazine talk show. Nonetheless, like Caldwell, in Chapter 7 I examine whether or 
not production rituals in Living the Life production involved ‘employees’ personal 
motives’. This section discusses rituals in television talk shows in general and the 
magazine talk show in particular.  
 Television talk show production has similar routines to news production. The 
current nature of the stories presented on talk show provides them with a topicality 
similar to news (Crisell, 2006). In her ethnographic study of daytime talk show 
production, Laura Grindstaff (2002) highlights such parallels. She likens the television 
talk show production offices to newsrooms, describing them as follows: 
Certainly, in a physical sense, talk show offices resemble newsrooms, with 
producers sitting in cubicles behind desks piled high with papers, files and 
clippings as well as an assortment of coffee cups and disposable food 
containers. Messages scribbled on Post-it notes sprout from every surface: 
bulletin boards, filing cabinets, and telephones. While producers use 
computers for researching stories and writing scripts, telephones are the 
lifeblood of the business. They ring constantly and producers spend the 
better part of every day on the phone, their voices blending to form a 
steady drone of background noise punctuated occasionally by a loud 
exclamation or peal of laughter. In general, there is an air of the hustle 
and bustle in this space that can take on a frantic, abrasive edge in the 
hours just prior a scheduled taping (p. 80)  
The above quote provides a vivid description of the behind the scenes 
experience of talk show producers and their daily production routines. Grindstaff 
further argues that Mark Fishman’s (1980) description of the newsgathering process 
and journalists’ experiences parallel her observations of daytime talk show production. 
Like newsgathering, talk show production routines include researching, scriptwriting 
and ‘repackaging information according to the mandates of the organisation’ (cited in 
Grindstaff, 2002, p. 81). According to Grindstaff, ‘the world of the daytime talk show 
is similarly organised, despite the often makeshift, seat-of-the-pants appearance of the 
programmes’ (ibid.). Unlike newsgathering, however, talk show producers are 
required to improvise, researching possible story ideas from other media texts, such as 
newspapers, magazines, and other television programmes or talk shows, and pitching 
the story ideas to the executive producer (ibid.).  
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Nevertheless, the ways in which talk show producers find their story resembles 
tabloid journalists. This process includes referring to other mass-media texts and 
‘personalis[ing] it, making it friendly to the talk show audience’ (ibid. p. 82). 
Whitefoot’s (2014) experience as a researcher of BBC’s magazine talk show The One 
Show is particularly relevant here as it fits the description of the talk show as audience-
friendly with light-hearted treatments of story items. She describes The One Show as ‘a 
live show with a distinct news angle to which my dad in Hereford, who does not watch 
Newsnight or Panorama, will tune in’ (ibid.). Thus, such talk shows target audiences 
who prefer light entertainment with news angles.  
As described, the rituals in television talk show production involve searching for 
interesting story items drawn from wide-ranging sources. Grindstaff notes that it is 
difficult for the producers to ‘explicitly articulate the criteria that guided their choice 
of topics’ (2002, p. 83). In agreement with Becker’s (1982) observation, she asserts 
‘people find it difficult to verbalise the general principles according to which they 
make decisions or even give any reasons for their decisions at all’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 
83). From her analysis of a statement from the producers, Grindstaff suggests that 
when asked questions such as how they knew a good topic from a bad one, they 
responded with statements like ‘It looked good to me’, ‘It worked’, or ‘I just know’. 
Similarly, to a question like ‘How do you know a topic that would work from one that 
would not?’ their responses claimed such knowledge was ‘instinct’ or ‘an innate 
feeling’ (ibid.). Despite these vague responses, Grindstaff argues that ‘producers are in 
fact guided by some specific considerations, each of which presumes it’s taken-for-
granted stock of knowledge’ (ibid.). She suggests that the producers of daytime talk 
show often ask the following questions when making creative decisions on topics and 
story items: 
• Will it appeal to the target demographic? 
• If it has been done before, does it have a fresh angle? 
• Can real [ordinary] people be found to talk about it? 
• Most important, is it ‘visual’? Does the topic involve controversy, conflict, or 
confrontation? These questions marked the ‘money shot’ because by ‘visual’, the 
producers mean ‘emotional’. If not, where will the drama come from? 
(Grindstaff, 2002, p. 84). 
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Grindstaff suggests that aside from looking for fresh and current story ideas, the 
producers also tend to recycle ‘the repertoire of stories’ to save time and energy trying to 
come up with original ideas (ibid.). Grindstaff also expresses her concern that if producers 
consistently handle the same categories of such heavy topics as ‘sexual assault, incest, 
harassment and marital disputes’ or light topics such as ‘miracle makeovers’, they will find 
themselves ‘occupying niches much like journalists who cover beats’. Tuchman (1978) 
highlights the dilemma between light and heavy treatment in her discussion of the 
conventional distinction between soft and hard news.31 Grindstaff specifies how the 
producers arrive at certain decisions about topics and story items.  
Aside from managing the tensions between the uncertainty and sociability factors 
that bear experiential consequences for viewers, other elements that the producer 
needs to observe are the execution of genre conventions and production rituals. To 
manage all these factors, the producer and members of the production community 
need to have journalistic and television production skills (Grindstaff, 2002). Thus, the 
production quality of a magazine talk show is not only determined by experiential 
consequences (as indicated by Bruun, 2001) but also the ways in which the producer 
executing the genre conventions and manage the production rituals. 
6.2 Living the Life as a Magazine Talk Show 
Living the Life begins with the presenters introducing themselves to home viewers. During 
the interviews, the presenters talk to the guests in turn. They briefly ask the guests 
questions related to the topic of discussion. Each episode also includes the presenters 
reading viewer comments received via Twitter and email. Although it is typical to see a 
wide range of human-interest topics on most episodes of Living the Life, Episode 144, in 
particular, is relevant to conceptualisation of the production culture of Islam Channel. I 
have chosen this episode for analysis because it reflects the mission of the Islam Channel. 
                                                   
31 Soft news is mass-media journalistic features that are not factual reports of events e.g., 
entertainment and leisure stories. Hard news is an up-to-date factual reporting of 
consequential newsworthy events (usually on a national or international level). In her study 
of journalism work, Gaye Tuchman found that journalists have developed such a 
typification to ‘capture what reporters and editors view as problem in temporal processing 
and how the identification of facts is tied to organisational deadlines’. See Tuchman, G. 
1983. Consciousness Industries and the Production of Culture. Journal of Communication. 
33(3), pp.330-341.    
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The mission goals which I discussed in Chapter 5 include: a) to convey a moderate form of 
Islam to non-Muslims, b) to educate Muslims and c) to be the ‘voice’ for the voiceless and 
of the oppressed British Muslims and global Muslims (Ummah).  
In this section, I will describe Episode 144 of Living the Life and discuss two 
problems that help explain its production quality. These problems are 1) poor execution 
of genre conventions and 2) lack of journalistic skills and television experience of the staff 
involved in Living the Life production. I will elaborate on each problem in turn after 
illustrating an episode of Living the Life. Table 6 presents Episode 144 of Living the Life, 
which demonstrates the kind of magazine talk show that the Islam Channel has tried to 
produce. The table illustrates the types of featured items (VTs) on the programme and 
how it has endeavoured to connect with its viewers (through the ‘Story of the Day’ 
segment). 
Table 6: The Output of Living the Life (Episode 144, 20th March 2013) 
 
Time-code Segments/items Description 
00:00:40 Opening Montage  
00:00:42 Introduction Presenters greet viewers and take turns introducing each 
other 
00:01:10 Introducing the first 
set of guests. 
Welcoming all the guests seated in the ‘green room.' 
Asif Nurani, the campaigner  
Ricky Cheema, the donor 
The guests are from the Anthony Nolan ‘Fit to Spit’ 
Campaign. 
00:01:18 Introducing the 2nd 
set of guests. 
Welcoming the guests seated in the green room: 
Isabelle Alaya (founder of Chocolate Museum),  Alessandra 
Ferrini  (curator/art director)  and Gaetan Sigonney 
(interior designer) 
The guests are individuals involved in the opening of the 
Chocolate Museum in London. 
00:01:50 Introducing the 3rd 
guest.  
Welcoming the guests seated in the green room: 
Haneefa Sarwar, Helping Households under Great Stress 
(HHUGS) 
00:02:20 Story of the Day  
(insert montage) 
The presenters chat 
Concerning the barista who claims he has blended a famous 
cup of coffee called ‘The Death Wish,’ which contains 660 
mg of caffeine. The second presenter relates this unusual 
dose of caffeine to the strangest kind of food that the first 
presenter has ever consumed.  
00:03:29 Question of the Day The presenter asks question related to the story of the day:  
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A caption appears at 
the bottom of the 
screen. 
Presenters chat 
What is the most unusual food you have ever eaten? 
The presenter shares his experience tasting sheep brain 
curry and a dish that contained sheep eyeballs. He asks if his 
colleague has tasted anything perceived to be adventurous. 
[Presenters banter]  
00:04:32 30-second filler  Prompt viewers to respond via email and Twitter. 
00:04:55 The presenter talks 
to the viewers 
Repeat previous livingthelife@islamchannel.tv or on 
Twitter@islamchannel #LTLIFE 
00:05:00 THE FIRST ITEM 




THE FIRST SET OF GUESTS: 
Talking to guests: Asif Nurani, the campaigner and Ricky 
Cheema, the donor 
The aim of this campaign is to find matching stem cell 
donors for patients (with blood cancer) in need of bone 
marrow transplants. The campaign targets ethnic minorities 
(mainly Asian) because there is a low number of donors 
from such communities. A patient who is white and 
European has a 90% chance of finding a matching donor 
while ethnic minorities have just a 40% chance. With a 
more diverse register of donors, the Anthony Nolan Trust 
helps to address this imbalance and works to ensure that 
nobody dies waiting for lifesaving stem cells, no matter 
their ethnicity.  
00:11:45 Presenter chat Repeat the purpose of the campaign 
00:12:20 THE SECOND 
ITEM 
The presenters discuss the upcoming feature (VT) 
Concerning a couple living in New York who have turned a 
shipping container into a home 00:12:40 VT 1  
00:15:26 Presenters chat Comment on the feature VT 
00:15:42 Wrapping up the 
first item/ the 1st 
set of guests 
The guests reiterate the purpose of the campaign and how 
viewers can contribute to the cause.  
00:17:05 Recap Story of the 
Day 
Prompts viewers to stay tuned to the channel as their 
tweets may be read after the break 
00:17:50 FIRST BREAK Commercial 
00:22:25 Welcoming viewers 
& recap Story of the 
Day 
Are you an adventurous sort of person? Answer the 
question of the day: ‘What is the most unusual food you 
have ever eaten?’ 
00:23:17 Reading the tweets Read two tweets and discuss presenters’ experience tasting 
unusual food. 
00:24:38 THE THIRD ITEM The presenters discuss the upcoming feature (VT)  
Concerns the first feature film (‘Wadjda’) produced by a 
female Saudi director, Haifa al-Mansour. Al-Mansour film 
challenges the conservative authority of Saudi Arabia as the 
film highlights female empowerment within the 
traditionalist, conservative society of the country.  
00:24:53 VT 2  
 
00:27:44 Presenters chat The discussion focuses on the film as an artistic expression 
rather than a demonstration of female empowerment.  
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THE SECOND SET OF GUESTS: 
Interviews with guests follow presenters chat. 
Isabelle Alaya (the founder of the Chocolate Museum),  
Alessandra Ferrini (the curator/art director)  and Gaetan 
Sigonney (interior designer) 
00:30:45 VT (courtesy of the 
Chocolate Museum) 
The discussion with guests continues during the play out of 
the VT, featuring the atmosphere surrounding the opening 
of the Chocolate Museum.  
00:33:22 Still photos  Engaging the guests with photos relating to the process of 
making chocolate 
00:35:50 SECOND BREAK  Commercial and Azan (call to prayer) 
00:45:00 Recap Story of the 
Day 
Presenter welcomes back viewers 
Reading tweets 
00:46:00 Studio activity: 
Chocolate tasting 
 
While blindfolded, two guests taste chocolate presented by 
the Islam Channel. They try to guess the names of three 
different kinds: two that are available in the shops (e.g., 
Mars and Snickers) and one that is artisanal chocolate 
(made by Isabelle).  
00:48:00 Wrapping up the 
fourth item/the 2nd 
set of guests 
Presenter informs viewers on how to get in touch with the 
guests or visit the Chocolate Museum 
00:48:28 THE FIFTH ITEM The presenters discuss the upcoming feature (VT) 
Concerning a women’s car rally in India – spreading the 
message of educating young girls and empowering women 
00:48:34 VT 3 
00:50:35 Presenters chat  Tie back to the feature VT. The presenter discusses 
people’s perceptions of women drivers [banter] 
00:50:45 THE SIXTH ITEM 
The upcoming 
charity dinner: ‘The 
Shattered Lives.' 
  
THE THIRD GUEST: 
Haneefa Sarwar, a guest, representing HHUGS promote an 
upcoming charity dinner event. The event, called ‘The 
Shattered Lives,’ raises awareness of the need to support 
families whose breadwinners have been arrested/detained 
under UK anti-terrorist legislation (a number were 
arrested without charge).  
00:54:33 Wrapping up the 
sixth item/ the 3rd 
guest 
The presenter discusses the HHUGS charity event. 
The guest reminds the viewers of the date (6th of April, 
2013). 
00:55:45 THE END  
 
Based on Episode 144 of Living the Life illustrated in Table 6 above, I will now 
discuss two problems that help explain its production quality. The first is poor execution 
of genre conventions; the second is a lack of journalistic skills and television experience. 
When addressing these problems, I refer to the list of the magazine talk show genre 
conventions deliberated in Table 5 (see Section 6.1). It outlines the genre convention of 
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The One Show which the Islam Channel aims to emulate and perceive it to be a “good” 
television programme of its genre.     
6.2.1 Poor Execution of Genre Conventions 
The results of the textual analysis suggest that the poor production quality of Episode 144 
of Living the Life was arising from the poor execution of the genre conventions of magazine 
talk show. A magazine talk show has a distinct set of genre conventions that differentiates 
it from other forms of a talk show, such as the daytime talk show and celebrity chat 
programmes. Whereas daytime talk shows comprise a presenter, guests, studio audiences 
and live/pre-recorded forms of television programmes (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; 
Shattuc, 1997; Grindstaff, 2002), a magazine talk show like The One Show has a distinct set 
of genre conventions that include: presenters, guests and features/VT, and involves ‘live’ 
broadcasting. On The One Show, two regular presenters discuss three items related to 
current issues and events happening around the UK. Except for the special ‘extravaganza 
episodes’, which usually cover special events (e.g., Glastonbury, British Music Festival, 
etc.), the daily episode is a thirty-minute programme; broadcast lives at 7:00 pm from 
Monday to Friday. The feature or VT helps to develop the issue discussed by the 
presenters. Conversations between presenters and guests are often related to the VT 
played out during the discussion.  
The result of textual analysis of Episode 144 of Living the Life indicates evidence of 
the poor execution of genre conventions marked by unsystematic editorial planning 
regarding the selection of story items, guests and features (VT). The lack of relevance 
between the story items and the features (VT) played out on the programme has shaped 
the production quality of Living the Life. For example, the VT played out during the 
Anthony Nolan campaign was irrelevant to the discussion about stem cell donors. The VT 
inserted was about a couple living in New York who turned a shipping container into a 
home, which was totally unrelated to the Anthony Nolan campaign. Thus, the 
incoherence between the discussed topic and the VT played out on the programme 
impacted the production quality of Living the Life. Such disjointed presentation impacts the 
audience’s viewing experience, to the extent that the variety of information on the 
programme may have caused confusion or speculation as to what to make of such 
information. The producer’s decision on story items was either based on results of 
research into other media, e.g., newspapers, the Internet and news or stories proposed by 
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other creative team members (one of his assistants and two researchers in Living the Life 
production). Grindstaff (2002) noted that the daytime talk show also adopts a similar 
strategy. Occasionally, other staff members would suggest story items or guests to the 
Living the Life creative team. The selection of guests was not properly planned to match the 
episode discussion. The guests were often booked depending on their availability on the 
broadcast day. Sometimes these guests (who previously featured on the show) agreed to 
appear to help the producer fill in the empty segments on the episode or they just 
happened to be available on the day that the researcher contacted them. Such poor 
execution of the genre conventions in the creative decision-making, the unplanned story 
items and guest selection impacted the production quality of Living the Life.  
In contrast, The One Show production demonstrates good editorial planning. For 
instance, The One Show researcher who worked on a piece about World War II described 
how she developed an episode and that it covered three items related to the war. As a 
result of good editorial decisions, all items featured seemed interconnected to a particular 
theme (World War II). In the first item, the team invited a family member of a soldier 
(who was involved in that war) to the show. The second story item, in VT format, was 
presented by the journalist/researcher who was a member of The One Show production 
team. This story item featured commandos in World War II. The third story item was 
about Royal Marines participation in an unarmed combat demonstration that had its roots 
in World War II training (Whitefoot, 2014).    
Apart from editorial planning, the second aspect of the genre convention that 
shaped the production quality of Living the Life is the ways in which it engaged with its 
viewers. The segment called the ‘Story of the Day’ was the channel attempt to engage 
with the viewers at home. In each episode, the producer would prepare a question, which 
the presenter would announce (and which would also appear in a caption displayed 
onscreen) during the live broadcast, prompting the viewers to respond via Twitter or 
email. Newspaper columns or articles on the Internet inspired the choice of topics for the 
‘Story of the Day’. For instance, for this episode of Living the Life, the producer discovered 
an online news article about a strange blend of coffee called the ‘Death Wish’ (see Table 
6). The producer chose the story because he perceived it to be unusual and thought it 
might capture viewers’ attention. Subsequently, he drafted a question for the audience, 
asking them about the most unusual kinds of food any members of the audience had ever 
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tasted. To encourage viewers to respond to the question during the live broadcast of the 
programme, the presenters shared their experiences with unusual food. As an example, 
one presenter mentioned durian, a type of fruit that has a strong smell, which he found 
challenging to eat. Then, he reiterated the question of the day, reminding the viewers that 
their answers would be announced later in the programme. The ‘Story of the Day’ is a 
simulated audience experience created by the producer on Living the Life. This aspect of 
genre convention seems like a good effort not only to connect with the audience but also 
to distinguish Living the Life from The One Show. The segment indicates the failed execution 
of the genre conventions of a magazine talk show. It looks like one separate item, 
detached from the rest of the key story items presented on the programme, which 
distracted the audience from the central information that the programme sought to 
convey. This resulted in another example of poor production quality of Living the Life. 
Finally, the third aspect of the genre convention is the ‘live’ mode of broadcasting. 
The failure to produce the live talk show affected its production quality. On Living the Life, 
for example, the presenter (as a sender of messages) created an atmosphere that makes 
viewers feel like they are ‘with’ the presenter and a part of the studio discussions. This 
encourages the feeling of being at the same time and space that ‘live’ broadcasting has 
developed. Furthermore, the instantaneous nature of the messages brought about by ‘live’ 
programming allows its viewers to respond immediately to the presenters, e.g., 
answering the ‘Question the Day’. The producer failed to create the atmosphere of 
togetherness on ‘Story of the Day’ segment. Such an environment is central to sociability 
element of talk show because it determines the aesthetic of the programme (Bruun, 
2001). The producer should utilise the ‘Story of the Day’ segment so that ‘contact with 
viewers becomes an element in the programme’ (ibid., p. 248). 
A live transmission of talk show has its flaws. Bruun (2001, p. 247) notes that the 
‘live’ talk show is challenging because ‘the chance of something going wrong, or taking an 
unexpected turn is always present’. Also, the ‘mini-planned interview’, which is a part of 
the talk show genre conventions, can be boring for the audience if the producer does not 
manage it well during the live transmission. John Carlsen, the Danish TV producer, 
argues that ‘live programme’s unpredictability, incalculability, and fortuitousness’ are 
among the uncertainty factors that viewers might expect, which also make a talk show 
entertaining (Carlsen 1984:126, cited in Bruun, 2001, p. 247). In the case of Living the 
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Life, the producer failed to infuse the uncertainty element during the interview for various 
reasons. These include ideological clash and tensions in Muslim society and other issues 
relating to the mission of the channel.  
6.2.2 Lack of Journalistic Skills and Television Production Experience 
I turn now to the second set of factors that impacted the production quality of Living the 
Life. This factor include the lack of skills and experience among the television workers, 
which I divided into three aspects: 1) journalistic 2) presentation, and 3) camera operation 
skills. It further elaborates the producer failure to follow the production conventions 
executed by The One Show (see Table 5). 
The first aspect is journalistic skills. Like other forms of a talk show, creative staff in 
the magazine talk show production undergo similar routines to tabloid journalists. 
Grindstaff (2002) highlighted such similarity in her ethnographic work. Lack of 
journalistic skills among creative staff was problematic and compromised the production 
quality of Living the Life. The production routines of the programme required such 
journalistic skills from creative staff as a) good negotiating skills with potential guests or 
contributors and ‘sources’/informants who provide story items, b) objectivity in 
presenting the stories and checking against secondary sources and c) good interpersonal 
skill while engaging with guests and audience.  
Whitefoot (2014), a researcher for The One Show emphasises the importance of such 
skills among creative staff to maintain good production quality. As with Living the Life, the 
lack of journalistic skills among its creative staff has shaped the quality of its production. 
The story items presented on Living the Life were not properly researched and presented 
from a more meaningful angle. For example, there is an audience-capturing and significant 
story angle that the producer could have tried with the guest who represents HHUGS, 
such as showing empathy toward the ‘silent victims’. Instead, the producer chose to 
downplay such an emotional angle and focused instead on a fundraising dinner event 
organised by the group. The lack of journalistic skill shaped the presentation of the story 
items. I will discuss this in detail in Section 6.4 when I examine the constraints in 
presenting Muslim charitable organisations on Living the Life. 
The second crucial aspect concerns the presentation skills of the talk show 
presenters, which are vital to talk show production. Unskilled presenters on Living the Life 
impacted its production quality. They did not receive any professional training and relied 
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on their personal experience from hosting community or fundraising events (Interview, 
20 June 2013). Broadcast talk is different from community events. An absence of 
uncertainty and sociability elements may affect the production quality of talk show 
(Bruun, 2001). The presenter lack of skills to deliver the element of surprise or offer 
viewers an atmosphere of togetherness and sense of hospitality (Bruun, 2001) and 
emotional response (Grindstaff, 2002) may affect the production quality. I will elaborate 
on this further in Section 6.3 in which I demonstrate how the lack of resources affected 
the production quality of the programme. 
A third vital aspect of television production that defines the quality of any TV 
programme (not only talk shows) is camera operation skills. The lack of such skills in 
determining camera angles and movement are all evidence of the absence of professional 
training in both direction and camera operation. This problem links to the failure of 
executing the genre conventions of magazine talk show discussed in the previous sub-
section. For example, the lack of skills in filming a ‘live’ television programme has led to 
poor creative decisions and consequently affected the quality of the entire magazine talk 
show. On Living the Life, inexperienced camera operators who lacked professional training 
did the filming. I will discuss these issues related to lack of journalistic skills and television 
production experience in greater detail in the Sections 6.3 and demonstrate how they 
affected the production quality of Living the Life. 
The Islam Channel aims to produce a magazine talk show like The One Show. The 
result of textual analysis of Episode 144 suggests two deficiencies that indicate the poor 
production quality of Living the Life: 1) poor execution of genre conventions and 2) lack of 
journalistic skills and television production experience. Section 6.3 through 6.5 discusses 
three main constraints connecting to the results of the textual analysis. These limitations 
include 1) lack of resources, 2) problems relating matters to the mission of the Islam 
Channel, and 3) the conflicting notions of what constitutes a “good” television 
programme. 
6.3 The Lack of Resources 
Like many media organisations that require capital, labour and resources to continue 
operations, the Islam Channel also relies on such basics to sustain its work. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the management of the Islam Channel claimed that its primary financial 
support comes from the Da’wah Project membership subscriptions to stay in the business 
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(Human resource manager, Interview, 18 June 2013) (see Section 5.2.1). Though the 
Islam Channel may have managed to secure a certain amount of funding through Da’wah 
Card subscriptions and advertising, it continues to struggle financially. As Malik, the 
human resource manager puts it:  
It is a medium-sized company with about 80 employees. We try our best 
to produce the best shows, the best programmes as much as we can. 
Unfortunately, we are not a massive company like the BBC and we are 
not as funded as much […] (Interview, 18 June 2013) 
This situation impacts on the ability of the channel to hire some staff and 
experienced professionals in television production. The Islam Channel has to rely on 
unpaid labour to cope with the lack of permanent employees working in television 
production. These unpaid labourers or so-called ‘interns’ are people (including myself) 
who work for the Islam Channel for free under the ‘Internship Programme’, an 
opportunity for school leavers, fresh graduates, unemployed individuals or anyone who 
wants to become a volunteer. Like other interns, I was not entitled to a monthly salary, 
annual bonus, annual leave, overtime payments, health insurance or any other type of 
benefit offered to the permanent employees at the channel. It was quite difficult to work 
with my limited experience in producing a ‘live’ magazine talk show. The tasks such as 
researching guests or assisting technical staff during ‘live’ broadcasts could be tough for 
inexperienced volunteers. As a result of both struggles in funding and lack of human 
resources at the Islam Channel, it was quite challenging to produce a magazine talk show 
anything like as accomplished as The One Show.   
In general, talk shows are perceived to be a relatively inexpensive television genre 
with strong potential to attract an audience (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; Shattuc, 1997; 
Grindstaff, 2002). This choice of genre indicates that the Islam Channel has been trying to 
deal with its financial constraints in that Living the Life is a programme that might help the 
channel to cope its lack of resources. The talk show may have been a cheap genre of 
television in the 1990s (Dovey, 2000), but its changing forms have created difficulties for 
producers, in particular for those programmes that require certain genre conventions. 
Laura Grindstaff’s (2002) observations of the daytime talk shows indicate that production 
routines resemble those of a newsroom’s. Citing Fishman (1980), Grindstaff describes the 
ways in which journalists rely on ‘routine sources and established information channels to 
produce fresh news daily under the pressure of deadlines […]’(Grindstaff, 2002, p.82). 
- 147 - 
The same is true for the Living the Life production in which the producer who works 
alongside an assistant producer and a researcher had routines similar to journalists. The 
only difference between the talk shows that Grindstaff observed and Living the Life is that 
the latter was produced ‘live’ in the studio. The pressure to meet a deadline (4:00 pm 
daily) heightened with a limited number of staff putting all three items and the individual 
features (VTs) together in one episode. In contrast, The One Show production involved 
twenty-six reporters, each producing their features (with the help of the production crew) 
and five dedicated researchers who planned for segments and potential guests at least 
three days before a live broadcast (Whitefoot, 2014). The issues regarding pressures on 
staff will be discussed further in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Ideally, Living the Life should also have its production crew members, focusing on 
research and producing individual features (VTs) like The One Show. Because the Islam 
Channel is a small television outlet that operates with a limited number of employees, it 
cannot afford to hire more paid staff (in addition to a producer and two assistant 
producers) to run the production of Living the Life. In the following, Malik, the human 
resource manager, confirms that the channel asks employees to try various tasks other 
than the jobs assigned to them: 
We have got quite a few jobs for one person, which is very good. He or 
she can learn a lot quicker and your skills are enhanced […] (Interview, 
18 June 2013) 
To cope with the shortage of staff, the Islam Channel opts for strategies that help 
the channel to reduce costs when hiring new employees. It chose such strategies as hiring 
individuals who have multiple skills and encouraging volunteers to work with television 
production. This was evident in the production of Living the Life. For example, a camera 
operator is expected to have skills in sound mixing or visual editing. Salem, a multi-skilled 
operator in the Living the Life production has a degree in camera operating. He told me 
that he accepted the job at the Islam Channel as it offered him a position as ‘a multi-skilled 
operator’. Working with the Living the Life production crew is his first ‘real’ job after 
graduation about a year ago and excites him (Interview, 20 June 2013). When asked about 
the employee management of the Islam Channel, Malik admitted that creating a job 
position such as ‘multi-skilled operator’ and bringing more volunteers helps with the 
shortage of workers in television production:  
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If you look at the television crew, you may find out that a camera operator 
is helping out with the sound system, a soundman is helping out with the 
camerawork. Moreover, maybe, the producer is helping out with the 
same category, with the lighting or something […] we would love to hire 
another ten people but it is just not really feasible in term of finances, 
budget and things like that, so we really have to encourage people to 
work, to be more flexible, and multi-skilling. That is why volunteers can 
support worker shortages at the channel […] (Interview, 18 June 2013).  
The strategy to hire multi-skilled operators to perform various technical works 
(e.g., camera work, sound engineering and visual editing) has proven problematic because 
it has impacted the quality of the programme. A multi-skilled operator might know how 
to do all these tasks. However, he or she will likely never be a skilled professional. In 
most cases, doing certain tasks for a short period (e.g., once a week) would not make a 
person an expert. To be an expert, one needs to perform the task repetitively for a 
sustained period. Harry Braverman’s (1974) labour process theory32 criticises multiskilling by 
pointing out the risk of deskilling working-class jobs. Although Braverman’s critique 
highlights the problem of deskilling among labourers impact on the product, his analysis 
paid little attention to workers’ subjective experience. Television workers experience of 
multiskilling is one aspect of television production that this thesis intends to explore: to 
find out how such experience affects the produced text and the quality of working life of 
these workers (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 56 discussed this in greater details). 
The Islam Channel’s heavy reliance on interns has impacted the production quality 
of Living the Life. Interns working in the production of Living the Life have little or no 
experience in television production. Hence, their lack of professional experience 
impacted the production. In my interview with Akram, the intern (Interview, 13 June 
2013), who has been unemployed for over a year, he informed us of his experience as a 
volunteer for the Living the Life production. Akram’s tasks involved researching potential 
guests. He claimed that he did not care about the quality of Living the Life. He did not feel 
that the programme had much impact on its audience. Akram described Living the Life: ‘It 
is not like good ideas, meaning, knowledge and inspiration’. He felt that the programme 
                                                   
32 Braverman’s labour process theory is based on a Marxist approach to the study of labour. It has 
been criticised for its lack of empirical insights as it focuses on a larger industrial practice 
rather than workers’ individual experience in multiskilling. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
look into his critique on deskilling of work as it supports my argument on how the 
deskilling of workers in the production of Living the Life was the reason for its poor quality. 
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‘was not necessarily full of that element’. Instead, Akram preferred to help other 
producers who make religious programmes because it gave him a chance to learn more 
about Islam, thus allowing him to contribute to viewers’ learning experience about Islam. 
For him, being an intern was just a stepping-stone. He looked forward to seizing either an 
opportunity to gain employment at the channel or to meet his ‘potential’ employer while 
dealing with various organisations and business owners at the channel (while researching 
for Living the Life). Ursell’s work has emphasised such attitudes in new entrants to the 
unpaid labour market. She noted an intensification of the ‘self-commodification processes’ 
by which each seeks to improve his/her chances of attracting gainful employment (Ursell, 
2000, p. 807).  
The above examples illustrate a clear distinction in motivation between paid and 
unpaid labour in television production. These different motivations among technical 
workers, ‘multi-skilled operators’ and ‘interns’ explain the problem of output quality of 
Living the Life. On the one hand, paid television workers, especially technical workers 
(aside from being paid for their job), viewed multiskilling as a way to gain experience and 
skills, enabling them to experiment with various camera techniques and help improve the 
programme quality. On the other, unpaid labour, such as interns, perceived their work as 
an opportunity to gain employment within the channel or meet their future employers. 
The quality of Living the Life suffered from the channel’s ‘experimentation’ with a small 
group of inexperienced, unskilled professionals as well as the exploitation of 
volunteers/unpaid labour seeking new employment contracts rather than being motivated 
to help the producer make good television programmes (in the case of Akram).  
Lack of resources meant the channel could not hire professionals or recruit workers 
to become experts in their fields. This explains the poor execution of genre conventions 
discussed in Section 6.2. Because of resource constraints, the Islam Channel could not 
afford to provide professional training for the producer and creative staff, which might 
help them to execute the genre conventions more efficiently and consequently improve 
the production quality of Living the Life. The channel also could afford to hire individuals 
experienced only in hosting community and charity events. These presenters have no 
journalistic skills and are unfamiliar with ‘live’ broadcast interviewing. Though they 
seemed to be confident in their conversations with guests, they failed to give the 
impression of professional presenters. The following conversation between the presenter 
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and the guest (from the Chocolate Museum) excerpted from Episode 144 indicates the 
presenter’s lack of journalistic skills (e.g., as a TV anchor) and sensitivity to TV 
requirements (e.g., responding to cameras and the producer cues):  
Male presenter: tell me if I am right, I know a little bit about chocolate. 
Is chocolate the only food that melts at body temperature? 
Isabelle: Just below [pause] it is true. You are good, a good consumer. 
Male presenter: I am a healthy eater [sic] I avoid all things that are fake 
and artificial. However, I do like chocolate. I go for a nice organic 
chocolate. I do not go for the artisan’s so much because they are sort of 
Green & Black’s, stuff like that. Moreover, we’ve some images coming up 
on our screen and maybe you could tell us a little bit about it. 
The above conversation is an example of the lack of journalistic skill and sensitivity 
to TV requirements. I agree with Scannell’s (2014) argument in which a conversation on 
live television requires special techniques. An abrupt change of topic performed by the 
male presenter above was clear – shifting from the discussion about healthy eating, 
organic chocolate and artisanal chocolate to the upcoming images on the screen. The cues 
(about the images) given by the producer via earphones startled him, forcing an 
immediate announcement of the next images. This is a clear example of how a lack of 
journalistic skills and sensitivity to TV requirements affected production quality of Living 
the Life.  
The lack of experience in ‘live’ television production has impacted the quality of the 
output of Living the Life. ‘Live’ television production requires good skills in camera 
directing. Coordination among camera movement, script and producer/director’s cue is 
crucial. The Living the Life production lacked expertise in coordinating these elements. 
The picture shows both presenters looking at their scripts while the camera focuses on 
them. It happened instantaneously as the male presenter was making the above 
announcement about upcoming images on the screen. Hence, the lack of professional 
skills in direction and camera operation is linked to weak output. Figure 7 illustrates poor 
camera work. 
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Figure 7: The Lack of Professional Skills in Camera Directing 
Source: Episode 144, time code: 00:33:18 
 
The lack of professional skills is a result of the limited channel resource to hire more 
staff in television production and skilled professionals or provide professional training for 
the presenters and producers (and creative staff) to produce a good magazine talk show. 
Moreover, the lack of resources also forced the channel to rely on volunteers and a small 
group of unskilled professionals to deliver the programme. This situation has affected the 
production quality of Living the Life.  
The channel’s unique business model which was built upon a combination of 
missionary/da’wah and economic strategies (to strengthen Muslims’ economy through the 
Da’wah Project) seems problematic. While the channel emphasises the missionary 
strategy and how to generate revenue through business sponsorship (Da’wah Card Scheme), 
it tends to neglect the quality aspects of its programmes.  
6.4 Problems Relating to the Mission of the Islam Channel 
In addition to the lack of resources, there are strong ideological issues that shaped the 
production quality of Living the Life. In this section, I will analyse how problems relating to 
the mission of the channel affected the production quality of the programme and 
subsequently conceptualise the production culture of the Islam Channel. I have analysed 
the mission of the Islam Channel in Chapter 5; it comprises of three goals: a) to convey a 
moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims, b) to educate Muslims and c) to be the ‘voice’ of 
British and global Muslims (Ummah). My analysis of these mission goals indicates that there 
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are two major factors that shaped the production culture of the Islam Channel. These 
factors are 1) ‘the culture of caution’ at the managerial and production level and 2) an 
ideological clash between ‘moderate Islam’ and Salafi fundamentalism at the channel. 
Whereas an element of moderate Islam was found in the CEO’s claim as well as in the 
Islam Channel’s mission ‘to convey a moderate form of Islam’, an element of Salafi 
fundamentalism was found among the programming department staff (e.g., the manager, 
assistant manager, assistant producer). In this section, the analysis of problems relating to 
the mission of the channel is based upon these two institutional challenges. The purpose is 
to identify how these problems have shaped the production quality of Living the Life. 
Earlier in Section 6.2, my analysis was based on the result of a textual analysis of 
Episode 144; I identified two key areas that indicated poor production quality at Living the 
Life: poor execution of the genre conventions (Section 6.2.1) and lack of journalistic skills 
and television production experience (Section 6.2.2). In the following sub-sections, apart 
from Episode 144, I also rely on other episodes of Living the Life and ethnographic accounts 
gathered during the production of those episodes to demonstrate how the problems 
relating to the mission have shaped the production quality of Living the Life. In doing so, I 
address three types of constraints: 1) constraints in presenting religious elements on Living 
the Life, 2) constraints in presenting music artists and performances and 3) constraints in 
presenting the physical appearance of women.  
6.4.1 Constraints in Presenting Religious Elements  
The production culture of the Islam Channel involves ideological clash and ‘a culture of 
caution’. I identified ‘the culture of caution’ at the managerial level when analysing the 
mission of the Islam Channel in Chapter 5, which resulting from the channel control on 
the production effort to balance between religious and light-entertainment as well as by its 
response to its conservative fundamentalist audience, e.g., not to offend them. In this 
section, I will demonstrate how ‘the culture of caution’ shaped creative decision-making 
and editorial planning in the Living the Life production. The ideological clash between 
moderate Islamic views and Salafi fundamentalism is another structural factor that shaped 
the production culture of Islam Channel and production quality of Living the Life. I have 
discussed in Section 5.2 the clash between the CEO inspired moderate Islam (supported 
by the producer of Living the Life and a few crew members) and the Salafi fundamentalist 
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dominated programming department which results from control from the management 
and consequences for caution among production staff. 
There was no agreed formula concerning the degree to which the producer ought to 
present religious elements on Living the Life. The producer, however, need to treat 
religious elements with caution. Such treatment resonates by Noonan’s research on the 
BBC Religion in which the producers perceived religious television to be ‘distinct style of 
programming' (Noonan, 2008, p. 11). Although there was no mechanism that guides the 
producer to balance religious elements on Living the Life, the treatment of religious 
elements can be observed in three execution phases of genre conventions: 1) researching 
for story items and guests, 2) deciding on the interview questions and 3) the ‘live’ 
broadcast of Living the Life.   
‘The culture of caution’ can be observed during researching of story items and 
potential guests where the researcher and assistant producer would seek the producer’s 
approval before booking the guests. If the religious elements were deemed to be 
controversial in that they might attract the attention of Ofcom, the producer would 
consult with the manager. To make sure that the religious elements presented on Living 
the Life did not contradict the mission of the channel, the producer chose the middle-
ground while executing the genre conventions. The producer took such measure not only 
to avoid conflict with the manager/programming department’s treatment of religious 
elements but also as a strategy to strike a religious balance with light-entertainment 
elements. Both religion and light entertainment are central to Living the Life genre 
conventions. Living the Life is a light entertainment magazine talk show that requires a 
religious thread running through it (producer, interview, 20 June 2013). The following 
illustrates the middle ground approaches that indicate the producer attempt to balance the 
treatment of religious elements on Living the Life. This include: 
1) Presenting a religious personality on the show and keeping the discussion light, 
focusing on the purpose of inviting the guest to the programme. Any serious forms of 
doctrinal discourse during ‘live’ broadcast were avoided.  
2) Presenting members of diverse religious groups was encouraged as it reflected the 
channel’s mission to engage with non-Muslims and to educate Muslims. 
3) The producer disapproved presenting Muslim charitable organisations associated with 
extremism; the conversation needed to emphasise the actual purpose of featuring the 
group, such as fundraising events, etc.  
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4) Presenting organisations associated with Muslim political resistance such as 
Interpal (Palestinian Relief and Development Fund) and the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolution. Again, the on-air conversation would be 
confined to the event organised and a portrayal of humanitarian suffering to 
show the Islam Channel commitment to the causes of freedom and 
solidarity with fellow Palestinians or Syrians rather than any political 
agenda.  
These constraints were the results of ‘the culture of caution’ and ideological clash 
among the production community of Living the Life. The execution of genre conventions 
such as researching of story items ‘with caution’ is common in The One Show production as 
well as in news and factual programming. Sharing her experience in researching the story 
items for The One Show, Rebecca Whitefoot (2014) says: 
When I’m researching, I draw upon a wide range of sources which I 
always check against a secondary source. The biggest boo-boo I can make 
as a researcher is allowing Dan or Matt and Alex to make a statement on 
air which isn’t factually accurate. I’ll use the Internet to read news articles 
and browse trusted sites like The Commando Veterans Association, which 
has a wealth of photographs and letters from World War II. I’ll go 
through the BBC archive, watching and listening to any programme the 
BBC has ever made on the soldiers. I’ll order books like Castle 
Commando by Donald Gilchrist and All in Fighting by Fairbairn for 
reference and stack them up on my desk. Moreover, of course, I speak to 
people. I’ve just checked my research for factual errors with military 
historian, Stewart Allan from National Museums Scotland and Pete 
Rogers from The Commando Veterans Association. 
Like newsgathering, the production routine of a magazine talk show also includes 
checking against other secondary sources to ensure the accuracy of the story items before 
presenting them on the show. This helps maintain the production quality of the 
programme as well the reputation of the media organisation that produced the 
programme. Living the Life also involved a similar process of checking, but the ‘source’ 
that the researchers and the assistant producers need to refer to is the manager of the 
programming department, in line with a particular ‘set of ideology’ (Manager, 20 June 
2013). 
What distinguishes Living the Life from The One Show process of checking is that the 
former involved the presentation of religion that required extra caution. In her research 
into the BBC religious broadcasting, Caitriona Noonan points out a similar situation in 
which producers at the corporation limited their risk-taking to maintain regulatory 
compliance. Noonan (2008) explains that ‘producers increasingly occupied the middle 
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ground of production as risk-taking was sidelined for safer mainstream programmes’ (p. 
33). Similarly, Aswad, the producer of Living the Life chose ‘the middle ground’ in 
presenting the religious element of the programme. He avoided extremes not only to 
maintain the channel’s regulatory compliance but also not to offend the conservative 
audience.  
The following sections discuss the constraints in presenting religious elements. I 
categorised these elements according to the types of guests that have been invited onto the 
show or had their bookings cancelled. These four categories of guests are a) religious 
personalities, b) guests from other religious groups, c) Muslim charitable organisations 
and d) institutions associated with political resistance. I will discuss each category in turn 
by drawing on my argument concerning the ideological clash and ‘the culture of caution’ 
as organisational factors shaping the production quality of Living the Life.  
Constraints in Presenting Religious Personalities 
The ‘the culture of caution’ and an ideological clash resulted in limitations in presenting a 
religious personality (sheikh/imam) on Living the Life. In a production meeting, Aswad the 
producer had advised Maryam, the assistant producer and I that the topic discussed with 
the sheikh must be kept light. Maryam told us that that she had booked Sheikh Abu Aliyah, 
who was engaged with a youth project (Episode 131, 26 February 2013). Aswad warned 
her that she must ensure interview questions are on the non-controversial subject matter 
and not touching on anything related to religion or doctrinal issues. Aswad suggested 
several questions so that Maryam could draft them later into a script. The issues that 
Aswad suggested to Maryam included trivial subjects related to the sheikh’s personal 
background, such as hobbies, and the size of his family. Maryam argued that the reason for 
approaching the sheikh was due to his involvement in youth projects, his newly published 
book and the blog that he writes. She insisted on booking the sheikh with the manager’s 
approval because she thought the sheikh had an engaging personality, which is consistent 
with Aswad’s approach. Maryam sought manager Iqbal’s advice. Iqbal told us that once, 
Sheikh Abu Aliyah had a connection with extremism. Despite a previous ideological 
background that was incompatible with the channel mission, Iqbal the manager permitted 
Sheikh Abu Aliyah to appear on Living the Life, but with one condition: the interview 
questions had to focus entirely on his blog The Humble-I and particularly on the section of 
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his writing that mentioned his family and their cat, Genie.33 According to Iqbal, Abu 
Aliyah has a close relationship with Abu Muntasir whom he met in the 80s.34 Abu 
Muntasir’s ideological position was in conflict with that of the Islam Channel. Iqbal 
warned our team not to mention Abu Muntasir in the script because of his association 
with an extremist ideology. Iqbal said of Abu Muntasir that ‘had gone off the rails, not in 
that sense of revolution, but there are few other things relating to extremism’ […] 
(Production meeting, 25 February 2013). 
As a researcher, I took note of Iqbal’s reminder of the above issue before 
scriptwriting. Iqbal also demonstrated the kind of questions that the presenter should ask 
while interviewing Abu Aliyah to maintain a light-hearted tone:  
As a sheikh and a blogger, you are not an ordinary Sheikh, are you? That 
would be the line of questions you might want to go down. For instance, 
his appearance breaks the barrier of common religious figures (who 
usually wear a turban and jubbah /religious outfit). Instead, he wears jeans 
and not giving the khutbah (sermon) all the time. He is a bit of a different 
character, so that might be interesting to explore […] (Production 
meeting, 25 February 2013). 
The presentation of a religious personality on Living the Life is complicated because it 
requires thorough research into the guest’s background to the level of trivial titbits. The 
case of Abu Aliyah involved negotiations between the production staff and the manager of 
programming. In the case of Abu Aliyah, although Iqbal agreed to a religious personality 
with a different ideological background from the channel (with specific instructions and 
warnings), Aswad needed to plan how to downplay the religious tone on Living the Life. 
The production quality of Living the Life relies on a combination of the directing skills of 
the producer, good camera work and the interviewing skills of the presenters during ‘live’ 
broadcasting. The following is an extract of the interview with Abu Aliyah from Episode 
131 of Living the Life. It illustrates a sudden shift from a ‘heavy’ discussion (about 
                                                   
33 The ‘Humble-I’ is the name of the blog written by Abu Aliya. The name spelt out ‘Hanbali’ after 
Imam Muhammad Ibn Hanbal, a founder of the strictest Sunni school of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Hanbali’s thinking has been manifested in Salafi fundamentalism. For 
details, visit: http://thehumblei.com/ 
34  Abu Muntasir is a former radical Islamic preacher, described as the ‘godfather of jihad’ in 
Britain.  On the ITV’s exposure ‘Jihad’, he confessed to recruiting, training and raising 
funds for jihadists. Realised the futility of fighting ‘for a false ideal and an unwinnable war’; 
he decided to turn his back on extremism. Reauters. 2015. Repentant 'godfather of British 
jihad' recalls extremism's lure. Al Arabiya News. 16 June 2015, pp.1-4. 
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knowledge transmission) to a light-hearted topic (about the sheikh’s cat). At time code 
00:45:14 of Episode 131:  
Rima (presenter): What do you make of this move from traditional 
learning to something more engaging with technology like blogging? 
Abu Aliyah: There is no doubt at all that modern technologies open up 
great opportunities for learning and democratise basic knowledge. That is 
fantastic! Moreover, that it becomes more accessible easily to everyone, 
which is good. However, only when there is a move from oral 
transmission to writing and from writing to printing, there are benefits 
but there is a danger in that. Then the scholars of Islam have to deal with 
that transition. So, we are in that transition period. Because not long ago, 
even in this country many people were illiterate: that kind of problem also 
affects the Muslim world. Then the literacy grows, which is a good thing. 
However, there is a challenge because some of these religious texts are 
actually at the deeper level only accessed by the instructors, the teachers 
otherwise they can be misread and misunderstand […]  
Fadhil (presenter): That is why your key things on your blog The 
Humble-I deals with contemporary issues, classical issues that are very easy 
to dip in and dip out and see what was going on at the time. Oh! I noticed 
there was a mention of your cat…the cat got mentioned now and then 
[…] 
Abu Aliyah: [laughing] yes, Genie. 
Fadhil (presenter): Genie. That is right. Well, look we do need to go 
for a break now [Note: the presenter continued talking about the 
Question of the Day before going to a commercial break] 
An abrupt change of topic from a serious discussion of knowledge and technology to 
a question about the sheikh’s pet indicates how the producer managed to divert the 
discussion from a serious to a trivial matter. Although the producer succeeded in 
downplaying the religious subject, he abruptly cut away from the discussion. This might 
leave viewers to wonder about the actual purpose of that inconclusive conversation. The 
interrupted conversation impacted the production quality of the programme. This entire 
editorial decision-making process involved seeking approval from the producer and the 
manager with the former making the final decision on the story angle (on what sort of 
interview questions that he or the assistant needed to come up with). The constraints in 
making creative decisions regarding the ‘kind’ of Sheikh or religious personality indicate 
‘the culture of caution’ among creative production staff and the ideological clash between 
the manager and the producer of Living the Life. 
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Constraints in Presenting Religious Diversity 
The second situation that exemplified the problematic process of balancing religion and 
light entertainment involved the presentation of diverse religious groups on Living the Life. 
The channel encourages this as it reflects the channel’s mission to engage with non-
Muslims and to educate Muslims. Again, similar rules applied to the previous situation 
despite the CEO’s encouragement of interreligious dialogue. Aswad, the producer, 
however, felt that such dialogue is a far-reaching initiative and not suitable for a magazine 
talk show like Living the Life that aims to provide light entertainment to its viewers. 
According to Aswad: 
Seven o’clock is when most people come home from work, looking after 
the kids and having dinner. They want something entertaining to digest 
easily […], (Interview, 20 June 2013).  
Aswad had also ruled that this particular group of guests should not be drawn into a 
serious religious discussion. He felt that Islamic values could be represented in a more 
subtle way rather than in an open dialogue:  
Although we do not necessarily talk ‘heavily’ about Islamic-related items, 
there is always an Islamic thread running through the programme […], 
(Interview, 20 June 2013) 
Nonetheless, the portrayal of guests from different backgrounds is in line with 
da’wah principles which are a part of the mission of the channel: to invite every human 
being to Islam with wisdom and discretion, meeting people on their own ground and 
convincing them with illustrations from their own knowledge and experience which may 
be very narrow or very wide. Simultaneously, help the channel to accomplish its mission 
‘to convey a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims and educate Muslims’. Aswad 
regarded such diversity of guests on Living the Life as an accurate representation of 
moderate Islam where Islam teaches Muslims to acknowledge contributions of non-
Muslims:  
There are so many things going on: positive things, events, initiatives that 
have been carried out by non-Muslims. So, as Muslims, why don’t we 
recognise them? Being a part of the community, we have to embrace and 
celebrate their achievements. We have somehow been ignorant not to 
acknowledge work of other faiths and backgrounds. The Prophet has 
advised us in Islam and that He (God) created us in different tribes, to get 
to know each other. We try to achieve that in our ways. Living the Life is 
doing that, acknowledging different tribes, and diverse backgrounds. 
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Without knowing them, we say welcome on our platform; saying 
congratulations, well done on your work! […], (Interview, 20 June 2013)  
Aswad argued that Islam supports diversity. He draws his argument on the Quranic 
verse: Mankind! We have created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you 
into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other).35 
History has also shown that Islam supports diversity and coexistence. The Constitution of 
Medina under the Prophet Muhammad’s leadership was the first example in history of a 
multicultural constitution (Modood, 2010, p. 88).  
Huda, a lifestyle programme producer, described the beauty of sharing a common 
ground among people of Abrahamic religions:   
Once we have a Jew, a Christian and a Muslim. They wrote a book 
together about the environment. That was nice that these Abrahamic 
faiths come jointly with this book. It was so beautiful when they came to 
Living the Life. It shows Muslims in a good light that they are interacting 
with people. There was a Jew on the sofa, a Christian. That does not 
matter because the main thing is to be together […] (Interview, 22 June 
2013). 
Aside from acknowledging non-Muslim contributions to the common interest, the 
Islam Channel also encourages working together to achieve something that contributes to 
the wider community. Working for the public good was designed to present ‘Islam in an 
inclusive way’ by stressing that ‘anything we do also has to benefit the wider community’, 
(Modood, 2010, p. 91). The example given by Huda about the book on the environment 
written by authors of Abrahamic faiths indicates the channel’s support for the concept of 
commonality, focusing on what these religions have in common rather than on their 
differences. The featuring of non-Muslims on the programme not only represented 
Muslim appreciation of their contribution but also showed that Muslims are willing to 
cooperate and interact with them for the benefit of the wider community. This approach 
creates a positive impression of Muslims and their religion. Negative reactions, such as 
Muslims preferring isolation to integration or being labelled ‘a suspect community’ 
(Kundnani, 2015), can also be improved with the presentation of diverse religious groups 
(see Chapter 2).     
                                                   
35 Quran 49:13 
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Similar to featuring a religious personality, the representation of religious diversity 
on Living the Life also needed a balancing process. A discussion between two or more 
guests from different religious backgrounds had to focus on the purpose of their invitation. 
For example, a group of youths working on a London-based magazine, Interact, was 
invited to Living the Life to discuss the magazine’s editorials. Guests represented Jewish, 
Christian and Hindu youth communities. They were interviewed on their experience in 
writing columns relating to sport, literature, lifestyle topics and so forth in Interact 
magazine, distributed at several locations in London (Living the Life, Episode 150, 1 April 
2013).  
The presentation of religious diversity on Living the Life involved the ‘quantifying’ of 
‘light’ and ‘heavy’ featured items. The producer insisted that the balanced treatment of 
religious and light-hearted items was important so that viewers will not take the discussion 
on religion too seriously. Maryam, the assistant producer, once reminded me of the 
strategy of balancing religious and light-hearted items. According to Maryam, one 
religious personality is enough for each episode. If I booked two, then the programme 
would not be ‘light’ since Living the Life must have entertainment elements. Aswad, the 
producer, also offered constant reminders about the light and heavy treatment of story 
items: 
The show must have something light to digest by viewers after a long day 
at work. They want to go home, having dinner with family, relax and 
watch Living the Life. So, the show should be entertaining, not heavy and 
controversial […], (Fieldnote, 11 March 2013).  
Aswad’s reminder makes me recall one Living the Life episode (Episode 192, 13 June 
2013) that featured the Reverend Robin Griffith-Jones, Sheikh Omar Suleyman and Chef 
Norman Musa.36 Because Aswad was aiming for a diversity of religious presentation, both 
the sheikh and the Reverend, although perceived to be ‘heavy items’, were featured on the 
same episode. According to Aswad, to balance this particular discussion, he added a third 
                                                   
36 Reverend Griffith-Jones and twenty other experts explore the evolution of English Law, the 
implications for Islam, Sharia and Jihad (martyrdom) and the principles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, family law and freedom of speech in a book entitled Islam 
and English Law. Omar Suleyman is an Islamic scholar from New Orleans, USA who is a 
strong advocate of community service, interfaith dialogue and social justice. He served as a 
field coordinator for ICNA Relief in Hurricane Katrina. In 2010, the Mayor and City 
Council of New Orleans awarded him for ‘Outstanding Civic Achievement’ (Fieldnotes, 
13 June, 2013). 
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guest: a celebrity chef from Malaysia who did a cooking demonstration. Beside the chef, 
Aswad added another two VTs entitled ‘Pakistan female pilot ’and ‘Gaza honey 
businesses’. Quantifying the items is an editorial approach to creating an impression of 
balance between heavy (religious) and light (entertainment) in Living the Life as a magazine 
talk show that features religious diversity.  
Quantifying and classifying each item on Living the Life into ‘religious’ (as equivalent 
to ‘heavy’) and ‘entertaining’ (as equal to ‘light’) has compromised the production 
quality. Table 7 presents the script, which the producer had prepared to create an 
impression of light discussion with the two religious figures: 
Table 7: Living the Life’s Script (Episode 191, 13 June 2013) 
Questions for Sheikh Omar Suleyman Questions for Rev. Robin Griffith-
Jones 
1. We mentioned in the introduction ‘kind-
hearted, friendly giant from New 
Orleans’. You are quite tall, aren’t you? 
2. You have been heavily involved with the 
Al-Maghrib Institute, a great experience? 
3. People say you have a great way of 
relating to a western audience. That can 
be a bit of a cliché? 
4. Your journey in a way started in 2000 in 
the UAE where you studied under two 
prestigious sheikhs: Tariq Ibn Najah and 
Amr al Sheshany. 
5. You are keen on community service, on 
interfaith dialogue. Do we have to keep 
justifying ourselves as ‘Muslims’? 
6. You also worked as a field coordinator 
after Hurricane Katrina. Must have been a 
tough time for you as an American. 
1. A reverend is talking about English and 
Sharia law. That is unique. 
2. The project is very much forward 
thinking in its approach. Would you 
agree? 
3. Contributors to the book include 
theologians, lawyers and sociologists, a 
real mix there. 
4. The book asks how the rights of all 
citizens are honoured and 
responsibilities are met. How can this 
achieve? 
 
The conversation with religious figures (i.e., the sheikh and the Reverend) during 
the live broadcast was not deep enough for viewers to benefit from (this reminded me of 
Akram, the intern researcher who condemned the programme, saying it lacks ‘good ideas, 
meaning, knowledge and inspiration’). Although both guests are experts in their 
respective religions, their expertise in interfaith dialogue was absent from this episode 
because the producer perceived dialogue as a heavy subject not to be discussed on Living 
the Life. Good editorial decisions could have helped improve this episode of Living the Life. 
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Although each guest was interviewed separately, a sheikh, a reverend and a celebrity chef 
ended up sitting together on the Living the Life set. Unfortunately, this ‘beautiful moment’ 
(as described by Huda, the lifestyle programme producer) was not properly planned or 
presented. The most important message that the programme should have promoted was 
working together on common ground for the benefit of the wider community. This 
notion was absent from this episode of Living the Life due to poor editorial decisions.  
While the sheikh was interviewed regarding his experience as a renowned preacher 
in the Islamic world, the Reverend was interviewed only about his new collaborative 
work on English Law and Islam. Both conversations were quite shallow because the 
producer wanted to maintain the lightness of the content. Moreover, neither guest was 
drawn into a discussion relating to their expertise: interfaith dialogue and comparative 
religion. Thus, viewers were exposed only to their biographies but were unable to 
experience the ‘beautiful moment’ whereby both persons from different Abrahamic faiths 
had come together to achieve a certain level of understanding to acknowledge the 
strengths and weaknesses of both religions in dealing with the law. 
To make this presentation even less effective, the only point in this episode that 
linked the guests was during the ‘Story of the Day’ segment when the presenter invited 
both viewers and guests to respond to the question of the day: ‘Are you scared to eat food 
past its use-by date?’ Despite bringing the guests together, the question asked was not 
relevant to topics discussed by the religious figures. The disjunction between the 
‘Question of the Day’ and the religious issue discussed with the guests impacted on the 
production quality of Living the Life. 
I have previously considered the producer’s attempts to balance the degree of 
religious representation on Living the Life through an analysis of two groups of guests: 1) 
Muslim religious figures and 2) members of diverse religious groups on Living the Life. I 
illustrated how the producer presented these groups of guests to avoid any serious forms 
of doctrinal discourse during ‘live’ broadcasts of Living the Life, resulting in a poor quality 
magazine talk show. The following discussions illustrate how the producer presented 
Muslim organisations on Living the Life. I chose two types of Muslim organisations: 1) a 
charitable foundation and 2) an organisation associated with Muslim political resistance to 
demonstrate the producer’s attempt to balance the degree of religious representation on 
Living the Life.  
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Constraints in Presenting Muslim Charitable Organisations 
Muslim organisations are a part of the general landscape of Muslim communities in 
Britain. Their presence is oriented toward education, social work and more specialised 
activities that focus on young people, women and students and toward Muslim 
representation at local and national levels (Ramadan, 2004, p. 157). Presenting Muslim 
charitable organisations known for their association with any particular form of Islam was 
often disapproved by Aswad, the producer, despite the channel’s endorsement of their 
appearances on Living the Life. This reluctance was due to the guests who represent these 
organisations. Aswad once argued that these guests’ appearances ‘do not result from the 
research carried out by the production team’ (Production meeting, 7 June 2013). Instead, 
these potential guests were often nominated by either the CEO or by the manager of 
programming (sometimes the staff) of the Sales and Advertising Department because these 
guests happened to enrol with the Islam Channel’s Da’wah Card Scheme, which included an 
advertising package. In this manner, the sales department manager requested Aswad to 
book a representative from Helping Households under Great Stress (HHUGS) on Living 
the Life (see Table 6). Aswad was reluctant at first, but he had to agree later because the 
request ‘came from the top’. This suggests that editorial decisions, at some point, are 
influenced by organisational pressure based on commercial imperatives. 
‘Conflict’ is the ‘main ingredient’ for daytime talk shows and a ‘topic without it just 
doesn’t have any bearing for the show’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p.84). On Living the Life, 
however, ‘conflict’ would be a ‘disaster’ according to the producer. To avoid controversy 
and negative criticism by the media regulatory body (Ofcom) or the counter-extremism 
think-tank Quilliam Foundation, Aswad employed a particular strategy when inviting a 
guest who represents a Muslim charitable organisation. HHUGS, for example, is known 
for its association with extremism or terrorism (both of which run counter to the Islam 
Channel’s mission ‘to convey a moderate Islam to non-Muslims and to educate non-
Muslims’). Although Ms Haneefa (the guest) was invited to promote a fundraising dinner 
event (‘Shattered Lives’), Aswad was afraid that she might speak at length about the 
experience of the convicts/detainees held under anti-terrorist legislation. Hence, to avoid 
any conflict or controversy which may have been caused by presenting this particular type 
of organisation, Aswad warned the presenters to confine their conversation with the guest 
to the actual purpose of inviting her on Living the Life: to promote the fundraising dinner 
event.    
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The treatment of a sensitive topic concerning anti-terrorist legislation affected the 
production quality of Living the Life because the conversation was kept at the surface/ 
superficial. Some interesting points went untouched because the presenters were too 
cautious. At one point, the presenter was driven by a fear that the discussion might touch 
a sensitive area that Aswad perceived to be controversial. Additionally, presenting the 
story and showing sympathy towards convicts or detainees might accuse the Islam Channel 
to be charged of advocating extremism or supporting terrorists. The following 
conversation on Living the Life (Episode 144, 20 March 2013) illustrates the tensions 
between Shadi and Rima the presenters, which affected the production quality of the 
programme: 
Shadi: Saturday the 6th of April, an organisation, Helping Households 
under Great Stress, known as HHUGS, will be holding an event in 
London. 
Rima: that is right and it aims at creating awareness of the need to 
support the families whose relatives have been arrested or detained. 
Moreover, she will tell us what we have Haneefa Sarwar, welcome to the 
show, Assalamu ͑alaikum [Peace be upon you] 
Haneefa: Wa ͑alaikumsalam [Peace be upon you] 
Shadi: HHUGS is becoming more well-known now and the event that is 
coming in April known as the ‘Shattered Lives’. Tell us why you chose 
that name, ‘Shattered Lives’. 
Haneefa: In some ways it is quite evident. The families that we help have 
been affected by the anti-terror legislation. Things like experiencing 
traumatic situations, like getting their homes raided and their family 
members imprisoned, at times without charge, you know. Moreover, that 
affects the whole family when someone like the breadwinner, for 
example, has been taken away, or the father or the son. Moreover, in the 
process, sometimes what happens is like an army of the counter-terrorism 
unit, officers will barge into a house, raid it, and turn it upside down. 
Shadi: That affects people’s sense of security, doesn’t it? [Turning to the 
female presenter] 
Rima: [Ignoring the question] and the event is coming up very shortly, 
only about three weeks now. What are the things that people expect?  
While Shadi attempted to bring out some emotion from the conversation, showing 
sympathy towards the families, the cautious Rima tried to end the conversation about the 
relatives of the detainees/convicts by ignoring Shadi’s facial expressions and his question 
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‘that affects people’s sense of security, doesn’t it?’ That was quite an intense moment for 
Rima. Although Rima managed to ‘push’ Shadi away from discussion about anti-terrorist 
legislation earlier, the next block of conversation shows how Shadi succeeded in turning 
the debate into a more serious one, delving more deeply into the topic: 
Haneefa: Like you said, it is about raising awareness, but also about 
raising much money. We have got some speakers waiting to confirm, but 
we have got people like Othman Latif, I think you are presenting? [Asking 
the male presenter] 
Shadi: Yes, yes I will be there. 
Haneefa: We have got Cherie Blair’s sister errr… 
Shadi: Lauren Booth37 
Haneefa: Yes, Lauren Booth. 
Shadi: It is ‘Shattered Lives’. Often, they are silent victims, because 
somebody is arrested, sometimes they are not even charged and the whole 
family life destroyed. They were afraid in their home, being stigmatised, 
tough. What sort of support has HHUGS given so far? 
Haneefa: Do you mind? I have got this brochure [request for the booklet 
from the presenter] 
Shadi: Yes, of course. So you want to read that? [Pointing at the 
brochure on the coffee table in front of her] 
Haneefa: Oh yes, just to answer your question. I can just sit here and tell 
you the bullet points of what we have done and what we have to offer. 
However, if I read to you directly a testimony from a family, it would be 
more interesting. It is a public statement and not confidential. It involved 
a family that has been affected not just by the legislation, but also by the 
media coverage. 
Shadi: Yes of course… 
Haneefa: So, basically, this is what they described: The press would 
stand outside the house and passers-by harassed us and signed a petition to 
                                                   
37 Lauren Booth is a pro-Palestinian activist and a broadcast journalist. Currently hosting a talk 
show Talking Booth on a new Islamic television station, British Muslim TV on SKY channel 
845. She converted to Islam in 2010. She is also a sister-in-law of the former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair. She is a guest speaker at events organised by Helping Households 
under Great Stress (HHUGS). I will discuss further this new Muslim TV in chapter 8; 
explain how it could be a new challenge for the Islam Channel. The details on the talk show 
Talking Booth on BMTV may be found at: 
http://www.laurenbooth.org/2014/03/23/terror-tea-and-hhugs/. Accessed on 1 
September, 2014. 
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get us evicted. They do the same thing to our neighbours. This incitement 
has encouraged racist pressure groups to hold demonstrations outside the 
house on a weekly basis, between four in the afternoon and eleven in the 
evening. These demonstrators would curse and scream at Islam and us. 
Our father was the only one jailed, however, a whole family was 
restricted, had to agree mutually to the practices of the British press and 
Home Office. It is as if we all are imprisoned. They also continue saying, 
idiotic demonstrators like English Defence League (EDL) types. These 
idiotic demonstrators and journalists do not realise we have asked the 
British government to allow us leave the UK for a third country 
somewhere other than the country that they are to deport to […] 
Though Shadi was eager to engage with the discussed topic, he was also warned by 
Aswad (who communicated through the presenter’s earpiece) to wrap up the 
conversation. Aswad’s instruction led to an abrupt change of topic, which resulted in a 
lack of closure to the conversation:  
Shadi: I mean, it is very clear that they [HHUGS] are an important 
charity organisation and doing a crucial job. Once again, please give us a 
reminder again, when is the event?    
Haneefa: 6th of April 
Shadi: Ok, 6th of April. Moreover, we are supporting these families, who 
are the silent victims of… 
Rima: [abruptly] If we want to find out more, how do we get back to 
you? 
Haneefa: You can go to the website which is hhugs.org.uk 
Shadi: Ok, we are out of time, thank you so much for joining us. 
A sudden interjection from Shadi in the above conversation lead to an abrupt change 
of topic: from Islamophobia (‘these demonstrators would curse and scream at us and 
Islam’) to a reminder for the viewers from Shadi (‘please give us a reminder again, when 
is the event?’). Hence, the incoherence of the conversation impacted on the quality of the 
entire episode of Living the Life. Moreover, because the discussion about the victim of anti-
terror legislation was kept on the surface, some interesting points were not discussed as a 
result of Rima’s caution.  
Presenting a Muslim charitable organisation such as HHUGS was a challenging task 
for the production of Living the Life as it involved a controversial religious ideology (e.g., 
extremism). As the producer, Aswad had reason to be cautious as the reputation of the 
Islam Channel lies in his hands. The presenters also risk losing their positions at the Islam 
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Channel if the media regulator took action against the channel or if the channel was 
accused (once again) of promoting extremism. Presenting an organisation like HHUGS, 
which the Islam Channel believed to have good intentions (aiming to help the families of 
convicts/detainees), however, was questioned by the production staff. This is a clear 
indicator of tensions within the production culture of the channel about its mission (to be 
the voice of British Muslims) the result of which was a poor quality magazine talk show.   
On a similar note, the poor editorial decision and the incoherence illustrated above 
signify the failure of the production team to accomplish the third mission of the Islam 
Channel: ‘to be the voice for the voiceless’. The culture of caution has resulted in the 
absence of the ‘voice’ that is supposed to assist ‘the silent victims’: the family members 
that the detainees/convicts have left behind. In sum, Living the Life not only failed to 
accomplish an aspect of the mission of the Islam Channel but also failed to be a good 
magazine talk show.  
Constraints in Presenting Organisations Associated with Muslim Political 
Resistance 
The political goal of the Islam Channel is to be the ‘voice’ for the ‘voiceless’, the victims 
of Islamophobia, and of ‘the oppressed’ (particularly) among Muslims living in conflict 
areas abroad. It is the sense of solidarity with the Ummah and brother/sisterhood in Islam 
that glues British Muslims to ‘oppressed’ Muslims abroad. Muslim organisations like 
Interpal (Palestinian Relief and Development Fund) and the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolution, for instance, are known for their links to the Muslim Brotherhood, a political 
movement that branched out of Islamic fundamentalism. Jihad or resistance has become a 
stated principle of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
The production quality of Living the Life was lessened. The Islam Channel 
religiopolitical goal experienced conflict at various levels, i.e., among the CEO, the 
manager of programming and the Living the Life production staff. While the CEO claimed 
to advocate moderate Islam, the programming department is dominated by Salafi 
fundamentalism. These are two different forms of Islam which, to a certain extent, have 
influenced the production culture of the Islam Channel. The clash between the two has 
affected the production quality of Living the Life.   
Interpal is a humanitarian organisation established to assist Muslims in Palestine. 
Interpal’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was the reason for Aswad, the 
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producer, to be cautious. Again (like the treatment of HHUGS), the on-air conversation 
was limited to the fundraising events arranged by these organisations. Despite the Islam 
Channel’s commitment to the cause of freedom and solidarity with fellow Palestinians, 
the on-air conversations lacked depth regarding the crises facing Palestinians because 
Aswad had decided to remove political aspects from the script. For example, historian 
Sheikh Adnan Rasheed accompanied Khalid Gamel, the director of Interpal, on Living the 
Life to give an overview of the history of Palestine and to promote the upcoming 
exhibition in London at which Adnan Rasheed would be giving a speech.38 Before the 
broadcast, Aswad warned the Sheikh that the conversation should confine to the historical 
aspects of Palestine. The producer concerned that the interview with Adnan Rasheed on 
Living the Life might escalate into a political discussion of the Hamas struggle for 
independence or the Arab-Israeli peace process. The following conversation illustrates the 
tensions between Aswad, Sheikh Adnan Rasheed and Khaled Gamel (Pre-production 
briefing for Episode 128, Fieldnote, 20 February 2013):  
Aswad: Please remember, this is a lifestyle magazine show; it is not a 
platform for any political discussion. We are trying to stay away from the 
conflict, so we do not talk about it here. 
Adnan Rasheed: So, purely academic discussion? Just about the 
Palestinian history and nothing else?  
Khaled: We are not allowed to do ‘that’ [political debate] on this channel 
[…] 
Because the genre conventions of Living the Life involve light treatment of issues, 
Aswad saw political discussion as inappropriate. Aswad narrowed the discussion to include 
only the upcoming exhibition ‘Palestine: Journey through the Ages’. Since the conflict in 
Palestine is heavily political, the on-air conversation was skewed toward the history of 
Palestine and promoting the upcoming exhibition rather than Palestinian suffering. For 
example, the script drafted by Aswad for Adnan Rasheed reads like this: 
Question for Shaykh Adnan Rasheed: ‘Palestine: Journey through 
the Ages’ is an event concerning the history of Islam in Palestine. Umar 
Ibn Khattab invaded Palestine in 638 and famously captured it from 
                                                   
38 The guests from Interpal, Khalid Gamel and Sheikh Adnan Rasheed, were featured on Living the 
Life to promote A History of Palestine Exhibition. Sheikh Adnan Rasheed is a historian and 
well known within Muslim circles for being a controversial scholar (Fieldnotes, 20 
February, 2013). 
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Byzantine rule without bloodshed. Are Muslims familiar with the history 
of Palestine? Why do an event on this topic?  
The script, created by Aswad, demonstrates his attempt to avoid political discussion 
by pushing the conversation in a historical direction. The next two questions focused on 
the exhibition: 
Question for Khaled (Interpal): It is a unique kind of event taking 
place. There are speakers and an exhibition and performances. What is the 
objective of the event? 
Question for Khaled (Interpal): The exhibition is highlighting 
different objects and artwork made by Palestinians and activists. 
Exhibitors are coming on to talk about some of those pieces. What 
inspired you to produce this?  
Since the history of Palestine has the potential to be political and might spur heated 
arguments on Living the Life, the on-air conversation was shallow. The discussion slanted 
toward as a promotion for the upcoming exhibition rather than allowing the Sheikh to 
become the ‘voice’ of the oppressed and demonstrate the channel’s solidarity with the 
Palestinian struggle for independence. The sheikh’s appearance on Living the Life was seen 
as a ‘threat’ to the genre, i.e., Aswad feared that the historical discussion might veer into 
politics. He refused to include any political elements in Living the Life because they did not 
fit into its genre conventions. The inability to balance the presentation of politics impacted 
the quality of this magazine talk show, which became, instead, a platform for the 
promotion of an upcoming event. Moreover, Living the Life also failed to achieve the 
channel’s mission, ‘to become the voice of the oppressed’, due to a lack of depth in the 
topic under discussion.  
Similar treatment was evident while featuring guests from the National Coalition 
for Syrian Revolution on Living the Life Episode 140 (13 March 2013). Again, Aswad 
insisted that the presenter keeps the conversation on the surface as he added the following 
warning in the script: ‘Item will focus more on the humanitarian suffering, not the 
political aspects’. On-air conversation with the guests of this organisation was restricted to 
an upcoming event, the ‘Etilaf March for Syria’, calling the UK Syrian community and 
their friends to show their commitment to the cause of freedom and solidarity with their 
fellow Syrians wherever they may be. The event marked the second anniversary of the 
quest for freedom by the Syrian people.           
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Since the Islam Channel aims to convey a moderate form of Islam to its audience, 
presenting any political controversy could give viewers the impression that the Islam 
Channel advocates extremism and, at the same time, might risk the reputation of the 
channel. The top management (both the CEO and the operational level) expressed their 
solidarity with the Palestinians and the Syrians by inviting the representatives from 
Interpal and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution to promote their events. Once 
again, as the producer, Aswad faced a dilemma in negotiating and balancing the 
presentation of certain forms of political ideology. The features (VT) selected for the 
episode on the ‘Etilaf March for Syria’ (Episode 140, 13 March 2013) were irrelevant to 
the topic. For example, in his attempt to ‘balance’ the amount of light and heavy items in 
this episode, Aswad selected three VTs that had no relation to the ‘March for Syria’ event. 
These VTs were: 1) ‘Businesswoman in Qatar’, 2) ‘Paralysed Dog in Jordan’ and 3) 
‘Handmade Shoes in India’. Aswad’s attempt to balance religious elements with light 
entertainment seemed incoherent. Moreover, he also failed to accomplish the mission of 
the channel to be the televised ‘voice’ representing ‘oppressed’ Syrians due to his strategy 
of controlling the degree of presentation of religion on the magazine talk show. As the 
conversation was shallow, many important points relating to the suffering of the Syrians 
(which might have enlightened viewers) were omitted as a result of the culture of caution 
in the production of Living the Life.          
To conclude, the production culture of the Islam Channel involved balancing and 
negotiating the presentation of religion on Living the Life. The ideological conflict was 
evident at certain organisational levels and proved to have impacted the produced text. 
The analysis of four situations above demonstrates that religion is central to Living the Life, 
yet needs to be balanced against light entertainment. The unbalanced religious 
presentation might change the tone of the magazine talk show that the channel sought to 
produce. The CEO’s desire to represent moderate Islam (also stated in the channel’s 
mission) clashes with that of the channel’s programming department (Salafi 
fundamentalists) and with the producer’s strategy of balancing the presentation of 
religion. To avoid any conflict with ‘the top’ and to produce a ‘light’ magazine talk show, 
the producer came up with the following strategies to balance religious presentation 
against light entertainment:  
1) Avoid doctrinal discourse 
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2) Keep the conversation light or at the surface  
3) Focus the discussion on the actual purpose of featuring the religious 
personality, group or Muslim organisation, such as fundraising, etc.  
4) Quantify the items representing religion by balancing them against light-
entertainment items  
5) Select features (VT) that have non-religious elements and schedule them 
during an episode that emphasises religion (e.g., two religious personalities 
featured on the same episode). 
I have elaborated the problems in negotiating and balancing religious representation 
on Living the Life about the mission of the Islam Channel. These problems are resulting 
from the ‘clash of ignorance’ (Said, 2001) between the West and Islamic cultures and the 
tensions in Muslim communities relating to ideology and intergenerational issues. The 
debates on the clash between the West and Muslim cultures shape the ways in which Islam 
and Muslims are represented, interpreted, perceived and politicised by the media, by 
those ignorant of Islamic cultures, and by the authorities and those in power (Kundnani, 
2015; Gilliat-Ray, 2010). The ideological clash in Muslim communities has impacted the 
creative decisions on presenting religious diversity and multiple dimensions of Muslim 
everyday life and identity. Such an extreme caution rooted in fear of being classified as ‘a 
suspect community’. Thus, the ideological clash and ‘the culture of caution’ shaped the 
creative decision processes; this situation, consequently, impacted the production quality 
of Living the Life.  
6.4.2 Constraints in Presenting Music Artists and Performance  
As with the course of balancing and negotiating the degree of religious presentations, the 
production culture of the Islam Channel involved caution when presenting light 
entertainment on Living the Life. The reasons behind such careful behaviour included the 
producer’s concern over an entertainment genre endorsed by the channel and the nature 
of the entertainment suitable for the channel’s ‘conservative Muslim audience’ (Assistant 
manager of programming, 17 June 2013). According to the producer, the aim to educate 
Muslims through ‘fun and entertainment’ while ‘keeping an Islamic thread running 
through the programming’ proved difficult to achieve in Living the Life production 
(Interview, 20 June 2013). Such difficulties can be explained by two constraints relating 
to the religious mission of the channel. These limitations are:  
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1) The genre conventions of a magazine talk show, which caused the producer to 
struggle with balancing the degree of light entertainment while maintaining an 
Islamic element. 
2) Problem in negotiating a form of music featured on the programme that adhered 
to the dominant ideology (Salafi fundamentalism) of the channel’s programming 
department as well as the CEO’s desire to promote moderate Islam and the views 
of its conservative Muslim audience.  
 
The constraint regarding the genre conventions of a magazine talk show was evident 
in the producer’s struggle to balance the degree of entertainment against the religious 
element required for Living the Life. The genre conventions of Living the Life, such as 
presenters, the guests presenting specific items, three separate features (the VT) and a 
particular segment that invites viewer participation (the Story of the Day) were chosen to 
be the sources of light entertainment for audiences. For example, the presenters’ banter 
about ‘the most unusual food they had ever eaten’. A studio activity such as ‘the chocolate 
tasting’, the VT featuring a New York couple living in a home made from shipping 
containers and the ‘Story of the Day’ segment about the barista who claimed he had 
blended a cup of coffee called ‘The Death Wish’, all suggest the channel’s attempt to 
introduce light entertainment into the programme (Episode 144, Living the Life). These 
examples also demonstrate the kind of light show endorsed by the Islam Channel.  
Despite the variety of approaches described above, it would be unreasonable to 
expect Living the Life to achieve anything like the standard of The One Show. The production 
quality was poor as the features and the studio activities presented were incoherent insofar 
as they have separated from the main topics discussed with the guests. Unlike The One 
Show, where religion is not central to its genre, Living the Life requires ‘an Islamic thread 
running through’ the light entertainment presented. This indicates that the producer of 
Living the Life ‘locked’ himself into the strictures of the magazine talk show in which he 
tried to fulfil the genre requirements while simultaneously maintaining a light religious 
element. Such a situation suggests that Jeremy Tunstall’s (2001, p.194) claim that 
television producers are ‘locked into a genre-specific world’ is accurate. Being ‘locked’ in 
the genre conventions of a magazine talk show impacted the produced text. For example, 
the producer tended to select the VT and the topic for the ‘Story of the Day’ from 
newspaper articles or the Internet to fit into the genre conventions of Living the Life. 
Although it might have given viewers the impression of light entertainment, such a poor 
editorial decision turned the programme into a disjointed magazine talk show. 
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Aside from being ‘locked in a genre-specific world’, the producer also struggled 
when negotiating the forms of entertainment endorsed by the channel. The tension 
between Salafi fundamentalist and moderate Islam was the reason for such constraints, 
particularly when presenting guests from the music industry, such as nasheed artists (artists 
singing Islamic devotional songs). According to fundamentalists, or ‘scholars of texts’, 
daily life must be ‘devoid of entertainment, without music or spiritual rest’ (Ramadan, 
2009, p. 196). Salafi fundamentalists tend to be intolerant while following a literal 
interpretation of Islamic sources (e.g., the Quran) and believe that Muslims should be 
governed by Shari ͑ah (Islamic Law). Salafi fundamentalists are also critical of un-Islamic 
innovations (bid ͑ah) in religious beliefs or practices that include music and entertainment, 
especially those associated with Sufism39 (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, pp. 68-69). 
 In contrast, moderate Islamists or the ‘scholars of context’ view music and 
entertainment as an important dimension of life. Nonetheless, they perceive music as a 
means to give rest to mind and heart (Ramadan, 2009, p. 196). Conflicting ideas about 
music and entertainment within the channel have caused tensions in the production of 
Living the Life. Producer’s tasks are not only to ensure that the music and artists fit within 
genre conventions, but also to make sure that the kind of entertainment the channel 
approved does not offend its conservative Muslim audience.  
In general, nasheed is a form of entertainment that the channel allowed because its 
devotional lyrics and melodies offer rest (according to moderate Islam).  It was, however, 
becoming problematic for the Living the Life production when most Muslim artists, 
including pop, hip-hop and rap artists, approached the channel and claimed that they were 
performing nasheed and that the lyrics of their devotional songs were suitable for young 
British Muslims. Such a blurred identity of nasheed/devotional songs has caused problems 
for Living the Life. In particular, the issue concerned the selection of and negotiation with 
the nasheed artists that the channel approved. Iqbal, the programming manager, often 
reminded the producers to be careful during the selection of nasheed artists on Living the 
Life. As he asserted: 
                                                   
39 Sufism is a form of mystical Islam, using songs and music as one way to praise God and His 
Prophet. Salafi fundamentalism categorized nasheed associated with Sufism as un-Islamic and 
an innovation (bid’ah). 
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We must make sure that the people who come on the Islam Channel are 
responsible persons. He has not got something bad written on his Twitter, 
on his YouTube link, he hasn’t got something bad written on his Facebook 
or doesn’t do anything wrong. Though we are not trying to judge that 
person, if the artist posted something controversial on his Twitter, he is 
passing it to the world. It becomes public information. So we have a 
responsibility to verify and check everything […], (Interview, 20 June 
2013). 
The purpose of checking the artists’ backgrounds before inviting them on Living the 
Life demonstrates the channel’s concerns with its image and reputation as a broadcaster 
that represents Islam. A filtering process was also necessary to ensure that the types of 
music and performances were in line with the programming department’s Salafi 
fundamentalism and that the artists’ performance did not offend the channel’s 
conservative audience. On one occasion, Iqbal refused to feature Muhammad Yahya, a hip-
hop nasheed artist, on Living the Life because of his previous appearance in a YouTube video 
clip featuring him singing and dancing to music alongside a female singer, a form of 
entertainment censured by the programming department.40  
Opinions differ among fundamentalist and moderate Muslims as to which types of 
music and instruments are allowed (Van Nieuwkerk, 2011). In the case of Muhammad 
Yahya, the Islam Channel disapproved the musical instrument, not the lyrics of the song. 
The song lyrics that he wrote complied with the channel’s requirement. They expressed 
gratitude to God and His Prophet, favoured peace, freedom and respect for humankind 
and were thus approved by the channel. It was the type of musical instruments and his 
YouTube video performance that featured dance moves and gender mixing within a 
confined space (e.g., a nightclub) that could offend the conservative audience of the Islam 
Channel.41 It is the way in which the artist behaved for the public and the conditions under 
which the performance took place that is offensive to both Salafi fundamentalist and 
moderate Islam. It is clear that although moderate Islamists support the use of music and 
entertainment for relaxation and devotional purposes, they remain concerned about the 
impact of artists’ behaviour on youth. This demonstrates that the production culture of 
                                                   
40 Muhammad Yahya is a nasheed artist from a hip-hop group called ‘Native Sun’. 
41 The performance that the Islam Channel prevented and which led to Muhammad Yahya’s 
exclusion from Living the Life can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3LMqnTulG8 
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the Islam Channel encourages caution among employees that may create tension between 
ideologies.  
The culture of caution expressed at the managerial and production levels concerns 
the perceived ‘conservative audience’ and reputation of the Islam Channel. The strain 
between the two ideological camps related specifically to presentations of music and 
nasheed artists and whether or not they complied with the programming department’s 
Salafi fundamentalism. The culture of caution within the Islam Channel shaped the 
produced text.  
What has affected the production quality of Living the Life was the conflicting 
opinions on the use of music and how nasheed artists ought to be presented in the 
programme. Continuing disagreement among Muslim scholars about the degree to which 
music is permitted (if at all) in Islam echoes along the channel’s halls. Some regard the 
human voice accompanied by individual percussive instruments as acceptable and others 
do not (Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 240). These opinions influence the music and entertainment 
presented on Living the Life, especially when the music genre is concerned, and whether or 
not artists’ performances are allowed to include musical instruments or must be presented 
a capella.  
On television talk shows, music plays an important role due to its ability to 
entertain. Music on a talk show has a ‘melodramatic and optimistic’ effect on guests and 
the audience (Blum-Kulka, 2008, p. 93). In the case of Living the Life, the dilemma 
involves deciding whether or not the presentation of nasheed artists complied with the 
channel’s ideology. Although there was room for agreement between the two dominant 
ideologies, particularly concerning issues relating to ethics and the perceived decency of 
artists, the tensions heightened in Living the Life production by the programming 
department’s Salafi fundamentalists banning of musical performances on the programme. 
Evidence of Salafi influence is seen in the opening montage of the programme, which 
included only a cappella singing. Additionally, nasheed artists were not given a chance to 
sing and play musical instruments at the same time during their performances on Living the 
Life. Most of these ‘live’ a capella were often incomplete as they were abruptly cut off 
during on-air broadcasts. For example, sudden cut off of a capella performances by such 
famous nasheed artists as Mesut Kurtis and Saif Adam on Living the Life may have frustrated 
Living the Life audience, especially if they were fans of these artists. Such disruption defeats 
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the purpose of Living the Life as a light-entertainment genre as well as affected its 
production quality.  
Living the Life presents entertainment challenges because it requires religious 
messages to flow through the programme. The producer’s experience of being ‘locked 
into the genre-specific world’ resulted in the failure of Living the Life to reach the standard 
of The One Show. Its output inconsistent with the features (VT). The studio activities were 
incoherently presented and detached from the main topics discussed with the guests. A 
deep-rooted culture of caution within the organisation at the management and production 
levels as well as the ideological tensions has shaped the editorial decisions of Living the Life. 
The programme lacks the musical performances typically presented in its genre, while its 
overall quality suffers as the underlying messages within the lyrics of devotional songs 
performed are often inappropriately interrupted. This leaves the performances of nasheed 
artists dull and meaningless. The Islam Channel failed to acknowledge the importance and 
attractiveness of music. David Hesmondhalgh (2013b, p. 76) argues that music has an 
ability to ‘enhance feelings of shared experience, attachment, and solidarity towards 
human beings’. Hence, the exclusion of the musical experience and the unprofessional 
treatment of those singing devotional songs of love of God, peace and solidarity define one 
aspect of what Living the Life has been missing: the opportunity to convey the beauty of 
Islam and its teachings.      
6.4.3 Constraints in Presenting Physical Appearance of Women 
As with the music issues discussed in the previous section, female-related issues are also 
central to the analyses of problems relating to the religious mission of the Islam Channel. 
The constraints within the production culture of the channel are caused by tension 
between two dominant ideologies: the programming department’s Salafi fundamentalism 
and the CEO-inspired moderate Islam. The constraints concerned the physical appearance 
of women presented on Living the Life. On most programmes produced by the Islam 
Channel, women are shown in a modest and respectable manner. While on air, female 
presenters wear headscarves (hijab) and maxi-dresses (abaya) or lengthy suit jackets. Such 
presentations are in line with the Islam Channel code of conduct stated in two policy 
documents: 1) the Dress Code Policy and 2) the Islam Channel Manners and Etiquette. Female 
workers and volunteers at the Islam Channel abide by these rules concerning dress code 
and behaviour. While the channel drafted the Dress Code policy for all employees and 
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volunteers during working hours at the channel, both staff and guests who appear on the 
programmes produced by the channel must observe the directives on Manners and 
Etiquette. The guests appear on Living the Life were not exceptions. According to Islam 
Channel Manners and Etiquette, female guests invited to the programme must wear modest 
clothing. The hijab, while not compulsory for non-Muslim women, is considered a ‘best 
practice’ for the Muslim female. A Salafi fundamentalist ruling on female-related issues 
within the Islam Channel is evident in the document on Manners and Etiquette. Half of the 
listed regulations in the document are meant for female employees, volunteers and guests 
of the Islam Channel:  
1) The Islam Channel expects people to present a respectable, modest and 
conservative image at all times.  
2) The Islam Channel encourages women to ensure their hair is covered when 
appearing on the channel. 
3) The Islam Channel discourages physical contact between persons of the 
opposite sex, including handshakes. 
4) The Islam Channel prohibits free mixing and unnecessary communication 
between men and women. Only work-related activities are to be discussed on 
the Islam Channel’s premises or when representing the Islam Channel. 
5) The Islam Channel encourages that, whenever possible, men and women are 
segregated in separate offices. 
Some of these rules may not be seen as explicitly for women. However, this set of 
rules indicates the influence of Salafi fundamentalism on the channel’s dress code and the 
instructions on how women should behave at the Islam Channel. Although given to all its 
employees and guests, the rules inherently function as a form of female protection against 
the ‘male gaze’,42 a set of restrictions central to Islamic fundamentalist legal thinking 
about women. Islamic fundamentalism believes that the media of Western cultural 
imperialism have tainted the image of women and, therefore, they need to be ‘saved’ 
before ‘their deteriorated ethics’ harm the entire Muslim society (Al-Najjar, 2012, p. 35). 
The ways in which fundamentalists look at women (as potential agents of moral 
destruction) place them in a social class that is inferior to men. According to the 
                                                   
42 Feminist theorist Laura Mulvey (1975), argued that visual pleasure in classical Hollywood 
cinema was based around the way in which women were subjected to the ‘male gaze’. She 
divided the gaze into three categories: (1) how men look at women, (2) how women look 
at themselves and (3) how women look at other women (not in sexual terms, but rather to 
compare body images). Mulvey, L. 1989. Visual and other pleasures. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
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fundamentalist literal interpretation of the Qur’anic text, women are expected to dress 
modestly and appear in a conservative manner when in the presence of men. Such 
conservatism includes modest garments or headscarves (hijab) and veiling (niqab) is 
encouraged. The fundamentalist rulings on how women should behave in public places 
include the prohibition of any form of physical or verbal contact with males and gender 
segregation. This dress code and etiquette, enforced by the Islam Channel, is also 
manifested in the Salafi fundamentalist Al-Majd television channel based in Saudi Arabia. 
At Al-Majd, fundamentalists view women as being objectified by Western media and 
culture. They argue that women should be confined to their homes as a result of the 
‘deterioration of their ethics’ caused by Western media. Such decline could be harmful to 
wider Muslim society (Al-Najjar, 2012, p. 52).  
The fundamentalists support a literal understanding of what Qur’anic texts say 
about women rather than what those texts have ‘promoted, defended and prescribed 
concerning women’s being and power’ about the current cultural context in which 
Muslim women live (Ramadan, 2009, p. 213). As a result of this literal reduction, 
fundamentalism tends to evaluate the image of modest women by the way they dress, 
regardless of the cultural context in which they live. As Ramadan claims, ‘Muslim 
institutions and scholars have been seen to offer modest dress as the ultimate expression of 
faith or as an act of resistance to Western cultural imperialism’ (ibid., p. 219).  
Although some characteristics of the Al-Majd TV rulings concerning women’s dress 
code and behaviour resonate within the Islam Channel Manners and Etiquette, the Islam 
Channel is dissimilar to Al-Majd in that it allows women’s voices on its programmes. 
Notwithstanding such visible forms of Salafi fundamentalist gender-based discrimination 
regarding women’s image and behaviour, there are signs of recognition of the women’s 
role in the production culture of the Islam Channel. These signs reflect the moderate 
Islam viewpoint to which the channel adheres as well as a hint of feminist activism within 
the channel. One might ask what kind of feminist activism exists in the channel and 
whether or not it is in line with the moderate Islam that the Islam Channel claims to 
espouse.  
Theologian Amina Wadud (2002) suggests three different schools of thought within 
Muslim feminist activism: 1) Marxist-informed secular feminists and activists who, though 
Muslims themselves, see Islam as promoting oppressive cultural manifestations in the 
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Western post-colonial context, 2) Muslim fundamentalists among Muslim male 
authorities and their female representatives who identify an ideal Islam based on literal 
interpretations of Quranic texts (discussed above), 3) Islamic feminists, including those 
who are Muslim female scholars and who accept Islam as an intrinsic part of their identity 
and ‘emphatically critique patriarchal control over the male Islamic worldview’ (cited in 
Mirza, 2012, p. 133). 
Among the three strands of Muslim feminist activism, Islamic feminism is the form 
of feminist activism found at the Islam Channel. The Islam Channel’s political aim (to 
become the ‘voice for the voiceless and of the oppressed’) resonates with Islamic feminist 
activism in the channel’s programming. Such form of activism is in line with moderate 
Islam, a kind of religion that the Islam Channel seeks to present to its non-Muslim 
audience. Moderate Islam does not confine itself to a literal reduction of the Qur’anic text 
like the fundamentalist prescriptions on how women should present themselves or behave 
in public. In the discourse about women, fundamentalists focus intensely on norms such as 
a female’s ritualistic aspects regarding religious practice (e.g., behaviour rules, dress, etc.) 
and formal ones concerning social affairs (e.g., the rights and duties of wives and maternal 
responsibilities) (Ramadan, 2009, p. 217).  
Contrary to literal reduction by fundamentalist, moderate Islamists combine 
analyses of texts and context in developing social aspects of womanhood. Moderate Islam 
deals with the issues of women according to the corpus of ‘higher objectives’ (Maqaasid).43 
Based on the higher objectives approach, the discourse concerning women is not only 
limited to norms, rituals or social affairs aspects as emphasised by the fundamentalist 
approaches to women’s issues, but rather, as Ramadan suggests:  
The discourse must rely on in-depth studies of all the dimensions of a 
woman’s being in the light of ‘higher objectives’ beyond norms, raising 
                                                   
43 The ‘corpus of higher objectives’ (Maqaasid) is an approach within Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
that combines both textual and contextual interpretations in dealing with social issues 
(including women’s issues). Moderate Islamic scholars, such as Tariq Ramadan (2009) and 
Hassan (2013), believe that the corpus of higher objectives must be established before any 
circumstantial analysis of texts and environments. According to Ramadan, this approach is 
relevant ‘to avoid running the risk of being misled by the letter of some texts or the 
cultural shackles of past or contemporary societies’ Ramadan, T. 2009. Radical reform : 
Islamic ethics and liberation. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 216. 
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such issues as the acquisition of knowledge (about texts and other bodies 
of knowledge) for women, the meaning of their dignity and welfare in all 
that has to do with their minds, hearts, and bodies, their inalienable 
autonomy and the essence of their freedom in the mindscape of social 
representations as well as in group structures, without overlooking the 
question of the essence of womanhood and related factors (Ramadan, 
2009, p. 218). 
I have identified a source of conflict within the Islam Channel: the Salafi 
fundamentalist influence within the religious programming department versus the 
channel’s mission to represent moderate Islam. Such conflict has also shaped the 
production culture of the Islam Channel. The tension arose in presenting the image of 
women on Living the Life. The Salafi fundamentalist insistence on their notion of a modest 
presentation of women on the channel has created constraints within the production of 
Living the Life. Such restrictions consequently impacted the programme’s production 
quality. 
The ideological tension between the Salafi fundamentalist dress code and the 
producer’s moderate Islam approach to the treatment of the female image was evident in 
Episode 136 of Living the Life (Fieldnotes, 6 March 2013). The episode featured a female 
guest, Ms Necera Gomes, who talked about nutritious organic argan oil came to the Islam 
Channel wearing a knee-length red dress. I remember welcoming her to the channel and 
assisting her with all the bottles of argan oil she had brought.  
After introducing her to the producer, I offered her a seat in the waiting area. 
Subsequently, I heard Iqbal, the manager of programming speaking privately to Aswad, 
the producer. Aswad immediately approached me after having an intense conversation 
with Iqbal, saying that Ms Gomes could not appear on the show in ‘that’ kind of dress. 
Iqbal approached Aswad again, asking him to speak to Ms Gomes in private about how to 
conceal her legs from viewers while seated on the set’s sofa. I observed her talking to 
Aswad through the glass window of the control room. She did not seem comfortable 
because her facial expression changed from one of enthusiasm to that of a discomfited 
woman when Aswad asked her to put the shawl on upon the manager’s request. Obeying 
the manager’s order, Aswad apologised to Ms Gomes and proceeded with the ‘live’ 
filming of the episode. When Ms Gomes took her seat, she covered her exposed legs with 
a red shawl that she happened to have brought with her. Such a ‘wardrobe malfunction’ 
and the absence of a hijab caused the camera operator and visual editor to worry; they 
- 181 - 




Figure 8: Ideological Constraints Related to Poor Camerawork 
Source: Episode 136, 6 March 2013 
 
Figure 8 describes the predicament in camera operation and visual direction, which 
resulted in a poor camera work. The sequence of images illustrates the difficulties faced by 
the camera operator and the visual editor. It demonstrates the limitations of capturing 
close-ups of Ms Gomes and sustaining the camera focus on her for an extended period. In 
this case, her appearance was unacceptable to Iqbal, the manager of programming. The 
notion of female modesty favoured by Salafi fundamentalists is widespread on the Islam 
Channel and has created constraints in the camera work. Ms Gomes had become a 
‘controversial’ subject. This issue has shaped the overall production quality of Living the 
Life. Also addressing problems relating to gender, Caldwell found common problematic 
forms of ‘sexual politics and gender segregation’ on the behind-the-scene videos that he 
analysed (Caldwell, 2008, p. 53). However, Caldwell frames such issues as ‘acute cultural 
typing’ (ibid., p. 55). Caldwell categorises gendered TV workers who were subject to 
such ‘cultural typing’ include: ‘the female network executive is intimidating because of 
her sexuality, glamour, and toughness; the female casting director is a tough worker-bee 
who is true, plain, and devoted; the male producer is virile and scary, marking his turf for 
any would-be challengers’ (ibid.). This thesis, on the contrary, presents the challenge 
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faced by the producer in presenting the physical appearance of women who dressed in a 
particular garment that could offend the channel conservative fundamentalist audience. 
Such incident also signifies the ideological clash that shapes creative decisions. The 
fundamentalist strict adherence to the dress code left no room for a female guest to 
negotiate her position as a non-Muslim talk show guest on a Muslim TV, who should be 
treated with kindness and respect. As a gendered individual and a moderate Muslim, I 
believe that a moderate form of Islam teaches its adherents to not judging non-Muslims or 
enforcing on them certain rules on how and what to dress in public. Moreover, the way 
the channel treated the non-Muslim women is against the Da’wah principles which 
encourage Muslims to invite non-Muslims to Islam with wisdom and beautiful way of 
teaching. 44 
6.5 Conflicting Notions of “Good” Television Programming 
In addition to the lack of resources and problems related to the religious mission of the 
channel, this section analyses what the production community perceived to be a “good” 
television programme and how the conflicting opinions on the concept of “good” 
television shaped the production quality of a magazine talk show. Like many media 
organisations, conflicting opinions between the ‘top’ management and the production 
workers is also evident on the Islam Channel. The concept of “good” television varies 
across the perspectives of and within its production community. It is important to identify 
what kind of end product the production staff was oriented toward producing. Unless we 
get the sense of their understandings of good television programming, we may have only a 
limited knowledge of the causes of their failure to produce a good magazine talk show. 
There are two aspects concerning television production that explain the conflicting 
opinions of what constitutes “good” television. These are 1) business expectations among 
managers and 2) the perceptions of the genre of talk show among the production 
community.  
                                                   
44 To invite every human being to Islam with wisdom and discretion, meeting people on their 
ground and convincing them with illustrations from their own knowledge and experience, 
this may be very narrow or very broad. And to adopt a ‘beautiful way of preaching’, the 
preaching must not be dogmatic, self-regarding or offensive, but gentle, considerate and 
such as would attract their attention. Cited in Yusuf Ali, A. 2011. The meaning of the Holy 
Qur'an. 11 ed. Maryland, USA: Amana Publications.p. 22n.Yusuf Ali, 2011, p. 669. 
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6.5.1 Business Expectations   
The Islam Channel relies heavily on its business enterprises to continue producing 
television programmes. The scheme such as the Da’wah Card subscriptions offered to 
individuals and organisations/businesses, the selling of airtime and the online advertising 
spaces and event organising, e.g., the annual Global Peace and Unity, are sources of 
income for the Islam Channel (see Chapter 5). Like many media organisations, advertising 
and sponsorship are the most lucrative sources of support that allow the channel to survive 
in the business. The channel relies on a broad range of programming to gain revenue. As 
Malik, the human resource manager, claimed: 
The primary source of income would be the advertising. As our sales 
team, they will look for clients to advertise on-air and on the Internet. 
Some of these clients subscribe to the sponsorship packages to get their 
services or products to reach our viewers […] (Interview, 18 June 2013). 
The above claim indicates that the Islam Channel depends on advertising revenues 
to survive in the broadcasting business. With insufficient financial resources, it can be 
tough for the channel to accomplish its religious mission ‘to convey Islam to non-Muslims, 
to educate Muslims, and to be representative for the voiceless and of the oppressed 
Muslims’. To send these religious messages, the channel has to produce more 
programmes. More programmes mean that the channel needs to look for more sponsors. 
Such attitude towards a ‘formula’ to survive in the business can put the production 
community at risk because it can compromise the quality of its programmes. Therefore, it 
is important to find out what the management perceived to be “good” television 
programming. 
Iqbal, the manager of the programming department, has claimed that “good” 
television is ‘a programme that has quality; it is liked by viewers and fits with the ethics 
and ideology of the channel’ (Interview, 20 June 2013). The problem with his definition 
was that the channel has no concrete evidence, such as rating figures, which could define 
the perceived ‘quality’ of the programme because according to Iqbal, the channel cannot 
afford to hire a consultant like Nielsen to oversee audience ratings.  The only source of 
discovering what the audience likes is from its online survey on the Islam Channel 
website. According to Sara, the assistant manager of programming:  
Our audience fills up what they like, what kind of programme they want. 
So our decisions are based on what our audience wants. We also monitor 
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emails they sent us so then we know what they want and don’t want […] 
(Interview, 17 June 2013).  
It is complicated when the management equalised quality with popularity. The ways 
in which the managers, for instance, perceived ‘quality’ of the channel programming is by 
referring to its audience preferences. Living the Life is the second most ‘popular’ after the 
‘live’ religious programme IslamQA according to the online polling result (between 
February and April 2013). Thus, the scheduling hour between 7:00 pm to 8:00 pm was 
seen as a good strategy to attract sponsorships.  
The conflicting understandings of good television have triggered tensions at the 
production level when presenting Muslim charitable organisations on Living the Life. The 
CEO and the sales department perceived Living the Life to be “good” television for its 
existing and potential clients who might advertise their products or services. The case of 
HHUGS, for example, the producer was not keen on featuring the guests suggested by the 
management because this type of guest does not make ‘good programmes’ according to 
him. The guests whom the producer perceived to be “good” for the magazine talk show 
are those resulting from the research by the production staff in Living the Life. The poor 
production quality of the magazine talk show can be explained by the results of textual 
analysis that show a shallow conversation between presenters and Ms Haneefa, who 
represented HHUGS. This happened for two equally relevant reasons: first, the producer 
was cautious on the subject discussed by the guest (e.g., anti-terrorist legislation). Second, 
the producer was not interested in the guest suggested by the management as their 
invitations did not result from the research carried out by the Living the Life’s production 
team. The reluctance to feature a particular type of Muslim organisation on Living the Life 
was due to the kind of organisation that the guests represented. This suggests that editorial 
decisions, at some point, are influenced by the managerial pressure that in turn, is 
strongly determined by commercial imperatives.  
Aside from producer’s response to the channel business expectation, his poor 
management of clash between the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘sociability’ factors as characteristics 
of good television talk show (Bruun, 2001) has also resulted in poor quality of Living the 
Life. While, the ‘uncertainty’ factor that can be represented through stories about family 
members that HHUGS support, the ‘sociability’ element found in ‘hospitality’ and 
‘atmosphere togetherness’ brought about by presenter-guest dramaturgy (Bruun, 2001, p. 
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250), could have enhanced the quality of Living the Life. Hence, this indicates that the 
channel expectation of its business client like HHUGS for making “good” television has 
shaped the production rituals, subsequently, the production quality of Living the Life.   
6.5.2 Perceptions on the Genre  
While the ‘top management’ viewed the concept of good television in light of advertising 
profits, production staff at Living the Life developed two sets of understanding of the 
concept. These understandings are that: a) religion is central to a good television 
programme and b) a good television programme has balanced elements of religion and 
light entertainment.  
Religion is Central to Good Television  
While the management perceived good television programming as a platform for their 
clients to promote businesses and services, workers in the production recognised good 
programming as having a strong religious message that helps one to fortify his/her 
religious identity. As an assistant manager of programming, Sara emphasised: 
A good television programme is something that inspires people to do good 
by instilling Islamic principles in them. So they find their identity within 
the programme, something that tells who they are, and something that 
encourages them that their deen (religion) is good, obviously something 
that educates them as well. I think something that also makes the audience 
want to watch it and feel to reaffirm their faith. Feel so strongly of their 
faith […] (Interview, 17 June 2013). 
“Good” television, then, is characterised by explicit religious messages within the 
programming. According to Sara, a programme is good when it seeks to accomplish the 
religious mission of the Islam Channel ‘to educate Muslims’ through which the 
programme reinforced viewers beliefs and religious identity. Religion, according to Sara, 
is central to her envisioned ‘good programme’. Maryam, the assistant producer of Living 
the Life felt that a good programme does not portray Islamic elements as an ‘ad hoc’ or ‘an 
afterthought’. Sara suggested that ‘religion/Islam should be there as a central idea to the 
show’ (Assistant Producer 1, Interview, 14 June 2013). Like Sara, Maryam also suggested 
that good television emphasises religion as the gist of the conveyed message. Maryam 
argues:  
I think we should start from Islam as a central theme then we insert 
different ideas into the programme. We can show Islam’s message 
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through history, through politics, through lifestyle because Islam has stuff 
to say about society, social and lifestyle […], (Interview, 14 June 2013). 
Moreover, a “good” television programme conveys the message of Islam to its 
viewers explicitly. As an example, the religious message should be in the form of verbal 
reminders by the presenters of Living the Life. Maryam found it difficult to project such a 
spiritual message via a magazine talk show like Living the Life because of its genre 
conventions. It requires unique skills and efforts from the producer to execute the genre 
conventions of a magazine talk show in order not to sideline the religious gist. She felt that 
Living the Life treated religion less seriously due to its light-entertainment nature:   
We are labelled as Islam Channel. We do have a responsibility in what we 
put up on this channel. It has to be Islamic because we are saying it is 
‘Islam’. Many people will look at Islam Channel as a reference point. 
However, sometimes I feel like Living the Life can be a little bit on the 
border with things like banter and mixing of gender. It sometimes has a 
very ‘relaxed’ atmosphere. For example, female guests are coming on the 
show chit-chatting and giggling. You see for yourself by looking in our 
office; we have segregation. There is a reason all women are sitting on one 
side and men on the other side. This is something that we learn from Islam 
[…] (Interview, 14 June 2013). 
A lighter treatment of religion on Living the Life has frustrated Maryam. The 
religious message seems to have been watered down once the ‘chitchatting’ or banter took 
over the conversation on the programme. The influence of fundamentalist ideology is 
evident in the above statement. A real advocate of such thinking tends to agree with 
gender segregation at the workplace. A concept such as ‘halal and fun’ (Herding, 2013) 
that the producer attempted to project on Living the Life had been disapproved by the 
fundamentalists. The ways in which television production employees view such situation 
may be different depending on their religious orientation and ideology. As for Maryam, 
she had been brought up in a conservative home when her father, a convert, became a 
practising Muslim (Interview, 14 June 2013). Thus, her religious orientation/ideology 
echoed through her attitude towards entertainment and her understanding of good 
television programming.  
Maryam’s desire to set Islam at the ‘centre’ of the discussion and not just an attempt 
to ‘Islamise’ the programme echoed in Tariq Ramadan’s (2009) critique of entertainment 
artists. Even though Ramadan encourages creativity among youth, he also criticises 
cultural producers including Muslim music artists for only trying to ‘Islamise’ songs and 
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lyrics through the insertion of Qur’anic terms or Islamic concepts ‘to give the impression 
that the work or product has been Islamised’. As he argues, ‘Such an attitude reveals a 
deep lack of self-confidence in the forms of culture and art [including music] in general’ 
(Ramadan, 2009, p. 205). As an Ulama (‘scholar of context’) and a moderate Muslim with 
his cultural experience as a European Muslim, he understands the Western environment 
in which Muslims live, i.e., that Muslims ought to live their lives in the West and 
integrate with their cultures without compromising their faith and Islamic values. Such act 
is useful for Muslim artists and musicians (ibid.). From the perspective of a moderate 
Muslim like Ramadan, religious entertainment fusion is allowed as long as it does not 
discourage Muslims from practising their faith. His criticism also suggests that he finds 
some aspects of entertainment problematic because it lacks ‘confidence’ in traditional 
Islamic forms. 
Balanced between Religion and Light Entertainment 
For workers at Living the Life, a good television programme contains a thread of a religious 
message running through light entertainment segments. Amar, another assistant producer 
of Living the Life, claimed that good television should include elements of entertainment 
because Muslims in this country enjoying very microscopic in the way of Islamic 
entertainment:  
Muslims need to see some entertainment on TV especially with Islamic 
element in it because the other forms of entertainment in this country are 
all un-Islamic entertainment […] (Interview, 19 June 2013). 
In contrast to the previous understanding of good television in which religion 
becomes a marker for quality programming, Amar emphasised the importance of 
balancing religion with entertainment on religious television. His opinion is in line with 
the form of moderate Islam proposed by Tariq Ramadan (2009) on how Muslims ought to 
live their lives as Western or European Muslims without compromising their religious 
identities.  
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The need for ‘Islamic’ entertainment is crucial to Muslim society residing in the 
West (Ramadan, 2009).45 Amar felt that the Islam Channel produced not only good 
programmes but also good ‘Islamic’ programming with light entertainment. Combined 
elements of entertainment and educational values will be meaningful and makes good 
television programmes. As Amar asserted:  
Education and light entertainment is another trait of good television. 
These two (education and entertainment), whenever they are on any TV 
programme, such programme can be considered as successful […], 
(Interview, 19 June 2013). 
While Amar found that education and entertainment as a combined set defined 
good television programming, Jahd, the producer of current affairs programmes believes 
that Living the Life is a good programme because it interacts with its audience:  
I think it is a good programme as to some extent it is interactive. This is 
relevant to the audience. It keeps them entertained […], (Interview, 20 
June 2013). 
Jahd considered the interactive element in the ‘Story of the Day’ segment as a good 
way of engaging with the audience. He also asserted that good television programming 
also offers ‘fun and the light-hearted with religious elements’. His understanding is in line 
with what Aswad, the producer aimed for: ‘an entertainment magazine talk show that has 
an Islamic thread running through it’ (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
Shadi, one of the presenters on Living the Life, thought that the programme is a good 
magazine talk show because it is unique and different from other types of programmes 
shown on other Muslim television stations:  
Living the Life is a good programme. It is something new on the channel. It 
is something fresh. It is different from other programmes. There is no 
other Muslim channel doing something like it […] (Interview, 20 June 
2013). 
                                                   
45 Ramadan addresses the apparent lack of creativity amongst Muslims in the west in creating an 
Islamic form of entertainment. He condemns the imitation of western music and 
entertainment. He summons Muslims ‘not to neglect the psychology that should underpin 
art and entertainment in the Islamic philosophy of life, not in order to isolate oneself or to 
forbid everything but, on the contrary, to commit oneself - to develop a critical mind, to 
make choices, to contribute, to renew, and always not to imitate the past or the present' 
Ramadan, T. 2009. Radical reform : Islamic ethics and liberation. New York: Oxford 
University Press. p. 222-223.      
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‘Islamic’, ‘balanced’, ‘entertaining’, ‘interactive’, ‘fun’, ‘unique and fresh’ are on 
the list of characteristics of ‘a good television programme’ of its genre according to the 
production staff. Despite such features, the production quality of Living the Life remains 
weak. There is an essential element of a good television talk show that has been missing in 
my interviews with the production staff regarding Living the Life: emotion. As a television 
genre, the talk show is a site for emotional responses. Emotion is what makes talk shows 
“good” television. According to Grindstaff: 
Producers encourage guests to exaggerate their emotions or prioritise the 
most sensational aspects of their stories. To do so in the name, not of 
deception but of producing ‘good’ television (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 247) 
As with the Living the Life production, the producer often encouraged the presenters 
not to show emotional responses or try to bring out emotion from guests. For example, a 
guest (Ms Haneefa) representing HHUGS in Episode 144 of Living the Life, wanted to 
demonstrate greater emotion in her explanation concerning the families that suffered from 
anti-terrorist legislation. Unfortunately, due to ‘the culture of caution’ of the presenter 
Rima and the poor management of uncertainty and sociability factors of the producer, Ms 
Haneefa failed to express her emotion. In contrast, Grindstaff’s study shows that good 
television is ‘produced’ by the guests who come on the show. She describes how the 
guests on a talk show could make good television by showing emotion:  
From the guests’ part; they know what to do to create emotions. Not 
because the producers asked them to, but because they know what 
constitutes good television within the parameter of the genre, and are 
eager to prove their ‘performative competence’ (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 
247) 
The failure to incorporate emotions into Living the Life made it less entertaining and 
meaningful. This problem may link to the poor execution of genre conventions of the 
producer and the lack of anchoring skills among presenters. A combination of producer’s 
poor creative decisions, the presenters’ lack of journalistic skills and a lack of sensitivity to 
television requirements have impacted the quality of the produced text. Emotional 
responses could make the Living the Life more interesting and meaningful to audiences; it 
matters when making a “good” talk show because, according to Grindstaff, ‘all good talk 
show is built around moments of dramatic revelation’ (ibid., p. 249).  
Grindstaff’s study shows that ‘emotion’ in daytime talk show is treated as a 
commodity that bears commercial imperatives for the network television. Although 
- 190 - 
emotion may add commercial value to daytime talk shows, it does not mean that it makes 
‘good’ television for viewers. I contend that talk shows that have been ‘built around 
moments of dramatic revelation’ are merely “good” for the channels or networks that 
broadcast them because these talk shows that are packed with emotional display help 
increase viewer ratings. I agree with Dovey’s argument (2000) that a “popular” talk show 
does not necessarily mean “good” for viewers. Instead, he suggests that “good” and 
“popular” are the terms given by television networks to sell talk shows to advertisers to 
gain profits from advertising revenue.  
As for a magazine talk show, emotion might not be its key ingredient, but it can 
make good television not in a commercial sense, but regarding meaning that it gives to 
audiences. This notion reflected in one researcher’s critique that Living the Life lacked 
meaning and that it is not a good magazine talk show (Interview, 14 June 2013). As a 
member of the production community and also as a viewer, I agree with such critique. I 
argue that poor execution of the genre conventions and management of ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘sociability’ factors  (Bruun, 2001) contributed to the failure to convey religious messages 
or meanings to its viewers, subsequently, impacted its production quality. Besides, several 
positive comments on Living the Life as a “good” television programme may be biased as 
people in professional roles made them at the channel.  
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
In Chapter 4 I mapped the research design that includes four phases of analysis to 
conceptualise the production culture of religious television. Up till now, I have discussed 
two of these stages, which include the sociocultural environment in which British Muslims 
live and work (Chapter 2), and the institutional mission (Chapter 5). This chapter 
presents the third and fourth phases, which include the analysis of the production quality 
of the magazine talk show, Living the Life, and how the staff involved perceives its quality. 
Furthermore, this chapter also discovers three fundamental problems that affected the 
production quality of Living the Life. These include: 1) a lack of resources, 2) a problem 
related to the mission of the channel, and 3) conflicting notions of what constitutes good 
television.  
Despite its unique business strategy deployed under the banner of the Da’wah 
Project, the resources issue remains prominent. The channel could not afford to employ 
skilled and experienced creative personnel and presenters to produce a magazine talk 
- 191 - 
show or provide professional training for its existing television production staff. Next is 
the ideological clash within the Islam Channel between moderate Islam and Salafi 
fundamentalism. Whereas the channel and the CEO’s mission aimed to convey moderate 
Islam, the programming department’s Salafi fundamentalism tended to control the 
production of Living the Life, which resulted in the limited creative autonomy of the 
production staff involved. The ideological clash also impacted on representational issues, 
creating constraints in particular for the producer and his assistants as well as the 
researchers. These include constraints in presenting: 1) religious elements, 2) musicians 
and performances and 3) women on Living the Life.  
This chapter also suggests that the environment of the Islam Channel 
practices/encourages a ‘culture of caution’. Such caution is traceable throughout the 
institutional hierarchy of the Islam Channel. For example, the CEO, the staff in a 
managerial position, and those involved in the production of Living the Life, are subject to 
the ‘culture of caution’. It can be concluded that the internal and external factors shape 
the production culture of the Islam Channel by which the genre conventions and 
production routines of television talk show are not fully met with negative implications 
for programme quality of the magazine talk show, Living the Life. While this chapter aims 
to conceptualise the production culture of the Islam Channel, the next chapter analyses 
the implications of the production culture on the working life of the television production 
community at Living the Life. 
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Chapter 7 
Experiencing the Production Culture of the Islam Channel 
This chapter analyses the experience of workers involved in the production of Living the 
Life. It emphasises key aspects relevant to work in television production in four sections: 
7.1 exploitation, 7.2 self-exploitation, 7.3 creative autonomy, and 7.4 emotional well-
being. While Section 7.1 demonstrates how resources constraints resulted in the channel’s 
exploitation of religion as a motivational tool to encourage hard work among the Living the 
Life production community, Section 7.2 discusses how creative and technical staff 
acknowledged such strategic, religious motivation and demonstrated how self-exploitation 
affected the workers’ physical wellbeing. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 address the implications of 
‘the culture of caution’ and ideological constraints for the creative autonomy of television 
production staff, subsequently, affected their emotional well-being. The focus throughout 
is on the quality of working life of those involved in the production of Living the Life.  
Before moving on to these empirical sections, this chapter begins with an overview 
on how the Islam Channel managed the employment of its television production workers 
through flexibility employment techniques. Such techniques are not only a cost-saving 
strategy but also used to encourage multi-skilling and multi-functionality in workers. 
In the previous chapter, I indicated that the channel’s primary source of income is 
advertising. It has come up with strategies to boost advertising revenue such as the Da’wah 
Card Scheme, which specifically aims at Muslim business owners, and the online/on-air 
sponsorship packages that aim to attract non-profit organisations and businesses owners 
who do not enrol with the Da’wah Card scheme. These sales tactics demonstrate the Islam 
Channel strategy to increase advertising revenue to survive financially in the broadcasting 
business.   
Aside from securing advertising revenue, the channel has also adopted ‘flexibility 
employment techniques’ to stay profitable in the broadcasting business. It hires ‘flexible 
workers’ who are multi-skilled and who can perform many different functions. Flexibility 
matters to the Islam Channel because it reduces production costs by hiring young 
workforce entrants who are willing to cope with fast-paced production schedules such as 
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those of Living the Life. Flexible television workers have the capacity ‘to contribute to 
productivity and hence to profitability’ of the organisation (Ursell, 2006, p. 136).  
‘Flexibility’ is a management technique introduced by John Atkinson (1984). This 
technique is used by modern employers to maximise business efficiency. In his model of a 
‘flexible firm’, Atkinson suggested three types of employment techniques for securing 
greater flexibility from workers: 
1) ‘Numeral/temporal flexibility’: the number of people employed and the number 
of hours work is varied according to the needs of employers. 
2) ‘Functional flexibility’: the types and range of tasks undertaken by any one worker 
are numerous.  
3) ‘Pay flexibility’: workers’ earnings should be open to recurrent negotiation, often 
on an individual-by-individual and/or project-by-project basis (cited in Ursell, 
2006, p. 136). 
 
These types of flexibility techniques have become common in the UK film and 
broadcasting industries in recent decades (Ursell, 1998, p. 131). The principal form of 
flexibility among core television workers is multi-skilling (ibid.). In her study of 
employees in UK television industries, Gillian Ursell has revealed that the producer-
broadcaster companies which adopted flexibility techniques tended to employ very small 
production teams (around five people), all of whom were multi-skilled and multi-
functional (ibid., p. 143). Such flexibility also exists within the Islam Channel. Of 
Atkinson’s (1984) three types of flexibility, the Islam Channel adopted ‘functional 
flexibility’ and ‘pay flexibility’ techniques for managing its short-term contract 
employees. Considering the short-term nature of TV contracts and the extent of 
freelancing overall, numeral flexibility seems to be at least as important in the context of 
the Islam Channel. 
Flexible workers in the production of Living the Life are required to be multi-skilled 
and multi-functional. Workers with such capacities help the channel to operate within its 
limited resources. To ensure the ‘live’ broadcast of Living the Life runs smoothly four days 
a week (Monday to Thursday), the Islam Channel adopted flexibility techniques for 
managing the employment of workers in television production. There are two types of 
employment, characterised as paid and unpaid labour, in the television production of the 
Islam Channel. Under these two types of employment, there are two categories of 
workers: creative and technical employees. Both paid and unpaid workers are affected by 
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flexibility techniques. Creative work such as scriptwriting, researching and directing, is 
part of the tasks expected from a producer and an assistant producer. Technical tasks like 
lighting and camera operations, floor managing, visual editing and sound engineering are 
expected from a single worker whom the channel called ‘a multi-skilled operator’. The 
following table illustrates the division of labour and distribution of tasks for workers at the 
Islam Channel: 














Technical multi-skilled operator camera operation, lighting 
control, visual editing, sound 
control, floor-managing 
Unpaid Creative researcher/intern Scriptwriting, researching for 
guests 
 
As seen in Table 8, workers under the employment flexibility scheme in the 
production of Living the Life are expected to carry out multiple tasks. Paid television 
workers are bound by a work contract, which describes their job titles and 
responsibilities. The condition of unpaid labourers, however, is different. Although they 
sign a contractual agreement that defines their right to be on the business premises as a 
member of the production team, their titles and responsibilities remain unspecified. A 
title such as ‘intern’ or ‘researcher’ might appear to indicate less responsibility when 
compared to paid television workers. However, under flexibility guidelines, they are 
treated as a part of the workforce, exempted only from remuneration.  
The management perceived flexibility to be positive, benefitting both employees 
and employers alike. The human resource manager described the channel’s expected 
results from such technique as follows: 
Because of the nature of our business, one person has to carry out quite a 
few jobs. This is good for them as the staff learns a lot quicker. Their skills 
in managing a few tasks are enhanced. After three months they have 
learned various skills which generally could take them over a year to learn 
elsewhere. So, it is really good as he or she can learn much stuff within a 
short period. Most people, when they first started working here, their 
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skills were limited. However, after a few months or a year, their skills are 
enhanced […], (Human resource manager, Interview, 19 June 2013). 
The human resource manager viewed flexibility as a way to equip workers with 
various skills. Allowing employees to carry out different tasks was seen as an excellent 
opportunity for them to learn and enhance their performance. This is what the Islam 
Channel expected from the flexibility technique. Indeed, this method benefits the channel 
as it may reduce costs associated with hiring skilled professionals and allows the channel to 
operate with a minimum number of permanent workers. The flexibility employment 
technique seems to be beneficial to the channel. However, what does it mean to 
employees in the production of Living the Life? How does flexibility impact the quality of 
their working lives?  
Gillian Ursell’s research into the commercial television industry in the UK indicates 
that the flexibility technique adopted by television production companies offers a variety 
of results depending on types of (a) programming, (b) production companies, (c) 
audiences, (d) production teams, and (e) technologies employed (Ursell, 1998, p. 144). 
She concludes that young, multi-skilled, multi-functional and digitally competent 
television workers will be increasingly employed because they are cheaper television 
labour than highly skilled and experienced employees in the business. Nevertheless, there 
is a risk in multi-skilling and multi-functionality because it can compromise the 
production quality. I have illustrated in the previous chapter some examples of the poor 
quality of Living the Life output. Such output is partly the result of flexibility techniques 
adopted by the Islam Channel (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3).   
Concerning the Islam Channel, flexibility seems to have reduced the production 
costs that prevented the management from hiring more workers to do both creative and 
technical work. It may have given the management a positive outcome, but both paid and 
unpaid labourers endure various unpleasant working conditions. I divided the analyses of 
Living the Life production crew experience of working under the pressure of resource 
constraints into two categories: Section 7.1 experience of exploitation and Section 7.2 
self-exploitation.    
In the production of Living the Life, I found two implications of flexibility 
employment techniques for workers’ working lives: first, workers experienced working 
longer hours than contractually stipulated and with a very small group. The second 
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implication for workers is self-exploitation, resulting from financial constraints of the 
channel and the multi-skilling and multi-functionality that employees felt obliged to 
accept for employment. Television workers tended to overwork and to some extent 
experienced burn-out in their pursuit to ensure the success of the ‘live’ broadcast of each 
episode of the programme. I will discuss these two implications in turn in the sections that 
follow. 
7.1 Exploitation  
The term ‘exploitation’ is often used about ‘the relations between people or groups of 
people in which one group or individual is structurally in a position enabling them to take 
advantage of others’ (Himmelweit, 2006, p. 227). Within the context of my research, 
television workers were in a position that allowed the channel to exploit them. This 
section explores the channel’s exploitation of a group of employees involved in the 
production of Living the Life. It identifies the channel’s strategy of using religion as a 
motivational tool. With this strategy, the management of the channel motivates its 
workers in television production to work hard and follow the production rituals. This 
section asks the following questions:  
1) How the management of the channel imposed its religious strategy on the 
workforce? 
2) How employees in the production of Living the Life perceived this strategy? 
3) What are the implications of religious strategy on working life?   
 
To stay in the broadcasting business despite limited financial resources, the Islam 
Channel adopts a flexible employment technique that allows it to hire a group of creative 
and technical personnel. While the producer and his assistants were paid employees in the 
production hierarchy, the researchers or interns were not given remuneration (although 
they assumed positions equivalent to assistant producer). Multi-skilled operators were 
included in a pool of technical labour within the production hierarchy of the Islam 
Channel. Various technical tasks in television production, from props and studio settings 
to sound engineering and visual editing, became the areas of ‘expertise’ of this group of 
multi-skilled operators.  
Studies show that flexibility techniques may lead to exploitation: a common 
experience for workers in television (Ursell, 2000; Banks, 2007). Similarly, my study not 
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only addresses such concerns but also reveals how the management of the channel has 
strategically used the religious mission to motivate the workers in television production to 
work hard. With so many tasks to be completed daily and with the limited number of 
workers employed, the Islam Channel always reminded both paid and unpaid production 
workers to treat their jobs as a mission that God wants them to carry out individually and 
collectively. Iqbal, the programming manager made the following statement during an 
interview which also contains advice similar to that delivered in a speech he gave earlier in 
the departmental meeting on the 4th of March, 2013:      
My philosophy and just kind of...as I was saying yesterday to the staff...of 
course, we make no bones about it. We are Muslims. We believe in 
Allah, in the Prophet Muhammad in Islam, so we are not going to hide 
[that] we wear our religion on our heart [sic]. So, that is why it is called 
the Islam Channel. The name Islam Channel holds a great responsibility 
for us who are working here to make sure that we are representing Islam 
fairly out there. So it is important. That is why when I talk to the staff...I 
said, ‘Look, there are nearly 1.8 billion Muslims, and from those 1.8 
billion Muslims, there are 3 million Muslims in this country. Moreover, 
from these 3 million Muslims, we are 30 to 50 people whom Allah has 
chosen to do this work. So, don’t just take it as work, it is also a mission 
for these people’. I am trying to encourage them that this is good for their 
akhirah (hereafter)...they earn rewards for it […] that is why I am trying 
to push them hard because I know...you know...Islam, to achieve 
goodness in Islam is not easy. Because if you want the highest level, and 
you want to go to a good place, going to heaven. You need to work hard 
to get there [...], (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
Iqbal’s statement above explicitly indicates the use of religious mission to encourage 
employees to work hard. The channel hoped that workers would convince that they were 
among ‘the chosen ones’ to do their jobs and carry out its religious mission. Religion, in 
this context, is used as a motivational tool to encourage workers to work hard and 
tolerate low salaries for the sake of ‘deferred rewards’ in the afterlife.  
As programming manager, Iqbal often helped production workers to be responsible 
for their tasks because that was a part of their religious duties.  
You are going to be sitting there inside your grave. Oh! That may sound a 
bit bad. You will be wondering where does that ‘light’ come from? 
Moreover, the angel will say to you: ‘that light is of the good things that 
you did at Islam Channel. So many people have benefitted from it’. For 
me, that is how I always see our work at this channel […], (Interview, 20 
June 2013). 
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The ‘light’ mentioned by the programming manager was a reference to the good 
work that he expected from the production workers at the Islam Channel. A good job was 
then translated into good religious programming from which viewers could benefit. 
Hence, hard work and responsibility are perceived to be two forms of religious 
commitment which the channel expected from its television production employees. 
Encouraging employees to work long hours can be a kind of exploitation. On one 
occasion, Iqbal gave an example of another group of employees who voluntarily worked 
long hours. He praised their willingness and commitment towards the channel:  
People like X and Y stay up late nearly every day. Why? Because they care 
about this company, expect everyone to care about this company. We 
may forget about the contract, our responsibility, but we must care about 
Islam and the Muslims [...], (Manager’s Briefing, 4 March 2013).  
Not only the above quote is a form of encouragement from the channel, but also 
indicates the way in which the channel aims to promote the religious notion of ‘work as a 
mission’ to its employees, pointing out that serving the company is equalled with serving 
Islam. The management used a religious idea of work to exploit workers in television 
production for the benefit of the organisation. Non-economic factors, such as ideas and 
ideologies, are the key aspects of Max Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ thesis (Weber, 1930). 
While Weber agrees with Marx’s capitalism thesis, which claims that ‘capitalist firms seek 
out cheaper sources of labour’, he also argues that non-economic factors, such as a 
religious notion of work, also shape the economic life of society (Giddens and Sutton, 
2013, p. 92). In Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber discusses the religious 
outlook towards economic life in early forms of Protestantism in which he notes that 
believers saw success in business as a sign of ‘divine favour’, not regarding profits (ibid. p. 
253). Whereas early Protestantism used the notion of ‘divine favour’ to encourage 
believers to work hard without thinking of the profits, Islam Channel exploited the 
concept of ‘work as mission’ to foster production staff to work hard by serving Islam and 
Muslims. By treating their work as such, they would gain rewards from God in the 
hereafter (see Manager’s Briefing, 4 March 2013). The Islam Channel’s idea of success as a 
‘divine favour’ was expressed by the manager in his briefing on 4 March 2013. In my 
conversation with the manager in June 2013, he further highlighted the importance of 
striving and competing as way to serve Allah and Islam as well as for the success of the 
Islam Channel: 
- 199 - 
Allah and Islam tell you to strive and to compete. Moreover, that is what I 
believe we are doing. We want to be better than the next Muslim 
channel. We want to be better than the non-Muslim channels, quality-
wise and everything-wise; we must continue to strive for success […], 
(Interview, 20 June 2013). 
The emphasis on God and serving the religion became a standard motivational pitch 
that echoed throughout the halls of the Islam Channel rather than driving the workers to 
excellence by giving them better remuneration or job positions. In other words, the 
channel management did not promise these workers job promotions or monetary 
rewards, but rather encouraged them to work hard, tolerated long working hours and 
low-wage to secure the channel’s success and suggested that God would reward them for 
their hard work and sense of responsibility. These ethnographic accounts are clear 
indicators of exploitation. Exploitation here not only refers to no pay but also to the way 
in which the management expected workers to accept long hours of work and tolerate 
low salary for the sake of deferred reward in the afterlife, and how exploitation disguised 
religious mission. The next section explains how workers accept the religious mission 
argument and do not feel that low/no wage and long hours are exploitation as their 
reward is a religious one. 
7.1.1 Perceptions on the Notion of ‘Work as a Mission' 
In the previous section, I have underscored the way in which the management of the Islam 
Channel motivates employees, exploiting the notion of ‘work as a mission’. Ultimately, if 
workers accept such discourse, this encourages self-exploitation. The actual exploitation is 
that employees do not get paid or paid a low-wage. This section is about whether or not 
they perceived it (the lack of remuneration) as exploitation and how they understood the 
notion of ‘work as a mission’.  
Maryam the assistant producer of Living the Life took her job very seriously, to the 
extent she felt responsible for the work that she had done at the channel, hoping that God 
would reward her for doing good work and not punish her for doing bad work:  
I really want what I am doing for the channel to come ‘for me’ on the Day 
of Judgement rather than ‘get me’...so I am trying to be careful of that 
[…],’ (Interview, 14 June 2013). 
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Her expression corresponds with the programming manager’s reminder about the 
analogy of ‘light’ for the good work done for the channel. Thus, she succumbed to the 
strong notion of ‘work as a religious duty’ imposed by the channel’s management.  
Another example is Sara, the assistant manager of programming. Sara felt 
encouraged by the channel’s approach to promoting hard work among its employees in 
television production. She used to work for Channel 4 before joining the Islam Channel 
and had been with the channel for six years at the time of my fieldwork. She convinced 
that the channel offered her a chance to do good work. She firmly believed that such good 
work meant serving her religion by producing good programming for the Muslim Ummah 
(community): 
I want to work for my deen (religion) and my dunya (world/livelihood). 
As for my religion, I work for Islam and helping people gain accurate 
perceptions of it, helping Muslims come back to their faith. That is why 
the Prophet (peace be upon him) wants all of us to continue the da’wah 
(proselytization). That is the obligation. So I think it is best to do so 
through the media. When the Islam Channel came around, it made sense 
that I joined here. I get to do what I love which is filming, scripting and 
producing. I studied in this worldly knowledge (referring to television 
production) and what I am doing is my religion. It is a unique situation 
that I do not find on Channel 4 or anywhere else […], (Interview, 17 June 
2013).   
The Islam Channel encouraged the workers to feel as if it was a ‘home’ for 
employees to perform sacrificial labour, to work in the name of their religion, aiming for 
‘deferred rewards’ (e.g., going to heaven). Employees in television production like Sara 
were persuaded by the religious notion of hard work stated in the above briefing by the 
programming manager. She accepted the difficulties of working in television production as 
she focused on serving her religion and the channel’s mission to convey Islam to non-
Muslims, to educate Muslims and to represent the voice of the voiceless and oppressed 
Muslims locally and globally. Sara also remained unfazed by long working hours as she 
committed her life to accomplishing the channel’s mission. Sara told me that although 
Channel 4 had offered her good salary and experience, she felt that her work at the Islam 
Channel is very rewarding as she saw what she work as a form of religious duty: for Islam 
and the Ummah. 
Huda, a producer who used to work with the Living the Life crew in 2012 (before I 
conducted my fieldwork), expressed similar views. She felt that Islam Channel provided 
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an environment that encouraged her to learn and practising Islam while making television 
programmes.  
I feel blessed that I am a part of it (Islam Channel). I am getting paid and at 
the same time learn about my religion. You are encouraged to make 
Islamic programmes. That is like amazing for me! How would I be getting 
paid elsewhere to learn my religion or to make even a programme? 
(Interview, 22 June 2013).  
Encouraged by the notion of work as a mission, Huda felt that the channel offers a 
working life that she thought she would never experience at other media organisation. 
The low wage paid by the channel is an indicator of exploitation. However, the 
channel managed to obscure such an exploitative act and encouraged workers to accept 
low remuneration. Amar, another assistant producer of Living the Life also shared similar 
views to the extent that he claimed he ignored the low-salary. He dedicated his work to 
religion. Focusing on doing ‘good work’, he admitted the following:  
Payment can be improved; at the moment, I am just considering doing my 
best for the channel and the audience without looking at the payment 
(Interview, 19 June 2013). 
Amar tolerated low salary, determined that he will get the raise as long as he 
focuses on doing his best for the channel and audience. Money is not the prime motivation 
in this sense because he believed that God would reward him for doing good work at the 
channel. Maryam, another assistant producer, felt the same. Money is not everything that 
she was after in her life. Maryam tolerated low salary and perceived her work as a form of 
da’wah (proselytization) or ‘the calling’ of non-Muslims to accept Islam, and to further 
educate Muslims via the programmes she produced (Interview, 14 June 2013). 
7.1.2 Implications of Religious Strategy for Working Life 
Religion as a motivational tool to promote hard work and responsibility among employees 
in television production was evident at the Islam Channel. The workers in television 
production accepted the idea of ‘work as a mission’ imposed by the management of the 
channel. They felt that the channel provided them with a conducive environment that 
encourages them to work hard, feeling responsible for their work, tolerating long 
working hours and low salary for the sake of ‘the deferred reward’ (heaven). Surprisingly, 
there was no indication of workers disagreement with such notion. Although there were a 
few complaints (among multi-skilled operators) on matching the amount of salary with 
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the amount of work done as well as on the length of breaks they had throughout the day, 
majority employees involved in the production of Living the Life ultimately agreed with the 
notion of ‘work as a mission’. They believed that their efforts would be rewarded in 
better form than monetary form.  
Like these television production workers, I am also a Muslim, who agrees with the 
notion of ‘work as a mission’. Muslims believe in that Allah will reward them heaven in 
the afterlife for their good deeds. The description of reward or heaven is based on the 
Quran Surah Al Baqarah, verse 25: 
Give glad tidings to those who believe and work righteousness, that their portion is 
Gardens, beneath which rivers flow, every time they are fed with fruits therefrom, 
they say: ‘Why, is this what we were fed with before,’ for they are given things in 
similitude; and they have therein companions pure and holy; 46 and they abide 
therein forever (Translated by Yusuf Ali, 2011, p.22). 
Concerning another Qur’anic verse, Muslims believe that Allah rewards them (add 
even more) and provides for them in this world based on the best of their deeds. 
According to Surah Al-Nur, Verse 38: 
That Allah may reward them according to the best of their deeds, and add even 
more for them out of His Grace; for Allah doth provides for those whom He will, 
without measure (ibid., p. 878). 
In the context of this research, I disagree with the religious strategy of the channel, 
which frequently use such notions as ‘work as a mission’ and ‘deferred reward’ to 
encourage hard work among workers in television production. This strategy not only 
resulted in employees condoning their exploitative positions but also encouraging them to 
self-exploit.  
While this section addresses how workers accepted the religious idea imposed by 
the management of the channel, the next sections offer experiences of employees involved 
in Living the Life production. It addresses both religious and non-religious motivations for 
self-exploitation among these workers.  
                                                   
46 What can be more delightful than a Garden where you observe from a picturesque heights a 
beautiful landscape around you – river flowing with crystal water and fruit trees of which 
the choicest fruit is before you. The fruit of goodness, similar, but choicer in every degree 
of ascent. You think it is the same, but it is because of your past experiences and 
associations of memory. Cited in Yusuf Ali, A. 2011. The meaning of the Holy Qur'an. 11 ed. 
Maryland, USA: Amana Publications.p. 22. 
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7.2  Self-exploitation 
It is a common experience in the television industry for workers to self-exploit. The 
motivations behind self-exploitation vary among individual workers. Mark Banks (2007, 
p. 60) addressed the issue of self-exploitation among cultural workers. His study revealed 
‘the charms and allure of cultural work, the desire to be artistic, autonomous, creative 
and self-directed’ are among the motivations that keep workers self-exploiting. Gillian 
Ursell’s research (2000) into the UK television industry notes that employees felt that 
television production is ‘a source of potential rewards, both material and existential, and a 
source of definite exploitation’ (p. 819). Similarly, the production culture of the Islam 
Channel involved self-exploitation resulting from the multi-skilling and multi-
functionality that the channel expected from television production workers. This section 
aims to cover a wide-range of experience of self-exploitation among creative and 
technical, paid and unpaid workers in the Living the Life production. It analyses the ways in 
which these production staff perceived their tasks and the extent to which they self-
exploited themselves.   
My analysis concerning self-exploitation among workers of the Living the Life 
production is from the perspective of paid and unpaid television labour who engaged in 
creative and technical work. I have drawn the experience of self-exploitation from three 
key personnel within the television production hierarchy. These are (a) the producer and 
his assistants who represent the creative workers, (b) the multi-skilled operator who 
represents the technical employees and (c) the researcher/intern who represents unpaid 
television labour. I have chosen to analyse the people in these roles because they are 
essential workers in the Living the Life production. They are vulnerable to self-exploitation 
because the channel relies on their commitment and group performance to ensure the 
broadcast of the programme. 
7.2.1 The Experience of the Producer and His Assistants  
As the producer of Living the Life, Aswad’s self-exploitation was driven equally by 
‘excitement’ and ‘the buzz’ of making the ‘live’ magazine talk show. Aside from 
attempting to meet the channel’s expectations and adapt to its constraints, Aswad 
expressed his excitement of executing the magazine talk show genre as follows: 
Islam Channel is quite young, still growing. Seven years old may seem a 
lot, but it is not really. The channel is still young, still evolving. I think 
this is a natural process, but I am sure in a few years it will have floor 
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managers and senior producers. However, until that time comes, we have 
to adapt and learn how to play all these roles (e.g., floor-managing and 
directing, etc.). However, I think this is good for me personally because I 
learn more skills. For example, I research for the guest, speak with them 
on the phone, meet them in person and brief them before the show going 
on-air. You know that in an established broadcast company, there is 
someone else who’s doing the research, meet and greet the guests when 
they arrive at the channel. In fact, there is a team that just does that. 
However, again, we do not have that here. So, I have to adapt. It is 
enjoyment. I like running around like a headless chicken sometimes 
because that is ‘the buzz’, the buzz of the show! (Interview, 20 June 
2013).   
Angela McRobbie’s (1998; 2002) in-depth study of a group of young fashion 
designers in London revealed that these workers self-exploited for the love of their art. 
Aswad’s case supports McRobbie’s claims about the ‘love’ for one’s work leading to self-
exploitation. The satisfaction he experienced upon completion of the daily production 
routine bonded him to his work. The ‘rush in getting the show done every evening’ is the 
kind of satisfaction that encouraged him to self-exploit. Despite realising that he had 
overworked, carrying out multiple tasks from the morning clock-in until the end of the 
‘live’ transmission of Living the Life at night, he was vulnerable to self-exploitation because 
of the excitement or ‘the buzz’ in executing the talk show genre conventions.   
Aswad perceived the pressure caused by the lack of staff resources in television 
production (which eventually led to multi-skilling and multi-functionality) as a ‘buzz’ or 
excitement that are an expression of the ‘love’ towards his work and the genre 
conventions of the magazine talk showed that he assembled. His endurance of such 
pressure indicates self-exploitation.  
The genre conventions of Living the Life were also another factor that drove Aswad 
to endure the challenges of the multi-skilling and multi-functionality introduced by the 
channel. Aswad expressed his fondness for the genre as follows: 
I will not swap it for any other show. It is a different style. I enjoy 
producing it unless my senior said to me, ‘OK, enough is enough’. For 
me, it is either I got sacked or I want to do something else […], 
(Interview, 20 June 2013).  
The above account indicates how Aswad, as the producer, tended to self-exploit 
because he enjoyed working under pressure against the daily deadline. Moreover, Aswad 
also acknowledged that the genre conventions of the magazine talk show (such as, 
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searching for guests, creating the ‘Story of the Day’ and producing the programme ‘live’) 
left him with a sense of thrill and excitement. Aswad’s experience of executing the genre 
conventions of a magazine talk show echoes Whitefoot’s (2014) account in which she was 
excited by the genre conventions of the magazine talk show. She described the excitement 
of ‘testing the ground ahead of the show, discovering which questions will prompt a sit-
up-and-listen response from the guests and which questions will trigger tumbleweed in 
the process of preparing interview questions for The One Show celebrity guests’.47 
Whitefoot’s description of the excitement of engaging with the genre conventions is 
somewhat similar to that of Aswad’s expression of the ‘buzz’ in putting together the genre 
conventions of Living the Life.   
Whitefoot and Aswad may have shared the similar excitement in executing the 
genre conventions of magazine talk shows, but Aswad’s experience highlights his 
vulnerability to self-exploitation. This evidence is drawn from his experience in 
performing multiple tasks and functions to ensure such routines as engaging with guest 
research, scriptwriting, floor managing and directing the ‘live’ broadcast of Living the Life. 
The nature of his self-exploitation was partly motivated by material reward (working for a 
salary), but, most of the time, it was driven by the thrill and excitement resulting from 
the pressure of preparing a ‘live’ magazine talk show with a very limited number of skilled 
professionals and within a limited time frame.  
Sharing similar excitement for the genre is Zain, another assistant producer. 
Although Zain was responsible for the VTs, he also engaged in other tasks, e.g., sound 
mixing and camera operation during the live broadcast. Like Aswad (and Whitefoot in her 
account), it is the genre conventions of the programme that lured him, leading him to 
self-exploitation. As he asserted:  
The good thing about Living The Life is I do not get bored with it even 
though it is four days a week show. I do not get bored with it because 
there are different people every day. Different people from different 
walks of life, different ideas, and different things to share are the best 
thing about making this show […] (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
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Because he loved doing his job, I observed him missing lunch several times. 
Although responsible for producing the VTs, he voluntarily helped the researchers and 
played such roles as a sound engineer and camera operator. He also stayed back after 
office hours with the production team until the programme ended. The genre conventions 
kept him excited and motivated to produce the programme, leading him to follow in the 
producer’s footsteps to self-exploit.     
Unlike the self-exploitation demonstrated by producers like Aswad and Zain, his 
assistant, who were mainly driven by enthusiasm about the genre conventions, Amar, 
another assistant producer, exhibited a different form of motivation for self-exploitation. 
His commitment to the daily production routines and endurance of long working hours 
were for his religion. He saw his job as a mission that he wanted to accomplish to go to 
heaven in the afterlife:  
For me, what motivates me is the reward from Allah. I want to achieve a 
reward from God. So, for me, even like working long hours or over the 
weekend, I know that overall, the outcome will be better, beneficial and 
bringing me to heaven in sha Allah, (by God’s Will), [...] (Interview, 19 
June 2013). 
The above statement reflects the notion of work as a mission encouraged by the 
channel’s management, which I addressed in Section 7.1. The ‘deferred reward’ used by 
the channel as a motivational tool inspired him to self-exploit, tolerating long working 
hours and agreeing to work at weekends.  
Maryam, the assistant producer of Living the Life, took her job seriously. Aside from 
being motivated by the religious reward and fear of God’s punishment, her motive for 
self-exploitation was to prove her responsibility and show her pride and professionalism in 
her work: 
I am going to work this many hour to demonstrate that there are a pride 
and professionalism in my work. It is like whatever you do you want it to 
be good...your name is attached to it, that sort of thing […] (Interview, 
14 June 2013). 
The sense of responsibility like Maryam and Amar, who worked for the promise of 
‘deferred rewards’ which encouraged them to self-exploit. The notion of ‘work as a 
mission’ imposed by the channel’s management on television production workers has 
encouraged these assistant producers to self-exploit. They were strongly motivated by the 
‘deferred reward’ for doing good work and by the fear of God’s punishment if they failed.  
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Unlike Maryam and Amar who were actively encouraged by the ‘deferred rewards’, 
the self-exploitation of the producer Aswad, and Zain, his assistant, on the other hand, 
was highly motivated by their love of the genre conventions; the excitement or ‘the buzz’ 
of making the magazine talk show. The thrill and excitement of creating and putting 
together the necessary genre conventions are the factors that allowed them to endure the 
hardships and survive the multi-skilling and multi-functionality expected by the channel. 
Although they acknowledged that Islam encourages hard work, the notion of ‘work as a 
mission’ was not the main reason for their self-exploitation. Rather their excitement of 
making the magazine talk show was their key motivation to self-exploit (Interview, 20 
June 2013). Despite such differences in motivation and experience between the producer 
and his assistants, they were all vulnerable to self-exploitation.   
7.2.2 The Experience of Multi-skilled Operators 
A multi-skilled operator is a person responsible for the ‘live’ broadcast of Living the Life. 
The Islam Channel created the position as a measure to deal with the lack of resources. 
Multi-skilling and multi-functionality of workers are the goals of the flexibility 
employment technique that the channel adopted. The production of Living the Life relied 
solely upon this group of flexible technical workers who possessed core competencies in 
camera work, lighting and sound engineering. There were four multi-skilled operators 
perform multiple functions in each filming session of the programme. Once they 
completed their outdoor filming, which often started as early as 6:00 AM, multi-skilled 
operators would return to the Islam Channel studio to perform their tasks in the Living the 
Life production around 4:00 PM. After their late lunch, they started arranging the set of 
Living the Life, which was previously disassembled and used for another programme 
production. As soon as they arrived at the channel, they immediately set up the 
backdrops, arranged the props and organised the sofa sets for the show. Next, they 
adjusted the lighting in the studio, worked the cameras, set up the teleprompter, 
inspected the sound system and sealed the wiring on the floor. Once the guest arrived, 
they fixed the microphone within the limited time available before the programme went 
on air, ensuring that all the microphones were functioning. Once the programme went 
‘live’, two multi-skilled operators were responsible for the camera work. The other two 
sat in the control room; a sound engineer and a visual editor. The producer, meanwhile, 
had two hats: film director and teleprompter operator. These are the tasks that the 
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channel demands from the multi-skilled operators who work on the Living the Life 
production.  
Unlike the producer who enjoyed ‘the buzz’ of making a ‘live’ magazine talk show, 
the multi-skilled operators chose to self-exploit because this employment is their only 
source of income. This condition may be a common motivation with most technical 
workers in television production. The experience of a multi-skilled operator can be 
assessed from the perspectives of junior and senior multi-skilled operators. These two 
groups of technical workers in television production offer distinct forms of motivations 
for self-exploitation.  
Salem, a junior multi-skilled operator who worked for the Islam Channel for less 
than two months, expressed his love of the daily production routine. He accepted the 
working conditions and agreed that frenetic activity was the nature of the work. Because 
this was his first permanent contract (he was previously a freelance camera operator for 
five years), he accepted the variety of tasks given to him and viewed them as opportunities 
to learn different camera techniques. He commented: 
Living the Life is a fascinating show. I get a chance to sort of experiment 
with camera movement and kind of doing fancy shots where most of the 
programmes on this channel are static and very conventional, like a single-
camera production […] Inasmuch as we get really creative shots and do 
some cool stuff and nice focuses, camera movements and drop shots 
which are among camera work that I never did before, which is fantastic 
[…], (Interview, 20 June 2013).    
The potential for self-exploitation among junior workers was quite high because of 
the responsibility that the channel placed on their shoulders (e.g., the lighting, sound 
system, camera operation and visual editing). Having their names appear in the credits of 
Living the Life added more pressure to the multiple tasks and functions that the channel 
expected from them as the ‘product’ of their hard work became visible to the audience. 
Omar, another junior worker, asserted:  
Once you do the show and it goes out ‘live’, it was like, oh fantastic! 
Moreover, you got camera credit for it. Also fantastic! You know what I 
mean? So, like to get the camera credit...that sort of thing. It is great but 
it is double responsibility. If you did it badly, your name still goes up in 
the end […], (Interview, 20 June 2013).  
The desire for recognition in the form of name credit as well as the thrill of being 
involved in a ‘live’ programme, has motivated Omar to work hard, prove himself worthy 
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of carrying out multiple tasks and fulfil the channel’s expectations. Omar was optimistic 
about his job, never felt under pressure because, according to him, he was flexible and 
knew his role, adapting to the organisational culture of the channel.  
Ayden, the senior technical worker, self-exploited to the extent that his work-life 
balance was affected and his basic needs suppressed (such as lack of time for a lunch 
break), which could impact his health. A senior multi-skilled operator, Ayden complained 
about the limited time that he had for a proper lunch.  
Ten minutes means a lot to me...I really need the ten minutes...I do not 
really have a chance to eat or drink […], (Fieldnotes, 22 March 2013).  
Kamal, another senior multi-skilled operator, felt that the flexibility employment 
technique adopted by the channel affected his life to the extent that he felt burn-out. As 
Kamal claimed: 
I have been feeling a lot of burn-out especially when it is low staff. 
Because sometimes when it is low staff, quality mistakes happen. Then it 
becomes low quality and then we become demoralised […], (Interview, 
12 June, 2013). 
Despite the burn-out and distress experienced by the senior technical workers 
because of working understaffed, they continued to self-exploit, ensuring that the 
production of the programme went as planned, on time and according to the schedule. A 
sense of responsibility drove these junior and senior multi-skilled operators to self-
exploit, ignore the hardships and endure multiple tasks. Certainly, the primary motivation 
for both the junior and senior multi-skilled operators was to earn a living but they were 
also self-exploiting. The junior multi-skilled operators saw self-exploitation in a positive 
light. In contrast, the senior multi-skilled operators saw it as negative, impacting their 
work-life balance although they continued self-exploiting.  
Despite these differences in the motive for self-exploitation, the job title ‘multi-
skilled operator’ is self-explanatory; it suggests the multiple tasks and multi-functionality 
manifested in workers’ employment contract as well as the reality of their working lives. I 
have pointed out in Chapter 6 in my textual analysis of Living the Life that the lack of skills 
in television production, e.g., camera work, has affected the production quality of its 
output. In this section, I have demonstrated that the flexibility employment techniques 
(which include multiskilling and multi-functionality) adopted by the channel have shaped 
the production quality. Self-exploitation among these workers may not necessarily lead to 
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the poor output of the magazine talk show. Rather, it is its consequences (e.g., burn-out) 
that do. Their experience of overwork and burnout has impacted the produced text. They 
failed to deliver a good magazine talk show. This finding agrees with Hesmondhalgh and 
Baker’s (2011) claim that a poor quality text was a result of poor working conditions.  
7.2.3 The Experience of Researcher/Intern 
In television production, researchers or interns occupy a lower rank within the Islam 
Channel labour hierarchy because they are unpaid workers. Researchers are mostly ‘hired’ 
by the channel through an internship programme that is made available for school-leavers 
or unemployed college graduates. Personally, I signed a contractual internship agreement 
before the channel allowed me to take part in any production work.  
My position, stated in the letter of an offer received from the channel, was that of a 
‘researcher’ and ‘assistant producer’ for the Living the Life production. There were two 
other researchers on the team: one was an intern who was unemployed and the other was 
a paid staff member from the Da’wah Project, who was helping the production team find 
guests two days a week. The producer assigned us tasks such as researching guests and 
conducting pre-interviews via telephone. Most communication was done via email or 
telephone calls. Once the guests agreed to be on the programme, the researcher would 
issue an e-letter invitation. This letter was just a formality, a gesture that indicated the 
channel had offered the guest ‘a spot’ on the sofa of the Living the Life set as one of the 
selected guests of the day for a ‘live’ magazine talk show.  
Shortly after that, a full-time researcher would conduct a pre-interview to obtain 
the ‘back story’ and discover interesting information that the presenter could talk about 
during the on-air conversation with the guest. Once the guests arrived at the studio on the 
pre-booked date, the researcher’s tasks included greeting the guests with chat and tea and 
biscuits.  
Further, the researcher had to make sure that the guests were comfortably seated in 
the waiting area on the second floor (the sales and marketing office), keep them calm and 
looking forward to the show. If the guest came for a cooking demonstration or product 
promotion, the researcher had to ready the utensils, set up a table for food preparation, 
remove labels from bottles or containers to avoid inadvertent product placement, etc.  
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All of the above researcher tasks are ordinary television production routine. The One 
Show, for instance, features guests’ musical performances, studio activities involving props 
and special arrangements inside and/or outside the studio. Most of these activities are 
meticulously prepared at least three days in advance by a group of up to twenty people 
whose tasks are delegated by the executive producer. In contrast, two researchers on the 
Living the Life production had to suffice to carry out multiple tasks that were only vaguely 
outlined in their volunteer agreements. Also, researchers on The One Show are paid 
creative workers whereas on Living the Life researchers worked for free.  
The Islam Channel took advantage of the flexibility employment technique to 
include researchers within the production hierarchy to assign them to creative roles, 
making their positions on a par with the assistant producers. The only difference was that 
a researcher was not paid while the assistant producer was a salaried employee within the 
production hierarchy. This suggests a significant level of inequality especially when the 
unpaid staff like researcher more experience in television work than the paid employees. 
Not only were the researchers at the channel free labour, but they also tended to self-
exploit.   
Laura Grindstaff’s ethnographic work (2002) offers an insight into the talk show 
production process. Following in Grindstaff’s footsteps, I was also a researcher for a talk 
show. As a curious doctoral candidate who enrolled in an internship programme at the 
Islam Channel, I saw this opportunity as a way to observe and participate in the 
production of Living the Life. My prime motivation for self-exploitation was to gather 
‘inside’ information, get to know the people involved and understand how the 
programme was produced. The information obtained at the channel has allowed me to 
complete this thesis and obtain the Ph.D., which is also a form of ‘deferred reward’. I 
persuaded the Islam Channel to accept me, showing how the production team could 
benefit from my curiosity, my past television production experience and my interest in 
the television production process. I am indebted to the Islam Channel for allowing me 
access to observe and be part of the crew. Without access to the channel’s inner workings, 
I could not have completed my thesis.   
Researching the Islam Channel was a long-term goal. Watching its programming 
(e.g., a lifestyle magazine show City Sisters) from my home country Malaysia kept me 
wondering, asking such questions as why the channel produced the programme, how they 
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managed it, who were the people involved in the process and what shaped the production 
quality of the programmes. Hence, I was grateful to the channel for allowing me access. I 
would make every effort not to disappoint its production community and contribute to 
the production work.  
To conclude, my analyses concerning self-exploitation among workers of the Living 
the Life production is from the perspectives of paid and unpaid television labour who 
engaged in creative and technical work. I have drawn the experience of self-exploitation 
from three key personnel within the television production hierarchy. These are (a) the 
producer and his assistants who represent the creative workers, (b) the multi-skilled 
operator who represents the technical employees and (c) the researcher/intern who 
represents unpaid television labour. I have observed self-exploitation the Islam Channel 
and various motivations for it. These motives linked to the religious nature of the channel 
and the particular work role. 
Motivations were different between creative and technical workers. Creative 
workers like Living the Life producer Aswad and his assistant Zain; motivation resulted 
from the love of their work and enthusiasm for the programme genre. Other assistant 
producers like Amar and Maryam self-exploited for the ‘deferred reward’ in the afterlife, 
believing that God would reward them for their hard work and responsibility.  
The distinct motivations for self-exploitation were also observed among junior and 
senior multi-skilled operators, which can be summarised as follows:  
First, junior multi-skilled operators perceived themselves as new to the 
employment and needing to learn all the skills that the channel expected from them, 
focusing on the results of their performances. Multi-skilling and multi-functionality were 
seen as opportunities to learn. This reflected the channel’s goal of hiring a group of 
‘flexible’ workers and allowed the human resource manager to argue that flexibility 
employment encourages workers to learn many skills, a situation which is ‘good for them 
(workers)’ (human resource manager, interview, 19 June 2013). In contrast, the senior 
multi-skilled operators felt that multi-skilling and multi-functionality could compromise 
quality, especially when the channel did not provide them with proper professional 
training in camera operations and other technical skills.  
Second, driven by their fondness for the genre, the junior multi-skilled operators 
gained satisfaction from what they perceived to be ‘getting a pat on the back’ and the 
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name credit/recognition when producing the programme kept the junior multi-skilled 
operators pushing themselves. The junior multi-skilled operators tended to self-exploit to 
prove to the employer their ability to execute various tasks. They hoped that their efforts 
would be valued. Because they acknowledged the financial constraints of the channel, they 
tended to ignore the material/monetary rewards. They preferred to focus on results, on 
doing a good job, driving themselves to the limit, ensuring each episode was successfully 
broadcast as scheduled and ignoring issues such as understaffing or doing multiple tasks on 
a daily basis. Senior multi-skilled operators, on the other hand, measured their 
employment against income, feeling that they should earn larger salaries for their self-
exploitation (multi-skilled operator 1, interview, 19 June 2013). Neil Percival and David 
Hesmondhalgh’s (2014) study suggest that junior television workers show more positive 
responses towards non-financial benefits in comparison to senior workers (p. 10). The 
junior multi-skilled operators at the Islam Channel have also shown positive responses and 
willingness to work hard for the sake of learning, gaining work experience and securing 
employment at the channel. Percival and Hesmondhalgh’s study also indicates that it is 
common amongst new entrants of the television industry to be motivated by such 
opportunities as networking and employment prospects during internships (ibid.).  
As a researcher and an ‘unpaid’ creative worker, the exploitative conditions of 
which I was in have also made me vulnerable to self-exploitation. The only difference 
between my self-exploitation and those of paid creative and technical workers was that I 
was driven by a desire to learn about the channel, the excitement in producing a magazine 
talk show and in collecting data for this thesis. The channel’s research tasks, the 
enjoyment of getting the ‘yes’ from a guest, the thrill of being on the set alongside the 
producer to take part in a ‘live’ broadcast of the magazine talk show encouraged me to 
self-exploit. Certainly, monetary compensation was not my motivation because I was only 
eligible for up to ten pounds for lunch and travel claims without salary or overtime claims. 
I was in exceptional position for self-exploitation compared to the rest of the interns and 
creative television workers. Aside from the rare opportunity of working with television 
production abroad, self-exploitation was driven by the goal to get a Ph.D. Self-
exploitation was sufficiently motivated not by my desire to avoid disappointing the 
individual who helped me gain access to the channel, but rather, ultimately, to gather data 
for my Ph.D. research project.  
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7.3  Creative Autonomy 
For a human, to be autonomous means ‘to be one’s own person, to be directed by 
considerations, desires and conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed 
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic 
self’ (Chrisman 2009, cited in Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, p. 40). Drawing on 
ethnographic data, I argue that the culture of caution to some degree impacted on the 
creative autonomy of the Living the Life producer and researchers. This section emphasises 
the difficulties faced by workers in these two categories in making creative decisions on a 
day-to-day basis. 
Research into television production suggests that creative autonomy often clashes 
with commercial forces, e.g., advertising and programme ratings (Ursell, 1998; 2000; 
Lee, 2008; Zoellner, 2010). As broadcasters are up against their competitors, they are 
constantly looking for new programme ideas to secure high ratings to attract advertisers 
and sponsors. By contrast, the production culture of the Islam Channel indicated a 
different form of commercial imperatives for its programming. The channel’s 
management expressed their concern about the revenue secured from the sponsorships 
and Da’wah Card scheme just to maintain the channel’s operation and its ability to produce 
programmes. The producer, by contrast, aimed to create a high-quality magazine talk 
show free from commercial pressure. Section 6.5.1 demonstrates how the commercial 
interests of the CEO and the sales department resulted in a poor quality output of the 
programme. I showed how the channel’s business expectation to some degree constrained 
the producer’s creative autonomy. It is the implications of ideological constraint on 
creative autonomy and quality of working life that I intend to analyse here. Hence, this 
section examines the creative autonomy of the producer and researchers. It focuses on 
constraints in making Living the Life a ‘good magazine talk show’: an informative, 
educational and entertaining television programme.  
My analysis of the producer and researchers/interns’ struggles and lack of creative 
autonomy in the production of Living the Life is drawn from two phases: ‘the development 
stage’ or pre-production and ‘the show day’. The development stage involved such 
routines as researching, selecting and pre-interviewing guests and the treatment of VT and 
the ‘Story of the Day’ segment. The second phase is ‘the show day’, a term which I 
borrow from Rebecca Whitefoot’s (2014) article about her experience as a researcher for 
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the magazine talk show, The One Show on BBC1. I use the term ‘show day’ as a reference 
to the day when Living the Life episode was due for its ‘live’ broadcast. Production routines 
on show day involved editorial meetings, script-writing and guest briefings. I will map the 
experience of the producer and researcher according to these phases to identify how ‘the 
culture of caution’ constrained their creative autonomy and, subsequently, affected the 
quality of their working lives.   
I do not intend to dismiss the experience of other workers. However, rather, I 
chose the producer over the presenters because he is autonomous and among the top 
creative roles in the production hierarchy and because they will experience potentially 
greater interference with their work than the technical operators as they are dealing 
primarily with choices regarding the content of the show. 
 Unlike Livingstone and Lunt (1994) and Grindstaff’s (2002) studies, which detail 
the presenters’ involvement in the development of television talk shows, the presenters of 
Living the Life production did not take part in such process. Therefore, I aim to explore the 
experience of creative autonomy of the producer and researchers.  
Although a researcher is less autonomous compared to the producer, in the process 
of developing a magazine talk show such as Living the Life a researcher plays a crucial role. 
Grindstaff’s (2002) experience as a researcher/intern of talk shows indicates that the 
researcher is a key staffer in the production process. Whitefoot’s (2014) experience as a 
The One Show researcher further confirms the importance of researcher roles in the 
production of a magazine talk show. Her job as a researcher involved searching for 
interesting story items/guests, developing ideas from current sociopolitical situations in 
the UK, verifying sources and checking against secondary sources to ensure the presenter 
statements are factually correct. For these reasons, I chose to analyse the experience of 
creative autonomy of the producer and researchers (including my involvement) in the 
production of Living the Life.    
The concept of autonomy is relevant to my research because it helps identify the 
quality of working life of creative workers. I noted in Section 7.2 that the producer was 
vulnerable to self-exploitation because he was excited about the genre of the programme. 
He overworked and tolerated the multi-skilling and multi-functionality imposed by the 
channel management because he felt that despite this, he still had a significant degree of 
autonomy. My argument in this section is that his perceived autonomous experience was 
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limited. These limitations resulted from the culture of caution within the Islam Channel. 
Hence, the concept of autonomy is central to my thesis because it allows me to explore 
the experience of ‘limited’ creative autonomy under the light of ‘the culture of caution’. 
So, what does limited creative autonomy mean for the producer and the researchers? 
At the development stage, I observed that the producer is to some degree free to 
explore diverse areas to make a ‘good’ magazine talk show. Problems arose when guests 
were perceived to be ‘controversial’ by the programming manager. The filtering process 
was discussed by the programming manager as follows: 
We do not leave anyone opportunity to discredit us. Because all eyes are 
on us, we must ask ourselves: ‘who are the guests that we invite? Have we 
done our check-and-balance? […]’ (Fieldnotes, 4 March 2013). 
The above statement signifies ‘the culture of caution’ that spread within the Islam 
Channel. I mentioned in Chapter 6 that Iqbal (the manager) was cautious about who the 
producer or the research team (including the assistant producers) invited to Living the Life 
since the guests are supposed to represent the Islam Channel’s image or views. Such rules 
applied especially/not only to guests who were religious personalities. Moreover, the 
channel also aimed not to offend its conservative audience when presenting certain forms 
of musical performance, nasheed artists or females as guests. With ‘the culture of caution’, 
the pre-production stage has turned into a distressing experience for the creative team 
instead of an experience that could stimulate their creativity and allow them to make 
Living the Life more entertaining. This culture of great caution has reduced the creative 
autonomy of the producer and researchers. It not only resulted in a bad production quality 
but also affected their working satisfaction.   
I argue that the producer and researchers’ limited creative autonomy resulted from 
the conflict between their desire to make a good magazine talk show and the various 
interests within the channel (addressed in Section 6.5). For instance, clashes between 
CEO’s moderate view and the programming’s Salafi fundamentalists as well as the 
business expectations of the sales department were all determinants that shaped the 
producer and researchers’ creative autonomy. As the producer of Living the Life, Aswad 
often struggled to create something that he thought might be suitable for a magazine talk 
show. For example, the producer perceived a nasheed artist singing and strumming his 
guitar would make Living the Life entertaining, a good magazine talk show segment. 
However, such understanding contradicted the Salafis in the programming department, 
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i.e., they felt that such a performance would not be by their doctrinal understanding and, 
subsequently, offensive to conservative viewers. For that reason, any form of performance 
involving guitar or stringed instruments had to be avoided on Living the Life.  
Like Banks (2007), Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011) also argue that a lack 
of/limited autonomy in creative work is a characteristic of poor working conditions. At 
Living the Life, since its production is largely based on researchers’ skills in developing 
interesting ideas or stories for the programmes, the lack of creative autonomy is also a sign 
of limitation in their working lives. For instance, as a researcher, I looked for a unique and 
inspiring story for the programme. I managed to book a teenaged girl who was trained by 
the Fulham Football Club. I thought it would be interesting for Living the Life to feature a 
young talent like her. Unfortunately, my idea of having her on the show was rejected as a 
result of the culture of caution. As I proposed the story item to Aswad, his response was 
as follows: 
It is woman football so we cannot bring her. As far as I know, women 
football players practising with men; they do not separate the practice 
session. So, there is no segregation between men and women. If we cover 
a male player, that is different; that's fine. We cannot cover a story about 
a female football player. The outfit is another thing, although a Muslim, 
she must be wearing shorts, so we cannot show that on TV [...]. 
(Fieldnotes, 11 April 2013). 
Aswad feared that the video clips portraying a woman football player wearing a pair 
of shorts might be offensive to the conservative viewers of the Islam Channel. For that 
reason, Aswad asked me to call off her invitation. It was difficult for me to tell her that she 
was not a suitable guest for Living the Life after expressing my interest in her story less than 
an hour before. I planned how to deal with such an awkward situation. I was 
contemplating either telling her that I had overbooked the guests for that week or 
revealing the truth (about what I had discussed with the producer). If I were to give her a 
fake excuse, it would be against my principles. Finally, I decided to pick up the telephone 
and speak to her. I told her the truth and the reason for cancellation. Although I could 
sense a slight disappointment in her voice, she said that she respected the decision and 
thanked me for being honest.  
The experience of limited autonomy in making a good magazine talk show had 
negatively affected my working life. Limited creative autonomy has not only affected the 
production quality of Living the Life outlined in Chapter 6 but also impacted my 
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experiences negatively as a creative worker both concerning autonomy (discussed here) 
and concerning my emotional well-being (mentioned in Section 7.4). Such effect may be 
explained by examining two situations: 1) the process of negotiating with the producer 
about the story item and 2) the process of dealing with the teenage girl’s emotions, which 
caused me some anxiety, confrontation and disappointment. My experience not only 
demonstrates the implications of ‘the culture of caution’ and the ideological constraints 
for creative autonomy, but also the impact on my emotional well-being. I will discuss the 
emotional well-being of production staff on Living the Life in detail in Section 7.4.  
The ‘show day’ also revealed similar challenges to the development stage of the 
Living the Life production. Tensions heightened on show day as the producer had to work 
against the deadlines, which included preparing the script for the presenters and 
formulating interview questions. The kind of questions created had to be ‘light’. Any form 
of doctrinal discussion had to be avoided at all cost. The producer carried out the process 
of constructing the set of questions for each invited guest. The researcher mostly handled 
the pre-interviews with guests. Then, from 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm, the producer sat with 
the researcher, discussing the ‘tone’ of the questions that the presenter would ask the 
guests. As a researcher, I was not free to create questions that might interest viewers. 
Although my experience approached The One Show researcher’s experience, which 
involved ‘trying to uncover funny/surprising/personal/moving/untold stories that they 
had not shared in an interview before’ (Whitefoot, 2014), I was not given a chance to 
draft questions on my own. The process was always led by Aswad, the producer. After 
conducting pre-interviews via telephone with the guests, I would give Aswad the ‘funny, 
surprising, personal, untold stories’ gained from such pre-interviews. Aswad would write 
down the interview questions while I was asked to observe him. He told me that I first 
needed to observe him constructing interview questions before I could do the task myself. 
I was embarrassed and felt mistrusted by Aswad. 
 I recall once working under Zain, the assistant producer, who took over for Aswad 
when he went on holiday. I was just two weeks at the channel at that time.  Zain asked me 
to write the interview questions and I was not required to observe Zain writing the 
questions; instead, he believed that I could work independently without his close 
supervision. When Aswad returned from vacation, he asked me to continue observing him 
create interview questions. I would understand if he required my ‘observation’ at the 
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beginning of the internship as that was a common practice of a creative manager to 
monitor subordinates, especially a new-comers. However, he never allowed me to write 
questions independently, which I thought very controlling and somewhat inefficient for a 
company with limited economic resources. I once asked him why this was so. Aswad told 
me that he wanted to ensure a balanced treatment of light entertainment and religious 
story items.  
The experience with ‘the culture of caution’ and a producer like Aswad can be 
illustrated on one occasion. When a Sufi poet cum nasheed artist from the US, Ahmad 
James was known as ‘Baraka Blue’, was invited on Living the Life (Fieldnotes, 23 April 
2013), Aswad joined me at my desk, asking me what information I had gathered from a 
telephone conversation with Ahmad James. During my observation of his ‘writing 
session’, he warned me to be careful; making sure that the interview questions did not 
cover Ahmad’s Sufi practices. Ahmad James is influenced by Rumi, whose Sufism thoughts 
and views of life are ‘somewhat complex’, according to Aswad.48 I was told not to lead 
the singer into such discussion; Aswad emphasised, ‘to avoid confusion amongst viewers 
upon such topic’. I could sense the caution in his voice, which explained that either he had 
tried to avoid writing questions that might lead to an in-depth discussion about Sufism 
(with Ahmad James) or offending (‘confusing’) the Islam Channel conservative audience. 
He may also have been trying to avoid conflict with the Salafi fundamentalism of the 
programming department. 
Whereas researchers are working on the Living the Life production experienced 
limited creative autonomy, The One Show’s researcher described her experience of ‘show 
day’ as intriguing as she gets to see her ‘craft product’ being broadcast as a result of her 
efforts in putting together interesting ideas for the previous few days. By contrast, in 
Living the Life production, the efforts to produce a good magazine talk show led to 
frustration and distress due to a lack of creative autonomy. As claimed by Akram, a 
researcher:    
                                                   
48 Sufism is the way of purifying the heart from bad manners and characteristics. Sufism is a path of 
spirituality that exists in Islam in which the meaning is: a) seeking the pleasure of Allah, b) 
love and peace with one’s self, c) harmony with all creation (mankind, animals, nature) and 
d) to be dressed with the beautiful attributes of prophets and saints. It is known that Salafi 
fundamentalism does not blend well with Sufism. Available from: 
http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/4-an-
explanation-of-islam-and-sufism.html 
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In the end, the tasks are often about trying to get a show made not trying 
to get a ‘good’ show made. So, if a good show happens, it happens. 
However, it is not really within our control…however, as much as we are 
as workers, it is not really in our hand. We can have some discretion 
about not inviting some guests on because we think they would not be 
interesting. At the end of the day, usually, I find the pressure to get the 
show done cancels out the much more interesting thing that can be 
happening such as interesting guests and in going deeper into the subject 
of discussion. Because personally, I think if the show is entertaining and 
also fulfilling, it would be hundred times better. If it is only entertaining, 
the viewers might end up losing time and opportunity to learn. I always 
put that in consideration. Perhaps that is something that is not being 
considered enough (by the channel) basically […], (Interview, 13 June 
2013). 
Views like this and my experience as a researcher for Living the Life indicate that the 
lack of creative autonomy, to a certain degree, not only affected the production quality of 
Living the Life, but also the working lives of those involved in its production. This section 
shows how ‘the culture of caution’ and ideological constraints limit the creative autonomy 
of the producer and researchers both during the pre-production stage and on show day. 
The Living, the Life creative team, felt distressed and distrusted while doing guest research as 
a result of this limited creative autonomy. The manager’s intervention amplified the 
degree of ‘the culture of caution’ to the extent that the producer felt that each guest 
needed to undergo some filtering process. The experience of production routines, such as 
writing interview questions, demonstrated the limited creative autonomy of the 
researchers. Whereas this section highlights the producer and researcher experience of 
limited creative autonomy resulting from ‘the culture of caution’ and ideological clash, 
the next section discusses the implications of such a limited creative autonomy on the 
emotional well-being of workers involved in the Living the Life production.  
7.4 Emotional Well-being 
Emotion is an ‘imprecise term for any affective psychological state, including happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, surprise and fear’ (Chandler and Munday, 2011, p.123). Earlier in 
this chapter, I argued that Living the Life production community became vulnerable to 
exploitation (Section 7.1) and self-exploitation (Section 7.2) because of resource 
constraints faced by the Islam Channel. I suggested that self-exploitation of creative and 
technical workers have, to some extent, affected their health and physical well-being, e.g. 
burn-out.  
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This thesis argues that the particular conditions and practices at the channel have 
poorly shaped the production quality of the magazine talk show and the quality of working 
life of those involved. In this section I make two arguments: 
1) ‘The culture of caution’ and ideological clash affected negatively on the 
emotional well-being of the creative and technical staff involved in the Living 
the Life production.  
2) The poor execution of the magazine talk show genre conventions affected the 
emotional well-being of the creative staff. 
Based on these positions, the following discussion seeks to identify the kinds of 
emotional responses amongst production team while to produce Living the Life episodes 
and the extent to which such responses impacted their emotional well-being. 
7.4.1 Emotional Implications of Ideological Constraints and the “Culture 
of Caution” 
‘The culture of caution’ has shaped the emotional well-being of the production 
community. Ideological constraints linked to, for example, the clash between religious 
views (e.g., moderate versus Salafi fundamentalism) or issues concerning gender 
segregation and female subjects have all affected worker emotions. The following example 
describes how ‘the culture of caution’ that guided the producer changed my emotional 
well-eing and that of the guest in question.  
It was almost an hour before the guest was scheduled to arrive at the studio (usually 
by 6:00 pm). The producer approached me, discreetly asking me to call Rayhan, a 17-year 
old nasheed artist whom I had only spoken to when conducting a pre-interview via 
telephone, and to ask whether he belonged to Hizb ut-Tahrir (http://www.hizb.org.uk/), 
a religious extremist group based in the UK. The producer gave me a memo from the 
programming manager with Rayhan’s phone number written on it. He said to me: “Nur, 
please call Rayhan and ask if he is affiliated with the group.  Don't speak to him in this 
office. Please go elsewhere, ask him privately, ok?”.  I took the memo from him and told 
him that I had once visited the Hizb ut-Tahrir booth while volunteering for the Islam 
Channel the Da’wah Project event the previous year. He replied: “that was different; now 
the group is controversial...we (Islam Channel) don’t want to be associated with such an 
extremist political group…”. I told him that I would call Rayhan. I left the office and tried 
to figure out how to begin the conversation with Rayhan. On the one hand, I was worried 
that Rayhan might withdraw from the show if I asked him such a question. On the other, I 
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might get in trouble if I did not make that phone call and later found out that he was a 
member of the extremist group. When Rayhan answered my phone call, he told me that 
he was on his way to the studio, which made me more nervous. I decided to ask him 
directly without beating around the bush. A part of our brief conversation went on like 
this: 
Nur: Rayhan, as a researcher, it is my job to check with our guests if they 
are members of any religious or political groups...I hope you do not mind 
if I ask you this...are you aware of the group called Hizb ut-Tahrir?  
Rayhan: Yes, I have heard about it.  
Nur: Are you currently a member of that group?  
Rayhan: (quickly answered) No…No…I am not the member of that 
group… (Fieldnotes, 10 April 2013). 
Despite such an awkward moment, I felt relief after knowing that he did not change 
his mind about being the guest on Living the Life. I tried to make him feel comfortable or 
perhaps forget about the question I had just asked. I thanked him for coming to the studio, 
reminded him of the time of the broadcast and the reason for his appearance on the show. 
‘The culture of caution’ had triggered anxiety: afraid on the one hand the guest might 
change his mind. This situation indicates the awkward social interaction and the potential 
confrontation with my emotional experience on the one hand, and its effects on the talk 
show and my professional experience on the other.  
Another example of the implications of ‘the culture of caution’ and ideological 
constraints on emotional well-being is related to female subjects and gender segregation: 
There was an occasion when a guest, the Salafi sheikh refused to join Rima, a female 
presenter, and other guests on the sofa during the live broadcast. This happened because 
of his rigid interpretation concerning female subjects and gender segregation. As soon as 
the programme ended, Rima told me how embarrassed she was when the sheikh refused to 
join her on the sofa: 
Nur, I am so ashamed...this is not the first time that a sheikh refused to sit 
on the sofa with other guests and me...This happened in the past...I feel 
so bad about it […] (Fieldnotes, 4 June 2013). 
Although Rima managed to suppress her emotions on-screen, she had to deal with 
her feelings off-screen after the show had finished. In the Living, the Life production, the 
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rigid interpretation of gender segregation demonstrated by the Salafi sheikh had, to some 
extent, affected the female presenter’s emotions. It is even worse for her as she had to 
deal with a repeated ‘incident’ that had impacted her emotional well-being. 
Another experience indicates the implication of ‘the culture of caution’ and 
ideological clash on emotion can be observed in the case of Ms Gomes. While Rima had to 
look pleasant on-screen and pretend that the sheikh’s reaction had not affected her 
emotionally, another male presenter had to deal with the guest’s (Ms Gomes) emotion. 
Ms Gomes has been told by the producer (after receiving a note from the programming 
manager) to cover her legs as she arrived at the studio wearing a short red dress. She 
seemed to be embarrassed but tried to keep herself calm. I addressed this issue in the 
previous chapter when the producer and multi-skilled operators (i.e., camera operator 
and visual editor) struggled to find good shots of Ms Gomes during the live broadcast of 
the programming (see Section 6.4.3 on my analysis of production quality). This 
experience affected the production quality of the programme. ‘The culture of caution’ 
relating to the female subject has negatively affected the quality of text and the emotions 
of television workers involved while trying to appear as normal before the audience.  
7.4.2 Implications of Genre Conventions on Emotion 
The talk show is a television genre that requires emotional displays. Grindstaff suggests 
that good television talk shows require emotional responses from presenters and guests 
(see Section 6.5.2). Emotional responses may create what Grindstaff calls ‘a moment of 
dramatic revelation’, a criterion of a good television talk show (Grindstaff, 2002, p. 249). 
There are two cases that demonstrate the culture of caution which highlighted the ways in 
which Rima, the female presenter, ‘avoided’ showing any form of emotional response 
toward the guests: first, an interview with the guest who represented HHUGS and 
second, an interview with Harry Fear, a pro-Palestinian independent journalist who 
reported on Gaza. 
 I discussed in Chapter 6 about the guest from HHUGS and how the female 
presenter tried to suppress emotional responses that the male co-presenter attempted to 
bring about during the interview. The female presenter sought to tone down the story 
mentioned by the guest. It was the story of the suffering of families whose breadwinners 
were detained under the anti-terrorism legislation. While the female presenter avoided 
showing her emotional response to protect the Islam Channel from accusations of 
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supporting terrorism, the male presenter tried to show his emotional response towards 
the families that suffered from such legislation. The tensions between the two were 
evident and affected the production quality of the magazine talk show.  
The second situation reveals the lack of emotional responses demonstrated on a 
segment featuring Harry Fear (Fieldnotes, 21 April 2013). The photographs and video 
clips provided by Mr Fear portrayed the suffering of the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the 
presenters concealed their feelings of empathy with the Palestinian Muslims during their 
conversation with Mr Fear, who emphasised the plight of Palestinians. Rather, their 
conversation was merely about Mr Fear’s experience in reporting the ‘live’ attack on 
Gaza, about his safety while filming and the camera technique used. They avoided 
displaying their emotion to create impartiality in the treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The Quilliam Foundation Report ‘Re-programming British Muslims’(Rajab, 
2010) and the Ofcom report (Ofcom, 2011) once ruled against the Islam Channel 
concerning its impartiality in the treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are 
among instances that indicate the implications of genre conventions on emotion.    
Dealing with the ‘dropouts’ or last-minute cancellations is the most frustrating 
aspect of the job; it gets worse if it happens just before taping, according to Grindstaff 
(2002, p. 108). Like Grindstaff, I was also frustrated with guest cancellations and it was 
worse if the request to cancel came from the producer or the top management. All I could 
do in such a situation was to control my emotions, not feeling too upset about it and keep 
smiling to show others that I was able to cope with such circumstances. When talking with 
me about a similar experience, Maryam, the assistant producer, shared similar frustration:  
Apparently I have gone through much work and tried hard. I have to go 
back to someone whom I booked a long time ago. Sometimes I have done 
it professionally; booked them for months or weeks and then I have to go 
back to them and tell them that we have to cancel…they cannot come on 
the show because of such and such reasons…I hate doing that!! 
(Interview, 14 June 2013). 
Whereas Maryam shared her experience in cancelling the invitation of guests, I 
observed Aswad the producer in distress when the CEO asked him to ‘include’ another 
guest on the programme. Such an order from ‘the top’ often cannot be resisted. For 
Aswad, to add another guest to an over-booked ‘show day’ might affect the genre 
conventions negatively. This particular CEO request meant that the producer had to 
create a revised script and another set of questions for the guest’s wife. When Aswad 
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explained to Mohammed Ali, the CEO, that the limited time slot precluded the addition 
of the woman and the nasheed artist to the show, he was reprimanded. Mohammed Ali 
requested that Aswad shortens the commercial break and invite the wife. Agreeing to the 
CEO’s demand, Aswad had no other choice but to make the arrangement. I observed how 
Aswad was embarrassed and disappointed with the CEO’s decision. After the live 
broadcast, Aswad told me that the ‘crowded sofa’ (because of an extra guest on Living the 
Life) had ‘ruined’ his show.   
It is important to find out how the workers manage their emotions. Aswad asserted 
that the keys to success of Living the Life as a magazine talk show included teamwork: 
The key is teamwork as it is not a work of just one person, not just two 
people…you need a team that won’t just show the same vision. He or she 
must prepare to be in a mental state: preparing to work on the daily 
show. That is not easy as much pressure involved. There is no time to 
mess about […] (Interview, 20 June 2013). 
The above statement suggests that teamwork is vital to magazine talk show 
production. Like any other talk show discussed by Grindstaff (2002), the experience of 
Living the Life production also requires strong emotional endurance amongst creative staff 
to handle the pressures of executing such genre conventions as researching for guests and 
finding new stories on a daily basis. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011, p. 177) suggest that 
workers in television production experience high levels of stress and anxiety in their 
efforts to maintain good working relations. The same applies with the Living the Life 
production in which the producer is required to manage his emotions on a daily basis. The 
anxiety and stress in getting the job done were not only bad for him, but also for others in 
the production team, e.g., assistant producers, researchers and multi-skilled operators. 
His and other production staff’s stress and anxiety can be mapped in such processes as the 
‘guest hunting’, dealing with dropouts, managing guests on show day and producing the 
live broadcasts of Living the Life. 
 In sum, poor execution of the magazine talk show genre conventions has affected 
the emotional well-being of the Living the Life production community. Although a few of 
the production staff expressed their excitement or ‘the buzz’ of making a magazine talk 
show (e.g., producer and his assistant), they also experienced mixed feelings. Anxiety, 
frustration, stress and disappointment were some emotional responses expressed by and 
observed amongst creative and technical staff. This confirms Grindstaff’s observation of 
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her experience and that of others in daytime talk show production as ‘variously exciting, 
tedious, stressful, frustrating, depressing, and rewarding’(Grindstaff, 2002, p. 37). 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker also observed that workers in a talent show production 
experienced ‘the anxieties of star-making’ by which they had to maintain certain degrees 
of emotional distance from the talent show participants (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011, 
p. 137). A similar state of anxiety may be observed among creative workers involved in 
the Living the Life production. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter argues that the working life of television production staff at the Islam 
Channel included exploitation, self-exploitation and limited creative autonomy, which 
affected their emotional well-being. The management exploitation of religious strategy 
such as the notions of ‘work as a mission’ to encourage efforts to obtain the ‘deferred 
rewards’ was approved by majority members of production community. The results of 
ethnographic data show distinct motivations for self-exploitation among creative and 
technical workers, paid and unpaid, and among junior and senior multi-skilled operators 
concerning their experiences of the genre conventions and production routines of Living 
the Life. Nonetheless, their motivations varied depending on job responsibilities and 
positions in the television production hierarchy. Results also show that creative autonomy 
of the producer and researcher was limited, constrained by the ideological clash and ‘the 
culture of caution’ within the channel. The ideological constraints, ‘the culture of caution’ 
and poor execution of genre conventions are factors that affect negatively emotional well-
being of members of production community of the Islam Channel. Table 9 summarises 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This research project set out to conceptualise the production culture of religious television 
by using the Islam Channel as a research site. The study of production culture of Islam-
based television is important as it may enhance our understanding of how religious 
television programming, and in particular Islamic television programming comes to take 
the form it does. Furthermore, it also supports our interpretation of the conditions under 
which television production employees produce television programmes. In this 
concluding chapter, I sum up the central findings by mapping the power dynamics that 
shape the production culture of religious television (Section 8.1). I also point out the 
contribution of this thesis to the television production studies (Section 8.2) and the 
recommendations for further work (Section 8.3). 
8.1  Summarising the Findings: Mapping the Power Dynamics  
This thesis affirms the concept of production culture, which emphasises ‘collective, daily 
cultural performance involving symbolic codes, [and] conventionalized power hierarchies’ 
within a television organisation (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). The results conclude that the 
power dynamics that are external and internal to television institution shaped the 
production culture of religious television. The power dynamics in the production culture 
of religious television verify by the research design (see Figure 1), which involved four 
layers of analysis. These include analyses of 1) the sociocultural environment in which the 
Islam Channel exists, 2) the institutional context, 3) the working life of members of 
television production community, and 4) the production quality of the magazine talk 
show, Living the Life. The following sub-sections deliberate these four layers of analysis. 
8.1.1 Discourse of the “Clash”  
At the first level of analysis, the thesis examined the sociocultural environment, by 
referring to problematic discourses of the ‘clash’ between the West and the Islamic 
culture. There are two separate views on the notion of such ‘clash’: the culturalist and the 
reformist. Culturalists upholding the Huntington (1993/1996) thesis implicitly regard 
Muslims as a threat to Western civilisation, and Islamic culture as incompatible with 
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Western culture (Kundnani, 2015, p. 65). Consequently, those upholding his argument 
suggest that Muslims should shed their religious identities to blend into Western society 
(ibid., p. 65). As the result of such clash, Islam and Muslims are misrepresented, 
misinterpreted, negatively perceived and politicised by the media, by those ignorant of 
Islamic cultures, and by the authorities and those in power. The Huntington thesis/ 
culturalists’ interpretation of this ‘clash’ has resulted in representations of Islam and 
Muslims in the media and therefore a conception of Muslims as ‘a suspect community’ 
(ibid.). These dynamics can be observed in the media representations of the events of 
September 11 and the 7/7 bombing of the London transportation system, after which 
Islam and Muslims received negative publicity in the press. These negative representations 
include the use of such terms such as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or ‘Islamic extremism’ 
(when referring to the religion). Other adverse words include ‘fundamentalist’, ‘radical 
Muslim’, ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ when referring to individuals or groups of Muslims 
(see Said, 1997; Poole, 2009; Knott et al., 2013). Over the years, the negative media 
representation of Islam has surged. A study by Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole and Teemu 
Taira (Knott et al., 2013, p. 80) discovered that references to Islam in selected British 
media grew significantly from 66 (in 1982) to 306 (in 2008), an increase of 400% within a 
16-year period. The same study also reported an increase in references to Islam as 
‘extremism’ (to 41), as well as 141 references to ‘militant action’ in 2009 (ibid., p. 81). 
Likewise, the study indicated a growing number of negative representations of Islam and 
Muslims in the media. The second effect of the Huntington thesis concerning the clash 
regards Muslims being cast as ‘a suspect community’. Arun Kundnani (2015, p. 63) 
argues that the ‘anti-extremism’ discourse in the media has particular implications for 
British Muslims; specifically, they have become ‘a suspect community’. State policing 
reflects the anxieties that the West bears toward the ‘other-ed’ Muslim communities and 
contributes to the surrounding suspicions. 
Another view on the clash between the West and Islamic culture derives from the 
reformists. Using Edward Said’s (2001) term ‘clash of ignorance’, Karim H. Karim and 
Mahmoud Eid (2014, p. 213) describe the apparent conflict between Muslims and the 
West. They portray those who view Islam as incompatible with western culture and as a 
threat to the modern civilisation as lacking knowledge and understanding of Islam. As a 
result, Islam and Muslims are misrepresented and become the victims of Islamophobia. 
Second, the ‘clash of ignorance’ concept also signifies Muslim communities who rely 
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heavily on literal scriptural interpretation (adherents to the scholars of texts) and refuse to 
integrate with western culture and society. Thus, the clash of ignorance concept also 
draws attention problems in Muslim communities.  
The media misrepresentation and the state suspicion of Islam and Muslims have also 
affected the Islam Channel. In response to these challenges, the channel declared its 
support for moderate Islam (Zarnosh, 2008). The first missionary goal of the channel ‘to 
convey a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims’ highlights the channel’s response to 
external challenges. It reflects on how the channel has deployed this missionary goal 
strategically to defend its reputation. Moreover, with such assertion, the channel also 
excluded itself from being ‘a suspect community’, a term that describes Muslims as 
victims of Islamophobia (Kundnani, 2015). The Islam Channel’s response to such clash 
between the West and the Islamic culture shaped the production rituals and the quality of 
programmes that it produced.   
The discourses on Islam and Muslims define the power dynamics that are external 
to the Islam Channel. From the production culture perspective, Caldwell does not focus 
on the clash between two different cultures. However, he examines power dynamics from 
the technological-industrial culture perspectives. He focuses on ‘how sexual identity and 
political economy animate the world of contemporary film/television production [and] 
how such factors inform and regulate the production community and its technical culture 
[...]’ (Caldwell, 2006, p. 124). In contrast, this thesis analysed how the sociocultural 
environment shaped the power dynamics in a religious television station.  
8.1.2 The Internal Tensions  
The second layer of analysis explores how the institutional mission of the channel 
contributes to tensions among its production community. The mission includes such goals 
as a) conveying a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims, b) educating Muslims and c) 
representing the voiceless and oppressed Muslims in the UK and abroad (see Chapter 5). 
Mapping problems in how the channel attempts to accomplish its mission helps to reveal 
power dynamics and tensions internal to the production culture. My analysis showed 
three forms of tensions within the channel: ideological, business and religiopolitical.   
Ideologically, there were tensions between moderate Islam and Salafi 
fundamentalist influences (see my account of the mission in Section 5.2). Ideological 
constraints at the management level took the form of a clash between the CEO’s 
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moderate form of Islam (stated in the first mission goal) and the programming 
department’s Salafi fundamentalism. On the one hand, Living the Life’s producer aims to 
promote social cohesion and such concepts as ‘halal and fun’ (Herding, 2013), and, on the 
other, the Salafi-dominated programming department aims to instill a ‘conservative’ 
religious identity amongst its young audience. These internal challenges faced by the Islam 
Channel have affected the production quality of the magazine talk show Living the Life. 
A second form of tension was found in the integrated da’wah/missionary agenda-
business model of the channel, the Da’wah Project. Through the Da’wah Project, the 
channel aims to spread a moderate form of Islam to non-Muslims while generating 
revenue through its business model (see Figure 4) that include the Da’wah Card scheme 
(see Table 4). The channel’s aspirations to spread Islam alongside supporting Muslim 
enterprises have affected the production quality of the magazine talk show, Living the Life. 
The channel did not exclusively serve its young and female audience (according to the 
mission to ‘educate Muslims’) because the attention swayed to its conservative 
fundamentalist viewers who happened to be amongst its business clients e.g., sponsors and 
advertisers. The missionary goal also shifted, as the channel increasingly worked not to 
offend these better-off conservatives. To do this, the management practised a control of 
production rituals of Living the Life to make sure that the guests and featured story items 
(VTs) were in compliance with the Salafi ideology of the programming department. Such 
control limited the creative autonomy of the producer, and subsequently affected the 
production quality of the programme.  
The third form of tension was found in the channel’s religiopolitical goals, to be the 
voice for the voiceless, and of the oppressed Ummah (global Muslims) and British Muslims. 
This solidarity agenda threatened the channel’s reputation. First, in declaring its solidarity 
with the Ummah, the channel risked appearing resistant towards the UK government’s 
foreign policy, particularly regarding the war in Iraq and the crises in the Middle East. 
Second, expressions of solidarity by the channel with particular Muslim individuals or 
groups might draw the attention of media regulators to the channel, e.g., ‘potential due 
impartiality issues’ in the reporting of these crises (see Ofcom, 2011 for details, pp. 5-
25). The channel risked an accusation of bias towards those guests and contributors 
associated with individuals or groups identified as upholding a particular religious ideology 
including Muslim charitable organisations or politically affiliated Muslim organisations 
- 232 - 
featured on Living the Life. Thus, the agenda of solidarity with oppressed Muslims served as 
a threat to the channel’s reputation, as it might attract attention from media regulators.  
The channel’s mission to represent the ‘voiceless and the oppressed’ amongst 
British Muslim communities includes supporting victims of Islamophobia (see the case of 
HHUGS on Episode 144, discussed in Chapter 6). Standing in solidarity with another 
Muslims is common especially given that television production workers engage in 
‘cultural expressions involving all symbolic processes and collective practices that other 
cultures use to gain and reinforce identity’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 2). Thus, the sense of 
belonging to a cultural and/or religious group was high, but the Muslim television 
workers I worked alongside were bound both by the institution that employed them and 
by their religion (Islam), which encourages cooperation (e.g., the concept of al-Ta’awun in 
the Qur’an). In this light, the solidarity agenda put the channel at risk of seeming to be 
allied with Muslim political organisations unsanctioned by the government (Rajab, 2010).  
This thesis builds on Noonan’s (2008) research on BBC’s Department of Religion 
and Ethics. Noonan indicated that producers worked for a broadcast institution such as the 
BBC see religious television as ‘a different sort of genre’ and believe that the resulting 
media products ‘cannot be considered neutral entities’ (2008, p. 10). Her study draws 
attention to how religion is a very sensitive subject in broadcast media and that this 
sometimes led to a sense of caution among production staff. One question that may be 
asked, based on my research is: Were the Living the Life production crew exercising the 
wrong kind of caution? Or too much caution? 
Noonan’s research indicates that despite being cautious, producers in the BBC’s 
Religion and Ethics Department, to some extent, are free to explore various religious and 
spiritual themes. By contrast, this thesis suggests that the form of caution exercised at the 
Islam Channel was more problematic, and that ‘the culture of caution’ within the Islam 
Channel, resulting from ideological constraints and managerial control, ultimately 
affected the production quality of Living the Life. 
8.1.3 Implications for Working Life  
The third layer of research design includes the analysis of the working life of television 
production community at the Islam Channel based on the four sociological approaches to 
studying creative labour. While the previous two sub-sections mapped the power 
dynamics inherent to the production culture of the channel by drawing on sociocultural 
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and institutional analyses, this section identifies the power dynamics according to these 
four aspects of television production labour. These approaches include investigation of 
such issues as 'exploitation' and 'self-exploitation' (Ursell, 2000; 2006; Banks; 2007), 
'creative autonomy' (Ursell, 1998; Lee, 2008; Zoellner, 2010; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 
2011) and 'emotional well-being' (Grindstaff, 2002; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011) in 
television production. 
This thesis shows that television workers were in a position that allowed the channel 
to exploit them. The forms of exploitation within the Islam Channel can be explained in 
terms of 1) the use of ‘flexible’ employment techniques; 2) the religious strategies that 
portrayed ‘work as a mission’.  
The ‘flexible’ employment technique adopted by the channel affected the quality of 
working life of those involved in the production. Working with limited resources, the 
producer, the assistant producers and the researchers, for example, had to perform tasks 
outside their job scope to ensure that Living the Life went on air daily at stipulated 
broadcast hours. The channel expectation that production workers would carry out 
multiple tasks affected their working lives.  
The channel’s religious strategy (the notion of ‘work as a mission’) was used as a 
motivational tool to encourage employees to work hard, tolerate low salaries and long 
working hours for a ‘deferred reward’ (in heaven) in the afterlife. The majority of 
employees especially amongst assistant producers accepted such a religious notion. The 
low wage paid by the channel is an indicator of exploitation. However, the channel 
managed to obscure such an exploitative act by using religion as a motivational tool to 
promote hard work and responsibility among television production staff. Like these 
Muslim television workers, I agree with the religious notion of ‘work as a mission’ and 
with the concept of ‘deferred reward’. However, this strategy not only resulted in 
workers accepting their positions, it also encouraged them to self-exploit.  
Production workers were vulnerable to self-exploitation in a number of ways. Paid 
creative television employees, such as the producer and his assistants, were susceptible to 
self-exploitation in their desire to meet expectations to produce a good magazine talk 
show. For example, the producer tended to self-exploit because of his love for the genre. 
He referred to the ‘buzz’ or excitement of producing the magazine talk show. 
Additionally, technical employees such as multi-skilled operators were prone to self-
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exploiting despite their positions as paid labourers. This occurred for various reasons. 
Some felt obliged to execute their tasks to match their work roles (multi-skilled 
operators). Others sought to meet the channel’s expectations of their ability to perform 
multiple functions (e.g., camera operator, sound engineer, and visual editor).  Others 
aimed for credit or recognition, such as getting their names on screen at the end of the 
programme or working hard for the ‘deferred reward’ from God in the afterlife (e.g., 
assistant producers). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, unpaid labourers, such as the researcher, 
were also vulnerable to exploitation and self-exploitation. My motive for self-exploitation 
however, included acquiring data for this research project and to get a Ph.D. The extent 
to which these workers self-exploited depended on the motivation of each staff member 
and how they perceived their responsibilities (see Table 9).  
 Furthermore, this thesis found that the producer and researcher had limited 
creative autonomy. The programming manager control over choice of guests and story 
items on Living the Life described limited creative freedom for the producer. At times, the 
producer was obliged to feature the channel’s potential clients and special guests, which 
indicated that top management undermined his creative decisions. The lack of creative 
autonomy, to some extent, affected the working lives of those involved in its production. 
‘The culture of caution’ and ideological constraints limited the creative autonomy of the 
producer and researchers. The Living the Life creative team felt distressed and distrusted 
while doing guest research as a result of this limited creative autonomy. The manager’s 
intervention signifies the degree to which ‘the culture of caution’ affected the creative 
autonomy of the producer as he felt that each guest needed to undergo some filtering 
process. The researchers’ experience of producer control over such production rituals as 
writing interview questions, demonstrated the limited creative autonomy of the 
researchers. This thesis confirms Banks (2007) and Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s (2011) 
argument that lack of/limited autonomy in creative work is a characteristic of poor 
working life. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011, p. 81) address the creative autonomy of 
creative labour and the ways in which struggles over autonomy ‘generate tensions and 
contradictions in cultural production’. 
Finally, concerning the emotional well-being of production workers, this thesis 
provides evidence for two claims. First, ‘the culture of caution’ and ideological clash 
negatively affected the emotional well-being of the creative and technical staff. These 
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effects can be mapped on several occasions: at the development phase, on ‘show day’ and 
during and after the live filming of Living the Life. For example, during the development 
phase, assistant producers and researchers had to deal with guest cancellations, which 
were often described by staff as frustrating and depressing. The ‘culture of caution’ 
relating to female subjects impacted the emotions of television workers while trying to 
appear as normal before the audience. A female presenter had to deal with her feelings 
off-screen after the show had finished because of the ideological clash. In the Living the Life 
production, the rigid interpretation of gender segregation demonstrated by the Salafi 
sheikh had, to some extent, affected the female presenter’s emotion. Even worse, she had 
to deal with a repeated ‘incident’ that affected her emotional well-being (see Section 
7.4.1). 
This thesis therefore confirms Grindstaff’s (2002) research which suggests that as a 
television genre, talk show requires strong emotional endurance amongst creative staff to 
handle the pressures of executing such genre conventions as researching for guests and 
finding new stories on a daily basis. Likewise, this thesis also affirms Hesmondhalgh and 
Baker’s (2011, p. 177) research, which suggests that workers in television production 
experience high levels of stress and anxiety. Living the Life production producer is required 
to manage his emotions on a daily basis. The anxiety and stress in getting the job done 
were not only bad for him, but also for others on the production team, e.g., assistant 
producers, researchers and multi-skilled operators. This staff stress and anxiety can be 
mapped in such processes as ‘guest hunting’, dealing with cancellations, managing guests 
on ‘show day’ and producing the live broadcasts of Living the Life. 
8.1.4 Implications for the Production Quality 
The fourth layer of the research design analyses the genre conventions of the magazine talk 
show, Living the Life. The purpose of the analysis is to consider the aesthetic quality of the 
magazine talk show production. This section summarises the tensions (resulting power 
dynamics) within the channel that shaped the production quality of the magazine talk 
show. These tensions included such interrelated factors as resource issues, problems with 
the mission of the channel and conflicting notions of ‘good’ television.  
I found that the lack of resources to adequately pay skilled professionals on both the 
creative and technical sides (as well as unpaid television labour, e.g., researchers and 
interns) impacted the production quality of this particular genre of talk show. This lack of 
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resources not only caused the channel to exploit its limited personnel resources but also 
affected the production quality of Living the Life. The channel’s reliance on interns and 
employees, who lack journalistic skills and television production experiences, 
compromised the quality of its programme.  
The channel’s response to the discourse of ‘clash’ between the West and Islamic 
culture resulted in a strong sense of caution among its production community, which 
consequently affected the quality of Living the Life. The output of Episode 144 of Living the 
Life featuring HHUGS, was an example of how the ‘culture of caution’ affected the 
production quality. As a Muslim organisation that provides support for families whose 
breadwinners detained under anti-terrorism legislation, the producer could have made the 
episode more appealing to viewers by featuring elements of surprise (the ‘uncertainty’ 
factor identified by Bruun (2001) as part of talk shows’ appeal) and producing emotion. 
However, there was an absence of emotion in this episode of Living the Life (as well as 
others, e.g., featuring Harry Fears on Gaza, 21 April 2013). The female presenter avoided 
showing her emotional response as she was cautious, and wanted to preserve the Islam 
Channel’s reputation (i.e., from accusations of supporting terrorism). By contrast, the 
male presenter tried to show his emotional response towards the families that suffered 
from such legislation. He failed in his attempt to bring the ‘sociability’ elements identified 
by Bruun (2001) as a feature of talk shows into the conversation. The tensions between 
two presenters were evident in a way that fell short of accepted professional standards. 
Such contradiction, as Bruun (2001) argues, requires a proper management of the 
uncertainty and sociability factors by the producer to maintain and enhance the production 
quality of the talk show (ibid., p. 251).      
The ideological clash between the programming department’s Salafi 
fundamentalism and the producer also caused the poor production quality of Living the 
Life. The case of Ms Gomes, who appeared as a guest on Episode 136 of Living the Life 
(Fieldnotes, 6 March 2013), is an example of an ideological clash regarding the physical 
appearance of women. Ms Gomes, who talked about nutritious organic argan oil, came to 
the Islam Channel wearing a knee-length red dress. Her style of dress resulted in an 
ideological clash between the Salafi fundamentalist programming manager and the 
moderate Islamist producer of Living the Life. The set of rules stated in the channel’s 
Manners and Etiquette guide indicates the influence of Salafi fundamentalism on the dress 
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code and the instructions on how women should behave and appear on the Islam Channel. 
Islamic fundamentalism believes that the media of western cultural imperialism have 
tainted the image of women and, therefore, they need to be ‘saved’ before ‘their 
deteriorated ethics’ harm the entire Muslim society (Al-Najjar, 2012, p. 35). The ways in 
which fundamentalists look at women (as potential agents of moral destruction) place 
them in a social class that is inferior to men. According to the fundamentalist literal 
interpretation of the Qur’anic text, women are expected to dress modestly and appear in 
a conservative manner when in the presence of men. Such conservatism includes modest 
garments while headscarves (hijab) and veiling (niqab) are encouraged. The fundamentalist 
rulings on how women should behave in public places include gender segregation and 
prohibition of any form of physical or verbal contact with males. This dress code and 
etiquette enforced by the Islam Channel are also manifested in the Salafi fundamentalist 
Al-Majd television channel based in Saudi Arabia (ibid., p. 52). Such an ideological clash 
has affected the production quality of Living the Life.  
Aside from the ideological clash, the production culture of the Islam Channel also 
involved intergenerational conflict. Such tensions can particularly be observed in the 
presentation of musical performances. This sort of clash is also rooted in ideology 
(moderate vs. fundamentalist). The moderate Islamist/reformist support for such notions 
as ‘halal and fun’ (Herding, 2013) in Muslim everyday life, is exemplified by the 
producer’s desire to produce ‘good television’ that includes a thread of religious messages 
running through light entertainment segments. His view on halal entertainment clashed 
with the mission of the channel to instill a conservative, fundamentalist religious identity 
in young Muslim viewers. His opinion also conflicted with the programming manager’s 
caution in not presenting hip-hop artists or those playing musical instruments so as not to 
offend the Islam Channel’s conservative audience. Conflicting ideas about music and 
entertainment within the channel caused tensions in the production of Living the Life. The 
producer’s tasks are not only to see to it that the music and artists fit within genre 
conventions, but also to ensure that the kind of entertainment the channel approves does 
not offend its conservative Muslim audience.  
The four-layer analysis discussed in this section concludes that the production 
culture of the Islam Channel is shaped by internal and external power dynamics. It also 
affirms Caldwell’s claim that television production culture involves ‘conventionalized 
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power hierarchies’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 342). Caldwell’s approach to power dynamics 
offers insights into how Hollywood television production workers respond to 
technological changes. These transformations include media convergence, labour 
outsourcing, unstable labour and business relations, new production technologies, 
corporate conglomeration, and the proliferation of user-generated content (ibid., pp. 
316-43). This thesis also examines the prevailing tensions external to television 
organisation, not in terms of technological changes, but rather, by focusing on 
sociocultural factors. It recognises tensions between cultures and between religious 
ideologies that shape television production. These findings also support my argument 
regarding a link between poor employee quality of working life and poor production 
quality.   
8.2 Contributions to Television Production Studies 
Cultural studies scholars once paid little attention to television production analysis. John 
T. Caldwell (2006; 2008) is among prominent recent scholars who study television 
production from the lens of cultural studies and media sociology (e.g., Vicki Mayer, 
Miranda J. Banks, Laura Grindstaff, David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker). Caldwell 
borrowed the concept of ‘production culture’, which helps develop a research design that 
maps the power dynamics in the television and film industries. By deploying media 
ethnography research design, Caldwell examines the technological transformations and 
how they change the below-the-line television production workers. This thesis contributes 
to two approaches to television production studies, from cultural studies and media 
sociology. In the following sub-sections, I discuss the potential contribution of this 
research to cultural studies of television production, focusing on the idea of ‘cultures of 
production’, and then in Section 8.2.2 sociological approaches to television production 
labour.  
8.2.1 Contribution to the Studies of Cultures in Television Production 
Researchers like John Caldwell (2008), Laura Grindstaff (2002) and Georgina Born 
(2004) in particular have used ethnographic research designs. Although they may have 
applied an ethnographic research design to study television production, their studies 
involve geographical, sociocultural, industrial and genre contexts. While Caldwell and 
Grindstaff’s studies were carried out in the US from the Hollywood industrial 
perspectives, Born’s research was conducted in the UK from an institutional standpoint. 
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Whereas Caldwell adopted a cultural-industrial approach to study television and film 
industries, Grindstaff applied a sociocultural-institutional approach to the study television 
talk shows production. Moreover, whereas Caldwell and Grindstaff combined media 
sociology and cultural studies traditions, Born, by contrast, used an anthropological lens 
to examine cultures of television production. Although these studies are varied, they 
applied a similar approach: an ethnographic research design to observe television 
professionals in their natural setting and engage in their production rituals. This indicates 
that thesis not only contributes to the cultural studies and media sociology but also to 
media anthropology.  
The ethnographic research design for this thesis proves applicable for television 
production analysis. The research design, which was built on two approaches to television 
studies: the cultural studies and media sociology, allowed me to examine four aspects 
pertinent to television production discussed in the previous section. The four-layer 
analytical framework includes: 1) sociocultural environment, 2) the institutional context, 
3) the production community, and 4) the genre. This analytical framework helped me to 
conceptualise the production culture of religious television. Although Caldwell’s 
production culture concept allowed me to explore working lives in religious television, 
his study was a cultural-industrial focus. By contrast, my research was a cultural-
institutional focus. The following arguments address the gaps that my study has filled.  
What distinguishes Caldwell ethnographic research design from my research was his 
‘critical industrial practice’ approach. Such approach involved interpretive schemes of 
trade/business methods and conventions, which he deployed within specific institutional 
contexts and relationships, the television and film production ecology concerning labour 
‘practice’ that manifest during the technical production tasks or professional interactions 
(ibid., pp. 5-6). In his research design, Caldwell combined the analysis of ‘macroscopic 
economic processes’ with ‘microsocial level’. He argued that the macroscopic economic 
processes influence television industries and ‘very much function on a microsocial level as 
local cultures and social communities in their own right’ (Caldwell, 2008, p. 2). 
I used sociological approach to study television production workers within an 
institutional context. Similar to Caldwell, I studied television production workers using 
the sociological lens. However, Caldwell examined economic and technological influences 
on television/film workers’ practices, which is certainly not the emphasis of this thesis. 
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Instead, I provide an ethnographic analysis of television production within a particular 
institutional context. Thus, the ethnographic research design of my thesis can be 
characterised as a small-scale, cultural-institutional design that examines a ‘microsocial 
level’ of religious television based upon a four-layer analytical framework.  
Unlike Caldwell, whose study covers an extensive television and film ‘industrial 
environment’ (the Hollywood industry), my research was mapped against the 
sociocultural environment, which represents the environment in which British Muslim 
society, including the production community I was part of, lives and works. I treat the 
sociocultural environment as an external factor that shapes television production. My 
approach to such external factor is sociological, and it allows me to consider a religious 
ideology/Islam as a source of power that shapes television production.  
8.2.2 Contribution to the Sociology of Work in Television Production 
Aside from contribution to the development of research design for television study, this 
thesis also contributes to the sociology of work in television production. This thesis 
expands understanding of exploitation in television labour by examining religious ideology 
as a source of power that is exploited by the television organisation. Media sociologists 
have also approached the study of exploitation, which is often an interest of the Marxist 
political economists. However, the application of the concept of exploitation to this thesis 
differs from the Marxist concept of exploitation that focuses on the exercise of power by 
an employer/organisation over their employees to secure economic and material gain. In 
my research, I adopted the concept of exploitation to examine religious ideology power 
structure, explaining how the channel exploits a social, religiopolitical mission to motivate 
their television production employees to work hard and to tolerate low salaries.    
 Sociological approaches to the issue of exploitation in television production have 
paid little attention to religion. This thesis has contributed to knowledge by offering three 
levels of analysis of religion in television production. The first level recognises religion as a 
source of power. It argues that religious ideology shapes the production culture of the 
Islam Channel, contributes to tensions therein, and results in the adoption of a ‘culture of 
caution’ within the channel. The thesis shows that religion has consequences for both the 
quality of production and the working lives of members of the television production 
community. As a form of religious ideology, Islam is used by those at an elevated position 
within the production hierarchies. The manager exploits the religious notion of ‘work as a 
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mission’ to encourage television production workers to work hard for a ‘deferred reward’ 
in the afterlife. Subsequently, production employees are placed in a position that renders 
them vulnerable to self-exploitation, for the channel relies on their commitment and 
group performance to ensure the broadcast of the programme. This indicates that 
religious ideology/Islam is a form of power that can be manipulated by those at the higher 
position of production hierarchies, subsequently affecting the working lives of television 
production employees.  
The second level of analysis of power dynamics regards ‘tensions’ in religious 
television production. This section addresses the implications that ideological clashes bear 
upon the production quality of the magazine talk show Living the Life, as well as upon the 
working lives of members of the Islam Channel’s production community. These tensions 
include clashes between Salafi fundamentalism and moderate Muslim identities, such as 
their different approaches to the work environment and the work norms; between 
political and non-political representations; talk show format and religious discussion; as 
well as economic, political, gendered and religious dynamics of the channel.  
The third level of analysis of power dynamics involves ‘caution’. This thesis suggests 
that ideological constraints foster a ‘culture of caution’ among workers, which affects 
their creative autonomy and emotional well-being. These three levels of analysis affirm 
the concept of production culture, emphasises the power dynamics within a media 
organisation, and confirm my argument connecting the poor quality of working life with 
poor production quality. 
The analysis of religious ideology and its relation to the issues of exploitation in 
television production contributes to the field of television production studies in general, 
and to the cultural studies and media sociology in particular. 
8.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
In this section, I address the implications of this research for future work and some 
theoretical and methodological issues that require further attention. This thesis discusses 
and assesses how potential research projects on the production culture of religious 
television may be explored from a narrow to a wider institutional context, with local to 
regional and global perspectives or, perhaps, using comparative studies of various faith-
based media institutions across media platforms. Further research is also required to 
- 242 - 
identify production cultures in the context of Islam-based television organisations in the 
UK through analysis of the sources, dynamics, and hierarchies of power within such 
organisations. There is also an urgent need for research into new Islam-based television 
channels, such as the British Muslim Television (BMTV), which is new competition for 
the Islam Channel.  BMTV aims to be different from the other Islam-based channels in the 
UK by being inclusive of all different views and open to all varieties of Muslims. The 
channel is not only about issues of faith, but also about Muslim living in Britain (Pathan, 
2014). Moreover, BMTV promotes itself as a channel that offers ‘halal programming’, 
aiming to attract the ‘entire British Muslim community’ and is ‘non-sectarian and one 
which represents the different communities that make up British Muslim society’(British 
Muslim TV Media Pack, 2014, pp. 1-4).    
In contrast, the Islam Channel aims to spread moderate Islamic views to Muslims 
and non-Muslims and to be a televisual ‘voice’ of British Muslims and the Ummah (global 
Muslims). The management of the channel expressed the channel’s wish ‘to be better than 
the next Muslim channel…’ (Interview, 20 June 2013). To achieve that, the Islam 
Channel needs to maintain its influence with the entire Ummah, or Muslims around the 
world in general, and among the UK Muslim community in particular. Such a goal can be 
achieved by continuing to stay in the faith-based television industry and produce quality 
programmes that are more engaging to a diverse audience in the UK.  
To compete with British Muslim TV, the Islam Channel needs to keep up with the 
challenge of relevance. One way to achieve this is to create programming that attracts a 
diverse audience and caters to the entire spectrum of British Muslim communities and not 
focuses on particular sects (e.g., Sunni), schools of thought (mazhab) or merely the 
conservative religious audience. It should also offer quality programmes that will engage 
young Muslims since this age group makes up the biggest segment of the Islam-based 
television audience (Pathan, 2014). Such improvement is helpful not only to compete for 
audience share and advertising revenues but also to remain relevant to Muslims in Britain 
and abroad. This thesis identifies the power struggle within the Islam Channel even as it 
faces the challenge of business competition. Hence, probing this new rival of the Islam 
Channel should be an appropriate goal for future research. Increased knowledge of the 
interplay between power and the factors shaping the production of television programmes 
- 243 - 
will help researchers identify the production culture of particular Islam-based television 
channels.  
Since this Ph.D. research project is sponsored by the Ministry of Higher Education 
of Malaysia, this thesis marks a starting point for future research in the Malaysian context 
into creative media management and television labour in general and the study of working 
life in religious television/departments in broadcast media organisations in particular. 
Since Muslims in Malaysia share several religious and cultural values with Muslims in 
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, it would be interesting to explore the 
production culture of religious television on a larger scale, perhaps among Muslim media 
institutions of these South-east Asian countries. The recent threat of violent extremism, 
such as IS (Islamic State) and Muslim fundamentalism (e.g., the Wahhabi Movement) and 
several other extremist movements, can also present a huge challenge to Muslim media 
organisations. Hence, research into television production culture allows us to identify the 
challenges, the power dynamics and hierarchies within media organisations. Subsequently, 
develop mechanisms to curb fundamentalism and extremism or other potential ideological 
influences that may be threatening to the reputation and position of media organisations in 
their societies. 
Further research is also required to conceptualise the production culture of religious 
television by employing different approaches, methods and research designs. It is 
essentially interesting to test the existing analytical framework to collect and assess data 
from various sites before formulating new concepts that can describe the production 
culture of religious television. Aside from looking at the production, research projects 
that incorporate audience and market research would bring added value to methodological 
and theoretical gaps that this thesis may have noted. 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has addressed such questions as the following. How does a religious television 
programme come to take the form it does, and how and under what conditions do 
television production employees produce a religious television programme? Knowledge of 
production culture may enhance our understanding of power dynamics that are internal 
and external to media organisations. Also, knowledge about the production culture of 
religious television, such as that of the Islam Channel, allows us to understand how power 
moves from external sources to sway the channel’s operations by positioning the Islam 
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Channel in the sociocultural contexts in which it exists. The analysis of the sociocultural 
environment, the institutional mission, the production rituals, and the production quality 
of the television programme, equipped us to analyse power dynamics in television 
production. 
Ethnographic approaches to the lived experience of television production workers 
have offered insights into their everyday working lives. Studies of working conditions and 
the lived experience of creative and technical workers in television industry provide a 
better understanding of occupational challenges that might affect the quality of their 
working lives. Further research into the production culture of religious television is 
required to understand factors shaping production quality and the quality of working lives. 
This thesis examines a single television organisation. It would be of further academic 
interest to explore other religious media and faith-based television stations to discover 
what influences their production cultures. Whether or not results similar to this analysis 
may be achieved from future studies of the production culture of other faith-based media 
organisations or religions other than Islam would, I suggest, depend on the television 
genre, the factors shaping the production rituals, and the conditions under which 
television production community works. Thus, the findings of this research project offer 
an ethnographic research design and a set of sociological approaches that can be applied to 
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